

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

Istina o Dra'zi Mihailovicu

De Immaculata Conceptione B.V. Mariae in Ecclesia serbica et russica

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Diplomatic and Political History Of Croatia

Economic Wealth of Croatia

The Sacred Crown Of The Kingdom Of Croatia

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Formation Norveska-Svedska-Hrvatska: Poredbena studija otcjepljenja i oblikovanja dr'zava Los von Serbien: Kroatien un das skandinavische Modell

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Prologue

NATIONAL HONOUR

"It is a matter of honour to us not to force a non-Communist prisoner-of-war to go back, to be murdered in Communist China. This is not a matter of argument, but one of the fundamental principles for which we fight and, if necessary, die."

WINSTON CHURCHILL to ANTHONY EDEN, the Foreign Secretary, on the fate of prisoners-of-war in Korea (1952). Cabinet Papers, released under the 30-year-rule (*Sunday Times*, 2 January 1983).

Ever since the conclusion of World War II and the partition of peoples and nations by the great powers into those destined to be free and those destined to be enslaved by Communist oppression, one enigma has insistently perplexed all those who are ideologically committed to the freedom of peoples and society and perplexed even more those who are the real victims of oppression and the denial of freedom to choose their form of government.

Seemingly inexplicable to those who enjoy the liberties of a free society and fought to the death to preserve for other nations the right and opportunity to enjoy like freedoms has been the wholehearted and continued embrace by Great Britain and the United States of the Communist dictator Josip Broz Tito and their paternal approval and support of his (or to be more accurate their) Communist Yugoslavia.

Absolved by the great powers of all crimes of genocide, tyranny and suppression, Tito until his death, and even after, remained dear to the hearts of Great Britain and the United States who tolerate no accusatory finger to be pointed at their Communist idol.

How and why could this be.

Slowly as long sequestered documents and records emerge, gradual revelations bring to light facts, events, personalities, maneuverings and machinations that disclose why this Communist dictator held such a cherished place in the mind, heart and politics of freedom loving British and American policy makers, although guilty of criminal Bolshevik rule achieved after perpetrating genocide, the holocaust of nations such as Cro-atians, Slovenians, Serbians and Montenegrins. If there was anyone who

did not know that, after reading this book, he could not claim his right to such ignorance. It has been said that ""When you aid and abet someone in a criminal conspiracy, you are a part of that criminal conspiracy. So America and England and the nations are criminals in the sight of Almighty God," and in the Law of The International Tribunal for Crimes of War in Nuremberg, made by Americans, British (and the Bolsheviks).

Ontological Background

I do not remember that anyone has attempted to make a profile of an Englishman. I do not want to mention profiles of Britons, because it is the Englishmen who rule all the others of Britain who come under any political or other description. There are some stereotypes and everybody knows of the proverbial Albion. But we do not speak of anything less than the scholarly and the ontological. The ontological background for the selection of Josip Broz Tito as the English favorite to run the Balkans must have deeper reasons than choosing the "gun to kill the Hun," and that selection happened before the cry for the "gun to kill the Hun."

The study of the origin of the British dislike of Serbians goes to long centuries past. But we would mention only a few expressions of that dislike in modern times. These modern times start with the beginning of the century when the Serbians' chieftain, Petar Karadjordjevic, with the help of Nikola Pasic and his Radical Party, organized the assassination of the King of Serbia, Aleksandar Obrenovic, and his Queen Draga, on the night of April 11, 1903.

The band of officers of the organization "Black Hand" (Crna Ruka) under command of future Premier General Petar Zivkovic erupted in the Royal Palace and assassinated the King and the Queen. The King's body had eleven revolver and fifteen bayonet wounds. The Queen Draga was first raped and her body then cut into pieces so that her wounds — except those caused by revolver — could not be counted. After that carnage and the theft of all court jewels, the officers threw their bodies through the window into the courtyard facing on the main street where they lay until the dawn displayed them to the disgust of the common people.

This crime shocked all of Europe and the whole diplomatic corps left Belgrade. Not observing the usual countenance of the British statesmen, Baltour said some nasty things about Serbians, and his Secretary of the Foreign Office, Marquis Lansdowne, responding to a question of Lord

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Newton, suggested that Serbia should be punished and that he could assure the noble lord that the government of His Majesty participates in his feeling of disgust which he had expressed about events which not long ago had shamed the capital of Serbia. He said that he thought that the banditry had no similarity in the world in the history of those states which claim to be adnumerated in the civilized world. British diplomatic intercourse was abrupted because of the death of the deceased King and had not at the time been restored.' For three years diplomatic relations were broken and only when Belgrade retired the leading officers who had taken part in the murder, did the British Government renew them.²

The *Evening Standard* in an editorial wrote that the Serbians were free to make revolutions in their way. But the way in which they had done it put them among the barbarians.³

The *Daily Telegraph*⁴ wrote that if Europe acknowledges the government of the assassins and bandits, which Serbia has chosen, that would mean that Europe would acknowledge its participation in the crime. The *Daily Telegraph* continues by saying that King Petar must not expect to be considered equal to the other crowned heads of Europe.

The English army sent to the army of Petar Karadjordjevic a telegram in which they said that the officers who in the night attacked their own King and Queen, whatever the inspirations which motivated them, were nothing but shameful bandits. As long as the Serbian army kept among its ranks officers who participated in that shameful assassination, it would be sealed with shame and dishonor.⁵

At that time historians noted that during the times of the Serbian medieval dynasty no Serbian king had died by natural causes. The most famous of them, King Dusan (1331-1355), strangled his own father, Stevan.

French papers quoted the French writer, C. Robert, who in his book *Les Slaves de Turquie* mentions the Serbian insurrection in 1804 when they occupied Belgrade, where they looted for many days and committed horrendous atrocities. All Turks who did not want to baptize perished in most atrocious tortures. Children were cut into pieces. The occupiers, in the name of Christ, opened the wombs of the women, leaving them to die on the street and others they took as slaves.⁶

In his book, *Essai Historique Sur Les Revolutions Et L'Independence de La Serbie*,¹ the French writer Cunibert writes that the Serbians committed thousands of horrors over the vanquished ones, broke the oath of surrender and massacred Turks, dishonored the women, and committed plunder.

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The French consul in Travnik, David, writes about the episode in the year 1807 when some Serbs did oppose the treacherous attacks on the Turks in Belgrade. From April 5, 1807, he writes to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Serbians killed two thousand of their own people who had been against the attack. The hate among two Serbian parties was so intense that one son killed his father who was of different opinion. At the same time he wrote the same things to his Minister of War, the French General Vignolle.

On March 24, 1807, the above mentioned French Consul, David, wrote to his superiors that the Serbians on that occasion massacred all Jews who had been on the Turkish side. That means that they killed all Jews in Belgrade and the surrounding provinces. That was the greatest holocaust of the Jews ever in the Balkans.

There is evidence that history has a rich plethora of such material. Thus we can transfer attention to records of the times and events which happened under our eyes which were leading to the ultimate rejection of Serbians by the British and the turn to Tito as star in the Balkans. These reports are from the British Public Records Office.

We bring some British Diplomatic correspondence which gives us insight into some of the most modern actors in Serbian diplomacy.

The first is a set of documents setting forth the exchange of concerns and opinions among British officials in the days of turmoil and upheaval of World War II.

Evident throughout is the preoccupation with the developments in Yugoslavia for their consequence to the interests of Great Britain and the British uneasiness with the Serbian officialdom.

MOST SECRET AND PRIVATE.

BRITISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

September 5, 1942.

Dear Moley,

Stoyan Gavrilovic, whom you will remember as Shone's "friend in the Yugoslav Ministry for Foreign Affairs", and whom you will probably remember on his visit to London early in 1940 I think, came to see me on his way from South Africa to Ottawa, where he has been appointed as Counsellor to the newly established Yugoslav Legation (I understand that he is to be one of two Counsellors). His visit was a natural one since he had accompanied us on the journey from Belgrade to Cattaro, and I had been able to help him with transport then and to get him out of the country.

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He is in a great state of distress over the way things are going between the present Yugoslav Government and His Majesty's Government. He thinks we may not realize the true character of some members of the Yugoslav Government or its policy, which he considers highly detrimental to our interests, to those of Yugoslavia and to the future in the Balkans.

Gavrilovic feels that he and all the Yugoslav friends of great Britain are being kept out of things by their Government, and as he thinks this is done on purpose in order that the policy of the Government may continue essentially unfriendly to us, he considers this is most undesirable. He feels that many things in the policy of the Government and concerning the real views of its members, and the real implications of some of its actions, may not from day to day be apparent to the Foreign Office, and that they should really be explained to the Foreign Office. He therefore would very much like to come over to London, and considers it most desirable in the general interest. The Yugoslav Government would, of course, not let him go as a Yugoslav official, since they have consistently kept him away, but he would be ready to give up his job if H.M.G. were ready to let him come over "as a distinguished

foreigner". This distinguished foreigner part is, I gather, due to a desire not to have to have truck with the police, etc., which I suppose he feels would put him in undue prominence.

I told him that what he was suggesting was obviously an exceedingly difficult thing in view of the relations between H.M.G. and the Yugoslav Government who might clearly take a visit from him assisted by H.M.G. very much amiss, etc., etc. He said he realized this but only made the suggestion because of his conviction of the importance of the matter. He has the highest suspicions of Nintchitch and also rather of Yovanovic. He feels that all that old gang should go (in which I must say I rather sympathize with him. As you know I thought it a disaster that the *coup d'etat* took them on). He says that there are plenty of good men wedded to Anglo-Yugoslav friendship and the Allied cause outside Yugoslavia, who are younger than the majority of the present Ministers, more in touch with real Yugoslav feeling at the time of the German attack, and not tarred with self-interest or the old political party game. He says that he could arrange to go over as a private individual if the Foreign Office would help him. I was not very clear whether he thought he could make a living on his own or not, but his object would be to be available to give advice to the Foreign Office on the real inwardness of things. He talked with sadness about the fact that the people who were the real friends of Great Britain (and therefore of Yugoslavia) found themselves interned in Egypt. I told him that since H.M.G. maintained relations with the Yugoslav Government I did

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not see what they could do but support the authority of that Government once they had, willy-nilly, become caught up in the imbroglio. He regretted the fact that we had got to that position.

I am off for a bit of leave but you may wish to let me know what you think. Gavrilovic, as you know, is a very good man and he is clearly really in a state of mental distress. If there were any means of getting him over and having him available for advice I feel sure you would find him useful. He is slightly embittered and you would have to make a few allowances of degree in what he says for that reason, but I think he would calm down and that the bitterness would go if he felt that he was being able to be of use.

He told me some rather startling things, the most startling of which perhaps is an indication of the policy of Simovic's Government (several members of which still remain in the present one), which is contained in the first paragraph of the enclosed minute of my conversation with Gavrilovic. I also enclose copy of a document which he has sent me since he left Washington. You will see that he mentions Protic. This man was, of course, pretty suspect to us as an ex-Private Secretary of Stoyadinovic: his wealth was a subject of some speculation. I see that this suggestion of Gavrilovic's is highly improper and bristles with difficulties, but if you could see a way round I believe he would be useful to you. I do think that a Yugoslavia on the proper lines is of very great importance to us in the after-war world.

You will, of course, treat this with particular secrecy, won't you, in order to protect Gavrilovic in case he goes on in the Yugoslav service in his tucked away place in Ottawa?

Yours ever

R. J. Campbell

Sir Orme Sargent, K.C.M.G., C.B., Foreign Office, London, S.W.I.

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COPY MINUTE

VERY SECRET

"1) No friendship with Great Britain of any kind.

2) In view of this benevolent neutrality towards Germany.

3) As a consequence protect Italian left flank in Albania and German right flank in Bulgaria.

4) Occupy Salonika in order to prevent any forces hostile to Germany entering town."

Above in the hand-writing of General Simovic, drawn up after taking office in Belgrade, as guidance to Yugoslav officials and diplomatic missions abroad.

Fotitch told him that Yugoslav Government has threatened or was threatening to break off relations with H.M.G. (reasons unknown).

State Department officials tell him Fotitch, by his attitude in respect of quarrelling Yugoslav factions, has lost the good opinion which he had enjoyed with the U.S. Government. Fotitch however says that

his position here with President, Mr. Hull and State Department in general is so strong that they would refuse *agrement* to anybody else.

Fotitch expects to be made Ambassador here. When this happens he would close down the Information Centre in New York, in which the various Ministers, Jetic, etc., function. Fotitch a Pan-Serb.

Yugoslav Government still of same way of thinking as shown by Simov-ic's note: used the *coup d'etat* engineered by young officers to get into office on their backs, for the sake of holding office.

Misrepresented opinions of Serbian people. Nintchitch has always promoted policy of collaboration with Italy and Germany as opposed to Great Britain: was head of German-Yugoslav Club. Yugoslav Government are playing dirty and intriguing game in London, merely thinking of their own personal interests, doing many dirty things practically in our name since we support them in London, and recklessly making King subscribe his name to such transactions, and yet the Serbian officers who were really our friends like the Serbian people are interned in Egypt.

Simovic as bad as Nintchitch — very political and most anti-British.

Folly of Yugoslav Government's policy which is Pan-Serb. They wish to incorporate Croatia and Slovenia in Serbia, and hold them down by force. This impracticable and certainly would not have support of U.S. Govern-

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ment nor surely of H.M.G. Croats in self-defence wished to see a Yugoslav confederation of Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, but a Serbia split up into Voivodina, Bosnia, Montenegro and Macedonia. This is a natural reaction. Serbian Government should take following position. "It is true that 400,000 Serbs have been massacred by Croats⁸ but these were not the mass of the Croat people, but a comparatively small percentage misled by Mihailovic, etc.⁹ The guilty Croats should certainly be punished.¹⁰ But Yugoslavia must go on and the misdeeds of minority Croats must be overlooked after due punishment has been meted out."

What is the alternative? A small Serbia of 6-8 millions, but this is impracticable. Small nations will not be of the order of the day, since they do not make for stability, and as for purely Serbian interests what good would it be to Serbia to have Slovenia and Croatia as other small Slav states or drawn into the orbit of Austria or Hungary?

Support of Yugoslav Government for Serbian campaign here making U.S. Government very angry, since it encourages American citizens of foreign origin to forget they are American citizens and think chiefly of their country of origin. This, of course, entirely contrary to traditional American policy. Some sympathy growing up for Croats in American official world since they do not believe Croats in general are responsible for massacres, etc.

He would like to go to London if he could be of use to the Foreign Office and they would help him go there. Would not be able to go as Yugoslav official, but would be ready to give up his position (at present he is appointed as Counsellor to the Yugoslav Legation in Canada), and then he could easily arrange to go as private individual but would need British assistance. Would take with him secretary, daughter of Tupanjanin. If Foreign Office did not wish to use him would like anyhow to go to London. He feels he should be there and could be of more use than as Counsellor at Ottawa. Would be willing to wait in London in private capacity since there might be changes in Government and he feels he could be of assistance to Foreign Office in explaining actions of Yugoslav Government and their true character. Could collect good younger Yugoslavs devoted to Yugoslav idea and to Great Britain as well as to true interests of Yugoslavia.

Altogether very upset with conditions, and with unfriendliness of present Yugoslav Government to Great Britain. Members of Government entirely unrepresentative of the people and are risking position of King *vis-a-vis* people of Yugoslavia. King and dynasty the great asset. Anglo-Yugoslav friendship essential for both countries after the war. (Initialled) R.C.

24 August 1942.

s COPY
ENIGMA TITO

I.

The relations between the official Yugoslav emigration and the British Government are as bad as they could be. The reason for this deplorable state of things lies in the anti-British mind of some of the leaders of the exiled Yugoslav Government in London.

II.

On the dismissal of General Simovitch as Prime Minister, the head of the Government became Monsieur Slobodan Yovanovitch, a former Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Belgrade.

Nobody minded General Simovitch going, but the new Prime Minister, too, whilst in Belgrade, was detailed to preside over a delegation which should have left for Rome somewhere about April 3rd, 1941, to conclude a political arrangements [*sic*] with the Italian Government, and through its mediation, with the German Government. The disastrous object of this mission is well known, as is also the reason for its failure.

Monsieur Yovanovitch accepted this mission, and all the Yugoslavs, friends of cordial collaboration with Great Britain, on hearing of his new appointment, felt strongly that the cause for which they stood is not in safe hands.

But the most important personality from this point of view is the Foreign Minister, Monsieur Nintchitch. This man has one of the blackest records.

Of all the Yugoslav politicians he is the first who has officially started the policy of collaboration with the Axes [*sic*] Powers. As Yugoslav Foreign Minister he negotiated with Mussolini in 1925, and concluded with him an understanding which meant the beginning of Yugoslavia's cooperation with our present enemies. The result of this attitude was the signing of the Tirana Pact between Italy and Albania, and the first encroachment of a Fascist Power in the Balkans.

In consequence he was dismissed by King Alexander in 1926, but far from abandoning his pro-Fascist policy, he soon took up the cause of German-Yugoslav collaboration and became one of the leading figures in the pro-German circles in Yugoslavia. He helped to organise the German Club in Belgrade, and was one of its chief supporters and the most prominent of its members. For years he maintained the most cordial relations with the German Legation, where he was regarded as the great friend of the Germans.

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Monsieur Nintchitch maintained those relations to the end, and when the present Yugoslav Government was formed after the coup d'etat of March 27th, 1941, he became Foreign Minister again, with the special object of securing Hitler's friendship. He did everything to do so, but Hitler did not wish to negotiate and started the war on the Yugoslav people in spite of Monsieur Nintchitch's efforts and his avowed friendship for Nazi Germany.

When the Yugoslav Government left the country and went into exile, it was hoped that Monsieur Nintchitch would resign and that his place would be taken by somebody else with a different mind and different feelings for our British allies and protectors.

This was only natural, and suggestions were made to General Simovitch in Jerusalem that he should be replaced by a pro-British personality, Monsieur Jevtitch and Dr. Milan Gavrilovic being mentioned as his successors. Monsieur Nintchitch, however, would not hear of it, and with General Simovitch's support, remained in office, to the greatest disgust of all Yugoslav friends of Great Britain who viewed with the deepest concern the failure to remove this highly pro-German personality from the position of the Foreign Minister in the exiled Yugoslav Government in London.

IV.

At the same time, the well known pro-Nazi elements in the Yugoslav Foreign Office were given prominent positions, at a moment when very strong influence was brought to bear with a view to putting them all completely aside.

The notorious Stoyadinovitch's Chef de Cabinet, Monsieur Dragan Pro-titch, was appointed Counsellor of the Yugoslav Legation in London, which meant nothing short of an insult to the British Government and the British people. This man, as everybody knows, was one of Hitler's right hand men in Yugoslav diplomatic service. He was a pure and simple German agent, too, and whilst in Athenes [*sic*], was active in passing military information, given him by an honest but simple-minded British officer of the highest rank, to the German Legation there.

Others of the same or similar kind became Monsieur Nintchitch's chief assistants and collaborators in London. So much so. that the whole Yugoslav emigration was unanimous in declaring that Monsieur Nintchitch had taken the entire Yugoslav Fifth Column with him to the British Capital.

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V.

The fact that these men, with such past associations with Germany and Italy and with such anti-British minds, are allowed to play to-day so important a part in the Yugoslav Government in exile, is in itself a calamity.

One can well imagine the pleasure which Herr Hitler and Ribbentrop must be having in knowing that so sincere and devoted friends of theirs are in the midst of London and in the midst of the Allied and British councils.

But there is much more in it. One of the first acts of Monsieur Nintchitch and his new administration was to remove from the Foreign Office the old and trusted friends of Great Britain and the devoted Artisans of British-Yugoslav friendly relations. This decision was taken with the full knowledge that such a measure would provoke an ill feeling on the part of the British Government.

These same anti-British minded members and officials of the Yugoslav Government in London have brought about the Cairo disaster, when the friends of Great Britain in the Yugoslav Army were all put in a concentration camp by people like Nintchitch. It is easy to understand Monsieur Nintchitch, who like every true pro-German has a feeling of deep mistrust for all British friends, but it is difficult to understand how the British Government could have been induced to agree to meet this far-reaching demand and to take part in its execution.

The friends of Great Britain who have remained in occupied Yugoslavia are to-day murdered and imprisoned by the Germans. Those who have succeeded in escaping out of the country are reserved a hardly better fate.

The exiled Yugoslav Government threatens to break off the diplomatic-relations with Great Britain if its highly embarrassing demands are not complied with, but it is unbelievable that the British Government could take into consideration such an inimical pressure.

VI.

The supporters of the cause of British Yugoslav collaboration are passing through a great moral tragedy. The official Yugoslav emigration is ruining the work, to which they have patiently and lovingly devoted all their time and energy for so many years.

The future of the British position in Yugoslavia is at stake, involving both the interests of Great Britain and those of Yugoslavia and perhaps of the whole of that part of the world. These high interests must at all costs be safeguarded.

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The Yugoslav friends of Great Britain have not the slightest doubt that the British Government, too, is holding similar views.

An action is urgently needed in London, and I rely on Sir Ronald Campbell to enlist the assistance of the British Government on the lines I suggested in the course of my talks with him in Washington the other day.

British Embassy to Yugoslavia,

45, Lowndes Square,

S.W.I.

S.O.281

17th September, 1942

SECRET AND PERSONAL

My dear Douglas,

I return herewith the letter of September 5th from Ronnie Campbell to Moley Sargent which you gave me the other day for my comments.

Like Alec Cadogan I am not impressed by Stoyan Gavrilovic's case. His accusations are far too sweeping and too bitter, it seems to me, to carry conviction, and they certainly don't seem to bear detailed investigation.

In the first place he accuses Simovic' of being "most anti-British". This may be so, but in that case it seems curious that he should have come into power entirely on the basis of a violent reaction against a pro-German policy. Simovic was muddleheaded, incompetent and a rotten politician. He antagonised every party in turn and was extremely difficult to deal with. But I don't think anyone could seriously question his alignment on the side of the Allies against the Germans.

Stoyan Gavrilovic' goes on to embark on a long diatribe against Nincic'. You know my views about the latter, and I have no illusions about him, but I think it is relevant to remember that it was Nincic who, for one reason or another, was mainly responsible for not bringing Stoyan Gavrilovic back to London a little over a year ago and it looks very much as though personal resentment was playing a large part in these accusations. In point of fact I have never myself been entirely convinced that Nincic — tiresome and dishonest though he no doubt is — is really pro-German. It is quite true, as he himself admits, that he tried to bring about a settlement between Yugoslavia and Italy in 1925 in the hope of averting the perpetuation of an extremely dangerous quarrel. But that hardly seems a proof that he is now associated with our enemies. He no doubt worked for "appeasement" longer than was quite wise, but so did many extremely respectable and

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loyal Englishmen. To drag up all his remote past as evidence of collaboration, between him and Simovic' (with whom he never was on good terms), against the Allied cause is really fantastic. It is equally untrue to represent Nincic as being one of the strongest members of the Cabinet here. His position is probably one of the weakest.

Stoyan Gavrilovic's main attack seems to be directed against the wretched Protic. Protic is a comparatively junior official who was, I believe, First Secretary in Athens, where according to all accounts, both from our own people and from King Peter and Queen Marie, he behaved extremely well and showed great loyalty to the Allied cause. I have dealt with Protic for about a year and during that time I have come across no evidence to suggest that he is less reliable than any other Allied official here. He was only appointed Counsellor to the Legation here quite recently when it was decided to send Franges to Washington to try to bring about better relations between the Serbs and Croats in America, and I have never heard the wisdom of the appointment questioned.

No other names appear to be mentioned but there are a number of sweeping accusations about Nincic having turned out all the pro-British members of the Yugoslav Foreign Office and filled it up with Fifth Columnists. The only case to which this might perhaps be applied is that of Milanovic. But Milanovic came here in the same circumstances as a large number of other Allied Ministers from enemy or enemy occupied countries. He had been in England for many years before and spoke English well and was without a post. I think he is a bad man, but it seems to be that it is always unnecessary to look for a complicated explanation when a simple and straightforward one is quite enough.

Stoyan Gavrilovic' goes on to talk about the army crisis in Cairo where he says that all the "friends of Great Britain in the Yugoslav Army were all put in a concentration camp by people like Nincic". This is really great nonsense. You know the history of the army crisis well enough to realise how little Nincic had to do with it and how completely Mirkovic and his small group put themselves out of court. Anyhow the Mirkovic group was openly supporting Simovic who, according to Stoyan Gavrilovic, is one of the worst of the lot, which seems a very bad augury for their pro-British sentiments!

Stoyan Gavrilovic then suggests that all the present members of the Yugoslav Government should be got rid of and that a "number of the younger Yugoslavs devoted to the Yugoslav idea and to Great Britain" should be brought in instead. I cannot imagine whom he is thinking of. There seems to be no younger Yugoslavs here who are the slightest use and

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one of our chief difficulties all along has been the complete absence of capable and reliable Yugoslav political manpower. The only conspicuous, capable younger Yugoslavs are the group centring round the Knezevic brothers and I can hardly imagine anything worse than an intrigue designed to bring them into power.

I am afraid that the whole letter suggests that Stoyan Gavrilovic has a very unbalanced judgment and is in a very hysterical frame of mind. I confess that I personally have always been a little puzzled by the great reliance which our Legation in Belgrade used to place on his judgment. It is true that he is passionately anglophile, but I hardly think that this quality by itself is enough to carry us very far. Incidentally his younger brother, curiously enough, is Chef de Cabinet to Nincic, to whom he is very loyal. He is not very intelligent, though he seems well meaning, and I imagine there would be some curious family developments if Stoyan Gavrilovic were to come over here.

As for this final suggestion I earnestly hope that nothing will be done to encourage it. We already have far to *[sic]* many personal quarrels and intrigues here, and to bring to England a man in the frame of mind revealed in the enclosed papers would, it seems to me, be like throwing a torch into a powder magazine.

The only thing that really worries me in the enclosed letter is that Ronnie Campbell, in whose judgment I have a good deal of confidence, seems to have taken the whole thing seriously and to be quite attracted by the idea of Stoyan Gavrilovic coming over here. I can only suppose that Stoyan Gavrilovic must have a very magnetic personality.

Yours ever,

George Rendel.

D.F. Howard, Esq., M.C., Foreign Office, S.W.I.,

MOST SECRET.

(R 6249/374/G)

Dear Ronnie

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.I. 28th September, 1942.

Many thanks for your letter of the 5th September about your conversation with Stoyan Gavrilovic. We were very interested to read your record of your conversation and the note which he subsequently sent to you.

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As you say he was clearly very distressed and this no doubt accounted for the sweeping and bitter nature of his accusations. We were none of us, I fear very impressed by the views that he expressed to you and still less by the proposal that we should assist him to come over here in the way suggested. I showed your letter to Rendel and I cannot do better than send you a copy of his reply containing his observations with which I am in general agreement.

I will rely on you to do everything possible to discourage Gavrilovic should he revert to the proposal of a visit to this country.

Yrs.

(Sd.) O. G. Sargent

Sir Ronald Campbell, K.C.M.G., C.B., Washington."

Stoyan Gavrilovic left the United States for London on August 15, 1944 straight into the bosom of Ivan Subasic'. He expected to become Foreign Minister in the Subasic government. He became Subasic's alter ego, something like undersecretary of state and ended with Subasic in Belgrade, hated by Serbians more than Subasic.

The Public Record Office has most affluent riches of materials but not many researchers are interested in them. Serbians, definitely not. During World War II the Allied propaganda media created a Serbian myth: Draza Mihailovic. But not for long. To make an end to the myth of Draza Mihailovic, created by the Allied media, mostly by ridiculous means, came to the rescue Draza himself. That day in February in Lipovo when he said: "The English want to fight to the last Serbian."

Lo and behold! Nothing better Churchill needed to drop Draza, coming after he had already decided to drop him and the Serbian myth. Drop him like a dead fish.

To be sure, Draza Mihailovic was not alone to opinate in that way. Churchill had to hear it later. Some Anglophobic French, including De-Gaulle, suspected that the British were trying to reestablish the old English kingdom of Aquitaine in France. Others charged that the British were willing to "fight to the last Frenchman."

Well and good for British fighting virtues, but Draza Mihailovic was not DeGaulle whom Churchill could not destroy as he did Draza.

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Although Churchill and FDR mistrusted the French so completely that they insisted that Eisenhower *not* tell any Frenchmen the date or place of the attack (Overlord), it did not stop DeGaulle and France from being restored to the old *gloire* after the liberation.

Still others had problems with British ontology. There is also Donovan's alleged statement that he would not use his organization "as a tool of British imperialism."

In the case of Draza Mihailovic, things were different. Nothing more irates, irritates, angers, and disgusts the Britons than this accusation, be it only an insinuation or innuendo, about the duplicity, about immorality of behavior, about imperialistic drives of their sacro-egoismo. Mention the "perfidious Albion" and you are burned. There is no more salvation for you. Draza Mihailovic could not antagonize, could not make Britons more deadly enemies than by saying that they would die to the last Serbian. He was set for doom before but now he gave himself the final coup.

Friends of Draza tried to rescue him from British ire. They said that he was drunk. Draza liked to drink. Sljivovica was omnipresent in his entourage, and never — for God's sake — was he without it. Draza was a skirt chaser too and all happened at a Cetnik wedding.

I cordially side with the friends of Draza who believed that nobody but a drunk would have said it.

The Serbians do not read Latin and do not know Cicero: *In vino veritas*.

But Churchill did know Latin (at Sandhurst they do learn Latin) and believed that Draza truly was in the foxhole waiting that Britain bleed for Serbia and not Serbia for Britain, or in Draza's word that the English would fight to the last Serbian.

Whoever does not understand the British reactions knows nothing and had better go far from Britons. Serbians never understood that. Do they ever understand anything?

The British could have been more incensed because Draza Mihailovic was celebrating the Montenegrin wedding and was drinking at the expense of his great Allies.

At that time had been delivered to Draza Mihailovic 40 tons of concentrated food sent in special packages.

According to C. Fotic:

The most substantial help by the Allies to General Mihailovich was in money. The Royal Air Force thus dropped to General Mihailovich the following amount:

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	Money to October 6, 1942	To Spring of 1943	Total
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Gold Pounds25,000.....	1,000.....	26,000.
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Liras32,300,000.....	31,050,000.....	63,350,000.
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Dollars8,500.....	20,000.....	23,500.
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.500.

.500.

Napoleons.....

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On December 10, 1944 the office of the representative at Bari, Resident Minister Central Mediterranean, F.W. Deakin, sent to Phillip Broad, office of the Resident Minister, Central Mediterranean, the following letter:

I refer to my letter of the 29th November giving details of the amount of gold sent to Albania by S.O.E. I now enclose a copy of a statement which has been prepared by Headquarters Special Operations (Mediterranean) showing the amount of gold despatched to Yugoslavia from the commencement of S.O.E. operations in September, 1941, to September 16th, 1944, when Fitzroy Maclean's Mission became responsible for the financing of British Missions in Yugoslavia.

No information is available as to the disposal of the gold which was sent in to General Mihailovic's forces prior to September, 1942. The funds were dropped from aircraft and there were no British personnel to receive them. It is known, however, that the 8,000 sovereigns shown in the enclosed statement as despatched during December, 1941, were lost when an aircraft crashed in the Western Desert.

From September, 1942, onwards approximately 70% of the total sent to British Missions with General Mihailovic was handed over either to Mihailovic or to his lieutenants, the balance being either lost or spent on the upkeep of the Missions. Of the sums shown as being sent to Missions attached to the Partisans only a small

proportion, approximately 20%, was actually handed over to the Partisans, the balance having been used by the Missions for their own upkeep.

Following is a statement of the money infiltrated to Mihailovic. (That to Tito is given later).

Gold Infiltrated Into Missions Attached to Mihailovic

1941

Sovereigns

Sept.	181	1942
Nov.	5	
Dec.	8,000	

Napoleons

Aug.	150
Sept.	1,126
Dec.	325

8,186

1,601

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1942

1943

1944

Jan.

April

July

Sept.

Dec.

Feb. April May-June July Aug. Sept.

Jan.

Rtd by Personnel Evacuated from the Field

1,000

8,020

5,250

22,100

500

45,056

1,170 3,650 1,700 400 2,070 1,300 1,850

57,196

500

57,696

632

1943

1944

Feb.

April

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Mar. April

Rtd by Personnel Evacuated from the Field

150 500 100

1,545 450 600

4,946

250 100

5,296

291

5,005

57,064

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With the problem of assistance to Serbia under the administration of the Yugoslav Government-in Exile and to Draza Mihailovic are connected other problems of help. In its special release on November 1, 1944 to newspaper editors and radio managers, Achilles N. Sakell, Chief Foreign Language Press and Radio of the office of War Information, Washington, D.C., sent the following release of the Foreign Economic Administration which should be of interest to their readers or listening audience:

Between 130,000 and 150,000 Yugoslavian prisoners-of-war in Germany have been provided for nearly two years through Lend-Lease and the Red Cross with vitally needed foodstuffs, clothing, and medical supplies, the Foreign Economic Administration announced today. This aid has been in addition to similar help furnished by such private agencies as the United Yugoslav Relief Fund, Inc.

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The shipments, which are still continuing, were begun early in 1943 when it became apparent that the Yugoslav Government-In-Exile did not possess sufficient funds to provide food packages and clothing on a scale at all comparable to aid provided other prisoners of war by their governments. In addition, owing to the fact that Germany did not recognize the official existence of the Yugoslav government, nationals of that country were in general worse treated than prisoners of war from other countries. The Nazis officially declared that they did not consider Yugoslavia to be in a state of legal existence, and therefore they were not bound to treat Yugoslav prisoners-of-war under the rules of the Geneva convention. With no food sent in from the outside, and with only the meager clothing allotted them by the Germans, the plight of the Yugoslav prisoners was a truly desperate one until the Lend-Lease aid began to arrive.

During the year 1942 the Germans made political capital out of the fact that British and American prisoners-of-war in Germany and German occupied territory were receiving food packages and clothing sets while the Yugoslav prisoners were not. According to reports reaching FEA, whenever food packages were distributed to British and American prisoners, Yugoslav prisoners were lined up to watch the distribution and were told by their captors that here was proof that their allies had "forgotten" them.

During 1943 approximately 2,000,000 food packages were shipped under Lend-Lease agreement to Yugoslav prisoners at a rate designed to assure each prisoner-of-war one food package per month. During 1944, shipments have continued on the same basis. Already 1,680,000 food packages have been shipped in 1944. The food packages are the standard Red Cross variety, similar to those supplied to prisoners and civilians interned in enemy prison camps throughout the world.

In addition to the food packages, Lend-Lease provided to Yugoslav prisoners in 1943 and 1944 approximately 300,000 complete clothing outfits, consisting of an overcoat, two pairs of trousers, two shirts, two sets of underwear, one pair of shoes, six pairs of sox, one cap, one pair of gloves, three handkerchiefs, one sweater, and one wool muffler.

Medicines were provided through a United Nations pool of medicines and medical supplies, established in 1944 at Geneva, which sent such supplies to prison camp hospitals and infirmaries. Each country participated on a pro rata basis, according to the number of its recognized prisoners-of-war. Lend-Lease funds were made available to the Yugoslav government to cover the Yugoslav share in this pool. Their share provided

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105,700 pounds of medicines and medical supplies to the 130,000 prisoners.

Since August, 1944, Lend-Lease has also financed and delivered approximately \$277,000 worth of other items, including 21,000 invalid food packages, 8,400 individual medical kits, and comfort articles. These comfort articles included soap, needles and thread, miscellaneous toilet articles, and 63,000,000 cigarettes.

Plans have been made for 1945. Lend-Lease aid to Yugoslav prisoners will continue as long as these prisoners remain in German hands. For the month of January, for example, 130,000 standard food packages, 6,000 invalid food packages, and 1,300 medical kits will be sent — provided such assistance is still required.

Under the Lend-Lease procedure, requests for such supplies have been made to FEA by the Yugoslav Government-In-Exile. The requests, after clearance and approval by FEA, have been handled entirely by the appropriate U.S. government procurement agencies. In the case of the clothing for the Yugoslav prisoners, for example, the procurement was handled exclusively by the Quartermaster Corps of the U.S. Army.

All supplies for the Yugoslav prisoners-of-war have been turned over by the Quartermaster Corps to the American Red Cross and shipped by the Red Cross to Marseilles on vessels owned or chartered by a subsidiary of the International Red Cross. Transportation and distribution between Marseilles, Geneva, and German prison camps is supervised by the International Committee of the Red Cross and its delegates.

Lend-Lease aid to Yugoslav prisoners originated late in 1942 when the Yugoslav Government-In-Exile called to the attention of the United States the plight of its prisoners-of-war interned in Germany and German-occupied territory. From early in 1943 on the flow of Lend-Lease food, clothing and medicines through the Red Cross to these prisoners has been steadily maintained.

I leave it to the Serbian ontologists to solve the puzzle about British Agent Tito as far as the following: Did Churchill adopt Tito as British Agent to run the destinies of Yugoslavia because of Draza Mihailovic's drunkenness in which he insulted Great Britain, or was the drunkenness of Draza Mihailovic only the scapegoat for Churchill to embrace the British agent Tito openly and without reservation, giving the boot to Draza?

However, the historical truth is that Churchill had his axiom — the British supreme military and political strategy "to give the gun to kill the

Hun" — and Donovan had the American supreme military and political strategy to organize the Communists to fight the Nazis.

Whatever the maneuvering of the whole British and American supreme military, political, and diplomatic strategy, Josip Broz was fated to become the British Red Lord satrap in Bolshevik Yugoslavia long before that. But the fate, the skyrocketing, of Tito was the doom of Draza — doomed a posteriori. He was doomed a priori by his own hand.

Even though Draza Mihailovic would fight "to the last Briton", the British official decision made on February 17, 1944, was to abandon their erstwhile support for Draza Mihailovic and his Cetniks in favor of the Partisans led by Josip Broz Tito.

The British were concerned only with the comparison of statistics relating to the numbers of Germans killed. Draza Mihailovic was not interested in that. His only goal was to establish solid and formidable foundations for a Great Serbia to dominate and keep enslaved everybody not Serbian in that territory which still was denominated Yugoslavia.

About the impossibility of Draza Mihailovic to transcend Pan-Serb hegemony idiocies, the British heard also from Americans. The OSS terrorist and spy, Captain Walter R. Mansfield, who was a member of the American terrorist Mission to Mihailovic in 1944 reported as follows:

"Most troop commanders impress me as capable soldiers. Mihailovic himself, while in good health and obviously having considerable ability as a leader, has surrounded himself with a second-rate General Staff, with a political adviser, Dr. Moljevic, who is an extreme Pan-Serb. Mihailovic lacks ability to delegate."¹⁴

One of the godfathers of the Cetniks (Constantin Fotic, brothers Knezevic) Radoje Knezevic, would not accept any fault in the idol that he had created in the name of Draza Mihailovic and stated that: "Mihailovic could not rely on politicians and intellectuals and that a relatively very small number of them rallied to his flag."¹⁵

In the Court the presiding Judge asked questions and the defendant, Draza Mihailovic, answered as follows:

President: Is it true that the Cetnik units, on their way, while retreating, fought against the Partisans, together with the Germans?

Defendant: That was very bad. The most important point is this. Before this breakdown, Ostojic sent a telegram to me and asked me to begin an action against the Germans and I answered him: "Act according to the situation".

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President: Did the Nedic and Ljotic troops go across Sandzak with the troops which were under the command of General Trifunovic?

Defendant: All the Nedic troops, but not one Ljotic man. The Nedic troops were reformed and came to Novi Pazar. General Trifunovic informed me that they wanted to go to Greece. General Trifunovic persuaded them to come there. They were formed in three divisions: the First, Second and Third division. The First and the Second divisions were composed of the Serbian State Guards, and the Third division was the Frontier troop. They all formed the Serbian Storm Corps.

President: Was the Serbian State Guard under your command during the retreat?

Defendant: Not all of it. From these guards and the Frontier troops we had previously formed the worst troops in the world. I realized that later, when we tried to use them at Knezina for fighting against the Partisans. I wanted to take my troops into the area of Spreca river. It was suggested to me that I should take my troops there.

Prosecutor: Tell me, what suggestions did you receive?

President: When did the Serbian State Guards place themselves formally under your command?

Defendant: When they came to me in the Rogatica District. Immediately after that I tried to reach the Spreca river, which was more fertile than Posavina. These troops, however, fled after the first clashes. They caused a serious crisis among the other Serbian forces, so that they came out of it with great losses. They went further towards Zavidovic'i, surrendered to the Germans, and were taken from there to Germany.¹⁶

At his trial Draza Mihailovic said:

"From General Trifunovic I received the following report: "These are fugitives, one can do nothing with them".¹⁷

Thinkers among those who ponder the eschatological and the travail of the individual in the valley of tears are unanimous in declaring that hate can not be the supreme rule in relations between people. Serbians have disagreed with eschatologists and declared the hate of Croats as their sole reason for existence and for the national struggle. On December 1, 1918, their fly fell into their honey jar. With the fly they yelled at Croats: Here we are, here we will stay.

According to tradition of all best fairy tales of Aesop, La Fontaine, Krylov, and all Serbian and Croatian lore, most fairy tales end tragically, e.g., the man who wanted that everything he touches become gold, died of hunger.

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On September 2, 1944 at the thunderous news that the Soviet armies are to erupt in Serbia, panic seized Serbians.

In fact, on September 22, the first units of the Red Army — the 113th Division of the Second Ukrainian Front — crossed the Danube river from Romania into northeastern Serbia. Six days later forces of the Third Ukrainian Front entered from Bulgaria to begin their attack against German forces in southwestern Serbia, and on October 2, the main forces of the Second Ukrainian Front crossed from Romania to attack German forces in Banat.

The Serbians started to flee heel and toe out of Serbia into Germany, or to Nazi Germany as they call it today, under the auspices of the quisling government of Milan Nedic. They were transported, fed, and lodged by Germans in Vienna and other spas of Austria and Germany. They were incorporated into the quisling military or civil formation of the Nedic Serbia and naturally professed their faith in a German victory.

Once Nazi Germany deposed arms, May 7, 1945, all these Serbians called themselves victors and victors louder than British, Americans, or the Bolsheviks.

All lower echelons had been sent by train or covered wagons to the west and stopped in the Ljubljana Gap. There came the quisling Cetnik groups of the criminal of war, Dobroslav Jevdjetic, of the criminal of war priest, Momcilo Djuic, the quisling volunteers of Dimitrije Ljotic, and besides the quisling groups of Milan Nedic, finally the quisling Montenegrin troops of Pavle Djuriscic.

Most of them had gotten *salvum conductum* from the state authorities of Croatia and had been saved from the Bolshevik onslaught in their native territories only by this mercy of Croats.

Pavle Djuriscic broke his word of acknowledgment of the existence of the Independent State of Croatia and decided to fight the Croatian troops, there on the spot, in Croatia. But he was beaten by the

efficient Croatian defense at Lijevce Polje and perished along with other prominent political and military leaders.

All of those mentioned above who exited, except those who perished at Lijevce Polje were transported, fed, and lodged all the way from Serbia to Ljubljana Gap by Germans, the Nazi Germans. In Ljubljana Gap too they have been serving and were maintained, fed, and lodged by the German SS Commander in Trieste, Higher SS-General and Police Leader, Odilo Globocnik until the armistice of the German Armies South, on May 1, 1945.

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Regarding the moral principle of Serbians, it has to be mentioned that all Serbians saved from Bolshevik slaughter by Josip Broz Tito who are now in exile, or simply abroad, were saved by the mercy of Croats and Germans.

Along with the hundreds of thousand Serbian hoi poloi also the elite of these Serbians have been saved by the Germans, whom they usually call Nazis, Nazi Germans. We mention only a few of their most glamorous names in that group: Milorad Draskovic, Branislav Stranjakovic. Nikola Pasic, and Evgenije Jurisic.

With the Nazis in September and October (1944) left about 4000 Serbians, all heroes of the Serbian "Cetnik underground." What a fabulous underground, fleeing Serbia in company of the Nazis. In truth about 4000 Serbian quislings.

All of these and everybody of the Cetnik golden youth were organized in the Cetnik Youth Staff 501 and 1001. All of them were under the protection of German occupying authorities and Serbian quisling services for their life. At times they would be taken to the Cetnik headquarters in the so-called underground, but for all purposes they were in open Serbian villages and meadows to be introduced to foreign visitors as parade stallions. But when the Soviet armies knocked at the walls of Serbia, they ran under the cover of their Serbian quisling lords and German Nazi authorities for safe conduct out of the land to the greener pasture of Austria and Germany.

Under the protection of the Nazi Diplomatic Plenipotentiary in occupied Serbia, Dr. Hermann Neubacher, they organized their evacuation.

After the Germans organized a special train for Vienna, they simulated an arrest by Gestapo which promptly took them to the waiting train and straight to Vienna. Royally installed, they were helped by the same services of the diplomat Neubacher to disperse through the old Austrian and Bavarian Alps to reach the supreme heaven in Switzerland. After the end of the war they secured for themselves fat scholarships in the west and integrated into the political machines still considering them the heroes of the Cetnik epopee.

Therefore, with the happy exodus from Belgrade, a carefree and opulent life in German spas under the protection of Minister Neubacher's Nazis. followed by their luxurious intermezzo in Switzerland, they surrendered clean shaven, in lacquered shoes, to the western Allies. They had luck; they were received by the Allies as surrendered friendly enemy personnel and survived all military and political vicissitudes in golden splendor.

They owed their status of the surviving, starved Cetnik Golden Youth to the Germans, to the Nazis as they usually call them.

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We will finish this chapter with some residuary problems. By now we know that there was nothing more sacred to Winston Spencer Churchill than to give the gun to whoever would fight the Hun. And Churchill meant that. Even the Germans who conspired with OSS or otherwise with SOE (British) and American diplomatic and military leaders did not find any ear with Churchill. Not even the Austrians of Otto Habs-burg to be organized in New York. They had dispersed before fighting for Austria because fighting clearly was not in their mind. Churchill cherished only the one who would take the gun against the Hun.

It was otherwise known to Churchill that Mihailovic personally was not any fighter. Whatever descriptions by the historians, pro and con, nobody lauds his intellectual heights or his military fighting virtues. He was never an intellectual — man of ideas — or a fighter, leader of armies or organizer of any kind. At his best he was a paper pusher as Military Attache in Prague and Sofia.

Otherwise too, Mihailovic had problems with women and with his children. His first wife divorced him and his son and daughter abandoned his Pan-Serb cause and embraced Tito's Bolshevism. No one came to see him in prison. Only his stepson, son of his second wife's previous marriage, remained faithful until the end of his own life, when killed in Croatian Bosnia at the end of the war by deadly typhus.

But Mihailovic never stopped the art of deceit which was put in his hands by the incompetent megalomaniacs of the Serbian hegemonism which surrounded him. In a message of November 13, 1944, Draza Mihailovic to General Maitland Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean offered to bring all his troops, claiming them to be about 50,000 strong. Wilson in the meantime had been replaced as Supreme Allied Commander by Field Marshal Harold Alexander, and Draza already by November 29 sent him a message mentioning the number of his troops as 55,000 to 57,000 men to beat Germans.

This happened at the time when Soviet armies had conquered Belgrade on October 20 and put Josip Broz Tito in the saddle of the supreme ruler of Soviet-dominated territories, especially of Serbia. By that time most of the Serbians were fleeing heel and toe from all kinds of quisling Cetnik units to fight under the banners of the Yugo Bolshevik army, and few Cetniks remained with Draza.

But whatever the number of Serbians who stayed with Draza, there was no one among them who would fight for anything, especially not against Germans who had been their lords and were still giving them equipment and food. Who those remnants were, miserable Cetnik hordes, we hear from Draza's Supreme Commander, General Miroslav Trifunovic.

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At the moment when the Croatian troops lost the city of Tuzla to the Bolsheviks, equipped and maintained by Americans, Draza with all his troops at his disposal wanted to conquer Tuzla from the Bolsheviks. At that moment he was commanding all Serbian quisling remnant troops, especially the State Guards of Milan Nedic. At the first sound of the gun from the Communists in Tuzla, the troops of Draza fled as one, especially Nedic's troops. Draza, looking at them with his glasses lowered on his nose, spit, and pronounced them the "worst troops in the world."

About the Cetniks of Pavle Djuricic, who were considered better outfitted and better trained than any other Cetnik groups Draza Mihailovic considered them "of bad fighting value."¹⁸

Were those Draza people still good for anything: well, yes. A witness to that is the American flyer, James M. Inks, then Lieutenant, later Major. When he parachuted from his bomber which was returning from Ploesti, wounded, he, with his companions, fell parachuted in Montenegro in Cetnik territory, in September 1944. The Cetniks did not help them to evacuate but kept them hostages for the glory, so to say, of having Americans who recognized them as a military and civil power in Yugoslavia. The Americans had to endure most humiliating conditions, sleeping with German soldiers, among others, and being fed by Germans while at the same time being bombarded by Anglo-Americans. It would have been better if the Cetniks had let the Americans go to safety in Italy than to allow them to witness their misery. With the fleeing Cetniks, Inks and his American comrades-in-arms reached the territory of the Independent State of Croatia in 1945. The Cetniks were under command of Draza Mihailovic. In April, some place on the right bank of Sava river, probably between Brod and the river Vrbas, Inks witnessed the following:

Soon it became clear why the Ustashi had offered such foolish resistance. We were in the heart of their country, in a fertile valley, and these particular Ustashi, we were told, had committed many atrocities against the Cetniks.

And now the Cetniks were giving back what they had gotten. For fifteen miles up the valley every house was on fire. Cetniks, drunk with unaccustomed victory, looted and pillaged. They were loaded down with poultry, wine, whatever they could carry. What they could not take, they laid to the torch. The road led right up the middle of the valley. Through the night, the fires lit up the countryside. Old men and women stood in front of their homes, wailing and sobbing.

The general shortly issued orders there were to be no more fires. Any man caught setting one was to be shot. I do not know how the word was carried ahead of the headquarters so soon, but, within an hour, there were no new fires.¹⁹

Evidently there was nothing more to lay to the torch. After everything had been put to the torch, Draza issued the orders that there were to be no more fires. There was nothing more to burn because Croatian troops stopped Draza from advancing into their territory. Serbians eternally deny that any atrocity ever happened under the command of Draza Mihailovic. The Americans witnessed it, but this piece of source was silenced and it is still not generally known.

Horrors perpetrated by Serbians are described also by a famous Yugo-Bolshie, who was later to be put as the President of the World Tribunal for War Crimes by Bertrand Russell (British philosopher).

Vladimir Dedijer as President of the Tribunal was to declare Americans to be criminals of war because of the "atrocities committed in Vietnam."

About earlier times of WWII and atrocities committed, Dedijer writes:

In a way I was a witness to the same feeling after a battle in the autumn of 1942 when about fifty Croat quislings were captured alive. They were tried and sentenced to death, admitting that they took part in the massacre of Serbs. Their execution was public and hundreds of peasant women who survived the ordeal came to see the last minutes of the murderers of their loved ones. I watched a middle-aged peasant woman, stocky, with grey hair and face full of wrinkles. When the first volley of bullets was fired, she jerked, advancing towards the dead ones. She ran at their still warm bodies, jumping over them, with eyes closed, groaning. Her long white skirt became red with blood, but she continued trampling their bodies under her feet, groaning more and more. At last she was taken away from the corpses, her eyes still closed, grey hair wet with sweat, the muscles on her face loosened, as though with some kind of inner relaxation. Such blind hatred also guided the knives of her family's murderers.²⁰

The reader of that writing of the President of the World Tribunal for War Crimes notices that he has no word of condemnation:

- 1) for shooting prisoners of war.
- 2) for the orgy of the Bolshevik woman's ceremonial dance over the dead bodies.

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Dedijer was not alone in failing to express his horror for such crimes against humanity, not any member of the Allied Military Mission registered any Yugo-Bolshevik atrocity. Still today the media of the free world print and reprint the black legends of the Bolshies against their enemies as the Holy Gospel, but nobody ever mentions their atrocities. If Djilas and Dedijer did not write about them, nobody else would write at all. Djilas wrote that his sword was never dry from blood. He was killing prisoners of war; he never was in open battle. Even if he repeats this acknowledgement in his own writing, his adulators in the free world do not repeat it.

Therein was the Croatian Scylla and Charybdis. Be they Cetnik or be they Bolshie, the Serbians killed Croatians.

For the Yugo-Bolshie Dedijer, Americans are war criminals as he condemned them, but not the Yugo-Bolshies who were killing prisoners of war. But killing of prisoners of war is a war crime and Yugo-Bolshie Dedijer is a war criminal. In the above description cited he confesses to having been a witness, present at the killing of prisoners of war. Since he was agit-prop, he was the tribunal, and therefore the war crimes have been committed at his order. Dedijer was more a war criminal than those at Nuremberg or those declared as such by his tribunal.

It is therefore here evident that the Cetniks (Serbians) and the Bolsheviks (Serbians) committed crimes of war against Croatians. They were in good company as the following description of an incident attests:

The O.S.S. men had planned to give every Nazi a chance to surrender, and if "that generous offer" was refused, to use them "for target practice." But it had not worked out that way, for "all five of the enemy were now dead, or so close to dead that only a doctor could tell the difference." An O.S.S. man therefore went up to the five figures on the ground and "gave each one a burst from his Tommy gun" to make sure they were dead. An Austrian private was the last to die, muttering that "he was too young" and that "he wanted to live." The partisans, who had been "a little amazed" by the American

idea of taking prisoners, moved in and stripped the bodies. One partisan berated a German corpse for having allowed himself to be shot through the legs, "thus ruining a perfectly new pair of boots." But there is one hitch to this tale of heroic resistance. On 17 April, the Nazis returned to the scene of the ambush, established a strict curfew in the area, burned several houses in a neighboring village, and took away twenty civilian hostages to be shot.²¹

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The Germans were hanged in Nuremberg for their part. Fortunately, Churchill had all proofs that Cetniks to achieve their perfect hegemony over Croats had killed Croats by extermination — genocide.

Unfortunately, he did not have that proof about the Bolsheviks. He became more and more annoyed with the Serbs until he finally would call the Puric'-Cabinet: "The King and his bedraggled government."

The hate of Serbs for Croats had been well known in the United States as the following document points out.

On June 8, 1942, Mr. Atherton of the Division of European Affairs of the Department of State, wrote to Mr. Dunn:

Mr. Alan Cranston, Chief of the Alien Control Division of OFF called by telephone to say that there was a new and disturbing development in the Serbian-Croatian conflict, which has been so troublesome in recent weeks.

The Serb National Defense Council has called a congress for June 28, to be held at Libertyville, Illinois, and in this connection has invited the Attorney General to attend, and make a speech, and has written to the President, asking that he declare this day an official holiday (this is the way the message comes to me) in Serbia's honor.

Mr. Cranston says that he has already been in touch with the Attorney General's office, mentioning the complications of this matter, and has been assured that Mr. Biddle will decline. He inquires whether the State Department could indicate at the White House that any endorsement of this Serb holiday, while pleasing the 90,000 people in the Serb faction of the Yugoslav group would infuriate the 5-600,000 Croats.

Incidentally, the Congress is being organized by the Serb Archbishop Dionysie and the Ducic brothers. The COI has accumulated some very unpleasant reports on the contribution of these men to the disunity in the Yugoslav element. Also, it was planned by the Yugoslav Legation that King Peter would visit the Archbishop at Libertyville, after his stay in Washington. At Mr. Summerlin's suggestion (he was interested primarily in the question of security and travel arrangements for the royal party) I inquired whether the Yugoslav Minister considered this visit to Libertyville essential. I was told that the visit would be very informal and personal, to "enable the King to kiss the Archbishop's ring" et cetera. It now appears that this visit would about coincide with the congress as scheduled. It would be a direct provocation on the part of the Greater Serbia faction to those elements representing the real Yugoslav idea.²²

Slowly the Serbian hot-headed hegemonists realized that because of their suicidal politics against Croats they themselves were doomed to annihilation.

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lation. They so started to beat their breasts and to withdraw all accusations against Croats.

The U.S. Howard Chapin in Algiers on June 30, 1944 (from Murphy) sent to the Secretary of State the following telegram:

According to a telegram sent by Stevenson to the Foreign Office from Bari, Topalovic told the Yugoslav Prime Minister that the Serbian political parties had come to the conclusion that the Croats were not responsible for the massacre of Serbs in Bosnia. They also realized that the Croats had organized resistance to the Germans in the same way as had the Serbs. A united Yugoslavia on a federated basis was thus a possibility. These conclusions were said to have been reached by a national council [council] duly elected by the people of Serbia which had met in January 1944 and called the Council of Saint Sava. Topalovic is quoted as saying that the Serbian people still hold the King to be the supreme authority and the legitimate commander-in-chief, with Mihailovic as the King's deputy. The Serbs according to Topalovic realized that Tito's movement is fighting for the liberation and that it is also aiming at the establishment of a Communist dictatorship. They intend to resist this latter part of

its program. Topalovic said that if Tito were to be imposed on Serbia as supreme commander-in-chief this would destroy Serbian unity as the vast majority of Serbs would not accept his Communist leanings and hostility to the King. Serbian political parties were anxious to avoid civil war and were prepared to collaborate with Tito provided that the King were recognized as commander-in-chief. They were ready even to sacrifice Mihailovic and agree to the appointment of another regular officer of the Yugoslav forces in his place.²³

However, massacres of Croats by Serbs — Cetniks and Bolsheviks — happened. They killed more than 400 Croatian priests (about one quarter of all priests). They usually tortured them in the most inhumane way. We give the following description:

Kind of tortures inflicted:

1. Crucified alive
2. Scalped alive
3. Spitted and roasted alive.....
4. Tongue cut out and given as a "Host"
5. Thrown into the fire and burned alive.....
6. Flesh torn from the body.....
7. Throat cut.....

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8. Dismembered.....
9. Sawn alive and thrown into the river.....'
10. Skin torn from flesh.....
11. Eyes cut out with knives.....
12. Bound in a bag and thrown into the sea alive after cruel torture . .
13. Shoed like a horse and driven through the town
14. Thrown into a cave (after torture)
15. Beheaded
16. Drowned.....
17. Unspecified torture.....
18. Covered with gasoline and burned.....
19. Stabbed
20. Poisoned.....
21. Tortured in the most horrible orgies
22. Stoned
23. Put in an air-raid shelter and burned alive
24. Thrown alive into a river
25. Shot
26. Shot in a group.....
27. Killed in a group, by other means.....
28. Killed without specification
29. Hanged
30. Died in prison after cruel tortures
31. Died at home after being tortured in prison
32. Died in concentration camps.....
33. Died during forced labour.....
34. Missing (believed: killed).....
35. Became insane after torture

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American diplomacy engages in ontological background much farther and very blatantly. While Churchill was very physical in his rule of the gun to the one who fights the Hun, let us hear Americans.

In the early part of March 1945, Draza's political creature, the so-called Cetnik Central Committee, met in Kozuhe near Dobo in Croatia.

Some weeks before this meeting, an American diplomat, after a fortnight in Belgrade, submitted to the Department of State a report composed on the basis of unofficial contacts which contained also the following appraisal:

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"Draza's stock lowering unsavory reputation his associates and his own lack of political acumen and military strength. It is generally admitted Draza would have been worse than Tito."

The document in its entirety follows:

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State
Caserta, February 9, 1945 — 1 p.m.

483. Following sidelights on Yugoslav situation from [Carl F.] Norden are based on information deriving from unofficial contacts in Belgrade during past fortnight.

1. Regime has restored order and the most essential utilities in city and distinct improvement in aspect of town is noticeable when over past 2 weeks stores are reopening, streets and restaurants wore banners, atmosphere seems more cheerful. There is ample food but salaries are wholly inadequate to meet rising costs and many people live under most difficult circumstances by sale of their belongings which are main stock in trade of many stores. There is an informal moratorium on rents and debts generally.
2. Despite outwardly cheerful aspects regime is not liked in Belgrade save among limited sections of population. Persons with out-of-town ties say same is true in provincial Serbia but I cannot judge accuracy of these reports. Reasons given are many but principal one is that this is not sort of liberation people expected. Propaganda and engineered "spontaneous" demonstrations in a forced labor [*sic*], high-handed and summary requisitioning, arrests and punishment, sense of intimidation are too reminiscent of occupation. Fear and dislike of Communism and Communists, excess of Croats and Montenegrins in regime and police, presence of Bulgar troops as allies, interference with religious education of youth are other factors. Dispatch of poorly trained and equipped forces levies to front with heavy casualties said to have alienated many but this is slowly being remedied. In general, regime's appeal based partly on mistakes of predecessors diminishes with own errors.
3. Opposition, however, not crystallized and may not do so. Rightly or wrongly regime is regarded as a passing military makeshift and there is no argument with its stand on seeing war through, war weariness notwithstanding. Many of its avowed objectives have wide approval especially of younger people who look less to methods than to ideals, and generally criticism is in proportion to age of information with oldest indulging in

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straight Nedic¹⁹ line. Expectation especially in business circles is that coming of London Government and of peace will mark new departure. Weakness of London Ministers not generally appreciated and few who do so pin hopes on Subasic and Sutej²⁰ and above all Anglo-American support of constitutional principles. Mood in general is optimistic wait and see. Subasic Croatian color not a live issue as any change thought to herald improvement, for instance, Catholic Archbishop views Subasic as Churchill's instrument for achievement of a compromise to result in free and honest plebiscite.

4. There is much whispered talk of going to forests in spring and we hear several nationalist groups presiding in Serbia. Great disillusionment would doubtless follow failure on Subasic's part to bring freer and more representative government, and many feel this would result in active opposition to regime. There, however, we enter realm of conjecture and some realize precipitate action might provide pretext for general liquidation of opposition. Successful right revolt on other hand feared as bringing even worse blood bath whence sentiment heavily favors constitutional solution.
5. King popular especially rural sections but his importance would diminish greatly if we were to be viewed by people as another dictator or a front for reaction. Few want return to old times.
6. Draza's stock lowering unsavory reputation his associates and his own lack of political acumen and military strength. It is generally admitted Draza would have been worse than Tito.
7. We must assume regime is fully aware of foregoing and will seek to make needed adjustments to prevent pot from boiling over as long as this is to its advantage and compatible with objectives. While criticism external and internal and administrative and economic troubles appear to have put it somewhat on defensive, (see Tito speech to Anti-Fascist women) its toughness, resourcefulness,

energy, determination must not be underestimated. Though Yugoslavs are a different breed from Russians and proud of it and Russian precedents need not of necessity apply it would be rash to ignore effect instant intensive indoctrination may have on malleable younger generation unless soon modified.

¹⁹ Colonel-General Milan Nedich, President of the Nazi puppet state of Serbia.

" Juraj Shutej, Minister of Finance. Commerce and Industry in the Subasich Cabinet.

- ' Reference is to Gen. Draza Mihailovich, leader of the Chetnik resistance forces in Yugoslavia, former Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Yugoslav Armed Forces.

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8. Under cover NKVD²² activity rumored which would appear subject for more discreet investigation.

9. Foregoing should of course be appraised in light of limitations under which it was gathered. Longer sojourn and formal contact might well lead to revision. The all important question of intentions of regime cannot be adequately judged by spot checking of this type, value of which is necessarily limited. All of above from native sources.²⁵

One of the biggest cover-ups about Draza Mihailovic is the fact that he became a criminal of war.

At the end of the War, Patrick Dean of the British War Ministry formed his idea that Draza be extradited to Tito as a war criminal if he fell into the hands of the British. The PRO document we give as Appendix 1.

The document puts an end to the myth that the "Allies" were waiting for Draza with a white horse to parade him in London and in Washington. Great Britain was ready to hand him to Tito as a war criminal if he surrendered to them.

British logic is at times of iron.

They declared Milan Nedic a war criminal. Draza and Milan were one and the same branch of the Serbian nation. If Milan was a war criminal, Draza was also. The British, of course, did not have the right to declare criminals of war. Criminals of war were declared at Yalta. Like Milan Nedic, so Draza Mihailovic was declared a criminal of war in Yalta. Draza knew it.

Was there any violation of the truth? Of the historical fact? No.

It was the Allied media, with BBC leading, which had created the myth of Draza Mihailovic. There was nothing behind the myth; there, therefore, was nothing to destroy. *Ex nihilo, nihil*. God giveth; God taketh away.

As the whole myth of that Serbian, so also his last days before May 8, 1945, are constantly and falsely mythicized.

When Tito was installed in Belgrade on October 27, 1944, by the Bolshevik armies, as the sole dictator of Bolshevik Yugoslavia, Draza started his trek towards the West at the head of a small band of his Cetniks. His myth-makers talk of 30,000, but that simply is a mystification. A few thousand stayed with him.

Cautiously he followed the retreating German troops who since the autumn of 1944 were in retreat from Crete. But soon there were no more

²² Special Political Police of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union.

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Germans in front of his little band, and so Draza, knowing that he was wanted by the British as a war criminal and realizing that he could no longer be protected by the Germans, turned his back to the West and proceeded eastward to his Serbia, now already Communist.

According to the Communist statistics, the Communists killed or captured most of these Cetniks. A few of them escaped immediate capture and fled into the Serbian mountains as Draza Mihailovic'.

Draza was very experienced in hiding his whereabouts and succeeded in avoiding Communist capture until March 1946, but finally he was captured on March 12, 1946. The Communists put him on trial together with many other Cetnik military and civilian leaders. The trial began on June 10, 1946 and ended July 15. Draza was sentenced to death, and on July 17 he was executed by a firing squad.

Milan Nedic, extradited by the Americans to the Yugo-Bolshies, preferred to jump to his death from prison window in Belgrade, in October 1945.

These and hundreds of thousands of Serbians killed by Bolshies after March 27, 1941, when Serbian Yugoslavia "found its soul" are victims of that Serbian soul finding.

It is strange that Jozo Tomasevich did not know about the British documents when writing his voluminous book about the Cetniks. It is true that the book is more a vilipend of Ustasa and Croatia than it is the truth about Cetniks, but even for such a Croatian renegade and quisling (quisling is not the Croatian who is for the Croatian state. Quisling is the Croatian who like Tomasevich invokes foreign occupation of Croatia, i.e., occupation by Serbian Yugoslavia) as Jozo Tomasevich, this is not pardonable. As a historian he put himself more among the glorifiers than among the historians. But so behave all traitors.

Tomasevich during WWII was a terrorist and spy of OSS. He stayed in the dens of OSS writing his reports in JICME (Joint Intelligence Collection Agency Middle East) in Cairo. He later published these long reports in his book to which he added his talks with Tito and other Yugo-Bolshies, as well as some other similar sources.

But when one studies his book, *The Chetniks*, one easily notices that the book is but the materials taken from the files of OSS in the National Archives. Tomasevich did study extensively in the National Archives, although he needed not to. Verisimilarly, he wrote the originals at JICME, be it in Cairo, Bari, Washington, Belgrade, or a k a cities. The spirit of OSS permeates Tomasevich's *Chetniks*; the same content, style, phi-

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losophy, mythology; moreover, not deleting the anti-Croatianism, in this worse than Radoje Knezevic, in the verve of the Communists' jargon. Most of OSS and SOE were Communists, under Communist supervision.

If British diplomacy and public opinion were looking for all these on-tological factors to send Draza Mihailovic, Petar II, all Serbian Cetniks, monarchists, and therefore everybody in that rucksack, to their doom in order to put Josip Broz Tito on the glorious throne of Bolshevik Yugoslavia, they acted very efficiently and persuasively.

They declared that Draza Mihailovic did not accept the gun against the Hun; that he was helping the Hun against Great Britain. For that reason they declared him criminal of war as they declared criminals of war, Milan Nedic, Dobroslav Jevdjevic, the priest Momcilo Djujic, and all those who were hanged or shot by the firing squad of the Bolshies.

They did not regret jettisoning Draza Mihailovic and found final blessing for their ontological justification for all that in the American diplomacy which declared Tito better than Draza.

The fleeing Serbians had collected gold and hard cash everywhere when they had to relinquish their status and positions to the Communists. The supreme leader of these fleeing Serbians, Draza, when abandoning Serbia in September 1944, took thirty millions in gold from Belgrade's vaults which before the bitter months of March and April 1945 in Croatia kept his food situation at a relatively good level at the time he had to compete for food supply with Tito's Communist government in Belgrade.²⁶ The famous Ambassador Fotic in Washington emptied the Embassy coffers to the last penny, kept the Embassy's residence, diplomatic car and gasoline allowances for a long time until the Department of State had to take them back by force.

Individuals gave themselves promotions in military rank and over night there mushroomed generals and colonels *sine fine*. The former military attache in Washington thus became Colonel, a rank he had never before held.

All of that, added to everything else said in this chapter and in many other books,²⁷ led to the British and American boot to Draza and to his and all other Cetniks. As already noted, they openly declared Draza worse than Tito. What a destiny! (Draza Mihailovic) worse than Tito.

Serbian peasants understood it very quickly. According to the Communists, when the Serbian peasants heard that Draza, when fleeing Serbia, in the Fall of 1944 carried huge amounts of gold and British pounds, they bitterly attacked his troops, killed, plundered, and collected all they could from that immense wealth gotten from Anglo-Americans and taken out of

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the vaults in Belgrade.

Historical science must be very deficient at this point. Few documents were accessible today to scholarly research. Most of the documents about Draza Mihailovic will be accessible to researchers only in the distant year 2028.

What can be so torpidly bad and compromising — and for whom, British or Draza — in those documents that none of us will ever see.

It would be interesting to know if the mysteries hidden in them will make Draza a saint of the Serbian religion. His body probably will be found (his grave now remains unknown), and the ceremony of canonization will be, to be sure, preceded by dispersing the ashes of Josip Broz Tito by the post-Communist government in Serbia.

One puzzle remains. What will be the manner of dispersion of Tito's ashes at the hand of Cetniks. Will they be blown into the air or dumped in the Morava river.

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2. When they (the British) cut off the head of their King. Charles I, the Emperor of all the Russians. Aleksej Mihailovic, broke off relations for eleven years.
3. April 14, 1903.
4. April 15, 1903.
5. *The Evening Standard*, April 16, 1903.
6. Paris, 1844, p. 221.
7. I, p. 37.
8. Some Serbians did perish, but hardly any innocent. However, the number was never established. The number of 400,000 or any other exact cipher is conjecture, it is a constant Serbian black legend against Croats. Only this black legend should be enough to declare the Serbians unfit to keep Croats in their slavery, in any Yugoslavia which is always Great-Serbia.
9. Sic.
10. About the Serbian killing of Croats, see p. 29. Never does any Serbian say that Serbians should be punished for killing Croats. 1. The originals of these documents are deposited in the Public Record Office in London and their copyrights rest with The Crown. We are thankful to the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office for the permission to publish them. PRO: FO 371. 33476/R6249/G/K5527.
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19. 20.
- 21.
23. 24. 25

British Certified Agent

The most scary name in the field of espionage, counter-espionage, terrorism, commandos, and the rest of the litany is British Secret Service, designating all branches of Intelligence whatever they might be called. The famous "British genius espionage." Most fearful of everybody was Adolf Hitler.

According to the cognoscenti, Hitler conceded that the Soviet Secret Services were superior to the

German, and he had experienced their superiority. He was almost crushed by them during the Communist takeover in Bavaria in the immediate Post-War I period. About the British Secret Service he believed it to be more powerful than British military might. And he did not even know of Ultra. Ultra probably knew even the hour of the Fuhrer's suicide. Most people believed Martin Bormann to have been a Soviet stooge. I would not be surprised if in the next millenium the British PRO would wash ashore the information that Martin Bormann was a British agent. General Reinhard Gehlen thought that Gestapo Muller died in the East. Was Gestapo Muller an associate of Martin Bormann and therefore died someplace in the West, and Gehlen is fooling everybody as he liked to do, especially through his brother.

When British Secret Services engaged Martin Bormann and Gestapo Muller in their net, nobody has yet said. But one other *cause celebre* among British agents is unsealed: Josip Broz Tito, certified British Agent.

When the British Services engaged Josip Broz as their Agent has not been mentioned by anyone else except this author.

To unravel this story of Tito we begin with "Camp X." From the literature about British Services we know that they have many training centers for their agents around the globe. The best-known, and relevant to our research was the Camp X near Toronto in Ontario, Canada. Cover for it was given by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, which acquired land from the farmers for so-called Canadian broadcasting services.

Camp X was a huge factory of British terrorism or guerrilla warfare as they like to call it because terrorism is only called terrorism when it is

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directed against the United Kingdom. The British believed that the war machine of the enemy could be very much damaged by terrorist acts against the industry of the enemy. Besides factories with their production of weapons and everything else, second in importance was transportation. Therefore, next to the acts of terrorism against factories, there was a whole series of instructions on how to destroy the means of transportation. In the Camp a whole railroad depot with all kinds of specimens of transportation means was reassembled which the terrorists learned how to sabotage. It is known that Germans needed to employ members of the vanquished nations to operate their industry and means of transportation. It is also known by their literature that these workers sabotaged at all times whenever possible. I think that French workers hold the first place in this kind of sabotage and the Polish workers are equal to French or maybe just a little inferior because of intelligence level. How much was individual initiative on the spot and how much was the result of organized directions for terrorism, or sabotage, by the British Secret Services is not exactly established.

At Camp X everybody was instructed in making dynamite and its alloys and in dexterity in using them.

Not of lesser importance were instructions for destroying everything that kept the enemy nation going. In that comes especially electrical power which naturally was generated by all kinds of generators. Camp X had a rich arsenal of all kinds of generators in existence in the enemy countries with which the terrorists and the saboteurs could become familiar and learn to destroy.

Perhaps all espionage activities, terrorist enterprises, and sabotage coups begin with forged documents or forgeries of all kinds. The forgeries begin with the false documents and then follow with false letters, false messages, telegrams, money, etc. There is naturally the section for breaking enemy codes, or for that matter all codes, and therefore falsifying those codes. A special subsection called Station M was organized for all those purposes at Camp X.¹

Station M employed a host of backroom workers, including skilled craftsmen to produce good forged passports and membership cards.

When William J. Donovan left New York on a Mission he carried some of these fraudulent products. His personal documents and papers described as Anglo-American notes for East European leaders and military plans were skillful forgeries made by the small unit in Toronto organized by William S. Stephenson. The unit worked in ramshackle houses adjoining the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation headquarters on Jarvis street, in the

Bolshevik Republic in Bavaria, the Bolshevik Republic in Hungary, and the leftist socialist regime in Austria. It was the era of huge troubles in Italy where the leftist socialism made open doors to the ascent of the socialist fascism of Benito Mussolini.

The terrain in Croatia was also fertile for rebellion, revolution, and thus also for the leftist socialism. The Croats did not accept the declaration of the union of the Croats with Serbs proclaimed on December 1, 1918, by the regent Alexander in the presence of a handful of Croatian corrupt traitors. The head of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party, Stjepan Radic, did not recognize that union and declared an independent Croatian Republic. Not to be arrested he fled abroad and after visiting Paris and London, he went to Moscow where he signed some agreement with Stalin.

Communist beginnings in Yugoslavia are historically very confused. In Belgrade from April 20-23, 1919 the new party was founded and called The Socialist Workers' Party of Yugoslavia (Communist); After a further conference at Vukovar in June 1920, it came to be called the Yugoslav Communist Party.

At this point the Croatian patriotism of some Croatian leftists became more pugnacious, and soon they started to call themselves Communists and founded a Croatian Communist Party. But with the abolition of all Communist associations and public meetings by King Alexander in 1924, the few Communists had to unite to resist more efficiently the Serbian Royal persecution. They always were few in number. It has to be remembered that in 1932 there were:

400 Communists in Croatia

300 Communists in Slovenia

185 Communists in Montenegro.

The number of the Communists in Serbia was unknown because the Communists had not yet split from the Socialists of Zivko Topalovic and nobody knew exactly who was a Communist.

As a relentless spirit having a gypsy trade, repairing locks, Josip Broz travelled extensively living almost as a gypsy nomad without firm address or habitat. It was good luck for his later meteoric ascent into international politics and diplomacy that he was arrested in 1924 in Krizevci. He was sent to Bjelovar where he stayed eight days in prison. That happened to him also in 1925. Since he had always a liking for the free bird life and for gourmet drives, he left those parts of northern Croatia and went to the Adriatic shores on September 21, 1925. There at that time on the navy docks in Kraljevica he joined workers on some abandoned marine tugs

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damaged by the Italians in 1918 when the Austrian navy was handed to the Kingdom of Croatia. His unruly spirit made troubles between the workers, and he was dismissed on October 2, 1926. Since by then Croatia was too small for his gypsy wanderings, he fled to Serbia and settled in Smederevska Palanka but not for long. He never mastered the Croatian literary language which some Serbs can understand but spoke all his life his native dialect mixed with Russian. Also his ways of life, of luxury and voluptuousness, did not appeal to the Serbs who did not yet wear shoes but some kind of local footwear.

Back in Zagreb in 1927, he was noticed for his eternal high gear and was elected an official in a workers' organization. But in June he was arrested and taken to the city of Bakar on the Adriatic shore, where soon on August 14, he was again arrested and taken to the prison in Ogulin. On October 28, 1927, he was sentenced to seven months imprisonment but allowed to go free pending appeal in the higher court in Zagreb. The court in Zagreb reduced his sentence to five months, but by that time the prisoner could no longer be found.

About his disappearance, later.

The year 1928 shows Tito climbing the ladder of the Communist Party. His progress was definitely the result of his disappearance. In the night of February 25-26, 1928, a Party meeting was held in Zagreb. Thirty-two people were present and a delegate of the Comintern. He attended the meeting.

On May 1, 1928, Josip Broz organized some demonstrations for May Day and was arrested in the Cinema Apollo and released after spending a fortnight in a prison cell. On August 4, 1928 he was arrested. In his flat the police found, in addition to Communist literature, four hand grenades, one revolver, and ammunition of army issue. During the interrogation he denied that the dynamite found in his room was his but later he admitted "they were mine all right."³ This is the only time in his life that Tito used any offensive weapon. He never more carried any offensive weapon either before the war or

during the war. He needed his time for his mistresses and for dyeing his hair. Tito never worked in all his life and he never fought. He liked the life of the vagabond locksmith from door to door and let others work (and write — he is a Doctor of Burma and Ljubljana Universities) for him. During the trial in the county court in Zagreb on November 6, 1928, he was sentenced to five years imprisonment. From January 1929 to June 1, 1931 he was imprisoned in Lepoglava and from then until November 1933

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in Maribor. But after the end of that term he had to serve three and a half months for the sentence given in Ogulin in 1927.

During his imprisonment he had the opportunity to be together with many a Communist leader of later days. Among them was the most famous theoretician of Yugo-Bolshevism, the painter Mosha Pijade who was considered the father of all intellectuals of the Yugo-Bolsheviks, i.e., of all those who knew how to read and write. Pijade considered himself a Jew but he was a gypsy, descended from those gypsies who fled with the Jews from the Spain of Isabella and Ferdinand.

In 1934, after all prison terms were served, Broz was provided with funds for his work.

Early in June he appeared in Ljubljana, no longer a vagabond worker but well dressed and wearing gold ringed spectacles.

On July 25, 1934, he arrived in Vienna, Austria where on August 18, he attended meetings of the European Communists at which was present a delegate from the Comintern. He said later that he signed the minutes as "Tito."

Now we must indulge a little more in the historiography of Camp X. It is evident that the author of *Intrepid* produces a photograph of Josip Broz made, according to the author, in 1927-1929. However, the passport of Camp X with that photograph states that that passport was issued to the "naturalized British subject, 25th July, 1923 of Yugoslavian origin." Phyllis Auty in her book on page two of the photograph sheet inserted between pages 46 and 47 reproduces the same photograph with the caption: "4. Tito in 1928 (not a police photograph)."

We can not claim that the jacket Tito was wearing in the photograph was produced in 1929 because I had purchased the same kind in 1928-29. It easily could have been on the market for one year.

However, on page two of the photograph sheet between pages 62 and 63, Auty has the following captions: "9. Photographs of Tito in forged passports dated 1940: (a) in the name of Engineer Kostanjsek; (b) in a forged Canadian passport of Spiri-don Mekas; (c) in the name of Slavko Babic. Auty reproduces only the three photographs and no other part of the forged passport. She does not indicate what kind of forged passports were (a) and (c), but for (b) she says that it is a forged Canadian passport. She asserts that all three forged passports have been issued in 1940. The pictures of all three photographs show the man to be in his forties.

The picture on the Canadian forged passport in Phyllis Auty's book, issued in 1940 is definitely, visibly, not the one on the passport forged at

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Camp X in 1927-28. That means that Josip Broz in 1940 still was an active (British) Agent at Camp X. It is in that year that Tito came to Yugoslavia from Moscow via Istanbul. From Istanbul he travelled on the British ship to Thessalonica and from Thessalonica to Zagreb by train in a direct sleeping wagon. To Dedijer he narrated:

I returned from Moscow at the beginning of 1940, after staying there more than four months. The war broke while I was preparing to return. Unable to return by way of Poland, I went to Turkey boarding a ship at Odessa and landing at Istanbul. But the control was extremely rigorous, and although I had a Canadian passport in the name of Spiridon Mekas, I had to stop off for a time at Istanbul because I was unable to obtain the necessary visa for Yugoslavia. Finally, when the Turkish police were already hot on my trail, I took a ticket for the United States on the Italian ship *Conte di Savoia*, then anchored at Naples. This automatically made me eligible for a transit visa through Yugoslavia. Arriving at Zagreb, I left the train. Spiridon Mekas, who had purchased a ticket for the *Conte di Savoia*, never

appeared in Naples. The ship left without him. But at Gibraltar, I later learned, the British authorities stopped the vessel, because they thought that Spiridon Mekas must be on board under an assumed name.

But the story is not that simple. Tito had no Yugo transit visa so he asked the Yugo-Communists to send him a forged transit visa. Vlatko Velebit came to Istanbul with that visa. But the forgery was not done masterfully so Tito rejected it and requested a new one. The party sent him a new one. This time the carrier was a pretty young Slovenian girl. If the visa was not good, the girl was. Tito rejected the second forgery too and inspired by the girl he forged his own visa in his usual way. Well, the British did.

The first to mention this episode was Comrade Fitzroy (Maclean) the famous Scot who for his services to Tito got the palace in Korcula, a beautiful, ancient, priceless palace that had once belonged to the Governor of Venice. In his laudatory book about Tito, *The Heretic*, Maclean mentions the passport but he falsifies it by putting a false origin. He says the Spiridon Mekas passport calls him of Croat [Croatian] origin. What arcane reasons Maclean had to falsify are unknown.

One other occasion when Tito did not trust the Communist forgeries and relied on his British forged passport happened earlier.

After a stay in Moscow from January 1935 to October 1936 where during party talks Tito and Gorkic had divided sharply in their opinions about the conduct of the Party in Yugoslavia, Tito left Moscow definitely

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for Yugoslavia. For his return Gorkic provided him with a false passport. But cautiously on guard against Gorkic he did not trust in it. Later he said:

"Gorkic told me to leave for Yugoslavia immediately. He got a passport for me and told me to cross into Yugoslavia, but I obtained another passport and went quite a different way, because other comrades who got passports through Gorkic were arrested at the Yugoslav frontier. . . .

Tito masterfully kept his British-Canadian forged passport(s) secret from the Comintern. He let them furnish him with their own Comintern passports but once out of their sight he destroyed their passport and reverted to using his British-Canadian passports more artfully forged than those of the Comintern.⁴

The author in *Intrepid's Last case* becomes spurious on the subject of his passport. Without regard to his own writing in his previous book *Intrepid*, he simply mentions that such passports have been doctored in Moscow.⁵ The fact that passports have been doctored in Moscow (where not) does not destroy the fact that Tito received his forged passports at Camp X as Stevenson first wrote in *Intrepid*.⁶ It is obvious that after this revelation in *Intrepid*, the British who have greater interest in guarding the myths of institutional inviolability than anybody else, put a muzzle on the revelations of *Intrepid*. With the professional historian of integrity such tampering with the truth is criminal.

This discussion is pioneer work in the research of the problem. It is obvious that Josip Broz Tito would hide this part of his life as the snake hides its feet, and that the British would be leery to reveal the biggest secret of their terrorism in all the history of the establishment of the British Secret Services. But not only members of other secret services, Soviet, Persian, French, German (not to mention proverbially being so) are blabbers. There are blabbers also in the British Secret Services. It is known that in May 1945 the members of the British Army were divided in their attitudes about Josip Broz Tito. There were those in diplomacy like Anthony Eden, in diplomatic military service as Harold Macmillan, and the Supreme Commander of the Mediterranean Theater, Harold Alexander, with their plethora of lackeys and underlings who favored Tito. But there were ordinary fighters of the British Army in the ranks of the officers, the non-commissioned officers, and soldiers who call a spade a spade and Josip Broz Tito a Communist. They do not call him a British Agent.

Most of the revealings of the British Secret Services about Communist Yugoslavia and Josip Broz Tito come from Communists, Communist

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stooges, para-Communists, pro-Communists, fellow travelers, or simply those who possess villas on the Croatian Adriatic shores, gifts of the Yugo-Bolshies, those who enjoy paid vacations on the Sv. Stefan, gifts of the same Yugo-Communists and the participants at the Communist-paid symposia, all

expenses paid. Their books are published by the munificence of the Yugo-Communist regime, as well as are the books of the pictorial Communism and of Josip Broz Tito, all with the indulgence and blessing of Josip Broz Tito. For names, take any catalogue.

The history of the Communist spies among the British and in the British Secret Services is less divulged than the history of the secret services of Albania. From the above mentioned British sources one could read that Josip Broz knew Kim Philby. Although it would be possible that the Fabians in Cambridge asked the young Croatian worker to come to England, including Cambridge, to be acquainted with all agents of Bolshevism, nobody would likely say that. The historians of Kim Philby would not reveal if he were at Camp X during the stay of Josip Broz. The historian of the life of Josip Broz between 1929-1936 never cares to mention all the whereabouts of young Broz in those years. What kind of Communist Josip Broz became during his captivity in Russia and in the Soviet Union has never been investigated. But up to 1936 Josip Broz was a Croatian patriot and, with most prominent members of the Croatian Communist Party, was fighting for an independent Croatia. I know that the leader of the Croatian struggle for independence, Ante Pavelic, was meeting with the Communist leadership in Zagreb, coordinating their activities to fight the Serbian Kingdom of Yugoslavia to establish a sovereign Republic of Croatia.

I know that Ante Pavelic was meeting with Andrija Hebrang, the leading Croatian Communist. Josip Broz was an upstart who tried to take over the leadership. This happened when Hebrang had to leave or flee the country and in Basel, Switzerland was publishing the organ of the Croatian Communist Party, *Hrvatski Put*.

Hebrang had no education and, as Josip Broz, was also a common worker. Therefore, the intellectual part of the activities of the Croatian Communist Party at that time were taken over by already accomplished intellectuals or future intellectuals as was Mladen Lorkovic. I researched in Basel about the vicissitudes of Croatian intellectual publishing activities in that city, where Lenin liked to study, but could not go far. The Basel city archives have no trace of any intellectual publishing activities of the Croatian Communists in that city between 1932-1936. But that copies of

Hrvatski Put do exist was shown by Franjo Tudjman who published excerpts from it, when he was a university professor and head of the Institute for Research of the History of Croatian Workers in Zagreb.

It would be interesting to publish some ideas from *Hrvatski Put* to show the beauty of the pure Croatian nationalism of the Croatian Communist Party of that time and its fight against Serbian Yugoslavia under the leadership of Andrija Hebrang and Josip Broz Tito, who in 1914 had fought against Serbia. Tito's court biographers are cautious not to mention that.

It is from this period of the Croatian struggle against Serbian Yugoslavia that Josip Broz became a protege of the Chief of the Comintern, Bulgarian Communist Georgi Dimitrov. Dimitrov as a Bulgarian was fighting the Serbians as the Croatians were, and therefore they found themselves on common territory. It is at that time that the star of Josip Broz started to rise. First, the Serbian Communists succeeded to destroy the Croatian Communist Party and to destroy all activities in *Hrvatski Put* of Josip Broz and Andrija Hebrang. Andrija Hebrang went to Moscow where he was under the wing of Joseph Stalin whose protege he became and remained until his horrible death in Belgrade dungeons in 1948 after he sided with Stalin against Tito.

The first step to the power of Josip Broz began in 1936 when he was enthroned in Paris, France, as the supreme ruler of the Communist-organized help to Spanish republicans and Communists against the forces of Francisco Franco. There are two moments which led Josip Broz to that position. The first one having been the protege of Georgi Dimitrov as the fellow fighter against the Serbians, and the second being a fellow comrade among the British Communists, Kim Philby with his two other close associates and the Briton most important for the future to help Tito during the war, James Klugman.

In history nothing happens by chance. Chances happen only in the emotional life, the famous *coup de foudre*, and therefore Tito's enthronement as the czar of all Communist forces fighting Franco was not by chance; since Kim Philby played so great a role in that war, the British art of espionage achieved one of the most macabre brilliancies. The Briton, Philby, who played Franco's friend could pass to the Communist czar in Paris all secrets the Communists needed for their purposes.

Most fascinating and exciting are the intellectual observations about how all British emissaries have been sure of Josip Broz Tito as British Agent when they were sent to him in 1943 and after. Most of these agents were in daily intercourse with Tito, and they liked and adored him while he protected them and tried to make life in the inaccessible mountains of Croatia

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and Serbia more hospitable than Oxford or Cambridge. I do not remember that they complained about any harshness. There was always a goat in their entourage to provide Tito with his daily milk and a cow to provide milk for the Britons.

Everybody was eager to see that Randolph Churchill with Captain Evelyn Waugh be sent to Tito's headquarters but not to Tito's vicinity. As Stephen Clissold writes, Evelyn Waugh did not hide his fervent Catholicism and his more fervent anti-Communism. Since he was sent mostly to keep company to Churchill's son who had to do something heroic but far from danger, both of them were sent to the headquarters of the Partisan forces in Croatia where they lived in a spa under the shadows of the walls of the old Cistercian monastery.

The Croatian Communists took care of Randolph and the *Sljivovica* flowed to his quarters like the neighboring stream.

The official biographies of J. B. Tito are still the standard biographies of that Red Dictator. But slowly come to light more particulars about him. The most recent revelation about him is that he was also an agent of the Red Orchestra.

Most recently, Eric Downton wrote in *The Vancouver Sun* that Tito was an agent of the *Rote Kapelle* (Red Orchestra). The beginnings of the Red Orchestra go back to 1935 when the future Grand Chef Leopold Trepper appeared in Paris. Downton's is the first news about Tito's activities in that glorified Communist terrorist and spy organization.

How and when Tito and Trepper met is yet unknown. Like Tito, Leopold Trepper used a Canadian passport with the name of Adam Mikler of Quebec. However, their meetings seem to have occurred before the war and before the *Rote Kapelle* code name came to be applied to Soviet espionage in western Europe generally. Their activities were especially dense after 1936 when Tito was installed in Paris as the supreme czar of all the people sent to Spain to fight Francisco Franco.

We know that Kim Philby was in connection with both of them. But all activities of the Soviet espionage were under the supreme command of "Mrs. Brewer." The name Brewer was the disguise for the GRU Colonel Ruth Kuczynski aka Ursula Hamburger who was running the networks of the Red Orchestra in Britain and probably in all of Europe. Into this group enters the name of Colonel Dick Ellis. Ellis was married to a White Russian woman whose brother, General Andrei Turkhul, was a double agent. He worked for Nazis and also for the Soviets.

Ruth was known in England as Mrs. John Brewster, a housewife. Besides being Chief of the British Red Orchestra and possibly of the Red

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Orchestra as a whole, she was the Soviet control for Dr. Klaus Fuchs.

Her brother, known as "Juergen," was also a Soviet agent. He joined OSS and became an advisor to John Kenneth Galbraith and George Ball. His reports concerned vital interests of the Soviet Union, and Stalin was the first to get them. When Washington asked London to look into the matter, he vanished.

A beautiful assortment of names. Ruth Kuczynski ended her days happily in East Germany; Dick Ellis died peacefully in 1975 in England although with diminished pension because of his having served as a Soviet mole in the British Secret Services; KGB General Harold Adrian Russell Philby sunning in Moscow. Donald Maclean, of the same glorious reputation, died in Moscow early in 1983, and the ashes of Josip Broz enjoy eternal peace, Lenin style, at Dedinje.

Leopold Trepper, after Siberia in 1945 went afterwards to Poland which he left in the early 70's, spent his last few years in Israel, where he provided the Israeli Intelligence services with a vast amount of information. A good deal of material has been published in Israel about Trepper's recollections and disclosures. He died in Israel in 1982, 77 years old. The life in the Red Orchestra for these was definitely very healthy; all died in old age.

All of them were latent anti-American and anti-Americanism was not entirely latent in those days. Most of them intrigued against Americans like Donovan, Stimson, and Roosevelt who identified American security with the survival of the United Kingdom. On their mind was the Soviet Union for which they lived and died.

There had been an official NKVD Mission in London whose agents were assisted by both British Special Operations and American OSS. London granted to these large NKVD representations legal stay in England, reinforcing the presence of some of the most experienced GRU officers.

General Donovan's OSS had exchanged Intelligence data with NKVD and GRU. Edgar Hoover, however, successfully frustrated Donovan's attempt to have such NKVD and GRU phalanges in the nation's capital. But by 1945 Moscow had received hundreds of top secret OSS research studies; The British had supplied guerilla warfare expertise to the Chief of the NKVD's subversive operations, Co. A.P. Ossipov. Most of the files on this remained secret up to the last year (1983), therefore for a subsequent thirty-eight years after 1945. By July 1944, OSS claimed to be sending 1000 "kits" per week to the Yugo-Bolsheviks to assist in producing Communist propaganda, including copies of the *Reader s Digest*.

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There was the political tendency in London, as in Washington, and in Ottawa, to brush under the carpet anything embarrassing to Stalin. The Soviet dictator's reputation for being difficult had the effect of "making almost any concession to Stalin's demands seem necessary." The result of this Communist bulldozing meant that "the furtherance of good relations with the Soviet Union has become all-consuming. Any concession is possible, no matter how base or cruel, if it doesn't dramatically affect strategic or political interests."

Dean Acheson reckoned: "Britain lost an Empire and has not found a role."⁸

The ancient role dictated that nothing must be done officially to annoy Stalin, from 1941 up to his death. The same role dictated dealings with Tito, and in the F.O. as well as in the Department of State, nothing was allowed to be done against Tito, because "Tito would be angry." What a catastrophe: Tito would be angry and thus the almighty UK and the U.S.A. down, under the table. Tito would be angry: a beautiful slogan invented by the Madam of the brothel.

With Tito in the Red Orchestra was one other fellow Croatian. He was later a member of the Croatian diplomacy. The day that the supremo of the German Red Orchestra, Harro Schulze-Boysen, was arrested in Berlin, he was expecting "a Croatian diplomat from Zagreb." Who Tito's mole was in Zagreb is not yet declared, but a good many have been in his service. Among them were the last Head of the personnel section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Heinz, and the Head of the section of Latin countries, Lucijan. His secretary furnished the Communists regularly with the copies of diplomatic documents until her arrest.

The case of Stanko Mavrek has peculiar connotations. He was assistant to the Minister of Ustasa movement, Lovro Susie, until the end of the war. In 1946, in Rome, he became an agent of Stephen Clissold. Day by day he would give to Clissold, Chief of the Allied Commission for Criminals of War in Rome, the true and assumed identities of Croatian emigres. Clissold arrested some of them at the moment of their embarkation for Argentina. Among those arrested was Air Force General and former Commander of the Croatian Air Force, Vlado Kren alias Marko Rubin. All of them were extradited and executed by the Yugo-Bolsheviks.

One day Mavrek was arrested by the Italian police. Clissold was screening the bunch of arrestees. He put Mavrek in chains, *modo anglico*, and transported him clandestinely on a British Sub to Argentina. MB was also in the net of Clissold. It is not known whether Mavrek was recruited by

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Ozna and Clissold while still in Croatia or only later in Italy, in 1945. He could have been one of the Communist agents but not too high, a mole.

All Britons and so also Americans were working for the final goal: to put Tito on the throne of Bolshevik Yugoslavia. The operation started at Camp X in 1927-1928 or whenever before, brought all its fruits as planned by the British Secret Services genius. A portentous genius.

The British started the Yugo holocaust with taking Josip Broz Tito as their agent. Those who approve the Yugo holocaust must approve the British.

But the British found help for Tito's task as British Agent. With Tito-British Agent, there were other British Agents in the Yugo-Communist Party.

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2. Born May 7, 1892, in Kumrovec, Croatia: his parents Franjo Broz and Marija Javersek, a Slovenian.
3. Phyllis Auty. *Tito A Biography* (New York, 1970). p. 66. When mention is made of this author, it is for materials from this book. But Maclean mentioned it already in *Heretic* and V. Dedijer in *Tito*.
4. The Comintern, short for Communist International, often called the Third International, was founded in 1919 by Lenin to organize revolutions through Communist parties in every country. It is the international arm of Soviet foreign policy for espionage and propaganda. and, of course, terrorism.
5. William S. Stevenson, *Intrepid's Last Case* (New York. 1983), p. 180.
6. *Intrepid*, p. 19. between pp. 230-231.
7. February 18, 1984.
8. B. F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors*.

III

Kopinic and Gorkic

A most interesting detail from the period of the Spanish Civil War was revealed only recently after the little Titos started to reveal the dark side about each other in the past. There is a most famous Communist in Croatia, Josip Kopinic, a Slovenian who was the delegate of the Comintern in the Independent State of Croatia. That Kopinic, who participated in creating Tito, was the Deputy Commander of the Soviet Submarine C-6 during the Spanish war. That submarine was operating in the North Mediterranean off the Catalan coast.

About the episode he says: "After our forces in the north had been destroyed and the Submarine C-6 was sunk I was being transported to France by a British man-of-war. The Phalangists captured the man-of-war on its trek. I was sentenced to death by firing squad but I was saved from sure death by the sudden appearance of the British man-of-war "Queen Elizabeth."¹

All historians, Communist and non-Communist, rightist or leftist, conservative or liberal, should be interested in this episode to know more about the British commitment to the Bolshies. This book naturally is more interested in the red thread of the story of Josip Broz Tito as a British Agent whose activities the British Empire protected. It is also a sign that they protected other Communist agents as Josip Kopinic. Knowing the logic in espionage, one must by aristotelian logic conclude that Josip Kopinic was also a British Agent and that all activities of Josip Broz and Josip Kopinic were coordinated by the beautiful herd of intriguing chaps of the Communists in the British Secret Service, be they Britons or Croatians and Slovenians like Josip Broz, Josip Kopinic, and Milan Gorkic. Every student of Communist affairs knows that the vita of every Communist is full of mystery. Communism is not an open society and cheating and deceit are their religion. One of the most secret affairs of the Yugo-Bolshevik Party is in the person of Milan Gorkic. Much is written about him but little said.

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It was Tito himself who said to Djilas that Gorkic was a British Agent. In fact, Gorkic was in prison in England. It is a known fact that no foreign agent comes alive out of British prisons. If he does he comes (out) as British Agent.

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1. *Dosije Hebrang*, 78/79

IV

Olga

At this point we come to one other discovery of British agents in the Yugoslav-Bolshevik firmament. At a certain moment in the "woods" with Tito appears Olga. She was taken immediately into Tito's closest orbit and became his secretary, interpreter, and mistress, or in the reverse sequence. Who

brought her to Tito and how, no biographer ever mentions. If it is true that she comes to Tito in the time of the arrival of the British Military Mission in Yugoslavia, then that is it.

Everybody knew her by her father's name of Nincic, Olga Nincic, although she was married at that time to a Croatian from Bosnia, Avdo Humo, a leading Communist Moslem, and she was Jewish.

Robert Murphy calls her a "statuesque girl."

But her statuesque quality was not the reason for her high position with Tito. When a young girl, her father, Momcilo Nincic, an ultra conservative Serbian Jew and Minister in many a Yugoslav Royal Government, sent his statuesque Olga to England to a finishing school. Olga learned beautiful English and later on in Caserta with Tito on August 12, 1944 charmed Winston Churchill, Field Marshal Alexander, and everybody else down to the last tommie who saw her.

But the non-mystery ends and mystery begins there. Olga had returned home a Communist. Nothing has been written about how Olga became a Communist in England, as nothing is written to give indication of how Josip Broz was lured from his Croatia to Camp X near Toronto in Canada at the end of 1927 to become a certified British Agent who was taught terrorism and espionage in that most celebrated British school of terrorism and espionage with all its charismas.

Olga was a public figure at Belgrade University before 1941 because she was a leader of the Serbian golden youth turned Communist in the late thirties. Milovan Djilas was one of the eternal students at that University who never graduated as Olga Nincic did not, and as no other Communist

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student did at that time. After 1945 they all got high academic degrees without any exam ever.

At the meeting of Churchill and Tito at Caserta on August 12, 1944, Olga was present and participated in the round of meetings, luncheon, and dinner with other Tito cohorts. The task of translating both business and social exchanges fell in the main to Olga, as Tito's secretary. Churchill fell in love with Olga. So charmed and pleased with her was the Prime Minister that on his departure he gave her a little gold locket with inscription: "to Olga from Winston Churchill." This gesture, unusual for the occasion, raises the question: Did Churchill give the gold locket to Olga because of her great performance or because he wanted to tell her that she as a British Agent had performed to the best satisfaction of her supreme (British) boss.

That Communism was rampant among British golden youth at that time is well known and widely exposed. But about Tito and Olga and whoever else of that mold like Vladimir Velebit, nothing has been written. But as a rich girl from the far Balkans, in London, intelligent, Jewish, and statuesque, whose father was a Yugoslav Minister, Olga was a coveted target of the British Secret Services to be conquered and ordained in the British Secret Services as a Communist, probably exactly like Tito. Whether or not Olga was a Communist there is no way to say. Was she ordained as a British Agent and consecrated as Communist for that purpose nobody has ever said. It is sure that her father did not stop her from being Communist and never disavowed her, and that Olga, after the war and her life with Tito in the "woods", disappeared. Probably to England where she retired for the job well done.

Was Olga a Mata Hari?

Before she charmed the crusty bulldog Churchill she charmed many others (besides being Tito's mistress), and especially Wild Bill Donovan. After their first meeting at Tito's on January 24, 1941, in the "off-hours" she succeeded in forging one of the saddest events in Cetnik diplomacy.

When in the Spring of 1943 King Petar had talks with FDR at the White House he asked help for Cetniks. FDR told him to talk to Donovan and arranged their meeting. Petar pressed for the delivery of forty tons of concentrated food in Cairo and for a definite liaison of OSS with Draza.

Donovan on May 4, 1943 wrote to FDR that the distribution of food had definitely been planned and would be carried out when arrangements were completed, that he had requested the requisition of 284 tons of dehydrated food. He also informed that he had sent to Cairo two American Serbians, George Musulin and George Wuchinich, trained in Intelligence and subver-

OLGA

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sive activities. Each of these men, he wrote, was a qualified radio operator and had the necessary language qualifications.

The food containers holding 10 packages of five pounds each were wrapped in Serbian colors. Each package contained a message of FDR in Serbian. The food arrived in Cairo all right. But the Cetniks never saw it. It was side-tracked to Malta.

Two mysteries to be solved:

How the food could be sidetracked to Malta since the delivery to Cetniks was a presidential order. Not executing a presidential order, an order of the Supreme Commander, during the war is a crime that carries a death penalty by court martial. Nobody was court martialed.

Second mystery: Why Donovan (an army general) did not execute the order of the Supreme Commander. Only one plausible answer. During the off-hour meetings with the red head of good looks, Olga, Donovan in the position of Holofernes with Judith succumbed to the charming request not to deliver the dehydrated food wrapped in Serbian colors and carrying FDR's message in Serbian to the "free mountains" of Serbia.

I never heard of any greater success of Mata Hari and thus Olga looms larger than Mata Hari.

Other Communists were British Certified Agents. During 1943 SOE sent to Tito's "woods" several agents, graduates of Camp X, Yugoslav-born Canadians. On April 26, 1943 Tito sent from his foxhole a signal to his Soviet Control: "Please urgently verify that Communist Party of Canada, Yugoslav section, if P-, S-, A-, and E-, have been sent as part of British Mission here." P is for Pavle Pavic (or Pavicic). S for Alexander Simic, and E for Petar Erdeljic. Simic had been recruited separately from the main group from Canada. He was of mixed Serbian-British parentage. Erdeljic had fought in the Dimitrov battalion in the Spanish Civil War; Pavic had worked in a Vancouver shipyard. Both men settled in Yugoslavia after the war.

Tito's message indicated active political support from pro-Soviet agents within SOE."

V Donovan

Physics, geometry, and arithmetics play very decisive roles in the life of man. The intellect is a concomitant power. Most of the time. There are times when intellect overpowers all of them. That happens even from the time when the human being still walks as a little gorilla and, up until the time when there are some brains left.

Philosophy and psychology of life are interesting studies of the human being, but they are like history, they describe how the human did live, did react, and did think. Nothing of that gives any norm for the future. It can at its best give some indication of behavior in the future.

What Luigi Barzini, author of *The Italians*, wrote about Sicilians offers some insight:

Their capacity to grasp situations with lightning speed, invent a way out of intricate tangles, gauge exactly the relative power of contending parties, weave wonderfully complex intrigues, coldly control their smallest acts, emotions and words . . . bewilders continental Italians. The islanders are so expert, in fact, that they neutralize each other . . . each participant inventing diabolical schemes of his own to get the better of his opponent and, at the same time, foresee all possible schemes which his opponent will try to employ.'

The average student of history knows that in the second part of the 1930's in Italy Fascism ruled, and in Germany Nazism. The most characteristic trend of these two ideologies was warmongerism. The people wanted to look warlike and they behaved as if waging war, and the leaders every day spoke more about the war.

It started to be apparent that the Nazi-Fascist nations would wage the new war together. To that duo was later attached Japan, and thus the three powers called themselves the Powers of the Tripartite Pact. This block of nations would wage wars against France and England and their little satellites.

DONOVAN

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Who listened to the Nazi-Fascists heard that Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany will vanquish their enemies in the oncoming war. Listening to the French in France you heard that France is invincible. The English would not even accept any idea which did not rhyme with their concept of victory.

It was difficult to predict a victor in such a formalized duel, but the average European was aware of the existence of America, the United States of America and its vast arsenal of materials, goods, and

weapons. The verdict therefore was that the war would be won by those powers with whom the United States would side. Even the less than average European knew well that the United States would not side with the Nazi-Fascists and with Japan.

How soon the British came to the decision to ask the United States for help probably is not established, but the United Kingdom was so poor in armament and in economic goods that to everybody it was clear that it alone could not wage a prolonged war. Therefore, the most urgent political, practical necessity was to bring America into the war, or at least induce her to declare neutral hostility to Germany. The British knew that the heart of the United States is in England. For all Americans of Anglo-Saxon heritage England is the mother country, and these are the ruling class in the United States; therefore all vicissitudes of England are part of the American Anglo-Saxon psyche. But the United States has its constitutional rules and nobody in the nation can ignore them. These constitutional rules have to be either changed or circumvented. In most minds of the civilized world the aphorism goes that the law is there to be broken, or if not broken at least circumvented. The British had to step into action to see how the United States should be induced to action.

On June 21, 1940 a little man arrived in New York on the British liner *Britannic*. He rushed to check into the St. Regis Hotel. Still in his traveling clothes, he called his old buddy, W.J.D. — William Joseph Donovan — at his office at number 2 Wall Street. The little man was a well-known Canadian millionaire, by name William S. Stephenson. From Churchill he got the name "Intrepid" and he was under direct command of the Foreign Office and thus of Winston Churchill.

Donovan rushed to St. Regis Hotel. Within the hour, Intrepid and Wild Bill met together in the suite of the Canadian.

At that time Donovan had not yet begun to organize the American secret services. At the request of President Roosevelt, Donovan had to start *ex nihilo*. There was not any American organized secret service. Individual departments had their information and research divisions; there was FBI,

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but nothing similar to the British Secret Service or the Soviet Communist secret services or any other similar secret service.

The rapidity with which the meeting of the two spies occurred indicates that they knew each other. Not much is written about the background of that acquaintance, but from then on the two men were as Siamese twins of the American and British Secret Services. It was clear that it was the Americans who were to learn from the British, because they knew nothing and the British knew everything. The most spectacular British disciple of all ages was Wild Bill. A rich lawyer, intelligent, Irish, he learned whatever had to be learned and with the power of the United States at his back, he soon started to create history.

When he was appointed Premier of the United Kingdom, Churchill, at a dinner at his house, had appointed Stephenson supremo British terrorist and spy in the United States. Not much was known about the future Intrepid or about his mind, but the mysterious Stephenson, little Intrepid, slowly had to show his colors.

On January 28, 1941, the following was noted in a memorandum at the Department of State's European Division.

When Mr. Rumbold of the British Embassy was in the Department today in connection with other matters, I mentioned the attached note which we have received from the Embassy in regard to the appointment of a "Director of Security Coordination in the United States." I told Mr. Rumbold that this title was not particularly revealing as regards the actual duties which Mr. Stephenson would be performing, and I wondered if he could enlighten me further on the matter. Mr. Rumbold said that Mr. Stephenson's work was in connection with anti-sabotage protection at ports and also the protection of British shipments from American factories to the docks. As a matter of fact, Mr. Rumbold said, Mr. Stephenson has been carrying out this function for some time under the title of Passport Control Officer in New York. The suggestion regarding the new title had come from "your own people" in order to make his relations with them at ports easier, since his work was obviously broader than that of a passport control officer.

It is believed that there is no objection to Mr. Stephenson's activities since he is presumably cooperating with our own people. It is believed, however, that Mr. Fletcher Warren's office should secure a detailed report on his activities and the officers, federal or local, with whom Mr. Stephenson may be associated in his work.²

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Quite a bit later we have more documents about Stephenson. On February 26, 1941, the Special Agent in charge, R. L. Bannerman of the Department of State in New York, wrote to Mr. Clark information concerning W. S. Stephenson, Director of Security Coordination in the U.S:

Mr. Stephenson now appears to be engaged in setting up his organization of Security Coordination, and it is believed that he has established an office at Rockefeller Center. He is not known to any of the Federal officials or agencies in New York that deal with anti-sabotage protection nor have any of the Federal agencies ever heard of him. Some of these agencies at my request inquired of him and the following information was gathered.

Up to the present time all anti-sabotage protection work in New York City both on piers and on board British ships has been handled by Capt. Bennett and Capt. R. V. Youd and others, as Consular Marine Inspectors of the Ministry of Shipping, which officers have been attached to the British Consulate. These officers cooperate with and regularly consult with Commander Bayliss of the Coast Guard, Captain of the Port of New York, and they draw up orders for the posting of guards, handling of ships, identification of crews and personnel, supervision of loadings of cargoes and other necessary precautions. Armed guards are hired by the British officers and are posted on the advice of Commander Bayliss. Mr. Sackett, Agent in Charge of the F.B.I. in New York is fully informed of this work at all times and is only called upon when investigation is necessary. These British officers also make regulations for the British ships leaving New York for the safety of the cargoes at sea.

All the above work comes under the authority of the Captain of the Port, who by law, supervises the movement of and handling of explosives, materials etc., for British ships and at the same time organizes anti-sabotage protection.

There are also a number of British officers connected with the British Purchasing Commission and the British Consulate who supervise the anti-sabotage protection of British war orders from the factories to the port, where it then comes under the authority of Commander Bayliss and the Consular Marine Inspectors. It is believed that these officers hire armed guards for the protection of the shipments to the port, and it is believed that such officers arrange local police protection wherever the shipment may be.

At no time in the past months has Mr. Stephenson ever made himself known to the Federal officials concerned in this work, nor has his name ever been mentioned as having anything to do with such work.

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It has now been ascertained that Mr. Stephenson will become the Director of such work for the entire U.S. with his office in New York, and all officers now engaged in such work will come under his control. He will coordinate the work of the different British agencies concerned and all agencies will be under his immediate authority. Mr. Stephenson is gathering a staff of liaison officers who will cooperate with the Federal agencies throughout the country in the handling of such work, and it is assumed that these officers will be those who have already established their Federal contacts. It was stated that Mr. Stephenson is not to be called upon personally by the Federal officials in New York or other cities, but that his staff will handle such matters, while he (Stephenson) will direct the national efforts of the organization.

Many of the British officers in New York did not know Mr. Stephenson and did not know anything about his new position.

Col. Constant of G-2, although he did not know Mr. Stephenson personally, stated that the following would be Mr. Stephenson's scope of work. It is not known where this information came from but it sounds as though it came from a notification either from this government or from the British authorities.

1. To assure the security of British materials purchased on government orders, covering the purchasing, production and transportation to a shipping port, and to issue regulations for the security of such shipments at sea. This to be accomplished with the assistance of the F.B.I, and the local police.
2. To establish anti-sabotage security with the local police and the F.B.I, cooperating.
3. A number of British Security officers will be appointed and they will work in cooperation with the F.B.I.
4. To assure security of supplies from factories to the ports and the loadings of such on the ships, to be accomplished with the assistance of the local police and the F.B.I.

As yet Mr. Stephenson is not known to either the New York Police or the New York office of the F.B.I., although the British officers as Consular Marine Inspectors are well known, which officers are now doing this particular work.

Mr. Stephenson has so far refused to reveal the exact whereabouts of his office and the entire matter has been handled with the utmost secrecy, however, his private phone number is Circle 6-8580. This covers all information available without making a direct inquiry.³

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Although Churchill was running Stephenson, Stephenson still was under orders of the Director of British Intelligence, one of the highest appointments in Great Britain. This organization in the United States was named BSC: British Security Coordination.

The directors of British Intelligence are confirmed in their appointment by the Crown. Their jobs are "within the gift of the Monarch" by long tradition.

Stephenson immediately extended to Donovan an invitation to come to England and to talk to Churchill. Because of the neutral status of the United States, President Roosevelt had to approve, which he did.

Already on July 14, 1940, Donovan flew all the way at British expense on a Pan American clipper flying boat to London, via Lisbon, and descended in Claridge's Hotel. Donovan saw everybody: King George VI, Prime Minister Churchill, the Chiefs of Staff, the War Cabinets, and the Commanders-in-Chief.

Understanding with Churchill was easy because Churchill wanted everything and Donovan promised everything. Winston Churchill was impressionable, emotional, of quick intelligence, with enormous strength of will. Some think that his bulldog look depicts faithfully the canine qualities of that Marlborough Duke.

Churchill remembered that Lord Grey of Falladon, the Foreign Secretary in the first half of World War I, had told him that the United States was like "a gigantic boiler. Once the fire is lighted under it there is no limit to the powers it can generate."

Since Donovan did not ask for money Churchill gave the order to the British services to obey all demands of the American. The supremo of all British Secret Services was Colonel Stewart Menzies. He was seven years younger than Donovan and described as a gentle, charming man, an offspring of very rich parents, friends of Edward VII.

The British Secret Services do not show any splendor from the outside and less inside. Menzies' headquarters were at 52 Broadway guarded by ancient pensioners in blue uniforms with brass buttons with the inscription, *Honi Soit Qui Mai Y Pense* ("Evil be to him who evil thinks."). What a parody. What but evil is thought behind the walls of those grimy office blocks opposite the St. James's Park tube station.

Donovan heard all British desiderata and on August 4, 1940, was back in New York by the British flying boat "Clare." The report to Secretary Knox amounted to a single sentence: "The British would fight on; they would not surrender their fleet; their morale was high, but their equipment was deficient."⁴

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President Roosevelt had just won his nomination for a third term as president and was on a railroad tour of New England. Donovan was invited to join the President and they had long talks. The result of the talks and the research that followed on American constitutional rules resulted in the President's

decision to transfer the destroyers to the United Kingdom. In justifying his actions, the President said that by his exchanging destroyers for bases on eight British islands in the Atlantic, giving the United States those bases and putting the destroyers in British hands, the American security would be enhanced rather than diminished.

With that success in his pocket, Donovan was invited to come back to England. In London, the Prime Minister invited Donovan to 10 Downing Street; they lunched together and spent a good part of the afternoon in the Prime Minister's office. This meeting became a milestone in the most intimate relationship between the two. Donovan was especially impressed by Churchill's visions of European rebellion against the Nazi-Fascist powers, "to set Europe alight," as Churchill liked to express it. This gave the idea to Donovan to work on setting Europe on fire.

Donovan started to work feverishly on the project, and on St. Sylvester 1940, in a 4-engine Sunderland maritime reconnaissance flying boat, he landed in Gibraltar. Lord Louis Mountbatten was his host and showered Donovan with royal welcome. The heart of the poor boy from the Irish first ward of Buffalo at the sounds of "Old Glory" and "God save the King," riding in a state Rolls Royce flying American and British flags from its hood, was in heaven.

For the next two months Donovan, accompanied by Churchill's personal aide, Col. Vivian Dykes, toured all British formations and installations between Baghdad and Madrid. Among the stops there were those in Athens, Belgrade, and Sophia. Our interests center on Donovan's visitation to Belgrade. On January 22, 1941, Donovan arrived in Belgrade. His diary of his tour notes the following dates of his itinerary: Dec. 26, 1940 Left London; Mar. 3, 1941 Return to London. Jan. 15, 1941, Flew from Cairo to Athens; Jan. 18, 1941, Flew to Salonika; Jan. 20, Arrived to Sofia; Jan. 22, arrived in Belgrade; Jan. 25, Flew from Belgrade to Salonika.

From Salonika he travelled via Skopje and Nis.

We give the following pages of his Diary:

22.1.41. Sofia-Belgrade.

D. was out early to see the Military Cadet School at 0915 and then went

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on for his crucial interview with King Boris (see separate record).

I spent the morning clearing up with Alick Poss and chasing round for our tickets and my passport which was lost for some time between our Legation and the Turkish in the hands of their slowest moving passenger. At 1200 Rendel showed me a telegram from Cairo urging D. to return as quickly as possible and see Wegand. I promised to discuss the matter with him during our journey to Belgrade. After collecting our baggage and paying the bills at the hotel I got down to the station and D. arrived with Earle shortly before the train left. There was a swarm of newspaper men waiting to see him off. He had just had time after his interview with the King to dictate a record and have a few words with Rendel. I went off to collect some food for the journey and when I returned I found him looking as worried as I have ever seen him. He asked me whether I had got his wallet with his passport and money in it. He had not got it on him and we made a frantic search through all his bags and belongings in the train while someone went off to the Legation to see whether he had dropped it there after returning from the Palace. All searchings were in vain, however, and we had to go off without it at 1400. The Police were to be warned at the frontier to square things with the Yugoslav officials and let him through without a passport.

On the train was Palmer (lately U.S. Consul-General at Beirut and his wife and son). She is a Canadian and they had known Salisbury Jones very well while he was with his Mission in Serbia. D. told me all about his interview with the King to whom he certainly spoke most frankly. We continued our discussions on the Balkan situation as a whole, which we had started on the journey from Salonika to Sofia.

We got through the frontier with no trouble at all. In fact, it was easier than when D. had a passport as we were invited in for coffee with the Police. He has become a very well-known person since Earle launched him as a public figure in the Balkan press which D. says he did in the best American political party style.

We had a very comfortable journey in a wagon-lit, arriving at Belgrade at 2200 where D. was immediately set upon by a crowd of press men and photographers. I made an unobserved get-away by the other door of the carriage having spotted the Legation messenger Oakley, who took charge of my

bags. I sat up till 01 15 talking to Campbell who remembered me from the old days in the C.I.D. D. was staying with Lane the United States Minister.

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23.1.41.

Belgrade

I got off a telegram to Wavell in the morning saying that D. wanted to complete his tour as planned but would be willing to cut it if it was considered essential. D. had various interviews and lunched with Prince Paul.

It was obvious that if we were to get back to Greece to do a tour round the Albanian front, we should have to fly back to do it in the time. Rankine the commercial secretary in the U.S. Legation undertook to find out what could be done about getting down to Salonika where we might be picked up by a Greek plane if necessary. At 1700 however he told me that it would very difficult to arrange and he had therefore booked sleeping berths on the railway instead. However, Macdonald (Air Attache) said that there should be no difficulty about getting a civil aircraft at all. As the American Minister wished his people to fix it all up I had to leave it to them, but asked D. to make sure and try to get something out of the Yugoslav air people when he saw them next day. I had spent most of the day with Macdonald, Dew, (First Secretary), and Garron (Second Secretary) giving them news from home and collecting information. Turned in early with rather a sore throat.

24.1.41

D. had interviews with Pecic (Minister of War), Kotic (Chief of Staff), Luteroti (Minister of Marine), and Simonic (Head of the Air Force) and visited the aerodrome. Simonic impressed him very favourably and the Yugoslav Air Force though small seemed very efficient indeed. Simonic is all out to fight the Germans at the first possible opportunity; he is said to be going to succeed the present Minister for Air very shortly.

I had a long talk with Lethbridge the P.CO. who seemed a capable fellow — an ex-mining engineer with large experience in Yugoslavia. I also discussed with Macdonald the D. Organisation which was apparently in a very bad state in Grand's time but now shows some signs of improvement. This corroborates what Alec Ross told me in Belgrade.

I lunched at the American Minister's house and met Mr. Lane and Colonel Fortier the Military Attache. Fortier comes from Louisiana and is a curious chap — I am afraid I found him an awful bore. In the evening about 1930 we got a call from Athens suggesting that we should go direct to the Albanian front from Salonika unless it would be possible to land at Monastir which would save us a good deal of road travel as it is quite close to Fiorina. They made it quite clear that there could be no question of coming back to Athens before going up to the Front so we had

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to do a quick hustle to get hold of some bedding for the trip. Mapplebeck (our Assistant Air Attache) was very helpful over this and fixed me up with some blankets and a pair of ski-ing boots and trousers as I had nothing but a town suit of clothes and shoes with me.

I dined that night at the Lanes with D. and Campbell as the other guest. Mrs. Lane is a very soul who lent me a sweater and also produced some flea powder in case we needed it in Albania. Fortier brought round his valise for Donovan. My throat was no better when I went to bed in spite of a visit to a doctor in a clinic opposite our Legation who said that it only needed a gargle.

25.1.41 Belgrade-Koritza

We turned out early and reached the airport at 0640. Aeroput, the Yugoslav civil air line produced free of charge for D. a very nice Lockheed 14 in which we took off at 0700. D. told me that the German Air Attache had also offered to fly him down to Salonika but he had politely declined. We had a good trip round in fine weather, passing over the Serbian War Memorial soon after leaving Belgrade. This is an unknown warriors tomb right on top of the small mountain. Very soon we had to climb a good deal higher over bare mountains and very rugged country until we reached the Vardar Plain where the mountains ceased abruptly. Flying over the Plane we could see the trenches which had been held during the last war.

We landed at Salonika about 1000 and were met by a deputation of Greek Officers of various sorts. Lieutenant-Colonel Papachelas, Chief Intelligence Officer in the Headquarters at Salonika was

attached to us as Liaison Officer. He is an engineer by profession, speaking good French, and has apparently been mixed up a good deal in politics in the past. Two cars were produced, one a large Pacard 8. In the second car was Lieutenant Tselephos of the Motor Transport Corps and two spare drivers, also all our kit.

After calling in the local military Headquarters for some maps and meeting the General and his Chiefs of Staff, we got away about 10.45 on the Fiorina Road which leads out westwards over the flat Varda Plain. Our driver was a stout bull-necked Thracian Lance Corporal who evidently intended to get to Fiorina in record time. The road was very greasy and very soon the inevitable happened. A jam of country carts appeared and the Terrible Turk (as we had nicknamed the driver) had to make a choice between ramming one head on or driving into the tail of the other. Fortunately he chose the latter and we skidded into it at about 12 miles an hour.

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The horse went down in a heap and lay there as though he was glad of the rest; the old boy who was driving fell back into the cart and the two men sitting on the tailboard got out backwards into the road on either side of the car. One of them who looked like a townsman dressed in a pair of pinstriped trousers made rather a fuss and lay groaning in the mud for some minutes before he was persuaded that no great damage had been done to him. By this time the horse also had been induced to get up on his legs again. The back axle of the cart had been damaged and a large piece of wood broken off from it which our party proceeded to use to straighten up one of the front wings of the cart which had been bent down onto the tyre. After a few minutes we got away again, the Terrible Turk having been thrown out into the other car to his great disgust.

The road over the plain has only a narrow metal strip in the centre with slimy mud each side. It did not look as if it would stand up to much heavy traffic. The plain itself is quite featureless except for occasional large tumuli. About 1400 we reach Edessa where the plain ends abruptly and the mountains begin with quite a steep escarpment. Edessa is quite a fair sized town, principally an agricultural centre. There is much cultivation of mulberry trees for silk in this area. We stopped for lunch in Edessa at a cafe and received a message while there from the British Consul in Salonika to say that a telegram had been received from Cairo agreeing to our making the full tour as planned.⁵

By this time Roosevelt was giving acceptance to the British lead in adopting a policy in Yugoslavia. The Donovan trip was made and organized on the specific wish of Churchill who sent his personal aide to accompany him.

The American Minister in Yugoslavia, Bliss Lane, did not look too favorably on the visit when he learned that Donovan was coming, not through U.S. diplomatic channels but through the British Legation. He made it his responsibility to oversee the schedule and activities of Donovan while in Belgrade. He took him as a guest to his own house and mapped out the schedule for the two-day visit of January 23 and 24.

A summary of the official engagements noted in the Donovan diary show a schedule to acquaint Donovan with the significant persons and activities in Yugoslavia.

On the first day Lane accompanied Donovan as he met Prime Minister Cvetkovic', held a press conference, lunched with Prince Paul, visited the tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Avala, and had conferences with the Croatian leader Vladko Macek, deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Cincar-Markovic.

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On his second day, January 24, accompanied by Fortier of the American Legation, Donovan continued to meet personnel and visit installations. He visited General Pesic, Minister of War; General Kosic, Chief of the General Staff; General Simovic, Chief of Aviation, and Admiral Luterotti, Chief of Naval Operations. He inspected the military academy and general staff school, as well as the 6th aviation regiment, chief preserve of General Mirkovic. He lunched with British Minister Ronald Campbell and his aides, held interviews with American newsmen and ended the day at a dinner party given by his host in Belgrade.

On January 25, still accompanied by Dykes, Churchill's aide, he left for Salonika where he would continue his introduction to the political and war scene.

Historians of Donovan mention that one never knew whither Donovan went and from whence he came. What was always crystal clear was that Donovan had been there, wherever it was. But somehow his women knew exactly about his arrival, be it in Cairo or Algiers.

In Washington that was much easier. Whenever his eyes would meet those of an attractive OSS woman the eyes would just seem to click and Donovan and the girl would somehow find opportunity to go off together. The OSS say that OSS women had affairs with their general, but they never admit that they themselves did.

Let us mention at this moment that Donovan was very rich, a former lawyer, and married to a rich wife. The budget of his organization was very high and money was spent without much worries. At the end of the war there was much of a problem to approve all his expenses, and not all expenses were approved. When his organization, OSS — Office of Strategic Services — was abolished and Donovan not quite ceremoniously dismissed by President Truman in the fall of 1945, Donovan had to sell all his wealth to pay debts incurred as the director of OSS. He had to retreat to the property of his wife on Cape Cod and live on her budget.

The ceremonial lunch with Prince Paul Regent on the day of Donovan's visit in Belgrade was not among his successes. He did not succeed to lure him to fight the Germans. Donovan even did not know that almost at the same time when he was lunching with Prince Paul in his residence, the White Palace, the Prime Minister Dragisa Cvetkovic and his foreign minister, Aleksandar Cincar-Markovic, left Belgrade to see Adolph Hitler at Berchtesgaden.

A much more fruitful visitation Donovan had in Zemun, the city across the river Sava from Belgrade to see the Commander of the Yugoslav Airforce, General Dusan Simovic at his headquarters. Donovan showed to

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Simovic President Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" speech of January 6, 1941, as well as a telegram signed by Roosevelt: "The United States is looking not merely at the present but to the future, and any nation which tamely submits on the grounds of being quickly overrun would receive less sympathy from the world than a nation which resists, even if this resistance can be continued for only a few weeks."

This is what almost all historians of Donovan register in their books: the lunch with Prince Paul on January 23 and payment of a visit the next day to Simovic. They were on January 23 and 24. Donovan left Belgrade on January 25 at 6:00 A.M. in an aircraft for Salonika. Between January 23 and January 25 was January 24 which he spent in Zemun. Should one reckon that on January 24 Donovan relaxed, enjoying himself in the Belgrade restaurants and night clubs famous for rich food especially duckling soup and Serbian bean soup. Well, no, Donovan did not relax. He accomplished that day his most brilliant stroke — the fulfillment of his mission in Belgrade, to set "Europe alight." He met with Josip Broz.

The only historian ever to mention the meeting of Wild Bill with Communist leaders is William Stevenson in his book, *A Man called Intrepid The Secret War*.

The following writing of W. Stevenson is of paramount historical importance:

There was one group in Yugoslavia capable of resistance: Tito's Communists. Tito was then only a name. Some said he did not exist at all. He had returned from the Soviet Union a year earlier, disguised as Spiridon Mekas and carrying a British passport issued in Canada. How this came about is still classified information. Tito had been deeply disturbed by Stalin's treatment of other East European Communist leaders. ("When I went to Moscow I never knew whether I would come back alive," he said later.) While other Communist leaders followed Moscow's policy of placating Hitler, Tito had spent the past few months preparing for war. He was getting no guidance from Stalin. He did get guidance through intermediaries from Donovan. Regardless of political allegiances, said Donovan, anyone resisting fascism would get outside support. Yugoslavia must not collaborate with the Nazis. A sellout would relieve Hitler of the need to tie down security forces in the Balkans, and thus both the Balkans and Russia would be lost. The message was quite clear: "If Prince Paul kneels to the Nazis, revolt."⁶

The Yugoslav situation was very well known in Washington and in London. This situation, the relations of Yugoslavia with the Nazi-Fascist

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Powers, Germany and Italy, had been discussed quite frequently and sometimes openly. In London, British diplomacy heard from Prince Paul that he must endure friendly relations with those powers because Yugoslavia was incapable of waging wars against them. As the decision to join the Tripartite Pact was closing in on Prince Paul, the British increased their pressure. All talks went aground with the British answer that they could not rescue Yugoslavia with any help. Therefore, Donovan's going to Belgrade had no chance of success with the pro-Axis element.

Neither could he promise any help to the Yugos. All that he could offer was to "set Europe alight." But he could learn from the British, and he surely did, that the British Secret Service was buying Yugoslav politicians and army officers to resort to insurgency. And that is why he met with Simovic in secret. The government, of course, knew of it because as usual the government penetrated British Secret Services with the spies of Double Cross. Belgrade could be a mastermind of double-crossing. Nowhere since Byzantium had double-crossing been such a lucrative art. A small specimen:

One morning in February 1944 Lord William Scott told me that he had a very important statement to make on the authority of the British government to the members of the government in exile at our meeting taking place that day. Churchill, he said, was to announce in Parliament on 24 February that the British government had decided to transfer all support from Mihailovic to Tito because he alone was fighting the Germans. Pandemonium broke out and we were submitted to a barrage of questions, most of which Scott could not answer beyond saying that British officers had investigated the position in Yugoslavia and the British government believed their reports and had decided to act upon them. The government in exile had brought with them a considerable number of advisers and assistants. Within a fortnight following Scott's announcement most of them had transferred their allegiance to the partisans. Amongst them was an able and enthusiastic young royalist. Many years later, when visiting a hotel on the Adriatic coast for an evening drink with some Parliamentary colleagues, I was greeted by the manager with a hug and kiss on both cheeks as he said 'How nice to see you John, after all these years'. I could not think where I had seen him before until he said over a drink 'I always was a good Communist, you know'. Then I remembered the enthusiastic young royalist. Somehow I think he was a Vicar of Bray rather than an under-cover agent!⁷

How much Donovan understood Serbians and Croatians, he, in the mold of Winston Churchill, understood well the "gun for the Hun." He put it

differently; "Recruit Communists to kill Krauts." Here he found them. Even though Josip Broz was a certified British Agent, and Donovan knew it officially, for all appearances, he was a Communist leader of a "Communist group ready to fight the Krauts."

About the Donovan visit Arthur Bliss Lane on January 27, 1941, sent to the Secretary of State, the following telegram:

Colonel Donovan's visit here has been subject to much speculation locally due to inability or unwillingness of public to believe his mission was primarily informative in scope. His visits under British auspices to England and British controlled areas and his avoidance of Axis territory made it clear to Government, prior to his arrival, that his mission had British blessing. The Minister for Foreign Affairs who invariably mollifies Axis and condones its actions gave us impression of endeavoring to snub Donovan by delaying to receive him even after interviews had been granted by Prince Paul, Prime Minister and Macek. One diplomatic colleague informs me that Minister complained to him regarding Donovan's visit indicating it would compromise Yugoslavia.

It is significant that although at request of reporters Legation gave press complete list of Donovan's calls here no mention was made in local press of his having been received by Prince or by leading Army Navy officials.

While Donovan's visit may have been distasteful to appeasement group it had good effect on military element which now appreciates that material assistance we are giving Great Britain and Greece is because these nations did not surrender without struggle. Likewise, it bolstered spirit of resistance of Prime Minister and Macek. As to effect on Prince Regent, I shall not be able to say until my next interview with him. Even then I doubt whether he will commit himself unreservedly; his position is so delicate today that a false step may bring disaster to him and his country. His discreet prudence is, therefore, entirely understandable. On other hand if he should realize that our Government is interested

in maintaining political integrity of this country his hand would be greatly strengthened when critical moment arrives.⁸

Only on July 11, 1941 did President Roosevelt create the new office, the Coordinator of Information (COI) under Col. William Donovan.

On June 13, 1942, Roosevelt changed the name of COI to OSS, Office of Strategic Services under JCS, and Donovan as director was created Brigadier General on February 17, 1943 and later in autumn Major General at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Before July 11, 1941, Donovan was called by many titles: secret agent of FDR, emissary of FDR and others.

Whatever in 1941 Donovan knew in advance about a possible coup d'etat in Belgrade, opposition to Prince Paul, and the subservience of "revolutionaries" to British money, it definitely was not all that WJD wanted and planned.

Donovan knew that there was one group in Yugoslavia which would resist any agreement with the Germans on accommodations. This group were the Communists and Josip Broz was their supreme boss.

Let us contemplate the protocol of that Belgrade visit in January 1941. Donovan arrived in Belgrade. He was received by the U.S. Minister in Belgrade, Arthur Bliss Lane. The minister was host in the Legation to Donovan. He arranged the lunch with the Prince. After lunch the American liaison with the British Secret Service put Donovan in touch with the British. They took him secretly (everybody in Belgrade knew it) the next day to Simovic, and, of course, to Tito.

During the visit Col. "Wild Bill" Donovan had established close relations with Simovic and some think that that encouraged the coup on March 27. It is likely that Simovic maintained the contact, according to SD's (Sicherheitsdienst) South East European Affairs officer, Wilhelm Hoettl, who also asserts that Simovic had a close liaison with both British and Russian intelligence.

On January 25, Minister Bliss Lane bids farewell to Donovan and Donovan leaves. That much for the protocol. But protocol could not help Donovan in arranging the meeting with Josip Broz (not yet Tito). Josip Broz was in the underground, in illegality, because the Communist Party in Yugoslavia was outlawed. Josip Broz himself was most of the time in prison when in Yugoslavia, or he stayed abroad: Vienna, Paris, and especially in Moscow or other places of the Soviet Union. In 1940 he came back to Yugoslavia from the Soviet Union on his British passport as Spiridon Mekas.

He had many other names and alias including, Rudi, Spiridon Mekas, John Alexander Carlson, Oto, Viktor, Timo, Georgevic, Jiricek, Slavko Babic, Josef Tomanek and Ivan Kostajnek; when he went to Moscow he was known as Valter. and this is the name he used in all his communications with the Comintern, and the name by which Stalin always knew him. Tito was the name he used in Yugoslavia and which eventually became world famous. He said himself that the name Tito had no significance beyond being a name with literary connections in his native Zagorje.

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About Tito's stay in Yugoslavia, it is known that he mostly stayed in Croatia and especially in Zagreb. On April 6, 1941 he was living in a small house in the suburbs of Zagreb with Herta Has. Herta was his second wife. The previous one, Pelagija was sent by the Party to her native Omsk with their son, Zarko, in 1929. Soon after the marriage to Herta in 1941, his son Aleksandar or Misko, as Tito called him, was born.

It was difficult to recognize him because almost every day he changed his clothes, or color of his hair, or wig. There was always some suspicion about a man from Kumrovec who would dye his hair. In Kumrovec dyeing hair was a perversity. To say that somebody "farba kosu" sounded worse than to say he was a chicken thief, a big criminal. He also changed his name, although he was mostly known as Inzenjer Walter (Inzenjer being the title for those who have a Master degree in engineering), a very respectable academic title, like any other, professor, doctor, etc.

Therefore on January 24, 1941, there was no protocol, But poof! Donovan meets Josip Broz in Belgrade in the public square?

Well, no. Donovan did not meet Tito on the public square; he would have been arrested together with Josip Broz and put in jail. By all idiosyncracies of the underground and of illegality, nobody knew where J. Broz was. Probably in Belgrade everybody knew, as usually in Belgrade everybody knows everything.

Minister Bliss Lane was not at all a hospitable host to Donovan, mostly ignored him, and he, according to the reports to be found in the archives, reported little about the visit.

Who then knew about Tito's whereabouts?

Well, of course, the British Secret Service.

How did the British Secret Service know the whereabouts of Tito. Easy to say — to know. Josip Broz was a British Agent.

Also, to meet Donovan in Belgrade, Josip Broz had to know well in advance. We know that Donovan had been in London and that Col. Vivian Dykes was his constant companion at that time. When the British informed Tito about Donovan's whereabouts — from Cairo, from Athens, from Sofia — is not registered or not yet published. William Stevenson writes that Tito "did get guidance through intermediaries from Donovan." There were no American intermediaries. These intermediaries could only be British. British Secret Service had a plethora of terrorists and spies in Belgrade. How many of them had been in contact with Josip Broz we do not know because neither they nor anybody else has said or written. Tito never mentioned it or wrote about it. As we could understand from Stevenson, most of this is "still classified information." Stevenson's book

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Intrepid was published in 1975 with its startling information about Tito. There was never any denial of Stevenson's revelations by Tito, still living at the time, or by his stooges, or for that matter any comment at all. By Aristotelian logic we must conclude that such information does exist and one day will be declassified. *Chi vivra, vedra.*

Therefore, Donovan comes to Belgrade and he meets Josip Broz. Josip Broz was ready to help Churchill and Donovan "to set Europe alight." It was the best way for Josip Broz to start a Communist revolution and to create a Communist Yugoslavia.

The Yugo-Communist Party had no means. Members of the Party were workers or poor. All workers in Yugoslavia were (and they still are) poor. The tremendous expenses for only the upkeep of the luxurious existence of Josip Broz could not have been paid by the Communists. Stalin never gave any penny to any Communist. The boss of the Comintern, Dimitrov, was very stingy in giving out money for the foreign Communists. They paid expenses for the Communists in Moscow when they came for training and schooling but that also was miserable. Most of the time Moscow would send them to Siberia and similar spas.

And lo and behold! Josip Broz in all his sartorial splendor in Belgrade to meet Donovan who was never famous for his sartorial art. And still his splendor was from money which Josip Broz was getting from Donovan's outfit, at this moment the British Secret Service.

It was money from the British Secret Service which was poured into the coffers of Josip Broz's outfit, and Josip Broz was starting to pay back dividends.

W. Stevenson's statement that at Donovan's arrival "there was one group in Yugoslavia capable of resistance: Tito's Communists," either was a prophecy, if it is not post festum writing, or simply the knowledge that the British Secret Service had at that time. We did not have information of the British Secret Services about the "one group in Yugoslavia capable of resistance" simply because there was not much Communism in Yugoslavia at that time; they numbered only a few thousand, mostly disorganized and dispirited workers. Only today we read about this "one group . . . capable of resistance."

According to Yugo-Communist statistics there were: 1500 Communists in 1937. 3000 Communists in 1939.

Although these statistics give 6,455 Communists for 1940 and 12,000 in 1941, it is a simple lie.

Everybody knows that in 1939 and in 1941 the Yugo-Communist Party lost almost to the last one in Croatia. There was

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almost never a real statistic of Communists in Serbia or Montenegro. They are the greatest masters of deceit and never is anything they say the truth.

There were never more than 3000 Communists in Yugoslavia.

The Yugo-Communist statistics say that 3000 Communists survived the guerrilla war, 1941-1944.

That means that in 1941 (and 1940) there were 3000 Communists. They were ministers, generals, commissars, bosses. They sent others to fight for them and these innocent peasants and mountaineers were falling for them. Few survived. Those "survivors" were Cetniks in Montenegro who surfaced in 1944 as Communist fighters, "survivors."

For the number of Communist youth, they give 2000-3000 in 1935. There is no statistic of 2000-3000. Either 2000 or 3000, but not both. For 1938 they give 9000 and for 1939, 17,800. Baloney. Simple lies.

There were never more than 2000 Communist youth in Yugoslavia because when the guerrilla started in 1941, there was one youth: Lola Ribar, son of Ivan Ribar (not a Communist). Both were named Fischer, before changing their original Fischer to the Croatian Ribar (fisherman).

The Communist historian Ljubo Boban writes.

In this period [March 27, 1941] the Communist Party of Yugoslavia pointing to the danger that the country could be involved in a war, be it on the side of western countries, or on the side of the Axis powers [the party] decisively emphasized that the exit for Yugoslavia was not in pseudo-neutrality but in the cooperation with the USSR, towards which the Yugoslav regime was leading the insincere politics. From the Party documents of that time it is evident that the leaning of Yugoslavia toward the Axis nations was perceived in time and that it would end with the adhesion of the Tripartite Pact. Very live agitation was led against such orientation. In the Party documents very much pointed to the danger of war menacing Yugoslavia and created willingness for the resolute resistance to the aggression. In harmony with that was condemned the policy of the regime which was debilitating the resistance strength of the nation.⁹

The mysteries of the "emissaries" at this place was unveiled by the same author of the book who in 1983 published *Intrepid's Last Case*. On Page 180, he writes: "He [Stephenson] was also on speaking terms with Tito, partly because of his pre-war business interests in Yugoslavia."

Since Tito never was a business man, Stephenson could not have talked business with him. Since Stephenson always was an intelligence man, private or whatever, he talked to Tito intelligence. Since (little) William

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Stephenson was St. Christopher to William (big, wild) Donovan, it was he who was liaison with Tito for Donovan. It was he, with others, who arranged the meeting of Tito and Donovan on January 24, 1941.

The power of Sir William over Tito was so overwhelming, that at his request Tito gave peremptory orders to settle the question of disgruntled Canadian Communists of Serbian descent. Tito instantly gave the order to fire the chief of police who had messed up things. What a power: Stephenson blinks his eye, Tito fires his chief of police, must be the state chief. Was Stephenson the one who brought Tito to Stephenson's Camp X in 1927-1928? Must be. Only such a master can blink his eyes and a dictator like Tito fires his chief of police. The little William and the big Tito.

The whole Communist crucible of the mysteries which happened in Belgrade-Zemun takes a totally new switch for the arcane dealings in those murky days. It is about positive that Donovan did not meet Tito before January 24, 1941. He dealt with him only through his emissaries. Whatever Sir William Stephenson was to Donovan, he was one of those emissaries all right.

The most significant and important emissary was to be Donovan's late nemesis, Colonel Dick Ellis. Whether or not Donovan knew the Soviet mole and Nazi agent, Dick Ellis, in 1940 in London, nobody has yet said. But it was he who, besides Sir William Stephenson, put him in touch with Tito. This Colonel Ellis is the one who William Stephenson sent in 1942 to Wild Bill to organize OSS. For five years he was *Intrepid's* deputy. He died in 1975, 81 years old.

American Donovanology is not clear about the role Colonel Dick Ellis played in British Secret Services and in OSS. Edward Jay Epstein in *The Times*, faulted [Anthony Cave] Brown, [author of *The Last Hero Wild Bill Donovan*], for giving little space to: "the crucial case of Colonel Ellis, a British intelligence officer who worked at the heart of the OSS. According to the secret CIA history of

the OSS written by Thomas F. Troy — a history that was eventually declassified and published — Colonel Ellis was detailed by British intelligence in 1940 to Donovan to assist him in the task of creating his secret-intelligence organization. In this capacity, Colonel Ellis worked out the organization plan and personally selected a friend of his, an ex-officer in the Czarist Russian army, to be chief of operations for spying and special activities. Colonel Ellis's contribution and assistance were deemed so important to the fledgling organization that David Bruce, later Donovan's intelligence chief, stated that "without [Ellis's] assistance, American intelligence could not have gotten off the ground in World War

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II." Colonel Ellis remained an *eminence grise* in the OSS throughout most of the war.

"But the real importance of Colonel Ellis emerged only in 1965, long after Donovan had died and his microfilmed files had gathered dust in his executor's office. Under grueling interrogation by a team of British intelligence investigators, Colonel Ellis broke down and confessed that before World War II began, he had been recruited as a double agent by the Germans and then blackmailed into service by the Soviet Union. Thus the man who really organized American secret intelligence was a German-Soviet mole. Situated at the core of the OSS, he was in a perfect position to expose and compromise every secret agent, operation and *modus operandi* of the agency. (Indeed, in 1963 Ellis even wrote a history of the wartime Anglo-American intelligence collaboration that was based on secret-intelligence documents). While the British government suppressed any mention of the Ellis betrayal until 1981, possibly to avoid damaging its intelligence relationships with the United States, his story is an additional lens through which it would surely be productive to view the chain of OSS failures brought to light by Mr. Brown."¹⁰

During the meeting between Josip Broz and Donovan on January 24, 1941 in Zemun, the interpreter at the meeting of the two men was Olga. As everybody else, Donovan also was very much impressed as he always was impressed by beautiful women. So much that he spent his off-hours of his stay in Belgrade with her.

The descriptions of Olga vary in volume and range in epithets from the "statuesque" to the "Mephistophelic." As already noted the old Winston fell under her spell.

At some time in May 1943, Donovan found himself once more in Cairo. "Donovan always found his visit to Cairo stimulating, not only because of the intrigues his people were carrying on there but because a blonde girl of exceptional beauty vied with a redhead of comparable good looks for his off-hour attention."

The description of the redhead fits to the skin that of Olga and thus that redhead with "comparable good looks" in all likelihood refers to Olga. Olga was in Cairo and succeeded better with Donovan than Mata Hari with her webbs.

That was the time when the Yugo-Communists had already established their trafficking with Cairo. It also coincides with the time when Olga was absent from Tito's headquarters, leaving Zdenka alone with Tito. In fact, Tito preferred Zdenka's charms to those of Olga. Tito probably would have married Zdenka but she died.

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In all likelihood the redhead of "comparable good looks" did not drop from Donovan's off-hour attentions after January 24. What a masterpiece of the British genius of espionage. The British Agent, Olga, spying for them not only on Tito but also on Donovan. It would be a brilliant study to learn just how the British knew about Donovan's scheming to infiltrate OSS into territories exclusively of the terrorist spy eye of SOE in the territory covered by the huge British army and SOE espionage. There is nothing to bristle at in the episode with Olga. Donovan "could not straighten out his own marital difficulties" and "felt free to enjoy the company of some of the most engaging and talented young women in Washington." Donovan had a warm heart and did not think only of himself. When Mountbatten came to New York, Wild Bill provided him not only with tickets for "Oklahoma" but also with two of the most beautiful girls in New York.

In China, an OSS man found himself strapping on a .45 automatic to guard the entrance to a house where Donovan was staying. The only visitor admitted was one of Donovan's favorite OSS women.

After that meeting with Tito in 1941 and the relaxing off-hours with Olga, Donovan was sure that he had gotten the "Communists to kill the Huns okay" as he put it. Donovan also had said that "every man or woman who can hurt the Hun is Okay with me."

All court biographers extoll the merit of W.J. Donovan for the revolution of March 27 (1941), President Roosevelt included. He later called "Wild Bill" the "Lawrence of Arabia of Yugoslavia" and asked Churchill in 1943 to install him as the Supremo for Anglo-American actions in Tito-land. Churchill, of course, considered himself, Supremo, and did not want Wild Bill to be supreme. The meeting of Josip Broz and Donovan on January 24, 1941 in Zemun was known to the prominent Communists of Yugoslavia. I know that Andrija Hebrang knew it. In his talks with Ante Pavelic and Mladen Lorkovic during his prison term in Zagreb, he revealed it in clear terms: Tito did meet Donovan.

At that time big confusion reigned among the Communists in Croatia. Andrija Hebrang was a Croatian patriot and was for an independent Croatia. He and Mladen Lorkovic published *Hrvatski Put* in Basel between 1930 and 1936. Tito at that time was not a leader of any party and even at that time not yet "Tito." Only in 1939 his star started to rise as the boss (Secretary General) of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the star of Andrija Hebrang was in decline. I did not know much of those relations, but during his prison time I knew that the Croatian authorities accepted his

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offer to go to Moscow to work for an independent Croatia. The details I did not know, except that he should travel to Helsinki as a Croatian diplomat in disguise where the Croatian Minister should help him to cross the border into the Soviet Union. If I did not know the details of all talks between Hebrang and Pavelic and Lorkovic', Tito came to know about them and demanded that Hebrang be exchanged as a prisoner and handed over to him. Some prominent Ustasa officials had fallen into Partisan captivity, and they were only happy to be exchanged for Hebrang to come to safety even at that high price. I do not even know how many Croatians knew about the deal of Ante Pavelic and Andrija Hebrang and whether Pavelic knew exactly what was going on, or whether he consented to the exchange. Mladen Lorkovic knew it only after the exchange and regretted it, but he was not beloved by Ustasa lower echelons and did not voice any objection and was eager not to show his old togetherness with Hebrang.

According to Hebrang's talks, he did not know that Josip Broz was a British Agent or at least I did not hear that he knew it. However, he was against his anti-Croatian policies and in Moscow would voice them in the open. Hebrang talked to Stalin directly when in Moscow. Did he talk to Stalin directly also from Zagreb on the direct radio connection of the Comintern's delegate, Josip Kopinic, I also do not know. However, between his exchange and death in 1948 at the orders of Tito, Hebrang had opportunities to talk to Stalin directly.

All of these things are mysteries to me but they are not mysteries to everybody. In Zagreb there is at this moment (mid 1984) a big inner Communist squabble about orthodox party allegiances and traitors with the subject of Hebrang at its center.

I know some who know more than I, but I do not know how much they want that to be known. Maybe soon, somehow soon, much more will be known. Some secrets in PRO about Tito will be opened to the public in 1995 and then more in 2028.

The Party was not ready for the resolute resistance to foreign aggression as the Communists say it was. That must be simply denied. As just mentioned there was almost no Communist party — those few thousands of pseudo-intellectuals, student drop-outs, and a few rabble rousers among the workers. Nobody would ever think that such a group could ever be "capable of resistance." Not even empty heads would think that.

However, there were some empty heads who did envisage Communism in Yugoslavia and Josip Broz as the head of them capable of resistance. In the British Secret Service in London, and in the Foreign Office sat Kim Philby and the rest of the trio; James Klugman, and the rest of the British

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Bolshies of the Cambridge Fabian group, whose close collaborator was Douglas Springhall, who also worked for NKVD at the Universities in the 1930's and, among others, recruited Kim Philby. Springhall received a sentence of seven years penal servitude in 1943 for stealing secret materials from

the Air Ministry. At the same time a Captain Uren, Springhall's colleague, got the same sentence for a similar activity. The intellectuals of the left swallowed contentedly the pro-Soviet propaganda of Lord Beaverbrook and Claud Cockburn.

England, maybe more than Wales or Scotland, was more or less thriving in the strong leftward trend. The historian Nikolai Tolstoy in his book, *Stalin's Secret War*, gives us the best study about the "Russian mythos" in the field. Especially relevant to this study is his characterization of Anthony Eden:

Perhaps the supreme exemplar of this mode of thought was Britain's Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. 'He hates the old Tories and would rather join the Labour Party if they remained dominant', his private secretary noted in 1941. Essentially a vain, shallow and humourless character, he believed his strength lay "among the people", referred to himself as 'the Red Eden', and was immensely flattered when in 1943 he learned that a secret meeting of trade union leaders had nominated him as successor to Churchill. Like Beaverbrook, he believed that wholehearted support for the Soviet Union would win him the public support he needed. He had always admired and liked Stalin, and nurtured long-lasting delusions concerning his benevolence and moderation. Regarding Churchill as "dangerously anti-Russian", he advocated a policy which, with rare lapses or misgivings, amounted to generous acquiescence in Stalin's aims, in matters ranging in importance from Stalin's claim to territories awarded him by Hitler, to declining to demand hospital facilities for British sailors at Archangel. In April 1943 the Head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office summed up policy towards the USSR as having been governed by 'the sort of rule of thumb under which we ... never say anything unpleasant to the Russians if we can possibly help it however much we disapprove of their doings'.¹² The old guard of the Conservative Party openly accused Eden of only promoting Left-wing people in the F.O. Under such policy the Soviet moles in the Foreign Office prepared all papers on British policy for Yalta. Stalin was so surprised about all concessions he got from the British that he was in doubt what lay behind the British "'Greek gifts.'" For Roosevelt he

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knew that he was sick and in the hands of American Bolshies, Harry Hopkins, Alger Hiss, down to ones not yet so nominated.

The Simovic Government refused to let Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden visit Belgrade, fearing that it would be considered a provocation by the Germans and reluctantly consented to receiving General Sir John G. Dill, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on condition that he come in civilian clothes.

Dill's talks with Simovic on April 1 were almost completely fruitless: a fiasco or less.

As we know the head of the British Secret Service is a royal appointment at the proposal of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. It is generally assumed that it is the Foreign Secretary and his Foreign Office who run the British Secret Service since the Prime Minister is principally a politician running the nation and not a diplomat running the world as the Foreign Office does.

Is therefore this Anthony Eden as described by Count Tolstoy the one who was running the Yugoslav Communist Party and its head Josip Broz? One must say yes. Anthony Eden came as far as Athens to help these Communist forces "to set Europe alight." The Foreign Office knew about Belgrade's hunch for realism and accommodation with Hitler's forces and put on the green table very attractive arguments for the Croatians and thus also for Slovenians.

This ace card on the green table, Istria, was one of the most successful ace cards in the hands of Josip Broz. Tito held this ace card in his hand victoriously up to 1954, when all of Istria became part of Croatia and the northern territories part of Slovenia. We publish the PRO document as Appendix II.

The question of lesser importance is when did Anthony Eden advise Josip Broz and the Communist Party about this most beautiful ace card for the Croatian and the Slovenian patriotism. Of much greater importance is the fact that Donovan met Josip Broz in Belgrade-Zemun on January 24, 1941. If it was not Winston Churchill, the Holy Ghost in the United Kingdom for Josip Broz, who arranged the meeting of Wild Bill with the future Marshal Tito, then it must have been Lord Avon, who still in 1944 had "a real liking for Stalin," who had "never broken his word."

It must be that Lord Avon liked the former Austrian Sergeant, who liked to waltz as he did later at the Court of St. James. I am sure that not even Josip Broz ever expected that when meeting Donovan. As we have said, Eden wanted to come to Belgrade in 1941 but was not wanted, and only Field Marshal

Dill came in all secrecies in civilian clothes, like Nico-demus. Anthony Eden, later Lord Avon, and W.J.D. (William J. Donovan)

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van), later General and Ambassador, knew inflated stories of Yugoslavia's Communist Party and Josip Broz and that he, Josip Broz, was a British Agent and that the Communist Party was "one group . . . capable of resistance."

At that time SOE, Special Operations Executive, in Belgrade was richly endowed with spies and terrorists. . The chief of detail in Belgrade was Tom S. Masterson of the first World War fame for his successful sabotage of oil fields in Romania. His assistant was Julius Hanau, a British business man who settled in Belgrade after the first World War. Also were former engineer of the British-owned Trepca Mines, Ltd., S. W. Bailey; and the South African mining engineer, Duane T. (Bill) Hudson, also associated with British mining in Serbia. There were people of academic status like Hugh Seton-Watson and Julian Amery and many other lesser or not lesser like George Taylor, an Australian. When Yugoslavia collapsed, they escaped to the Adriatic coast to be picked up by the British submarines. But instead they were captured by Italian forces and taken to Italy. There they identified themselves as diplomats with diplomatic passports and diplomatic rank and were released. All of them remained active in the field of Yugoslav espionage and terrorism. Needless to say that in addition to the SOE operatives in Yugoslavia, there were also those who called themselves members of the regular Intelligence service or simply, diplomats. At the peak was British Minister in Belgrade, Sir Ronald Ian Campbell.

As already mentioned, the money, British and American, was flowing richly into the hands of Josip Broz and the Communist Party which always had big money at their disposal. In the words of Tom Masterson, the British money was flowing to the hands of the Serbian and Slovenian politicians. The money worked; the coup d'etat in Belgrade happened as ordered by Winston Churchill. The next day after March 25, 1941 when the Yugos signed accession to the Tripartite Pact with Hitler in Vienna, Winston Churchill sent a telegram to the British Minister in Belgrade:

Do not let any gap grow up between you and Prince Paul or Ministers. Continue to pester, nag and bite. Demand audiences. Don't take No for an answer This is no time for reproaches or dignified farewells. Meanwhile ... do not neglect any alternative to which we may have to resort if we find present Government have gone beyond recall . . .¹³

When the Yugo "revolution" erupted on March 27, (1941) Hugh Dalton, head of Britain's secret service department known as SOE, sig-

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nailed his agents to "use all means to raise a revolution." For this, he said, "all was well prepared beforehand." The SOE had been created by Prime Minister Churchill on July 16, 1940 under the Minister of Economic Warfare, Hugh Dalton, whom Churchill had instructed to "set Europe ablaze." By the Fall of 1941 SOE had thirty-three training establishments. SOE had its own small navy and RAF units with adequate arms and means of delivery to move a substantial number of agents to the continent.

The British had a great deal of money at the British Political Intelligence Centre in Cairo to spend for subversion. A force of four B-24 Liberators was stationed in Cairo to provide supplies and equipment to resistance forces in the Balkans. "Z" force of (British) Major General, W.A. Stawell of the Command of Special Operations Mediterranean in the Bari-Brindisi area was responsible for the special training given to the Yugoslav Partisans in Southern Italy.

The Britons in Belgrade did not neglect any alternative to which they may have had to resort if they found the present Government had gone beyond recall. They did pester, nag, and bite and pour money. Revolution happened. Prince Paul departed. Petar II was crowned, and Winston Churchill with Anthony Eden, Colonel Donovan with President Roosevelt; and Josip Broz with the Communist Party, all got the desired revolution.

The Yugo-Bolsheviks consider the "revolution" of March 27, 1941 of their doing. Vladimir Dedijer in his writings claims so.

The leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has had this to say about it:

The first revolutionary breakthrough of the old political system took place on March 27, 1941. The putsch of the pro-Western part of the bourgeoisie and high military against the entry of Yugoslavia into the Hitler bloc was surpassed by the feelings and movements of the national masses, because the growing revolutionary democratic pressure, which was materializing under the leadership of the Communist Party, did not allow the putsch to remain within the limits in which its promoters tried to keep it. The Communist Party succeeded in further developing it in the direction of a deeper revolutionary movement.¹⁴

To condense in a few words an expose of British money poured into Juggery. Beginning with July 1940, SOE was giving to the Serbian Agrarian Party 5000 pounds monthly. Money was given also to the Independent Democratic Party. The same must be said about the Radical, Democratic, and National Parties. Especially generous in dispersing gold and pounds was SOE with the patriotic Serbian organizations, particularly with the

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organization, National Defense. The most prominent conduit for passing SOE distribution of bribes was Ilija Trifunovic' and the most prominent member was Jovan Djonovic. A member of SOE, George Taylor, in his report of June 1941, wrote that through Ilija Trifunovic they were able to obtain all information they wanted from the various national Serbian associations.

The most prominent organization on the list to receive bribes from SOE was the Serbian Cultural Club. The president of the club was Slobodan Jovanovic and the soul of the club was Radoje Knezevic'.

SOE was especially lavishing its gold and pounds on the officers of the General Staff, carefully avoiding any possibility that the amount ever be known.

Among the officers were the most notorious British agents, Dusan Simovic', brothers Mirkovic', and Zivan Knezevic, Commander of a unit of Royal Guards. Who received more in bribes, brother Radoje or brother Zivan, they never confessed.

Since the local British supreme spy Thomas S. Masterson, later to become Sir, was the supreme boss of SOE in Belgrade, all British terrorist and espionage activities were conducted by Military Attache, Lt. Colonel E.S. Clarke and Air Attache, Lt. Colonel A.H.H. MacDonald, as well as by Captain Mapplebeck. Since they were public figures, members of the diplomatic corps with open public entry to the officers clubs, they did not have to hide their contact with the conspirators and conducted the conspiracy in openly held meetings with the organizers of the putsch: General Simovic, Brothers Mirkovic, and Zivan Knezevic. Some apologists of Draza Mihailovic want also to insert him as an organizer of the putsch. Draza neither ate onion or smelled onion. He was pushing his papers without bothering with the conspiracy. To be sure, he would never be a member of any conspiracy to overthrow Prince Paul to whom he was devoted as he told me on April 14, 1941, when we both departed from the battleground position of the April 6 war at Modric and Gracanica: I, for Podgrade, and he for his hut in his native village.

In Belgrade at that time, all hot heads were conspirators. Conspiracy to the Serbians is as milk to the lactant. Thus all the Masons participated in the conspiracy. The supreme Mason of England gave the order to Donovan to meet with the Masons in Belgrade. He did so at the special urging of the King, himself a Mason. Since the Masons never appear in the broad light of day, the supreme Masons of the supreme Lodge of Juggery met with Donovan in the utmost secrecy, so secret that nobody has ever mentioned it.

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At this particular moment, it is worthy to mention that prior to 1940 Lord Hartwood asked the Supreme Mason Of Yugoslavia, Vladimir Corovic, if they had Communist members.

In fact, there were Communists in the Masonic Lodges of Yugoslavia. Nobody has yet found out whether or not Josip Broz Tito was a Free Mason. Since he had access to the most arcane and murky

secrets of the Free Masonry in the land, it must be sure that he was one of them. Whether that also was the result of Tito's association with Sir William Stephenson has not been brought to the light of day. Tito is dead and there is no trace of his confessing it. Sir William at 87 is still alive in Bermuda but refused to talk about his making and ruling of Tito. What a pity. The book about Sir William's making and ruling Tito would be the most interesting book of the century. How I wish I could see Sir William to collect all that information to publish.

Donovan was in contact with Tito through the emissaries of Sir William Stephenson, Colonel Ellis et al.

On March 27, 1941, the Serbian Communists organized a demonstration march on the streets in different cities, especially in Belgrade in support of the putsch of the Belgrade camarilla.

In Zagreb, at a meeting on April 10, 1941 the Communists decided to fight against Hitler and for the fatherland, Yugoslavia. All Croatian Quislings sided with Tito. One of the biggest Croatian Quislings, Communist Jakov Blazevic wrote in VJESNIK, Zagreb, Jan. 15, 1981 from his book SUPROTSTAVLJANJA I LJUDI, II, that the Communists met with Tito in his flat on Hercegovacka Street in Zagreb. Tito's wife Herta also participated in that meeting. All those Quislings at that meeting concluded that the future of the freedom of Yugoslavia was in the hands of the Communist Party. That meant that they would enter the fight against Germany regardless of the Soviet Union which, of course, held to the Friendship Pact with Germany of 1939. The Yugo-Communists had already declared to Donovan that they did not obey orders from the Soviet Union but would accept the directives from England and the United States. This they did. They immediately started the war against Germans without the Soviet Union.

Josip Broz acted as directed by Donovan and the British Secret Service.

According to Winston Churchill that was a very joyous episode to advance his desire "to set Europe alight." In his address to the Conservative Central Council, after receiving the news of the putsch in Belgrade, Churchill said: "Here at this moment I have great news for you and the whole country. Early this morning the Yugoslav nation found its soul. A revolution has taken place in Belgrade. ..."

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Josip Broz was rubbing his hands in satisfaction, knowing that that was Churchill's carte blanche to give to Yugoslavia his Communist soul. Churchill cared less about that.

When towards the end of the war, his emissary to Tito, Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, was telling Churchill that Tito was a Communist and was installing a Communist dictatorship in Yugoslavia, Churchill answered by putting the question: "What do you care, will you live there after the war'."

Josip Broz was a totally unknown entity to the world outside the British Secret Service up until 1943. In Zagreb there was a police file on Josip Broz, No. 10434, but up to the end of 1942 they did not know that he was the boss. General Secretary of the Yugo-Communist Party, and had been the leader of Yugo-Communist insurgency since the summer of 1941. As the Croats, so others as official Great Britain, the United States, and Nazi Germany did not know. When Draza Mihailovic met Josip Broz on September 19, 1941 in Struganik, he thought that Josip Broz was a Russian. Tito later was saying that that probably saved his life from the Cetniks because they believed that he was a Soviet emissary to fight under Draza. Draza Mihailovic thought the same also during their second meeting on October 26-27 in Brajici, near Ravna Gora.

And thus it is much more certain that Josip Broz was a British Agent when Wild Bill came to Belgrade on January 22, 1941, talked to Serbian leaders, openly and clandestinely, and left Belgrade on January 25, 1941. On the day of January 24 he saw his man, having made connection with him through his emissaries.

Nobody anywhere, Zagreb included, knew who Josip Broz was, but Wild Bill, without any preparation, diplomatic protocol, or military conspiracy, talked to Tito.

Tito for a long time was hiding his connection with British and American secret services. To Charles W. Thayer (a career U.S. FSO who had been on loan to OSS 1944-45), an OSS Colonel and Chief of the American Military Mission to Tito, he complained in March 1945 that "A majority of Americans were opposed to his regime."

But although Tito was aware of the opposition to him of American official diplomacy, he had his channel to the White House and FDR whose emissary Donovan had found him on January 24, 1941 in Belgrade and made agreements with him for the future for Tito's military and revolutionary activities.

So also as the enthroned Red dictator in Belgrade, Tito was on very familiar and friendly terms with OSS man Thayer with whom he spoke more than with anybody else. This also means that he knew about "Operation Shepherd."

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While Tito knew that some Americans were opposed to his regime, he also knew that he never got any help from the Soviets except at the last moment when the Soviets had to occupy northeastern Yugoslav territories on their march to Vienna. Tito said later that he never was sure for his life in Moscow because nobody ever knew when Stalin would strike.

While other Communist leaders followed Moscow's policies of placating Hitler after the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement of August 23, 1939, Tito came to Yugoslavia from Moscow and spent the last few months before April 6, 1941 preparing war.

That was secret even to the Communist followers. For the British to know that Tito was the one force to fight Nazis in Yugoslavia there is no other explanation but that Tito was a British Agent.

After that Stalin-Hitler agreement, all members of all national Communist parties organized in the Comintern, i.e. All foreign Communists, especially French, obeyed the supreme rule from Moscow not to fight Hitler. Only Tito did not. "While other Communist leaders followed Moscow's policy of placating Hitler, Tito had spent the past few months [before the War] preparing for war."

On January 24, 1941, he had already made firm commitments to fight the Nazis. It is a fact that he did not know anything about Operation Barbarossa (although his adulators put him among all those omniscient ones who knew about it long in advance) because neither Donovan nor anybody else knew it.

In my opinion Josip Broz Tito was not a Communist believer. He carried the Communist identity card only to perform his duties as double agent. He never lived as a Communist, at least not according to — should we call it — Communist ethics. There is much to say about that life style and probably it has been already said, but not in the context of our title that he was not a Communist believer. He was simply a double agent: British and Communist Agent.

In the Court in 1928 he would not say that he was a Communist. According to OSS reports Yugo pre-war Communists were not being used by the Partisans, perhaps because Tito was a Stalinist rather than Communist.

The key to our problem is still secret. "How this came about is still (1976) classified information."

That liaison never extinguished. During the War, up to the fall of the Cetnik Ambassador in Washington, Constantin Fotic, and the abolition of OSS in Bolshevik Yugoslavia, it was maintained directly with Donovan or through his emissaries. In the OSS archives there is no trace that Tito was an OSS agent, but from the establishment of the Communists at the Em-

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bassy in Washington up to today, there is always a diplomat of high ranking who keeps liaison with OSS and its successors and the American branch of NATO in Washington.

Bolshevik Yugoslavia did its best always to have its delegate with NATO services in Europe. The most famous of all of them was a Miroslav (Miro) Varos. Since the Yugo Communists can not have an actual delegate or any kind of participation with NATO, they do it skillfully through their specifically trained agents. Varos was especially successful since he, through the services of a former Croatian diplomat in the service of German Intelligence, Ernest Bauer, achieved to be accredited with German military Intelligence with high pay. Through different other channels he was in connection with the General Staffs of Switzerland and Italy. It was from that Varos that NATO received the most intimate military Soviet secrets passed to him by the supreme Yugoslav military authorities. That liaison lasted for more than two years when it was truncated by the sudden departure of Varos for home because he was involved in organizing the kidnapping of a priest whom the lesser echelons of UDBA wanted back. Both in Washington and in Europe, the Yugo Bolsheviks keep their irons in NATO offices.

Emptio-Venditio: The Yugo Communists pass them Soviet military secrets and NATO guarantees the integrity of Communist Yugoslavia which is at the heart of the rulers of Communist Yugoslavia, Serbian hege-monists, and the rest of the Cetniks.

About the activities of Donovan it is crystal clear that Donovan acted always as an American, working for the American cause. Every time he achieved a service for Britons he was putting seeds in the earth for American interests. How much before meeting Tito in Zemun on January 24, 1941, he was in touch with him through the emissaries is not registered anywhere. But from that point on Donovan

was in constant touch with Tito, as if Tito was now also an American agent. At that date there was not yet the OSS, but as soon as OSS was established, Tito and Donovan exchanged correspondence. Americans were floating to Tito in big numbers, and American military and economic aid was pouring in. There are some mysteries about all of that left. One of the biggest mysteries is the adventure of an OSS major, Louis Huot. Having inherited an adventurous spirit from his mother, he sneaked from Bari to Tito's headquarters at Jajce as one walks on Fifth Avenue. Tito received him without any checking on his authenticity and seated him at the table where was Olga and Tito's other mysterious woman. It was Zdenka. Zdenka, by civilian name Davorjanka Paunovic, was a famous mystery woman around Tito. Although almost impossible to achieve, Tito still did his best that nobody lay eyes on

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Davorjanka with the conspiratorial name Zdenka. While Olga was free to go around and let everybody gaze his eyes on her statuesque contours, nobody had better do it with Zdenka. Poor Zdenka! How much she exaggerated with her services to the leader of the Partisan bands remains unclear, but she died of consumption. A noble cause probably to die consummated by lavishing her graces in the "woods" consisting of love trees, for the greatness of Britannia.

There has to be some mystique about the leader of the bands if the statuesque Olga and the parsifally beautiful Zdenka shared the convivial pleasures with the Master and also with the American terrorist and spy of OSS.

Donovan wanted to beat the Nazis (Krauts) with Communists. In his diary p. 57 he says:

After giving Sam Hoare an account of his talk with Vigon, D. left to see Alvarez, Head of the Texas Oil Company in Spain, and Martinez-Campos. He had dinner at the Wyatts and met there the Infante Alphonse who harped much on the danger of communism in Europe if the war went on a long time. D. countered this line by pointing out that Hitlerism was almost exactly the same — anti-christian in ideology and dynamic and ruthless in method. It was therefore a more imminent danger than communism.

Like most Americans Donovan started to cry after Yalta. In 1956, he stood in the swamps at the border between Austria and Hungary to pick up fleeing Hungarians from their Communist inferno set up by, among others, himself. Naturally, he never regretted his merits for putting Bolsheviks in their glory. Donovan died on February 8, 1959 at the age of 76. During his sickness his clouded mind imagined the Russian tanks were advancing over the bridge to take Manhattan.¹⁵

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12. Nikolai Tolstoy, *Stalin's Secret War* (New York, 1981), pp. 288-289.
13. *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan*, p. 366. Alexander George Montagu Cadogan was an agent of OSS. So also many other Britons in high position.
14. Communist Party of Yugoslavia, *VII kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, p. 991. See also Kardelj, "Ten Years of People's Revolution." pp. 55-59.
15. American Communists were organized in a number of underground groups or "cells" composed of US government employes, which operated within the government structure. James Burnham in his book *THE WEB OF SUBVERSION* (New York, 1954) identified three of them as follows;
Ware Cell
Harold Ware: Department of Agriculture.
John J. Abt: Department of Agriculture; Works Progress Administration; Senate Committee on Education and Labor; Justice Department.
Nathan Witt: Department of Agriculture; National Labor Relations Board.
Lee Pressman: Department of Agriculture; Works Progress Administration.

Alger Hiss: Department of Agriculture; Special Senate Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry; Justice Department; State Department.

Donald Hiss: State Department; Labor Department.

Henry H. Collins, Jr.: National Recovery Administration; Department of Agriculture.

Charles Kramer (Krevitsky): National Labor Relations Board; Office of Price Administration; Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization.

Victor Perlo: Office of Price Administration; War Production Board; Treasury Department.

Silvermaster Cell

Nathan Gregory Silvermaster: Director of Labor Division. Farm Security Administration; detailed at one time to Board of Economic Warfare. Solomon Adler: Treasury Department; agent in China. Norman Bursler: Department of Justice.

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Frank Coe: Assistant Director. Division of Monetary Research, Treasury; special assistant to United States Ambassador in London; assistant to the Executive Director, Board of Economic Warfare and successor agencies; Assistant Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration.

Lauchlin Currie; administrative assistant to the President; Deputy Administrator of Foreign Economic Administration.

Bela Gold: (known to Miss Bentley as William Gold), assistant head of Division of Program Surveys, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Agriculture Department; Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization; Office of Economic Programs in Foreign Economic Administration.

Mrs. Bela (Sonia) Gold: research assistant. House Select Committee on Interstate Migration; labor-market analyst. Bureau of Employment Security; Division of Monetary Research, Treasury.

Abraham George Silverman: director. Bureau of Research and Information Services, United States Railroad Retirement Board; economic adviser and chief of analysis and plans, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel and Services, Air Force.

William Taylor: Treasury Department.

William Ludwig Ullmann: Division of Monetary Research, Treasury; Materiel and Service Division, Air Corps Headquarters, Pentagon.

Perlo Cell

Victor Perlo: head of branch in Research Section, Office of Price Administration; War Production Board; Monetary Research, Treasury.

Edward J. Fitzgerald: War Production Board.

Harold Glasser: Treasury Department; loaned to Government of Ecuador; loaned to War Production Board; adviser on North African Affairs Committee in Algiers, North Africa.

Charles Kramer (Krevitsky): National Labor Relations Board; Office of Price Administration; economist with Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization.

Solomon Leshinsky: United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

Harry Magdoff: Statistical Division of War Production Board and Office of Emergency Management; Bureau of Research and Statistics. WPB; Tools Division. WPB; Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce.

Allan Rosenberg: Foreign Economic Administration.

Donald Niven Wheeler: Office of Strategic Services.

Not attached to either the Silvermaster or Perlo groups were the following: Michael Greenberg: Board of Economic Warfare; Foreign Economic Administration, specialist on China.

Joseph Gregg: Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, assistant in Research Division. Maurice Halperin: Office of Strategic Services; head of Latin American Division in the Research and Analysis Branch; head of Latin American research and analysis. State Department.

J. Julius Joseph: Office of Strategic Services; Japanese Division. Duncan Chaplin Lee: Office of Strategic Services; legal adviser to General William J. Donovan.

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Robert T. Miller: head of political research. Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs; member. Information Service Committee. Near Eastern Affairs, State Department; Assistant Chief. Division of Research and Publications, State Department. William Z. Park: Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. Bernard Redmont: Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. Helen Tenney: Office of Strategic Services, Spanish Division.

For the massive OSS "special operations," therefore, the key question was really: which tendency within the resistance, guerilla and other clandestine groups, including the purely intelligence groups, was to be primarily aided — the pro-Communist or the anti-Communist? In many cases where the issue was present, even if unrecognized, the decision was for the pro-Communist. In Yugoslavia, in north Italy, in many of the French and most German operations, and sporadically within the confused Chinese situation, Communists and pro-Communists gained the comfort, gold, arms, supplies — and ear — of the OSS.

Among the Fifth Amendment cases who served in the OSS, many of them in critical posts of both intelligence and special operations, were: Leo M. Drozdoff; Jack Sargeant Harris; J. Julius Joseph; Leonard Mins; Maurice Halperin; Irving Fajans; Paul V. Martineau; Carl Aldo Marzani (later sent to jail); Milton Wolff; Philip O. Keeney; Irving Goldman; Helen B. Tenney; George Wuchinich.

Milton Wolff, Leonard Mins and George Wuchinich were all graduates of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, which was organized by the Soviet secret police for operations in the Spanish Civil War. In their appearances before the Internal Security Subcommittee (June, 1953), these three made a new high in rudeness of manner. In OSS they were not badly located in terms of their interests.

Leonard Mins was assigned to the collection and analysis of information on the Soviet Union. He comes from an old Communist family, and was trained in Moscow and elsewhere in the Soviet revolutionary schools. George Wuchinich, a loud, declamatory man, operated with Tito and inside China. Milton Wolff was in northern Italy. He had been commanding officer of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, which at full strength was organized as a battalion of eight hundred men. He refused to answer whether he had taken part in the execution of American citizens in the brigade who "rebelled" against its Communist leadership. He described himself as by occupation "a painter, an artist."

VI Ultra and Drvar

Drvar. In about the heart of Croatia, in the mountains there is Drvar. A beautiful resort for fresh air, summer and winter spas, and one of the centers of the Croatian lumber industry. Drvar had two cellulose factories, a railway line. Far from all rumbling in the big cities and ideal for all kinds of covert activities.

The rich Communist Party of Yugoslavia started to concentrate all kinds of its activities, covert and non-covert, before 1941 in Drvar, so that at the beginning of the War on April 6, 1941, Drvar could harbor all new Communist arrivals fleeing less safe surroundings and become some kind of capital city of Yugo-Communism, and, in fact, by July 1941, some two thousand Bolshies found themselves there, about two thirds-of all Yugo Bolshies.

Of the big Communist activities at Drvar, the hibernation of Josip Broz there during the winter up to May of 1944 is its biggest event. Drvar was the capital of a new Communist republic, the more that not far, in Topusko not far from Zagreb, were the headquarters of the Partisan army of Croatia where British terrorists and spies like Randolph Churchill and Evelyn Waugh, and super terrorist and spy Stephen Clissold enjoyed Bolshevik hospitality.

Croatian authorities had no free hand in dealing with Josip Broz. For some time he had already made political and geographical agreements with Germans. In May, 1944, the Germans had already decided to evacuate the Balkans. That meant that the German armies from Greece down to Crete had to be in retreat up to the Danube Basin and farther to Germany.

The Germans had to withdraw over 300,000 men.

The Allied Command in Operation Ratweek launched a heavy terror air-ground attack on railroad and road communications throughout Yugoslavia.

The Yugo-Bolshies did not care about the retreating Germans. To tell the truth, they could not. There were so few Communist fighters that they were

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not a fighting force at all. Churchill and British propagandists spoke about 30 Communist divisions and so about 300,000 Communist fighters.

Vulgus decipi vult. It is not a Yugo-Bolshevik merit that the British believed that. The Juggs, to be sure, gave the conventional names to their so-called military units: division, regiment, corps, battery, company. But there could or could not be an existing company, or one with few men in it. The Regiment did not have any established number so the Bolshies could call any group of people they wanted to be a Regiment. A conventional division would have 12,000 to 15,000 soldiers. Not so with Bolshevik-Partisans. They call division any group of people they wanted. Nobody ever knew what they had or whom they had in any unit. Thirty divisions: Maybe that was a fabrication of British propagandists with Tito and Fitzroy Maclean at their head. The Britons more than the Bolshies needed to glorify those wretched soldiers of fortune to keep their stake high with Churchill. Nobody knows why Churchill wanted to glorify the Yugo-Bolshies in that way.

Therefore the Yugo-Bolshies were not in a state to attack the retreating exhausted German armies.

There were not enough of them to keep going and to survive until the Soviets put them on the throne in Belgrade. In reality only a few went against their arch-enemies. All the military groups existing in Serbia had to be present in Serbia when the Soviet Bolshies arrived; otherwise it would be the end of them.

The same ciphers about Yugo-Bolshevik military might are challenged by Cetniks. From Cairo, on March 24, 1944, Robert P. Joyce through his minister Lincoln MacVeagh (on April 12, 1944) sent to the Department of State a Memorandum of Conversation with Colonel Popovich and Lieutenant Colonel Bachovich, in which they say:

Colonel Bachovich and Colonel Popovich then proceeded to endeavor to minimize the importance of the Partisan movement in Yugoslavia. They both said that they understood the difficulties of organizing guerrilla resistance in their own country and they were convinced that Tito at no one time had more than 20,000 or 25,000 guerrilla fighters under his command.'

Even Stalin knew it. according to Dedijer:

In November, 1944, while the war was still being fought, Edvard Kardelj, the Vice-President of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, and Ivan Subasic, the Prime Minister of the Yugoslav Government and Foreign Minister, went to Moscow where they were re-

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ceived by Stalin. During a conversation Stalin, suddenly, for no apparent reason, began to speak about our army, about our contribution in the war. He spoke disparagingly about the Partisans, their fighting spirit, even their numerical strength.

"I know those Partisan figures. They are always exaggerated."

Anglo-Americans wanted to hear that huge Yugo-Bolshevik armies were fighting big numbers of German divisions, and their emissaries in Tito's den fabricated as many as their bosses liked to hear. And good for them. They so modulated their requests for military and economic help that they soon had so much help for the huge non-existent armies, that they lived better in the "woods" than at home and without fighting, as will be seen in chapters on military and economic aid.

Whether the Germans knew that the Yugos were not any threat to them is hard to say. They too listened to BBC and heard that there were 30 divisions of them which makes 300,000 fighting men. That was the number of retreating Germans. It was thus better to have a non-aggression agreement with them, for all plausible purposes.

In Valjevo on September 15, 1944, the Yugo-Bolshies did not at all attack the German garrison, but were eager to destroy their opponents, the Serbian Quisling troops, Cetnik included. Who in reality was fighting whom was hard to establish since everybody was against everybody else. So also there could not be established how many in reality were Bolshies and how many Quislings. Never was any account made, and each party put out numbers as it was convenient.

Moreover, the Allies took on the task to beat Germans during the German withdrawal from Greece. Allied terror air forces sent over Yugoslavia 1,973 aircraft, all but 600 of them from the American Fifteenth Air Force which discharged in terror raids over 3,000 tons of bombs.

The strategy of Germans (and on their coattails Italians) and Croatians, as well as Serbian Quislings of all kinds, to lead armies against these Bolsheviks was stupid. That was exactly what the British planned: to have that many organized armed forces fight a few Communist guerrillas or snipers. What should have been done was to organize a few commandos to fight the few Communists in their style. That could have been achieved if there had been a "gamebook." The "gamebook" of OSS recorded the number of Axis troops that resistance forces claimed to have killed in the Mediterranean Area. If all the above mentioned armed forces had had the know-how of OSS, they could have had their "gamebook" in which could have been registered the name of

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each Communist and his whereabouts, and they could have exterminated all of them. What a pity, all the great strategists of the German super Army Command, frustrated by a few smart SOE terrorists. Among the stories of WWII which the perpetrators hide like the serpent its feet is also the story of agreements between the Germans and the Yugo-Bolsheviks. Namely, all Yugo-Bolshies and with them all their stooges, fellow travellers and other similar adulators, call those who cooperated with the Nazis Quislings. Here it is clear that the Yugo-Bolshies cooperated with the Nazis against the Allies. Therefore, they were the Quislings.

David Martin, Bowie, U.S.A., writes:

It has now been established on the basis of German documentation that in late 1942 and early 1943 there was a series of agreements between the Partisans and the Germans and that in March of 1943

three top-ranking Tito lieutenants, Vladimir Velebit, Koca Popovic and Milovan Djilas, were flown to Zagreb in a German plane where they signed a protocol stating that they did not wish to fight the Germans, that their only enemies were the Chetniks, and that they would fight the British should the latter land in Yugoslavia. These negotiations with the Partisans were finally broken off by Ribbentrop, but before this happened there was a vigorous exchange of communications between Ribbentrop and Kasche, the German Minister in Zagreb, in which Kasche argued in favor of continuing the arrangements with the Partisans on the ground that in repeated negotiations the "reliability of Tito's promises" had been "confirmed" . . . Obviously, these negotiations must have involved an extensive W/T traffic in Yugoslavia itself in addition to the repeated communications with Berlin. Given the all-encompassing nature of the "Enigma" operation I find it exceedingly difficult to believe that none of this traffic was intercepted. And the question I would like to ask is: did Basil Davidson ever see any of these intercepts?-

At the conference between Partisan and German leaders in March 1943, Tito's reasons for seeking collaboration were to have an ally should the Allies land in the Balkans. Tito was "convinced" an Allied invasion of the Balkans was inevitable. Moreover, there was constant prisoner exchange between Partisans, Germans and Croats. Naturally, the Yugo-Bolsheviks did not want anybody to know of their Quisling activities. So Djilas in Moscow on or about June 1, 1944 said that the Yugo-Partisans had killed more than 300,000 Germans as announced by the Bulletin of the Soviet Embassy in Washington on June 1, 1944.

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Even though Tito's army had not much strategic importance and could not impede a German retreat, the Germans preferred to come to agreements with Tito for a free retreat of their armies from Crete to the Danube.

For that part of the agreement, Tito obtained assurances from the Germans that they would not fight him along the Adriatic coast and thus leave free access to the Tito Partisan armies to the Adriatic sea up to Trieste.

From then on the Germans travelled safely on the railroad lines from Zagreb and Budapest to Belgrade, and from Belgrade to Skopje and Thessalonica.

The Germans did not hide the terms of the agreement totally, and it was known in pretty wide circles. At that time the preparations for the Croatian Putsch to bring Croatia to the war side of the Allies with a debarkation of Allies on the Adriatic shores of Croatia (from Kotor to Trieste) were very much in the making, and the Germans were that much happy that Tito would hinder Allied debarkations with his troops. How much the British knew about the agreement is not registered in the archives. Modern Titoist apologists do hide it as much as they can.

For some time Tito's whereabouts were unknown. Even the German Commander of the Second Panzer Army, Lothar Rendulic (of good Croatian ancestry), in his headquarters in Serbia's Vrnjacka Banja did not know. He was in excellent rapport with Draza Mihailovic and his Cetniks and asked Draza to find out: where is Tito.

Draza's long hand abroad was former Ambassador Constantin Fotic in Washington and the former Military Attache, from the summer of 1943 to July 1944, former Chief of the Military Office in the Jovanovic Government, also in Washington, Lt. Colonel Zivan Knezevic (one of the famous brothers, the other being Radoje), who with Draza were collaborating with Germans against the Tito-phile politics of President Roosevelt in the shadow of the Britons. At just about the same time Winston Churchill, with the approval of Roosevelt, ordered Petar II to drop Draza and to make agreements with Tito. Like Churchill, ready to copulate with anyone who wanted to fight the Hun, the Cetniks were ready to fornicate with any Babylon on the Horizon against Tito.

Knezevic wired information of Tito's location to Draza, Draza to Rendulic, and German troops made an organized descent on Drvar on May 24, 1944 to capture Tito. History of this "betrayal of Tito" is well known in the history of American terrorism and espionage. An inquiry was ordered in OSS to establish how Knezevic obtained the knowledge of Tito's whereabouts, but it was not able to ascertain that Knezevic was the one

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who "betrayed Tito". In 1972, when I ask Radoje Knezevic about the "betrayal of Tito," he replied by saying how Vrnjacka Banja is beautiful, how he yearned to go there to enjoy the fresh air as he used to do with the child-King when he was the tutor to the child-King Petar II, and how Rendulic wanted to secure from Cetniks a fair deal at the moment of the final victory. The Cetnik story goes that the Germans on the Balkans wanted to surrender to Cetniks, and with Cetniks sail into the safe harbor of the Allied sea.

When recently (March 1984) I asked Zivan if the American story about the "betrayal of Tito" was true, and if he wanted to comment on the American story, he did not answer.

According to many oral accounts, the descent of the German Army on Drvar to capture Tito was betrayed by Germans. According to super spy Reinhard Gehlen, Gestapo Muller, as well as Martin Bormann, was in the Bolshevik service. They easily could inform their masters, the Soviets, and the Soviets Tito. The Soviet Military Mission was at Tito's headquarters in Drvar. In fact, it was Soviets who came to rescue Tito.

On the Night of June 3/4, Tito was flown from Mliniste to Bari in Italy, piloted by a Russian in a Soviet Dakota plane.

In August 1943 Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean was appointed Head of the British Mission at Tito's headquarters. The Soviet Military Mission arrived in Partisan territory in February 1944. The Head of the Mission was General Korneyev. After the arrival of the Soviet armies in Belgrade he was sent home. As the new Chief came Major General A. F. Kiselev.

But there was no need for Gestapo Muller and Martin Bormann to be part of the betrayal which could be dangerous for them. There was British Ultra.

According to the historians of Ultra, Ultra was decoding every word coded by Germans. The moment an order to the German Army was issued, Ultra knew it and counteracted when it could and would want to.

Of course, the British could inform Tito. Their Head of the Military Mission to Tito was day and night with Tito, everywhere at all times. So also in Drvar.

According to Phyllis Auty, it was the British who warned Tito that the Germans were preparing to attack.

Involved in the U.S. investigation of the "Betrayal of Tito" was Colonel Sands, who was in a high position in OSS.

Years later, when he was asked the question "Who betrayed the whereabouts of Tito's headquarters," Sands replied: "I thought it was the British." Was Sands pro-Mihailovic? "Certainly I was pro-Mihailovic,"

he stated emphatically. "And so were a lot of other people inside OSS. But we did not play politics with secret intelligence, I assure you. The only politics we played were those that we were told to play by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Why should the British have betrayed the whereabouts of Tito's headquarters? What had they to gain? Sands stated: "I don't know. But that was the suspicion at the time. There were a lot of British Intelligence people in Washington who didn't like Tito any more than I did."³

About the mystique of Ultra, Richard Crossman, former deputy-director of British Psychological Warfare, wrote that intelligence agencies "appeal to those who revel in being mysterious men with secret knowledge, loving the moral twilight shrouding activities that by civilized standards are barbaric."⁴ These *phantasts* then found spies in teen-age girls in Zagreb.⁵

According to Britons, brilliant men served Ultra; sharpwitted dons, wayward professors, eccentrics who hated the dreary routine and the heavy secrecy that fettered their freewheeling intellects. Felix Fetterlein, once cryptographer to the Czars of Russia, decorated one end of the spectrum of talent. At the other end was a former Merchant Navy radio operator who seemed telepathic in his ability to read the weak and distorted signals of a distant agent.

Knezevic, all signs say, was the guy who "betrayed Tito", but probably not on the tip of OSS, and thus OSS probably was right in concluding that no terrorist (agent) of OSS "betrayed Tito" to Knezevic. Knezevic was a British Agent, and Britons used him to "betray" Tito to the Germans. Britons had not been happy with Tito since the arrival of the Soviet Mission to Tito. The Soviet Mission's members were gregarious comrades, drunkards, and otherwise similar to the Yugo-Bolshevik comrades.

All of his life Tito spoke some kind of Croato-Russian and so found it enjoyable to be in the company of his Soviet Bolshie comrades. He did not speak English or French and his German was the German of a Croatian sergeant in the army: "rechts-links; eins-zwei." The Croatian of the English such as Stephen Clissold and Brigadier Maclean was perverse, and generally nobody likes to speak through interpreters.

On January 25, 1944, Lincoln MacVeagh sent a telegram from Cairo to the Secretary of State about the Soviet Mission to Tito:

Military Attache has telegraphed the War Department as follows in paraphrase:

"Military Mission of USSR arrived Cairo 23 en route to Tito. It consists of a total of 32 persons including one Lieutenant General, two Major

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Generals, four Colonels, seventeen other officers and eight secretaries. As British Tito Mission is headed by Brigadier the British are greatly disturbed at being thus outranked. It would appear from the strength and importance of this Russian mission not only that full support is to be given Tito but also that endeavor is to be made to supplant British influence and obtain predominant position in Yugoslav affairs. Within a few days it is planned for whole Russian mission to drop into Tito's area by parachute."

Ambassador Stevenson confirms the above but appears less apprehensive than the British military over the rank and importance of the mission as he feels that in any case the Soviets are not in a position to supply Tito to the same extent as the British are.

As regards British negotiations with Tito reported in my Yugos 13, January 17, 8 p.m., Stevenson advises that he has had word that McLean and Randolph Churchill have arrived safely at Tito's headquarters and have delivered Churchill's message which Tito received cordially but to which he is delaying a reply pending further discussions.⁶

The British organized the first flight of Tito from Drvar to Ban to Vis.

Hitler is said to have admired the British Secret Service: Would he have admired them here at Drvar: Britons whisper to their agent Knezevic to whisper Tito's whereabouts to Draza who whispers it to Rendulic. Britons then whisper to Tito that because of Ultra they know that the Germans will attack, and Poof! Tito falls into the hands of the British without possibilities of wiggling out. There he is, in British hands finally, as they had wanted ever since the arrival of the Soviets to his "woods."

OSS's "P" who related to the British Embassy in Washington that Knezevic was the author of the "betrayal" of Tito did not exist and was an invention of the British Secret Services to detour from the real source of the "betrayal."

But things went bad for Zivan and his stooges. OSS did not like it, and the factotum of OSS, Otto C. Doering Jr., sent Zivan and his deputy Todorovic, assumed to be the heads of the Royal Yugoslav Embassy's strong lobby and also of an intelligence service, to the Allied base in Bari. Americans flew them in August 1944 to Bari in a U.S. transport. Upon their arrival the British took care of them — seized them and put them incommunicado, or in Serbian jargon, muzzled them. For ever, as far as British listening goes, or Americans for that matter.

The Serbians had reason to be interested in Bari.

Immediately following the Allied landings in Italy, a group of OSS men had pioneered trans-Adriatic seaborne shipment of supplies to the Parti-

sans, but by early 1944 this activity had been regularized and made part of the overall special operations support system.

The Bari base complex could handle 2,000 tons of Adriatic Seaborn shipments monthly, plus 850 tons of air lift as early as February 1944, for Tito. What a source of mouth water to Draza and the Cetniks. The OSS had four teams of weather observers for the Air Force in Yugoslavia, as early as June 1944. OSS also provided air rescue services in Yugoslavia during the summer.

By April 1945, the Juggs had received 1,147 tons of supplies from SOE.

It is not exactly a secret that the British did not feel altogether right with Tito out of their reach and in the hands of his Soviet comrades.

The Secretary of State received from OSS official in Algiers, Howard Chapin, on June 4, 1944 (from Murphy) the following telegram:

Fitzroy Maclean arrived from London last evening at same moment I returned from Italy. At airport he said he desired to see me urgently today regarding current Yugoslav situation. Macmillan now informs me that Maclean was ordered this morning to proceed to Bari for return to Tito's headquarters as soon as circumstances permit. He departed immediately.

(SECRET) One British view of Tito's present difficulties and reverses is that it may turn him more in direction of British influence as it becomes apparent that the Soviet Union is powerless to supply him with sinews of war and practical as distinguished from ideological support.⁷

There were losses on both sides but especially severe on the Yugo-Bolshevik side. The Germans descended about 500 paratroopers who defeated all of Tito's divisions. Evidently the propaganda did not have its hey day; either there were not so many divisions of Partisans (30,000 men) and 500 Germans destroyed them easily, or 500 Germans defeated 30,000 Titoists.

During the week of May 25, Allied fighter and bombing planes from Italy flew over 1,000 terror sorties to aid the Partisans. Involved were 300 medium bombardiers and 200 hunter bombardiers.

Three days after his landing in Bari, the British took Tito by night to Vis in the HMS Blackmore, a Hunt class destroyer. Vis was in the hands of the British after the capitulation of Italy on September 8, 1943. The Italians had captured Vis in April 1941, and taken full possession of it.

Americans had their eyes and ears opened and Chapin on June 9, 1944 (secret from Murphy) wrote from Algiers to the Secretary of State:

Marshal Tito and British and Soviet missions are now established on Vis. Air traffic between Vis and Italian mainland is now feasible. This information is to be treated as highly secret. It is also understood from British sources that new Yugoslav Prime Minister was appointed primarily to bring about an understanding among Yugoslav resistance groups and forces. He has indicated apparently that he would be willing to accept for such reorganization of Yugoslav forces any reasonable proposal. I am also informed that Prime Minister intends in the near future to confer with representatives of Tito. The disposition of certain elements of Yugoslav forces in this theatre are awaiting outcome of such conference.^H

At Vis there were British Brigade Commandos, navy and Aviation units. About Soviets with Tito, Howard Chapin sent a telegram on July 2, 1944 (secret from Murphy) to the Secretary of State:

The Soviet Military Mission continues on the island of Vis (Vis) at Marshal Tito's headquarters. As far as we are able to ascertain all members of the Soviet Military Mission were evacuated from mainland at the time of Tito's departure. (Your 2004, June 26, 3 p.m.)

According to Fitzroy (Fitzroy) MacLean, while the Soviet Mission maintains close personal relationship with Tito, during the past weeks it has been very inactive and in fact many of its members are dissatisfied with their inactivity on Vis. They have no particular facilities for work and naturally on the island their field of action is extremely limited. They are of course dependent to a large extent on Anglo-American sources for supplies and facilities.⁹

About the whole affair, the British Embassy in Washington on June 12, 1944 sent to the Secretary of State the top secret Aide Memoire:

As the United States Government are aware Marshal Tito was recently evacuated by air from the Yugoslav mainland to Bari whence he has proceeded to the island of Vis to set up his temporary headquarters there. The evacuation took place at Marshal Tito's request owing to a breakdown in his system of communications. He proposes to re-establish contact with the Partisans from Vis where he expects to remain for two to three weeks. While in Bari Marshal Tito had conversation with Brigadier Maclean in which he (Tito) expressed readiness to meet the new Yugoslav Prime Minister whose appointment he welcomed. Marshall Tito also expressed approval of King Peter's decision to dispense with his previous advisers.

2. Taking advantage of the situation which has thus arisen, it has been decided that King Peter, accompanied by the Yugoslav Prime Minister and

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His Majesty's Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government, should leave immediately for Malta where His Majesty will remain while the Yugoslav Prime Minister and Mr. Stevenson proceed to Vis to open conversations with Marshal Tito. These conversations will have as their object the reaching of an agreement between the King and Tito and the unification of all forces of resistance in Yugoslavia. It is hoped that these conversations will pave the way for a friendly meeting between the King and Marshal Tito. In any case His Majesty may proceed from Malta to Vis after a short interval to take up his residence there.

3. In informing Mr. Hull His Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to say that His Majesty's Government will of course keep the United States Government fully informed of the results of the discussions, and to express the hope that the United States Government approve of the action which is being taken.

4. It is evidently of the highest importance that the utmost secrecy should be observed as regards movements of the King and the Yugoslav Prime Minister and also as regards the scope and place of the proposed discussions with Marshal Tito.¹⁰

The British achieved very quickly what they wanted, to put two Croatian Quislings: Subasic and Broz-Tito to make an agreement as the Britons dictated. Subasic arrived at Vis on June 13, chaperoned among others by British Ambassador Stevenson.

Donovan was on Capri, and on June 27, 1944, G. Edward Buxton his deputy in the United States, sent the following memorandum for the Secretary of State:

The following is a paraphrase of a cable from General Donovan which he asked be delivered to you:

"I had lunch with General Sir Maitland Wilson today. General Wilson stated that the conversations between Tito and Subasich went better than anticipated. The following was agreed upon:

"1. The Subasich Government would have a Tito representative.

"2. As part of his Army, Tito would accept Mihailovich troops who would be allowed to wear the Royal insignia as distinguished from Tito's red star. This would also apply to Naval forces.

"3. That ultimate determination of the King's position would be put off until after the war was over.

Wilson remarked that the chasing around the mountains which the Nazis gave Tito had had a healthful effect. Both Peter and Subasich are going back to London.""

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The British would inform Tito about the peril of capture at that moment because they had just dispatched Draza Mihailovic to his doom and enthroned their Agent, Tito, to the sole power in Yugoslavia.

The overthrow of the Government of Prince Paul on March 27, 1941, by Tito along with some naive Serbian military officers and Serbian politicians, was bringing its dividends for the Anglo-Americans. The Anglo-Americans now sealed the destiny of Yugoslavia: to become a Bolshevik country.

The Germans failed to capture Tito. The Soviets took him to Bari, the British kept him in villas like royalty, transferred him as royalty to Vis, and treated him in the future as royalty.

They not only guided him until May 24, 1944, they saved him.

Although Tito was aware that he was in English hands, he made the Britons sweat by his dangling.

On July 13, 1944 from Naples, the following telegram was sent to the Secretary of State from Brandt: Brigadier MacLean does not offer much in the way of explanation for Tito's present refusal to meet General Wilson at Caserta. Tito he says two days ago professed eagerness to make the visit. During the interval Tito received unfavorable advice either from members of his committee or possibly from Russian sources. Some of Tito's supporters according to MacLean distrusts Tito's recent negotiations with the Royal Yugoslav Government. The Russians suspect that Tito is being oriented too much

toward the west at a time when they themselves are unable to strengthen their position by the supply program via Bari which they desire.

General Wilson now plans subject to what ever advice he may receive from Churchill to hold MacLean at Caserta for about one week so that Tito may interpret this action as a mark of dissatisfaction with his present attitude. MacLean while attempting a rather feeble apology hopes that as in the past Tito will become worried and adopt a more reasonable and understanding attitude. According to MacLean in addition to British officers now assigned to his principal mission on Vis he has now twelve sub-missions on the mainland each consisting of at least two British officers. He plans to increase these branch missions to fifteen. Randolph Churchill will be in charge of the branch mission in Croatia. MacLean as usual writes off Mihailovic stating that Serbians continue to come over to Partisan in large numbers.¹²

From Algiers on July 16, 1944, Lawton sent to the Secretary of State the following telegram:

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MacMillan has given me a (SECRET FROM MURPHY) copy of a memorandum prepared by Brigadier MacLean presumably for forwarding to London of which the following is a summary. Tito genuinely intended to come to Caserta and was prevented from doing so at the last moment by strong representations made to him by certain sections of his entourage and by certain recently arrived provincial delegates. These took the line that the Partisan rank and file had been unsettled by the sudden announcement of an agreement between Tito and the Royal Yugoslav Government who had always been represented to them as traitors. People were saying that Tito had been forced by the British to sell out to the King. This rumour had been cleverly exploited by the Germans and the BBC had also helped to confirm the impression by building up Subasic at Tito's expense. Tito's advisers represented to him that if he went to Italy at the present stage it would immediately be said that he had been summoned abroad to take orders from his foreign masters. This would have a further unsettling effect and at the same time damage Tito's prestige.

It seems likely that it was on these grounds that Tito was persuaded not to leave Vis though as he told MacLean his bags were packed and he had even set aside four bottles of the best local wine as a present to the Sac. He has shown no anxiety to avoid discussions with Subasic. On the contrary he told MacLean that there were numerous points which required settling between them and that he was accordingly sending Velebit (repeat Velebit) to London forthwith where he could act as his representative with the Royal Yugoslav Government and Channel of communication with them as agreed with Subasic.

Apart from an understandable desire not to upset his followers Tito's discourteous behaviour seems to have been largely due to an exaggerated idea of his own prestige. He is still feeling his way and it is only natural that his head should be turned by all the attention paid to him of late. To one who all his life has been wanted only by the police it is naturally flattering to find so many eminent people running after him and he evidently now thinks that everyone is at his beck and call.

The best cure for this seems to be to leave him to stew in his own juice. To press him to come to Caserta would be to court further rebuffs. There are in fact no military matters of importance requiring discussion which could not be settled through the normal channels while on the political side there is a strong case for not seeking to rush matters but rather leaving the two parties to settle outstanding questions direct through the agreed channels.

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As the Department will note this memoranda relates to a British view regarding Tito's failure to come to Caserta for a meeting with General Wilson.¹³

The Division of European Affairs of the Department of State on 7-18-44 commented:

MacLean's explanation does not sound very convincing. Note particularly that political and military discussions have suddenly (and conveniently) become unimportant for the moment.

The period from May 24, 1944 to October 20, 1944 was maybe the most fatal for the holocaust of the people who were forced to live in the Bolshevik dictatorship of the Red Marshal at the request of Anglo-Americans. Everything: Allied military strategy, diplomatic maneuvering, media activities all were feverishly engaged in that scope.

The Charge d'Affaires a.i. Harold Schantz from Cairo sent to the Secretary of State on July 7, the following correspondence:

With reference to the Embassy's despatch no. 50 of June 15, 1944, transmitting a copy of a report by Mr. R.H. Markham of the OWI regarding the situation in Yugoslavia as of June 7, 1944, I have the honor to forward herewith a copy of a similar appraisal of conditions there as of June 30, 1944, expressing Mr. Markham's views with his usual pungency and force.

It will be noted that a principal military development in Yugoslavia during the month of June, as reported by Mr. Markham, was Tito's serious defeat in Serbia where his "much heralded campaign completely failed, the Serbs of Serbia defeating him."

Politically, Markham considers June a very fruitful month for the partisans externally, though not so good internally. Externally the Subasic — Tito conversations constituted, he says, a triumph for the latter, the two Croat nationalists disposing of Serbia in accordance with their desires, under the aegis of England and with the joint protection of Allied military power. In addition, the King, whom Tito did not recognize, has apparently been prevailed upon to appeal to the Serbs to support the partisans. If he does so, it is Markham's view that he will eliminate himself and his dynasty, for a liberated Serbia will not approve a renegade King and the Croats, having used him for their ends, will similarly abandon him. Internally, however, Tito's fortunes did not fare so well. Defeated militarily by a Serbia which becomes more and more opposed to his Partisans, Tito's

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recruiting drives, with a minor exception in Macedonia, have uniformly failed not only in Serbia but also seemingly in Croatia and Slovenia.

Continuing, Markham summarizes: "As of today, a) the most virile element in Yugoslavia, the Serbs, are decidedly against Tito's Communist Partisans, b) he, Tito, is supported by only a minority of the Yugoslavs in other areas and his general political strength is not increasing, c) his military strength is decidedly limited, d) his main military and political aim is to make himself master of Yugoslavia, e) practically all his authoritative leaders are fanatical Communists who never represented more than a *very small* minority in Yugoslavia, f) his chief followers are very closely attached to Russia."

Mr. Markham closes with a warning to his organization to "keep strictly out of this fearful internal fight" and "not help impose this Communist Tito and his Communist reign on Yugoslavia".

June 30, 1944

AN APPRAISAL OF THE SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA AS OF JUNE 30, 1944

A) MILITARY

1) The Partisans continue to be the only armed force in Yugoslavia actually fighting the Germans. They devote much of their energy to fighting other Yugoslavs. The chief aim of their military activity is to prepare for the political domination of the country. During the month of June they made no appreciable military progress anywhere and received some very serious setbacks.

2) The most striking event was the capture of Tito's headquarters by the Germans. All the Partisans there were temporarily driven out, many were killed in the fighting, the whole communications system was disrupted and large stores of munitions and weapons were captured. The Russian and British missions fled. And so did Tito.

3) Thus Tito's "300,000 fighters" in "the half of Yugoslavia" which they had freed, couldn't save their chief. Boys from Rhode Island and Wales or some other places in America and Great Britain had to bale him out in haste. They took him to Bari, and then to the island of Vis, made safe from the Germans not by Tito's "300,000 Warriors" but primarily by American and British ships, planes and men. The only really "free" spot in Yugoslavia is what the Allies have freed and keep free. Tito will go (or

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has gone) into Yugoslavia again and will try to set him up another headquarters.

4) The month of June confirmed Tito's serious defeat in Serbia. It showed that his much heralded military campaign there had *completely failed*. The Serbs of Serbia licked him — even though "Foreign Minister Smodlaka told me with assurance, "we are closing in on Serbia from three sides". He seems to believe his own propaganda on Free Yugoslavia and BBC.

5) Tito has made no appreciable military progress in Macedonia. The number of warriors he has there is very small (in the hundreds).

6) In Slovenia Tito is completely stalemated. Indeed his only June military claim is to have taken the little town of Mirna and to have retaken a village or so. Tito hasn't as many as 15,000 fighters among the almost two million Slovenes. These are largely engaged in terrorizing other Slovenes. As a result of this activity far more than that number of potential Slovene anti-German fighters have been killed or imprisoned, and a still larger

number seized by the Germans for forced labor. An equal number have been driven into Security Battalions. Not a thousand Germans have been killed in the whole Partisan activity in Slovenia. Usually the Slovene Partisans are careful to act where the Germans are not.

7) In East Bosnia, the Sandjak and Montenegro, the Partisans are stalemated. In Lika and Kordun they continue skirmishes.

8) Throughout Croatia proper their military activity is sporadic, largely ravaging.

9) They report more recruits in Voivodina.

10) They have been using their military strength and American-British weapons in fighting Albanians way down in the heart of Kossovo, far from vital communications lines and strategic centers. It seems to have been a purely political action.

11) While the Americans and Britishers were rescuing Mr. Churchill's "Communist" from his own headquarters, his fellow Communists were busy at political coercive activity in distant Serbia and Kossovo.

12) Tito has had *very little success* in winning over Bulgarians. He has fewer than a thousand; they are organized in a Christo Botieff Brigade. They and the Serbs don't get along well. Neither do Serb and Macedonian Partisans. The Partisans' campaign against Bulgarian Trun has failed.

13) In other words during the month of June, Tito's "300,000 fighters" were a) stalemated, b) confined to distant mountainous, unimportant areas, or c) being chased about. Nowhere was there an appreciable advance.

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B) STOYAN PRIBICHEVICH

14) Toward the end of May the American and British governments facilitated the establishing in Yugoslavia of Stoyan Pribichevich, John Talbot and two photographers. I expected the three "innocents abroad" to act as mere press agents of Tito, but thought that Pribichevich, because of his knowledge and standing, would be more objective, responsible and reliable. He proved a terrible disappointment. He deliberately set out to sell himself and Tito. First the newspaper boys hustled about and had their pictures taken in many poses. Then they reported that Tito had freed half of Yugoslavia. Stoyan poetically described the Partisans train and autos and said "It's free enough for me". Two days later Stoyan and Tito had to flee for dear life; Americans and British had to rush over to save him from his freed territory. He ran for seven days and seven nights, but utterly refused to call that *a flight*; it was a "military movement". He saw only *one little village*, Drvar, yet wrote and writes about Partisan Yugoslavia. In the whole land the Partisans haven't half a dozen trucks. They control no railroad except what is left of one little, private, narrow-gauge lumber line. Stoyan deliberately tried to mislead the American nation.

C) FREE YUGOSLAVIA

15) Free Yugoslavia has worked itself terribly thin. It is vague, repetitious, inaccurate, misleading. It gives no true, precise picture of the military or political situation anywhere. It is no longer considered a useful source of information by the G.S.I. (top) in Cairo, and is not cited in their Balkan Transportation Reports.

D)REPORTS

16) The partisans were active in sabotaging transport and achieved useful results. They have stopped traffic on no vital main line but have hindered it, slowed it down, and forced the Germans to expend men and material in guarding the lines. The railway from Zagreb to Split doesn't function in certain places. It is permanently out. The narrow-gauge from Visegrad across East Bosnia to Sarajevo is out. The long trunk-line Ghevghali-Ljubljana runs fairly regularly; the vital line Vienna-Maribor-Ljubljana-Trieste carries very heavy enemy traffic. A source that is considered reliable reports that 20 trains were destroyed in 46 days on the Belgrade-Zagreb line by Partisans. In 37 days, according to other source, there were 10 cases of demolition and destroying of trains, mostly in

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Croatia. All this activity was highly useful, but enemy traffic continued heavy. On May 31st it was "*very heavy*" between Zagreb and Belgrade. On the 24th and 25th of May 25 enemy trains passed through Zagreb for the Italian front. During the first week in June traffic was said to be *very light*. From the 24th to the 27th of May 26 trains went east from Zagreb and 26 went west from Brod. This was not a complete record. From the 28th to the 30th, 19 went east from Zagreb, 14 went west from Brod. During five days in May 39 trains entered Skoplje from Nish, 36 left Skoplje for Nish. On March 28th it was reliably reported that the wreckage of three bridges had blocked traffic for the duration from Zagreb to Budapest on three lines. On June 16th all three lines were reported as functioning.

It seems certain that vital enemy railroad traffic in Yugoslavia is more regular and in larger volume than six months ago. Some of these lines run past "freed" territory.

E) POLITICAL

17) June was a *very fruitful* month for the Partisans as far as external politics go; not so good internally.

18) Tito and Subasic met on the island of Vis. In view of the half-year of steady Partisan Military setbacks, climaxed by the chief's flight from his own headquarters and his rescue by foreigners, the meeting between the

exiled Communist and the exiled Ban was of extreme interest. Both were taken to the pleasant Dalmatian isle by Allied transport. The armed planes and ships of the world's two allegedly capitalist empires watched over the two Croatians as they bathed in the sun and conversed long and heartily in the shade. Boys who had travelled far and not too willingly from Montana and Scotland enabled the two Yugoslavs to talk at great length in peaceful security. And the two pulled a fast one. Tito has written in his "Proleter" that the Croatians are the *strongest nation* in Yugoslavia. Subasic was a spokesman for Machek, whose lieutenants have repeatedly declared that Croatia must be a Free Republic. Thus two Croatians with their strongly nationalist views joyfully disposed of Serbia under our grand protecting wings. Croatians, whose fellow citizens in Zagreb welcomed Hitler's soldiers in Zagreb with flags and flowers in April 1941, disposed of Serbia, 140,000 of whose sons were taken to Germany as war prisoners in April 1941, because they dared stand alone against the powerful Nazi Reich and fight for Great Britain. These men decided it was a propitious moment to crush Serbia now. They made their agreement, drew up a statement to be broadcast, and said "good-bye" with great satisfaction. Subasic toured the

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warfronts in Italy and went back to London to report to his sponsors. Tito took another dip in the sea and told his Communist Chief of Staff, the fanatical Montenegrin Arso Jovanovic, to tell boys from Nebraska and Glasgow to fly him over to some new Yugoslav fastness and put up new headquarters. It was quite a Tito triumph, amounting to something like the following: Tito, the Communist, was master. He is director of two companies. One is his internal Committee; the other is the Royal Yugoslav Government. One company's vice-director is the Croat Ivan Ribar, seconded by the Croatian-Serb (across-the-river Serbs) Velebit, with the Croatian Smodlak to say amen. The vice-director of the other Tito Company is Ivan Subasic, seconded by the Croat Janchikovich, a very able, practical and slick man. No representative of the Serb nationalists (five million in number) was anywhere about.

Said Tito to his vice-director Ivan No. 2, "Will you recognize Ivan No. 1 and his committee?" "Yeste" said Ivan Subasic, which in both Croatian and English is about the same. Then Tito asked Ivan No. 1 "Will you recognize Ivan No. 2's Royal Yugoslav Government?". "Yeste" answered Ivan Ribar. There it was, a nice Croatian Agreement, with the Serbs left out! There will be no one in the Royal Yugoslav Government of whom Tito disapproves and he will have his own special appointees in it. Thus he won a double victory, remaining boss of the legitimized and effective internal government and becoming master of the external government with fleet and gold at his disposal, and prospects of being marshal and commander-in-chief of the Serbs of Serbia. As we Americans sat watching the Communist Joseph Broz got two strikes on nice old Uncle Sam who thought that the meeting on Vis was a Sunday-school picnic. Indeed, he had all reason to think so, for when Tito told Ivan Subasic good-bye he added with emphasis as he made the five-fingered sign of the cross, "Tell your friend Churchill I wouldn't think of imposing Communism."

19) How about the little King? Tito and his Croatian Ivans have him just where they want him. Tito didn't recognize him. Not at all. But he hopes to use the King as a decoy, as a Royal Lord Haw Haw. He hopes King Peter will broadcast to his Serbs telling them to kick out Michailovic and flock to the colors and serve under the Royal Yugoslav Marshal Joseph Broz Tito, the democrat who abhors the Party Line and only yearns to save Serbia from the Serbs. Thus two birds will be killed with one stone. The King and Dynasty will be cooked forever and the Serbs will be softened up for the phalanxes of the Marshal, armed with shiny and deadly lend-lease weapons

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paid for by the innocent citizens of Iowa. Then when the Ivans have liquidated the Jovans and freed Serbia from the Serbs, there can be a plebiscite. The people left in Serbia will vote against a renegade and the Croats will cast aside their tool.

20) Such is external political situation of Tito as of June 30. Whether Mr. Churchill is completely satisfied and will go through with this agreement between Tito and the two Ivans I do not know. Stranger things have happened — but not often.

2 1) What is Subasic's role in this plan? Is he just a stooge? No. He is a rather gullible, rather flattered, but quite strong-willed *Croat*. This is a rare moment for Subasic. He would love to have Tito and his across-the-river Serbs crush Serbia and weaken the dynasty. Then he hopes the Croats, most Slovenes and the chastened, humbled Serbs of Serbia will rally round Machek against Tito. Then Zagreb will be

exalted on the Hill of Zion and the people who make the sign of the cross with five fingers will give laws to the people of Yugoslavia.

F) INTERNAL POLITICS

22) These are not so hot for Tito.

23) From long conversations with people just out of Serbia I am convinced that the Serbs of Serbia were never so much opposed to Tito's Communist Partisans as now. They have repelled him with arms and in only one place has he any appreciable political success to his credits.

24) That is the defection of Mihailovic's commander Major Djurich, a Herzegovinian. Djurich has long been questionable. He has fought neither Germans or Partisans. Just lived off the land. He had a Russian mistress whom he got tired of, as men do, and after a scene he killed her. Then he got a brand new one whom he considered pretty hot, clever Vera Pesich, a pro-Partisan. Mihailovich didn't like to have a Partisan sharing brave Djurich's tent so had her killed. He promised Djurich a fine new one, but first he wanted Djurich to come talk things over. The major was scared white and tried to figure things out. "Mihailovic will kill me as he did my Vera" he thought. "But Tito won't. He takes anybody — the Ustasha Pierc, the Ustasha Augustinchich, the Ustasha Nazor. the Nedichist Ritnikar. What have they got that I ain't got?" So Djurich arose and went to Tito and as a sign of his deep pure love of the people and democracy proceeded to write a long Sunday-school pamphlet urging the Serbs to come to Tito. The pamphlet is now being circulated in large numbers.

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25) Along with this there has been a new membership drive in Djurich's wild, backward area of mixed population between Skoplje and Les-kovats, and with the help of Allied weapons and agents and promises there have been some converts. But even they haven't accepted salvation through Tito and his Red Star which they fear and abhor, but because Tito's sponsors say it is all okay and Britain and America are for it. Some of these poor, harassed mountain peasants say "Well, if it's good enough for Britain and America, I guess it's good enough for us."

This, however, as of June 30th, is a small regional success and Tito has not yet won over many Serbs of Serbia.

26) He and his Partisans are carrying on a terrific campaign against Machek, which is one of a number of sure signs that Tito is not gaining ground in Croatia, where a majority of the people are against him.

27) New evidence from persons very recently from Slovenia indicates that the Communist Partisans have, as of June 30th, failed to win the allegiance of more than a comparatively small minority of the Slovene people inhabiting a decidedly limited area.

28) I am making no predictions, but as of today a) the most virile element in Yugoslavia, the Serbs, are decidedly against Tito's Communist Partisans, b) he, Tito, is supported by only a minority of the Yugoslavs in other areas and his general political strength is not increasing, c) his military strength is decidedly limited, d) his main military and political aim is to make himself master of Yugoslavia, e) practically all his authoritative leaders are fanatical Communists who never represented more than a *very small* minority in Yugoslavia, f) his chief followers are very closely attached to Russia.

29) In addition it must be pointed out that Tito and his chief supporters aspire to dominate the Balkans, playing up Pan-Slavism.

30) Finally some of them are aggressively disloyal to our ally Greece. (This point deserves a much more careful analysis. It is important).

31) In view of all this we must keep strictly out of this fearful internal fight, whose outcome is doubtful and whose developments will certainly be tragedy and blood. We *must* not help Tito attack the Serbs while scores of thousands of their men are in Germany because they fought for Great Britain and democracy. We must not help impose this Communist Tito and his Communist reign on Yugoslavia and thereby crush and alienate the friends of Western Democracy. Even if King Peter becomes a Lord Haw Haw to decoy and demoralize the Serbs we should not broadcast his sad, seductive appeals.

Reuben H. Markham¹

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Soon the whole plan of British Diplomacy would be working toward that finale: establishment of Bolshevik Yugoslavia.

Robert Murphy on August 8, 1944, writes to the Secretary of State about the Caserta events.

Marshal Tito arrived Caserta Sunday accompanied by members of his staff mentioned in Embassy's 45, July 31, together with twelve armed body guards and *Brygaqoyvan*. He was received in his capacity as a guerilla chieftain and it was decided at SAC's conference August 5 that Tito's future military position and nature of armed forces to be placed at his disposal were a matter for arrangement between Tito himself and Yugoslav Prime Minister, Dr. Subasic. SAC proposed at that time to deal only with Tito's requirements for forces at present under his command acting in a guerilla role. CCS had recently asked for views of AFHQ on what equipment should be supplied to Tito's forces on assumption that they were required for a defensive role in Yugoslavia after liberation of the country. SAC indicated the intention was to build up partisans south of the Save Line to a defensive guerilla force of approximately three corps, if and when Germans retreated to that line, at same time maintaining the partisan forces north of line as offensive guerillas. It was also indicated by SAC prior to Tito's arrival that it is hoped to develop a situation where all supply matters will be taken up with Royal Yugoslav Government rather than with Tito personally. It was also planned to take advantage of present conference with Tito to inquire how his relations with Dr. Subasic were progressing. SAC also indicated that in view of political implications of naval and air matters likely to arise during conference, he proposed to treat these matters purely as means of educating Tito in Allied methods in operating naval and air forces.

There was one meeting of Tito and AFHQ staff Sunday afternoon. Thereafter Tito departed for a visit to General Alexander's Headquarters in north Italy and then Tito insisted on an unscheduled visit to Rome where he is today. There will be conversations of a minor nature tomorrow. Tito was scheduled to return to Vis Thursday, August 10 but (STRICTLY SECRET) in view of delay in arrival of British Prime Minister now scheduled to arrive later in week probably accompanied by Subasic, Tito may be persuaded to remain here until Mr. Churchill's arrival.

Detailed report on Tito's visit will be transmitted soon as possible¹⁴

Murphy on September 8, 1944, wrote an office memorandum to Cavendish of the Department of State:

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During the course of Marshal Tito's visit to Caserta he suggested several times that I visit him at Vis. After his return there he again reminded me of it on four different occasions, through the OSS Mission. I thought, therefore, that it might be well before departure to go over to the Island and, accordingly, I flew over there on Thursday, August 31.

He was in excellent spirits, I found, and on the *qui vive* regarding the pending military operations in Yugoslavia. He had been asked by SAC to attempt to cut certain German lines of communication and to extend his sabotage activities. For that purpose he was being provided some additional means, although General Wilson said that he did not contemplate sending a large force to support him immediately.

I spent the entire afternoon with Marshal Tito, and had opportunity to ask him a few questions. Among those was whether in his opinion the Soviet Union would invade Serbia and attack the Mihailovic forces. He spoke with great assurance on this point, stating that he was convinced that the Russians would not enter Serbia, but would confine their activities along the Danube into Hungary, leaving Marshal Tito to deal with Serbian matters.

On the subject of territorial settlement after the war he said that the Allies would find Yugoslavia "stiff necked". He said Yugoslavia is entitled to, and will insist on, Istria, and in his opinion should also have the Kossovar area and parts of Macedonia and Thrace. He felt that the Allies could afford to be liberal in their treatment of Yugoslavia, in view of the sacrifices the latter has made in the winning of the war.

Marshal Tito also expressed the opinion that, while the German settlement was a matter which he felt could well be left to the great powers, he did believe that any proposal to partition Germany should be approached with the greatest delicacy. He said that he personally believed that Germany should not be divided, but that its economy should be used as a unit for the benefit of the European community of

nations. That economy has been built up over a long period of generations and represents an element of the greatest importance to the well-being of all of Germany's neighbors. Punishment of German war criminals should not be confused with proper use of German economy.

He gave me the stock reply on the question of communism in Yugoslavia after the war, saying that Yugoslavia did not include a population whose traditions would tend toward communism, that he stood for a liberal and democratic form of regime, the form of which he was content to leave with the Yugoslav people. He made a long plea for economic support from the United States. There was no doubt in my mind after meeting the members

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of the Russian Mission during a luncheon that the relationship between them and Marshal Tito could not be closer or more friendly.¹⁵

Vis became a familiar expression in the jargon of the United States and British diplomacy. It thus deserves a little attention.

"The rocky little island of Vis, the Issa of classical times, possesses by virtue of its geographical position considerable strategical importance. The most outlying of the Dalmatian Islands, it offers a convenient base from which to raid the other islands and the mainland or to attack shipping in the Adriatic. During the Napoleonic Wars it was held by the British for several years and to this day Fort Wellington and Fort George still bear the Royal Cipher of King George III, while an elegant marble obelisk commemorates a naval victory won against the French by Captain William Hoste, R.N., in 1811."

Everybody at Vis had a good time: no fighting the Krauts, rich supplies from the Allies, and much money in gold, dollars and pounds. Murphy also had a good time, especially since he believed that the Yugo-Bolsheviks would not impose Bolshevism on their peoples. Writes Dedijer:

In June 1944 I went back to headquarters on the island of Vis. Never had we lived under such non-partisanlike conditions. We had always been on the move, our pack horses ready to push on as soon as the shooting started, which it did practically every day. And now here we were at the seaside— (True, there was no drinking water, but we drank wine instead, because there was not enough rain water for all.) When work was done we went swimming, but even then made up a game of battle which included dunking one another. As a former water-polo player, I was a past master at this. Once I was attacked by four Montenegrin generals: they had me cornered, but I started shouting insults against various Montenegrin clans — one of them was a Katunjanin, a Montenegrin "aristocrat," while another was from somewhere in the Scutari plains, a "fukara"; they set about arguing among themselves and I got away scot-free.

Our beach became very international. We were joined by several western statesmen who came to see Tito, among them Robert Murphy, a special political adviser to General Eisenhower. We barely escaped a serious diplomatic incident, the first in a series of mishaps with the American government. As I was recognized king of the sea as far as dunking was concerned, the minute I entered the water everyone made for the shore, trying to avoid provoking me. That day, however, I saw a redheaded man swimming toward me, splashing as he approached. That was supposed to be a terrible provocation; I started for him to punish him for his brashness,

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but Tito yelled from the beach, "Stop it, he's a guest!" And so Robert Murphy was spared a plunge into the depths of the blue Adriatic.

By the time of Tito's arrival at Vis, which had been occupied by the British in January 1944, it had become a miniature military, naval, and air base, and, although not called an occupation, it was run by the English but still considered Yugoslav territory. It was not an Anglo-Yugoslav condominium. The British Commando Brigade furnished the garrison and carried terror raids against the armed forces of the Croatian State on the neighboring islands and on the mainland. The British organized a "Balkan School of Artillery" to train the Yugo-Bolsheviks in the use of the 75 mm. pack-howitzer.

At Komiza, the British Naval Headquarters was responsible for a force of motor torpedo boats operating against the Croatian shipping in the Adriatic, a task in which they were joined by a number of armed schooners and fishing boats. Later on the Yugo-Bolshies would call these British enterprises the nucleus of a Partisan navy.

The central plain had been cleared of vines and olives and converted into a full-sized airfield from which a squadron of rocket-carrying Hurricanes was operating against shipping and other targets in Croatia, while other aircraft, based in Italy, used it for refueling, thereby considerably increasing their range. The whole island was congested with British military vehicles and huge signboards advertising the presence of REME, NAAFI, DADOS, and a Corps of Military Police.

Thus Tito was in the heart of British Army quarters. He had nothing to do besides observing the fighters and bombers of the RAF landing and taking off. The myth about his "levanting" unbeknown to the British is the most childish one created by the British. No fly could enter, leave, or fly over Vis without the British seeing and knowing it.

Whatever happened at Vis happened because the Britons wanted it to happen. It was the highest peak of British overlordship of Tito. That can happen only with agents. Never was anyone so dominated and kept in the web of any master, if he was not an agent.

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It would be hard to determine how it came about that Ivan Subasic became terrorist and spy of OSS (Office of Strategic Services). Fleeing Croatia on April 10, 1941, he tried to join the fleeing Government of Yugoslavia with the King leading. But he notoriously was a confidant of Prince Paul and Prince Paul had not to flee. He was ceremoniously escorted with his family by the Yugos to Greece and then by British to Jerusalem and to Kenya.

The Serbian element of the Yugo-Government was eager to transfer in safety their coffers full of gold and dollars (besides the gold and foreign currencies deposited abroad) to live on them. They had not much consideration for their Croatian and Slovenian partners. Subasic was not a member of the Government and the administration of Croatia had no endowments in gold or foreign currencies, but only in domestic money. Whether or not Subasic took any of the Croatian treasury in his coffers with him was not registered. So once in safety in British Jerusalem, he was left to himself. The Serbians around King Petar (II) did not care about Subasic at all. With some other fellow travellers, he surfaced in Capetown, Brazil, and in the United States. But he was penniless. The Serbians in London did not care to pay him the annual budget for Croatia. Only King Petar paid it later. Petar found all Serbians of his entourage against his marriage to the Greek half-princess. They did not think much of their King's sumptuous wedding, Serbian style, in London, while Draza Mihailovic was suffering (in reality he was not) in the mountains.

Petar married the Greek half-princess, Alexandra, on March 20, 1944. His lack of independent thinking is known but about his marriage he was very independent. Or was he. Was it his future mother-in-law, the notorious Aspasia who bitterly wanted her daughter to become a queen, now. But the supreme Croatian in Petar's Government, Juraj Krnjevic, was willing to bless the royal marriage if the King pays him the budget of Croatia. The King did pay all retroactive amounts and also those for the future. Krnjevic deposited all the money to his own account in the bank and according to Dinko Suljak, he kept it for himself.

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It is not known how much of the budget Petar II paid to Krnjevic' advance. With the appointment of Ban of Croatia, Ivan Subasic, to Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, the office of the Ban ceased to exist. r> body was appointed as his successor. It must be said that on June 1, 19^ for all practical purposes, that there was no longer an autonomous Croa in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and no more any Ban.

Already at that moment Subasic had accepted the ruling of the Coi munist Assembly in Jajce, November 29, 1943, that Communist Yug slavia will be divided — into six Communist republics and two autonomo provinces, as it is still today. Croatia thus is a Socialist (Communi; Republic of Croatia without Bosnia and Hercegovina and many other Cro tian historical and ethnic territories.

Arriving in the United States, Subasic had to cater to the organizations < the Croatian Peasant Party in the United States, not numerous and not ricl Subasic, among others, was an unknown politician and had to beg Krnjev to recommend him to fellow Croatians in the United States which Krnjev did.

That means also that Subasic was not in the graces of the Serbia Camarilla in London and its long hand the Yugo-Ambassador in Washing ton, Constantin Fotic the most famous Pan-Serb, anti-Croatian, Cetnik o the Cetniks of all times. President Roosevelt had to teach him not to hat Croatians so much.

All Fotices hated Croatians. His wife was a Croatian, daughter of Ba: Slavko Cuvaj (January 10, 1912-April 5, 1912) and as anti-Croatian a Fotic himself. All Croatian women married to Serbians become Croato phobes or Croatohaters as their husbands are. If the Croatian spouse is ; male married to a Serbian woman, he hates Croatians as his wife does.

Thus no money for Subasic from anywhere and Croatian contribution; were scarce.

Did Subasic beg OSS for money or did Donovan offer the employmeni and the means with it? We do not have any knowledge and it does not make much difference. Subasic had with him a numerous entourage and personal secretaries, as in Zagreb. Among these are Josip Mohorovicic, Ivan Mod-ercin, and Ante (Smith) Pavelic, who became Subasic" s secretary in December 1941 until March 7, 1945, all bloody Yugoslavs. One other former Yugo official, at the Yugo Information Center in New York and also a former Press attache at the Yugo Legation in Washington, who after the abolition of the Yugo Information Center in new York was unemployed, was Bogdan Radica, also connected with the group.

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Radica was appointed Press Attache at the Yugoslav Legation and got an I.D. card from the Department of State on November 2, 1940. When he ceased to be a member of the Yugo Legation, the Legation returned his I.D. card on August 1, 1942, he became Press Attache' or responsible for the press at the Yugo Information Center in New York. The offices of the Yugoslav Information Center located at 812 Fifth Avenue, a former residence of a wealthy architect, were palatially furnished. The house is said to have rented at \$450 per month. To run the Center, established in January 1942, were appointed the former Premier Bogoljub Jevtic, the former Minister Savica Kosanovic, the Minister Franc Snoj, and the Ban of Croatia Ivan Subasic.

At the Center also were working all the previous members of Subasic's entourage. After the Center (JIC) was closed in September 1943 at the request of Ambassador Fotic, Josip Mohorovicic became a member of the Yugo Embassy in Washington.

Dinko Tomasic was the first secretary to Subasic but he resigned for a matter of principle. He was a leftist and a Yugo before 1940, but after he came to the United States and became a professor at Indiana University he renounced his leftist ideas and his Yugoslav political orientation, and thus could not be associated with Subasic in legalizing the Yugo Bolshevism. His case became a prototype of character assassination by OSS of those who do not dance as they require their terrorists and spies to do. Since they had no means and the Ban had no means of paying their services, it is very likely that all of them, with the Ban their boss, were on the pay of OSS.

When Juraj Krnjevic later in 1946 was told by Radica that V. Macek, B. Peselj, B. Vuckovic, S. Gazi, and himself were on the pay of the CIA, Krnjevic told him to renounce the payments of CIA because one loses his independence when on the pay of somebody else. Whoever was on the pay of OSS had to dance as OSS played the music.

As we said we do not know when Subasic became an Agent of OSS and how it came to be. The Yugoslav situation during the War was a real Balkan wasps nest. Much has been written about it already and much more could be written, but not here.

Subasic's hora came when the Anglo-Americans became disenchanted with King Petar (II) and his courtiers' policies. In the first place they wanted to jettison Draza Mihailovic from the Yugo-Emigre' War Ministry. He had been appointed in January 1942, as War Minister in the Yugo-Emigre Ministry of War in the Government of Prime Minister Slobodan Jovanovic. After that step the Anglo-Americans ordered the King to make an agreement with Marshal Tito for cooperation in the war effort against

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Germans. Pan-Serbians resisted bitterly and so the government of bureaucrats under Bozidar Puric, still in Cairo, fell. With that the star of Subasic started to shine on the Yugo horizon and would shine until the fall of his star in the autumn of 1945.

It was Donovan who recommended the Ban to Churchill and it was Donovan who brought him to Churchill in London.

This episode always looked like a bolt from the clear skies: how Donovan knew about the Ban and just so, plucked him from the firmament of Allied stooges and put him at the threshold of Checkers. If it formerly appeared as a bolt from the clear skies, it no longer does today.

The Ban was an agent of OSS and thus on Donovan's list for solving the intricacy of Yugo war politics and diplomacy. Donovan knew exactly where Subasic was, what his ideologies were, and his burning desire to follow Churchill's schemes in running Yugoslavia.

No talks between Donovan and Subasic are registered. Donovan liked to work in utmost secrecy, sworn to it by the British, and acted mostly alone without much paper work and consultation. The fact that Donovan knew exactly who Subasic was and how he fit into those schemes means that he had talked to Subasic and had him ready to be put at the disposal of Churchill. One could think of the possibility that they met in church as both were Catholic, although Subasic, even though the former theological seminarian, was not a practicing Catholic.

But Subasic had been under the direction and command of OSS terrorist and spy agent, Bernard Yarrow since 1942, thus already for two years. Already at the end of 1943 there were plans in the Allied camp to put Tito and Subasic together for the planning of the merger of the Yugo-Emigre' outfit with Tito's Bolshies. It looks as if these plans included bringing Subasic to Tito in the "woods."

It looks as if at this moment there was a conflict between American and British terrorist and spy agencies. The British On January 27, opposed sending Subasic, an OSS Agent, to British Agent Tito to talk it over.

British Secret Services always had their undercurrent idea that it was the Yankee intention to undermine the British Empire in order to become the leading Western power. British Secret Services and the Foreign Office never trusted Americans, especially because American foreign policy planning and conduct, in their mind, were in the hands of American Jews who had never liked and never do like the British Empire.

There was naturally also the mistrust of the British Communist agents of NKVD, because American secret services were not so absolutely infiltrated and dominated by the Communist moles as was the case with British.

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Some, yes. William Casey never said how much, but not as much as in Great Britain.

On January 27, 1944 the U.S. Minister to the Yugo-Government in Cairo, Lincoln MacVeagh, sent to the Secretary of State the following telegram:

The British Foreign Office has advised the British Ambassador that it cannot entertain the proposal concerning the visit of the Ban of Croatia referred to in my Yugos 6, January 8, 8 p.m., until it learns Tito's views and accordingly I hope the Department may soon be able to advise me of the results of the steps which it stated in its Yugos 6 of December 31, 7 p.m. have been taken to ascertain his attitude. Regarding the suggestion which the Foreign Office further states has been made by the Department that the Ban might usefully come to Cairo even if he should not go to Yugoslavia. Ambassador Stevenson feels that this would simply result in embarrassment to the Yugoslav Government and in this I concur.'

Churchill had had horse trading with Tito as early as May 9, 1944, about the selection of Subasic as the new head of the Yugo Government in exile.

On April 13, 1944, Churchill mentioned Subasic to Petar as one of three members of the ruling committee, the two others being Mihailo Kon-stantinovic and Boris Furlan.

Churchill also said to Petar that FDR through Donovan had selected Subasic as his Prime Minister and that he (Churchill) seconds that choice.

He said that they would bring Subasic now in the United States with the first available aircraft.

Subasic arrived in London on Sunday May 7. One day between May 8 and 12 at a lunch, Churchill introduced Subasic to the Queen of Holland as the Yugo-Premier.

The U.S. Ambassador in London, John Winant on May 12, 1944, sent a telegram to the Secretary of State as follows:

The ban of Croatia arrived here at the beginning of the week and has seen King Peter. Nothing as yet has come of their conversations.

This Foreign Office believes that Subatic will not accept premiership, despite any wishes of the King in this regard, for the former considers it a part of Yugoslav tradition that the Premier be a Serb, but he would accept a Cabinet position. The ban apparently envisages a very small nuclear government which could eschew politics and restore to the King a certain

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amount of the prestige which he has lost through the bunglers of the Puric Government.

The Foreign Office said that Brigadier MacLean reports that Tito will have no delais whatsoever with the King as long as Mihailovic remains minister of War, but that it is remotely possible that Tito might deal with the King, on a purely personal basis and not as King, if Mihailovic were dropped. The Foreign Office says that Tito must be well aware that the King enjoys great popularity with the Serbs and it would therefore be advantageous to the Partisans to have some sort of cooperation with the King and the Yugoslav Government which is recognized by the Allied Governments.

The Foreign Office official said that the prestige of Tito in Allied circles may possibly have been overplayed, but, on the other hand, Mihailovic, although not pro-German is of no use to the Allies as he refuses to become involved in hostilities with the Nazis. The support of Tito must therefore be continued to the fullest extent possible because of his military value, but a delicate balance must also be maintained in support of the Yugoslav Government. The crux of the whole matter is the position of Mihailovic, and it is realized by the Foreign Office that the King is in rather a predicament as he believes, probably quite rightly, that Mihailovic has a very considerable prestige among the Serbs.²

After Avnoj's (1943) decisions, Yugo-Royal Administration was faltering and Tito's star rising.

The United States Ambassador Averell Harriman in Moscow filed with the Secretary of State on March 21, 1944 the following telegram:

Mr. Semic, who until his recent action in publicly offering his services to Tito was Yugoslav Ambassador here, called on me today at his request. He was careful to explain that his visit was personal as he did not desire to cause me any embarrassment.

He said he had received a telegram from Marshall Tito asking him to remain at his post and that he had informed the Soviet Foreign Office of this message.

The Foreign Office had agreed to his remaining and residing at the Embassy. Arrangements had also been made for him to receive the usual privileges accorded diplomats, such as the right to trade at the diplomatic store. He said he had been received by the Foreign Office several times since publication of his letter to Tito, but that he had not discussed political matters. On the other hand he said that, while the Soviet Government was apparently prepared to permit him to remain as the representative of Tito, it

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continued to recognize the Cairo Government and his status was officially not that of a diplomatic representative. He said he thought the Soviet Government expected that the question of the status of the Cairo and Tito Governments would shortly be decided in London. Mr. Semic told me that he had attempted to publish a similar letter to Tito last November but that the Soviets would not publish it at that time and had asked him to wait.

Mr. Semic expressed the opinion that the recent marriage of King Peter would mean the end of the King's political career. He said that the Greek Royal Family was very unpopular in Yugoslavia and

that the King's insistence on his personal happiness at a time when his country was engaged in a bitter struggle for existence would discredit him with the Yugoslav people.

In the course of the conversation and speaking entirely personally I stressed the importance to Yugoslavia of an agreed policy between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union with respect to Tito and the Cairo Government and said I hoped that in his future activities here he would be guided by this consideration. Mr. Semic said he fully agreed and assured me that in all his actions he would have this in mind. The British Ambassador has informed me that he recently received instructions to express the concern of his government at the attacks upon the Cairo Government that were appearing in the Soviet press and to express the hope that they did not mean that a break of relations with the Cairo Government was contemplated, and to request assurance that no action of this nature would be taken without prior consultation with the British Government. Clark-Kerr understood Molotov to agree that the Soviet Government would not take any action without prior consultation. Clark-Kerr was subsequently authorized to give a reciprocal assurance to the Soviet Government.³

On the horizon of the American-Yugo-Bolshevik firmament appears a new star of the mold favoring the glory of a Communist dictatorship. The U.S. Ambassador, MacVeagh, in Cairo, on March 28, 1944 sent the Secretary of State the following telegram:

Colonel Robert Weil an OSS intelligence officer on special assignment with Tito has just come out from Yugoslavia and has already sent his principals in Washington a telegraphic report of his mission. He is also preparing an extended written report and after a long conversation with him I believe the Department will be interested in both. His contacts with Tito have been unique so far as American experience has gone to date and he appears to me to have gathered some valuable material on the Partisan military situation and future plans. On the political side while he seems unable to add anything essential to what the Department already knows he

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does provide information from Tito's own mouth of a desire for wider political contacts with the Allies. In this connection he is the bearer of a letter from Tito to the President which the former hopes may be the beginning of a correspondence similar to that which he has already been enjoying with Mr. Churchill and also as he says with Marshal Stalin. Colonel Weil is personally in favor of our establishing such contact along with the British and Russians basing himself on his belief that Partisan success would surely follow throughout the whole of Yugoslavia and on the desirability of our earning the gratitude and friendship of the Yugoslav people. But while he is a shrewd observer and expresses himself as being alive to the necessity of avoiding any bias his knowledge of Yugoslavia clearly does not (repeat not) extend beyond the limits of the Partisan picture as seen from Partisan headquarters and the Department may therefore feel that his interpretations lack the authority of his facts.⁴

The American-British devious ploys with the Yugo little Monarch reached the ridiculous. After they decided and arranged for the OSS terrorist agent and spy, Subasic, to take over the Premiership of the Yugo-ghost-Government in London, they played with the idea that Petar invite the big Scrooge. On April 27, 1944 the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Halifax, sent to the Secretary of State the following top secret and personal telegram dated April 26, No. 663:

King Peter is very anxious to have Ban of Croatia over here as soon as possible. I am most anxious that he should form a Government which will not tie him to Mihailovitch, a weight which cannot well be borne. The Ban is essential to his plans for forming a broad-based administration not obnoxious to the Partisans. Could you find the gentleman and put him on an aeroplane as early as possible. He may need a little encouragement. Halifax will do this if Ban is directed to the British Embassy.⁵

The game continued and on May 13, 1944, at the Department of State, Mr. Gray made a house memorandum:

The attached telegram addressed by Mr. Churchill to the President came to us only after we knew of King Peter's plan to have Ban Subasic in London, and had already done everything to speed him on his way. He has been there since last week.

Having taken this action, I overlooked the fact that the President (who of course did not know that we had already worked on the matter) had requested a reply telegram. Now, of course, there is nothing much to say. What is your advice?

On April 28, 1944, Chester C. Wood, Captain, U.S. Navy, Assistant Naval Aide to the President, wrote the memorandum for the Secretary of State signed by FDR:

I have received the following message from Churchill:

"King Peter is very anxious to have the Ban of Croatia over here as soon as possible. I am most anxious he should form a government which will not tie him to Mihailovitch, a weight which cannot well be borne. The Ban is essential to his plans for forming a broadbased administration not obnoxious to the partisans. Could you find the gentleman and put him on an aeroplane as early as possible? He may need a little encouragement. Halifax will do this if the Ban is directed to the British Embassy." I am perfectly willing to help the Prime Minister but do not know where the Ban is. Please prepare a draft reply and also read King Peter's letter to me.⁶

Subasic on his pilgrimage to Vis was in the company of the aide-de-camp of Petar, Colonel Skrivanic.

About the whole odyssey of Tito from his foxhole and the British virginal cover of Tito's shame, the Department of State, on June 17, 1944, sent to AMEMBALK, Cairo, the following telegram:

The British Embassy has informed the Department that Tito was evacuated from Yugoslavia at his request because of a breakdown in his communications system. While at Bari he expressed readiness to meet Subasic, whose appointment he welcomed. In Vis, where he expects to remain for two or three weeks, Tito proposes to reestablish contact with the Partisans.

The British have decided that King Peter should remain in Malta, while Subasic and Stevenson proceed from there to Vis to open conversation with Tito with a view to achieving unification of all resistance forces in Yugoslavia. The British hope that later a friendly meeting may take place between the King and Tito and indicate that in any event the former may shortly proceed to Vis to take up his residence.

The Department at present has no direct communication with Subasic. The information summarized above, and the notification that the Government will be transferred to London, were received through the British Embassy. Ambassador Fotitch states that he has received notification of Ban Subasic's appointment as Prime Minister, and of his, Fotitch's, retirement with instructions to turn over the Embassy to Dr. Franges who would be Charge, but no further information of any kind.

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The Department questions whether the necessities of military secrecy should be held to cover the political transactions in view, but since the personalities involved are still in movement in a war zone the Department is not inclined to raise this question for the moment, though it maintains its well-known position against political censorship.

From the above, and with particular reference to your 119 of June 13, it is evident that delicacy and caution must be exercised with respect to the use of intelligence coming to us from British sources, particularly since the Yugoslav officials at Cairo and Washington are not being vouchsafed any information regarding the current political and military developments in their own Government. Neither the Department nor the OSS has had detailed reports concerning the extent or success of the German operations preceding the escape of Tito.⁷

Americans followed Subasic step by step. John Winant on July 22, 1944, filed with the Secretary of State the following telegram:

Subasic returned to London on July 18 accompanied by Tito's nominees in the Cabinet, Vukosavljevic and Marusic, and by General Velebit.

He was somewhat weighed down by the course things had taken at Caserta.

He gave me some sidelights on Tito's refusal to attend the Caserta meeting. Subasic said Tito took the position that if he was to discuss military matters at General Wilson's headquarters he should do so alone, i.e. without the Yugoslav Prime Minister. He would be willing to discuss political matters with Subasic but on Yugoslav soil. Subasic remarked to me that if Tito could not come to Caserta he naturally could not go to Tito

As for relations with the Serb leaders generally, he could report no improvement. He had received the resignations of quite a number of Serb diplomats including Hadzidjordjevic, Minister at Cairo and Saponic, Under-secretary of State also at Cairo.

Subasic dwelt on his desire to bring about a united war effort and the avoidance of fratricidal war. He wished above all to have Yugoslavia follow a policy that coincided with that of its three great Allies so

that when the war was over Yugoslavia would be in a position to receive the advantages of one of the United Nations. He hoped that if at any time he was not on the right track they would tell him.⁸

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It is evident by now that Josip Broz was an Agent of the British Secret Services and that Ivan Subasic' was an Agent of OSS.

Josip Broz enjoyed British guidance as much as was necessary on his road to keep and preserve the state of Yugoslavia. It was an easy task. The Britons wanted only the state of Yugoslavia. They cared less whether or not it be Communist, Bolshevik. While Stalin could not give him more but his talks about Marxism and Leninism (he could not talk about Stalinism) England could give him money. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was rich. It never got money from Stalin, could not collect money from its poor membership, and there was no money from bank robberies; the money could come only from Great Britain whose Agent Tito was.

It was not difficult to achieve the identity of goals: both Josip Broz and Great Britain wanted Yugoslavia.

No need: *Hie rhodus, hie salta*. There was a sacred alliance of a most hideous nature. Josip Broz, Communist Bolshevik, Agent of the Kingdom of St. Edward to keep Yugoslavia even if he runs it as a Communist dictatorship.

About British political ideas and especially the ultimate imperialistic goals of Great Britain, we can read in a "Memorandum of Conversations" made on December 29, 1945, by Mr. Barbour, SE at the Department of State:

Flying Officer David Martin, 216 Arlington Avenue, Brooklyn, a Canadian in the RCAF called by appointment made at his request. He explained that he is a journalist in private life and has concentrated on Balkan Affairs with particular reference to Yugoslavia. He recently returned to the United States from India via England where he says he has talked with British Foreign Office Officials in regard to Yugoslavia. The Foreign Office in his opinion is divided between support for Tito and Mihailovich with a strong sentiment in favor of Mihailovich at the lower levels.

Mr. Martin summarized his views on the position of the Western Allies in the Balkans and the Middle East vis-a-vis Russia substantially as follows. It will be impossible for Britain to hold on in Greece with a Soviet dominated Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Having maneuvered Greece into its orbit the Soviets will then be able to control Turkey and without difficulty to penetrate to Suez. As he sees it Yugoslavia is the key to the situation and the only hope for the Western Powers is the overthrow of Tito. From talks in London he considers that 65% of the Yugoslavs oppose Tito, such opposition coming principally from Machek followers in Croatia and aided by Mihailovich strength in Bosnia and Serbia. He claims that British Am-

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bassador Stevenson has the same informal opinion as to the numbers in opposition to Tito.

Martin said that he had been discussing this matter with a Dr. Popov, a high-ranking officer in British Intelligence, who is now in London and that Popov had suggested that it would be an easy matter to arrange for smuggling arms to Mihalovich and to permit the infiltration into Yugoslavia of resistance elements at present displaced in Austria and Italy. With such aid and *if* the Western Allies could diplomatically immobilize the Red Army threat in Yugoslavia, Mihailovich could overthrow Tito. These views of a British Intelligence officer may be of interest particularly in connection with indications we have received from some American sources that British Intelligence authorities in Italy have recently shown a more friendly attitude toward the Chetnik refugees there. Coupled with the present Foreign Office attitude of increased support to Tito, these developments are reminiscent of the conflict of views on Balkan affairs between the Foreign Office and British Intelligence services in 1942 and 1943. It would seem, however, that on this occasion the respective roles may be reversed.⁹

Subasic moved slowly and cautiously out of the United States. Only on July 11, 1944, the Royal Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington asked the Secretary of State for permission for shipping his belongings and for Madame Subasic to travel:

The Ambassador of Yugoslavia presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to request that clearance through the United States Customs be accorded for two trunks

and three suitcases, representing personal belongings of H. E. Mr. Ivan Subasic, Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, and Madame Subasic.

This shipment is bound for London and will be handled by the Combined Argosies, Inc., 11 Broadway, New York City, phone Whitehall 3-1640 (Captain Baranovic).¹⁰

The Secretary of State diplomatically obliged and wrote to the Secretary of Treasury on July 11, 1944: The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Treasury and requests that the Collector of Customs at New York be authorized to pass without examination two trunks and three suitcases containing personal effects belonging to His Excellency Ivan Subasic, Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, and Madame Subasic. This ship-

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ment is to be handled by Combined Argosies, Incorporated, 11 Broadway, New York City."

On the same day, July 11, the Secretary answered as required by protocol:

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Yugoslavia and acknowledging the receipt of his note A. no. 633, dated July 11, 1944, has the honor to inform the Ambassador that the Treasury Department has been requested to authorize the Collector of Customs at New York to pass without examination two trunks and three suitcases containing personal effects belonging to His Excellency Ivan Subasic, Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, and Madame Subasic. It has been noted that this shipment is to be handled by Combined Argosies, Incorporated, 11 Broadway, New York City.¹²

Subasic ended with his belongings and Madam Subasic in Communist Belgrade to surrender his job to Tito. The formation of the unified Yugoslav Government in Belgrade on March 7, 1945, through the fusion of Tito's National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia and Subasic's Yugoslav Government-in-exile constituted the unified Government of Yugoslavia, with Marshal Tito as the Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense and Subasic as Foreign Minister. The most important task of Subasic as Foreign Minister was his service as the head of the delegation of Communist Yugoslavia to the founding ceremonies of the United Nations on April 25, 1945.

The OSS was very active and tried its best in whiskey-diplomacy (American diplomacy has dollar diplomacy, gun diplomacy, and dynamite diplomacy, also). The official note explained that "other OSS people who will be in San Francisco, apart from those who would normally be there in connection with the routine business of our San Francisco office, are some of our Service people concerned wholly with clerical and maintenance duties." That statement was, in fact, superseded; other operational branches of OSS, especially the elite X-2, which engaged in special high-grade espionage as well as high-grade agent recruitment and control, were to be present in force.

Yet except for the existence of interesting evidence in WJD's files — the OSS's groups' liquor bills, paid for out of unvouchered funds — the size and composition of the group would have remained buried forever. But at a time when White Horse scotch whiskey cost \$47.80 a case, Colonel E. J. Connelly, chief of the San Francisco office of the OSS, paid liquor bills for

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the OSS group totaling \$6,790.77. This was for the period March 21, 1945

— April 26, 1945, and all the expenditures were for the "Purchase of liquors to be used for entertainment purposes in obtaining strategic information."

The bills give some idea of the OSS branches represented in the group and their size. The \$6,790.77 was broken down into its components, and each component was then debited to the account of the branch. Thus, Secret Intelligence was debited for \$2,656.80, Research and Analysis \$2051.42, Foreign Nationalities \$975.17, Counterespionage (X-2) \$754.46, Morale Operations \$138.96 and \$47.80, and Field Photographic — which engaged in clandestine as well as overt photography — \$166.56. It can be seen from the original bills that these sums were the result of large cocktail parties. The bills show that the liquor was purchased a case or two at a time from different stores. Thus, it was used for a large number of small parties rather than one or two large ones. Other bills show that, for example, R&A's component must have been much larger than the handful of men named for the State Department, for at a time when OSS personnel on out-of-town work received a per diem of \$6 a day, R&A accounts received itemized expenditures for housekeeping totaling some \$2,600.

Here in this atmosphere, San Francisco atmosphere, we hear about Subasic and OSS.

Nor was the OSS being wholly correct when it advised the State Department that it was sending a small group of analysts, for telegrams from Buxton to WJD show plainly that at least some of the OSS men were there on the business of espionage. For example, the OSS's Bernard Yarrow was there, and so was Tito's new foreign minister Ivan Subasic, who was known to the OSS by the code name Shepherd.¹³

Yarrow was very active and on April 26, 1945, Buxton reported to Donovan:

Yarrow has just made this very interesting statement. I had breakfast this morning with Shepherd at my hotel. He informed me that he had talked with Stalin and Molotov who were anxious to get his viewpoint on the situation in Yugoslavia.

Shepherd related to me that he told them frankly that he is having difficulties in Yugoslavia where the prevailing sentiment is that "all the brains are in Moscow and all the power in the Red Army," that furthermore there is a tendency to rely on Soviet only disregarding completely America and Great Britain.

Molotov told Shepherd that the approach is wrong and that although Russia will try to help as much as she can after the war is over, she, Russia,

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herself will have to seek assistance from the United States to rebuild the devastated cities and the ruined economy, that they themselves will seek loans up to 10 billions to assist in her post-war rehabilitation. Stalin told Shepherd explicitly not to try to imitate Soviet Russia. Yugoslavia is a small country in comparison with Russia and not to carry on experimentation by establishing a Soviet regime, that they will have to get along with the western democracies and to arrange a democratic regime where the representatives are not appointed but elected by [garble] and expressing the sentiments of the people. He, Stalin, further told Shepherd that Soviet Russia will act with Great Britain in regard to Yugoslavia in complete harmony and mutual consultation.

Shepherd explained to [Yarrow] that he was having great difficulty at present because of the extreme elements who are trying to rule without having any experience but the important thing is to preserve peace, for the present, and to go slowly, that Tito is very reasonable and he has no difficulties with him because he is first a Yugoslav and then a Communist.

The people in Yugoslavia are so exhausted, said Shepherd, that they are reluctant to have any changes and he was confident the Serbs will fall in line, but expects greater difficulties with the Croats once they are liberated.

Simach, present Yugoslavia Ambassador to Washington, was not Shepherd's choice, nor was Leontich, Ambassador to Great Britain. Shepherd said he will give them a chance to see what they can do but will see to it that they produce the expected results; otherwise, he will act preemptorily.

OSS acted as a super Department of State. The delegation of OSS was more huge than the one of the Department of State. OSS compiled huge preparations for the occasion. These preparations consisted especially of the Minutes about each member of the Foreign delegations which came to participate at the founding of the United Nations. Special attention was given to the agents of OSS. Many of them like Subasic were prominent at that time; many were prominent Britons; many became prominent and are no more so and some of them prominent still today. A book about those Agents of OSS would be more interesting than any other book about OSS.

Nulla linea sine causa. If anything at any time happened without a cause, the selection of Ivan Subasic was not without cause and it was not of any earthquake. Subasic simply was an OSS Certified Agent. He was enrolled in OSS in 1942. His I.D. carries his photograph, a better looking one than any other, with the following inscription:

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Area 12 Yugoslavia 1942 Dr. Ivan Subasitch Governor of Croatia Before the War. OSS 712093.

Just so: This and That. Subasic has his number in OSS and thus is a certified terrorist and spy of this terrorist and spy organization, whose tool he was in organizing the holocaust of his, Croatian, nation, and of other nations in the Yugo-Bolshevik orbit. His activities in the service of OSS were fatal not only for his people but also for himself.

In the chapter "Operation Shepherd" we will describe the path of the making of Subasic the Yugo-Emigre'-Premier and his premiership up to March 7, 1945, when he surrendered the premiership to Tito and assumed the portfolio of Foreign Minister. The following are OSS minutes about Subasic. Name: SUBASICH, Premier Ivan Country: Yugoslavia. Region: Belgrade Major positions: Chief Delegate to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government, March 1945—. Premier of the Yugoslav Government in Exile, May 1944. Ban of Croatia, 1941. Lawyer. Birth date and place: c. 1895; probably Zagreb. Nationality: Croat. Family history: He grew up in poverty. Education and work history: Ivan Subasich fought in World War I with the Serbian Army on the Salonika Front. After the war he became a prosperous lawyer, practising in Zagreb. In August 1939, when the so-called Serbo-Croat "Sporazum" was concluded by Machek and Cvetkovich, establishing Croatia as an autonomous region, Dr. Subasich was appointed the first "Ban" (governor). In 1941 Subasich left Yugoslavia with the exiled government and took up his residence in London. In 1942 he accompanied King Peter on his tour of the United States, but did not return to London with the King. In

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April 1944, Subasich was called to London by King Peter and asked to set up a Crown Council to direct Yugoslav affairs. He was also delegated by Peter to get in touch with Marshal Tito and negotiate an agreement between the Royal Government and the Partisans. In May Dr. Subasich officially succeeded Purich as Prime Minister. His first step as Premier was to meet with Marshal Tito on the liberated Island of Vis (14-17 June 1944).

On 20 November 1944. Premier Subasich arrived in Moscow for conferences with Premier Stalin and other Soviet and Yugoslav leaders regarding the federation of post-war Yugoslavia. From Moscow he went to Belgrade, and left Belgrad on December 8th for London to submit the already crystallized plans to King Peter, British Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Minister Anthony Eden.

On 23 January 1945, King Peter asked for the resignation of Premier Subasich. He resigned and was reappointed on 30 January 1945. Political history:

As a member of the Croat Peasant Party, Ivan Subasich, with Dr. Krn-jevich and Dr. Shutej, formed a triumvirate who supported Vladimir Machek. Before the agreement of 1939, Subasich played an important part behind the scenes in Zagreb, and eventually acted as the confidential intermediary between the Prince Regent and Dr. Machek in the prolonged negotiations which eventually led to the conclusion of the Sporazum.²

When Subasich was in the United States in 1942, he held Croat rallies in various cities, and gave lectures in which he advocated a federated Yugoslavia. In February 1943, he and Sava Kosanovich organized the American Croatian Congress with the avowed purpose of "unifying all American Croats, Serbs and Slovenes." Only the left wing Serbs and Slovenes were represented, however, and the Congress aroused considerable opposition among other groups. The American Croat clergy suspected it of being Communist, and the Mihailovich Nationalist followers feared that the Congress would endorse the Partisans.⁴

In May 1944, Subasich succeeded Purich as Prime Minister of the government in exile. Before his appointment there had been sharp bickering among the various exiled groups in London around King Peter.⁵ Constantine Fotich, the ambassador to the United States, had opposed him, saying that he was not a representative of the "Serbs", (i.e., the Nationalist group who did not wish to collaborate with Tito). In June Premier Subasich dismissed Fotich from his position, and went to Vis for conferences with Tito regarding the unification of the govern-

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ment. Premier Subasich agreed to include Partisan representatives in his cabinet, and also to recognize Tito as Commander in Chief of the Yugoslav forces. Accordingly, on 11 July 1944, Dr. Drago Marushich and Sreten Vukosavljevich entered the Subasich Cabinet as delegates of the Partisans. The extreme right-wing of the Croat Peasant Party, represented by Dr. Tomo Jancikovich in Italy, repudiated Subasich.

Before departing by Russian plane from Cairo to meet Marshal Tito, Premier Subasich granted an interview on 22 October 1944, in which he said that he hoped Tito would respect the Constitution of Yugoslavia and would agree to make changes in the government only through the Constitution and the King. He also hoped that Russia would advise Tito to be moderate. While he said "that he did not consider Tito an unreasonable man, he knew that dangerous people around him were waiting to seize offices and to control affairs." It was his opinion that many Croats would prefer government under King Peter to a dictatorship under Tito, and he intimated that the Yugoslav people "might launch a revolution against everybody in the spring." The Premier referred to himself at this period as a martyr. On 20 November 1944, Premier Subasich arrived in Moscow for the final conferences regarding the federated Yugoslav State. Others present were Edward Kardelj, Stanoje Simich, and Lt. Generals Terzich and Djilas. They were received by Premier Stalin and by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov. He returned to Belgrade in December, and left on the 8th with Lt. General Velebit for London. In London he submitted the already crystallized plans to King Peter, Prime Minister Churchill, and to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. He had previously refused Churchill's request to come to London before going to Moscow.

The plans for a federated Yugoslav State as agreed upon by Tito and Subasich provided that King Peter should be controlled by a Regency of three men. King Peter objected to the Regency, and called Premier Subasich to a conference, saying that he had lost confidence in him and wished his resignation. As a mere formality, Premier Subasich resigned on 30 January 1945, and was reappointed Premier on the same day.

Personal data:

Subasich, reported to be suffering from diabetes, has consistently displayed an unstable temperament and vacillation of purpose, probably because of his physical condition. Consequently, his political associates report that Subasich's attitude — usually one of extreme elation or

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depression — is usually unrealistic and seriously hampers normal routine working relations.⁸

Summary:

Ivan Subasich, the former Ban of autonomous Croatia, and a member of the Croat Peasant Party who supported Machek, succeeded Purich as the Premier of the Yugoslav Government in Exile in May 1944. According to the wishes of King Peter, Premier Subasich met with Marshal Tito in June 1944 and agreed to his demands that Partisan leaders be included in his cabinet, and that Tito be recognized as Commander in Chief of the Yugoslav forces. This decision of the Government in Exile aroused sharp opposition among the Nationalist Yugoslavs and other groups who opposed Tito.

From 20 to 23 November 1944, Subasich was in Moscow where the Soviet Government and Partisan representatives drew up plans for a federated Yugoslav state. He submitted these plans to Prime Minister Churchill after they had been approved by Stalin. In March 1945, Subasich and the members of his Government resigned, in accordance with the Tito-Subasich agreement of 1 November 1944, and he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia.

Sources:

1. Source S, CID #41041, October 1944.
2. Source S, CID #94767, January 1944.
3. Source S, January 1945.
4. Source S, CID #28653, 9 February 1943.
5. Source S, CID #33004, 27 April 1943.
6. Source S, CID #87214, 26 July 1944.
7. Source S, XL #998, 22 June 1944.
8. Source S, CID, 10 April 1945.

This record is a summary of such intelligence (from one or more sources as indicated) as was available at the time of preparation.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH

R&A, #2995.16 YUGOSLAVIA

Chairman:

*Ivan Subasich

Minister of Foreign Affairs. *Delegates:*

*Sretan Zhujevich

Minister of Finance. *Stanoje Simich

Ambassador designated to the United States. *Assistant Delegates:*

*Dr. Stoyan Gavrilovich

Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs. *Advisor to the Delegation:* Dr. Todor Djurgjevich Chief of Protocol. *Secretaries to the Delegation:* Dr. Dragovan Shepich

Chief of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Milorad Cerovich

Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Official Correspondent of the Delegation.*

* Vladimir Dedijer *Journalist*

*Branko Kojich

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CHARACTER AND COMPOSITION OF THE DELEGATION AT SAN FRANCISCO

YUGOSLAVIA

/. *Yugoslavia and the San Francisco Conference:* Yugoslavia, as a member of the United Nations, accepted on 5 April the invitation to San Francisco. Its participation will be somewhat conditioned by the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Postwar Cooperation between the

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USSR and Yugoslavia, signed at Moscow on 11 April. The treaty, parallel to that signed with Czechoslovakia, will remain in effect for twenty years and will be automatically renewed for successive five-year periods, unless denounced within one year before expiration.

In effect, the signing of the treaty underlines what has long been apparent, that Partisan Yugoslavia's closest foreign ties are with the Soviet Union. As *Borba* put it on 9 April, "Yugoslav-Russian relations are closer than those between any other two nations." The Yugoslav delegation will not come to the San Francisco Conference with the tenuous support of any one or all of the three major Allies, but in effect as the protege of the Soviet Union. It does not necessarily follow that the Yugoslav delegation will open the conference with a truculent attitude toward the Western Allies, but it is possible that the delegation may present an attitude of reserve. The Partisans, *nouveaux arrives* on the international political scene, have in the past shown themselves to be sensitive to what they have regarded as slights and hostility on the part of America, Britain, and nations other than the Soviet Union whose political systems considerably antedate and differ from their own.

While official Yugoslavia's reaction to the conclusion of the conference is likely in any event to reflect that of the USSR, the Provisional Government may well regard the reception and treatment of its delegation at San Francisco as an indication of the degree of cordiality it may expect in its future relations with the Western Allies. Should the Yugoslav Government be satisfied on this issue and also regard the general conclusions of the conference as a success, it seems probable that its current domestic policy of political moderation and broadening of the government by the inclusion of uncompromised non-Partisans may be further implemented in the spirit of the Yalta recommendations. While the Yugoslav delegation certainly will not seek any advice from representatives of the United States and Britain on the conduct of domestic and foreign policies, it is possible that the United States may have an entree in influencing the orientation of the Yugoslav government in international affairs. According to recent reports, in liberated Yugoslavia there is a noticeable trend of interest toward American world leadership in medicine, the pharmaceutical industry, and in the sciences. A large proportion of the medical profession is now studying the English language. American observers state that this interest in American-manufactured medications, instruments, and so on, is also found in other fields: weapons, airplanes, automotive equipment, clothing, etc. These observers report that this type

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of American psychological hold could easily be expanded.¹ Moreover, although the Yugoslav Government, to all appearances, is oriented to Soviet foreign policy and without ties to the Western Allies, the Provisional Government has expressed its desire for obtaining American financial aid, without which reconstruction would probably be virtually impossible.

These points are illustrated by the composition of the Yugoslav delegation. Its chairman is Foreign Minister Subasich, whose deputy is the Minister of Finance and member of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Sreten Zhuyovich-Tsrni.² Stanoye Simich, Yugoslav Ambassador to the Soviet Union, is an ordinary delegate, and Stoyan Gavrilovich, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, is an assistant delegate.³

Dr. Subasich was the last Prime Minister of the Royal Yugoslav Government-in-Exile and, under the aegis of the British, effected the amalgamation of the Royal Government with the *de facto* Partisan administration. A Zagreb lawyer, Subasich was the *Ban* (Governor) of Croatia from the time it was granted autonomy in 1939 until the Axis invasion in 1941. He was known in that period to have been a loyal machine politician in the Croatian Peasant Party under the leadership of Dr. Machek. From 1941 until May 1944, when he was summoned to London by King Peter to negotiate an agreement with the Partisans, Subasich came to accept the National Liberation movement and, in the United States, to work for its support by the exiled Yugoslavs. His career as Prime Minister of the Royal Government showed him to be a well-meaning but vacillating executive. Under British guidance, which twice prevented him from resigning, he negotiated and concluded two agreements with Marshal Tito which ultimately led to the formation of the Provisional Government.¹ Throughout his premiership, Subasich regularly fell into moods of deep depression during which he prophesied such developments as a rigid communist dictatorship under Tito if Yugoslavia were not directly supervised jointly by the three major Allies, and a violent universal uprising of the Yugoslav people "against everyone."² In spite of his instability, reportedly caused by diabetes,³ Subasich, by virtue of his position in the

1. OSS source S, 23 March 1945.

2. OSS source S, 7 April 1945.

3. *Ibid.*

1. Situation Report: BALKANS, 24 June 1944; 4 November 1944.

2. Situation Report: BALKANS, 21 October 1944.

3. Outpost letter, Belgrade, no date.

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Provisional Government and especially because of his previous relations with the Western Allies, should prove extremely useful to Yugoslavia at San Francisco.

Minister of Finance in the Provisional Government and member of the General Staff, General Zhuyovich, Deputy Head of the Yugoslav Delegation, has been an active Stalinist Communist since before the war. One of the original leaders of the Partisan movement, Zhuyovich is a personal friend of Tito, and is believed to be one of the most influential members of the Communist Party and of the policy-making Partisan inner circle.⁴ While he will undoubtedly provide a positive attitude which will sufficiently make up for Subasich's negative qualities during the conversations at San Francisco, Zhuyovich may also deliberately utilize his strong personality, impressive appearance, and spectacular career in the Partisan movement as publicity material for the consumption of the American public. This is indicated by a report that the pro-Partisan Yugoslav-Americans including Louis Adamic, advised Zhuyovich not to come in civilian clothes, as he had planned, but in uniform, and to avoid meeting or circulating among Yugoslav-Americans, which advice reportedly was accepted.⁵

The third delegate, Stanoye Simich, is Yugoslav Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Ambassador-designate to the United States. A career diplomat, Simich was Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow for the Royal Government-in-Exile until March 1944, when he broke with the Pan-Serb Premier Purich and offered his services to the Partisans. Tito delegated him to remain in Moscow as representative for the Partisans, where he remained until the liberation of Belgrade. Simich then returned to Yugoslavia for a short period, and was elected Chairman of the Executive Committee of the National Liberation Front of Serbia, after which he returned to Moscow as "ambassador" from the *de facto* Partisan government.¹

The assistant delegate, Stoyan Gavrilovich, is Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and occupied the same position under Subasich in the former Royal Government. Before the war, Gavrilovich was Assistant Political Director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After the Axis invasion in 1941, and his flight from the country, Gavrilovich served as Consul General in Capetown, Director of the Yugoslav Information Center in New

4. Outpost letter, Belgrade, no date.

5. Private source.

York, and Counselor of Legation at Ottawa. Although Gavrilovich is not known for independence of action, he is believed to be extremely capable when working under the direction of a higher authority. Todor Djordjevic, Chief of Protocol in the Foreign Ministry, is chief advisor to the delegation. At present, nothing is known of him. Dragovan Shepich, Chef de Cabinet to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Milorad Tserovich are secretaries to the delegation who are likewise unknown at present.² Two official press representatives, Branko Koyich and Vladimir De-diye, are also included in the delegation. Koyich, a Serb, was Belgrade correspondent for the Croatian newspaper *Obzor* before the war and also contributed to various liberal magazines. During the occupation, he remained in Belgrade under an assumed name, and apparently did not participate outstandingly in any underground resistance. After the liberation of Belgrade he was held for examination by the OZNA (Partisan secret police) and was shortly given a clean bill of health and released. Koyich seems to be a political moderate, and in recent conversations has appeared to be pro-Western Allied. At San Francisco, he will represent Tanyug (New Yugoslavia Telegraph Agency), the official Yugoslav news service, and after the Conference will go to New York to negotiate an agreement with an American press association.³ Vladimir Dediye has been a leading Communist for years, and is highly influential in Partisan inner circles. Probably as the result of a head wound received in combat, Dediye is subject to moods of anger and suspicion. During the conference he will serve as correspondent for *Borba*, organ of the Yugoslav Communist Party, and thereafter will proceed to Washington to take up duties as press attache of the Yugoslav Embassy.¹

The Yugoslav delegation to San Francisco will be completed by approximately five members who presumably will come from London and Washington and who will serve as technical advisors.² It is believed that Rudolf Bichanich and several assistants will come from London,³ but there is no information as yet on who will fill the remaining positions. Bichanich is a former member of the Croatian Peasant Party, and was Vice Governor of the Yugoslav National Bank until dismissed by Prime Minister Purich in

2. OSS source S, 7 April 1945.

3. Private source.

1. OSS source S, no date. Private source.

2. OSS source S, 7 April 1945.

3. Private source.

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January 1943. In November 1943 he, in company with Boris Furlan and Mihailo Petrovich, established the British equivalent of Loius Adamic's committee in the United States, the United Committee of South-Slavs in Britain, and became a member of its Executive Committee. Although both Subasich's Royal Government and the Partisan regime in Yugoslavia have consistently been keenly interested in international affairs, Dumbarton Oaks received almost no publicity in Yugoslavia, mainly because of the distraction offered by the entry of the Red Army and the liberation of Belgrade. On the other hand, the settlement of the Yugoslav government problem by the appointment of the Regency, and the combination of the Royal Government and the Partisan administration into the Provisional Government, was regarded by the now predominantly Partisan government as a direct product of Yalta. Since the formation of the Provisional Government, the Yalta recommendation that AVNOJ be broadened by the addition of uncompromised former members of the pro-war Parliament has been accepted by Yugoslav authorities, but work in this direction has been proceeding slowly. Although Yalta did much to diminish Partisan suspicion that the Western Allies in reality were hostile to the National Liberation Movement, there has remained evidence that the Partisans are still unsure of the American attitude and still suspect that former Ambassador Fotich is influencing the United States Government and the American press. With regard to the British, the troubles in Greece apparently confirmed the Partisans' worst fears of British intentions toward Yugoslavia. Judging from the continued Yugoslav press campaign against the present Greek government, the Partisans still regard Britain with profound distrust. Yugoslav aims with regard to the post-war disposition of Germany and Italy will probably consist of reparations, use of Axis nationals as forced labor, and boundary rectifications. Although these

questions will not arise directly at San Francisco, the Yugoslav approach to the problems of setting up an international security organization will be affected by what they think to be the major powers' attitude toward these questions. Territorial adjustments may interest them the most. In an informal discussion of the problems surrounding the occupation of Austria, General Velebit, head of the former Partisan military mission in London, said that the Partisans intended to occupy Klagenfurt (Tselovets) and Villach (Bolyak), since these areas "belong to us. But in addition we also want to occupy a portion of enemy territory."¹ There has also been a constant campaign in the Belgrade press

1. OSS source S, 14 March 1945.

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since the liberation of the city against what it terms the "Fascists" in power in Rome. The most recent outburst was a broadcast by the Belgrade radio on 10 April, which reported demonstrations in Belgrade, following the bomb attack in Rome against the Yugoslav Military Mission on 9 April. The broadcast asserted that the demonstrators shouted such slogans as: "Istria belongs to our Tito," "Trieste and Goriza," "Tito's army will defeat the fascists," Trieste is ours, our enemies must die."² Strong Yugoslav pressure may also be expected for allied approval of the inclusion of Bulgarian Macedonia within Yugoslav Macedonia, and there may be strong hints about the desirability for a change in the border of Greek Macedonia.

Whatever merits or faults of the Department of State warrant OSS acting as a super State Department, OSS acted as such.

Donovan's deputy, G. Edward Buxton, sent him on May 1, 1945 the following telegram:

I have now heard and seen enough to have some personal opinions which I submit for what they are worth. I find that most of my associates here have the same general opinion.

1. San Francisco is a battleground on which the world's 2 most powerful nations are now feeling each other out. The Russians knew before they came we had the votes. Therefore they are interested at the moment in developing:

A. The strength of international communism and radical labor organizations.

B. Prestige at home and along their bordering satellites. Both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are in the Russian bag and will do as they are told.

Molotov can also bring pressure on other governments containing communistic elements or radical labor organizations.

Russian foreign policy is still obscure in the Far East so far as anything here is indicated. The policy in the West is obvious. All nations bounding Russia on the West must be not only friendly but subservient. Russia will take unilateral action to achieve this purpose. Rumania, Bulgaria, Poland. Czechoslovakia, now Austria, tomorrow Hungary and then Russian occupied Germany if she is not able to dictate the selection of a rubber stamp government in every corner of pre-war Germany.

2. FCC: *Ticker*, 11 April 1945.

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United States' interest requires us to make what sacrifice is necessary to dominate the 7 seas and the international airways. . . .

The United States did not cease to consider the Bolshevik Yugoslavia a puppet state and so in the Fall, on October 15, 1945, Cloyce K. Huston gave to Mr. Matthews an aide-memoire as follows:

With regard to the situation in Yugoslavia, we have drafted the attached telegram for transmission to London and Moscow.

In doing so, we have tried to avoid the appearance of giving "outside help" to Subasic, which he does not desire at this stage, but have proposed that Tito and Subasic be urged to get together themselves. We have also expressed the view that the elections should be postponed, which Subasic regards as "very important".

If you decide to send this, we suggest that, as Balfour has already been exploring possibilities with us, it might be well to inform him before it goes out.¹⁴

Subasic in between succeeded in having his slogan "kill Croats" in Zagreb achieved in Bleiburg where more than half a million Croats, military and civilians, have been extradited by the British on May 15, 1945 to his Bolshevik government and slaughtered by his Bolsheviks. Subasic never took

cognizance of the massacre. It means that he did not undertake anything to prevent it. Or was he happy that Croats had been slaughtered as he wanted then in the distant 1940 in Zagreb.

Two Croats at Vis sealed the destiny of Bolshevik Yugoslavia. I should pity the Serbs at this supreme moment when two Croats were demolishing all their old traditions, all their fetishes, all their supremacy, hegemonism, and colonialism. But I am not a Croatian supremacist, hegemonist, or colonialist, and therefore I could not gloat in it. But then should anybody? It is the Serbs who had orchestrated it with December 1, 1918, creating Yugoslavia, with January 6, 1929, and with March 27, 1941. The events on all these dates were manipulated by the Serbs, and I still today do not find one Serbian who regrets them. Therefore, the encounter of the Croats, Ivan Subasic and Josip Broz Tito at Vis in June 1944, was of their making. *Habent sua fata homines*.

The fate of Subasic was sealed the day that he sealed the fate of his King Petar II, surrendering the reign of Yugoslavia to Tito. Subasic was accepted by his fellow Croatian Quisling, Tito, as another Croatian Quisling who would keep the British puppet state, the Yugo-Bolshevik Satrapy, from disintegrating into its constituent parts. He performed brilliantly, as

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his OSS bosses wanted him to perform. To be sure, he wanted it too from the bottom of his heart. To do that he had not to be raped. And now it was time to go. The Bolshies did not need him more, he was a nuisance.

The U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Belgrade, Harold Schantz, on September 6, 1945, sent to the Secretary of State the following Top Secret telegram:

Sutej asked Fraleigh to meet him today and told him has lost confidence in Subasic, will soon resign and may have to flee from Yugoslavia.

He said he returned yesterday from Zagreb where he met with Croatian Peasant Party leaders and with Subasic who returns tomorrow. Great majority of Croats are not only against Partisans but condemn Subasic and Sutej for collaborating with them. Subasic travelled deep into Croatia and saw for himself strong anti-Partisan sentiment, great popularity of Macheck. Despite this Subasic has not made up his mind to resign and Sutej feels he can no longer continue with him. Sutej expects to see him once more and tell him if he does not resign he Sutej will go his own way: that he, only Minister not in Front, finds situation no longer bearable.

If Subasic refuses Sutej will either resign now and join Grol in election struggle or stop collaborating with government and resign later, probably within thirty days. He will see Grol today about election plans. If elections seem to promise nothing he will prepare to resign and his fears for his safety will be multiplied for he says Tito's gang has never trusted him. As last resort he would flee abroad via Croatian Littoral. He expressed a wish for an American boat or plane to cross Adriatic; was given no encouragement in this. He would prefer to flee in ministerial capacity for maximum anti-Tito effect. He now profoundly regrets his return to Yugoslavia.

Sutej said he came to Americans and not British for help because, although he trusts British, he knows Stevenson tells Subasic everything. He added that although Subasic likes and works closely with Stevenson he does not completely trust British, would prefer to work with Russians and told Sutej he had had contacts with the NKVD while in USA. Russian link, Sutej insists, is real reason Subasic does not resign.¹⁵

Subasic did resign and fell into oblivion. He died in Zagreb and was buried at Mirogoj in the presence of only a few. No fanfare like that witnessed at Tito's funeral, and no splendor of marble at his grave as that for Tito in Belgrade. Subasic's grave is adorned only with a cross, wooden. The Communists considered his funeral and his grave the business of OSS and not of Communist, Bolshevik Yugoslavia. Communist Yugoslavia treats her heroes with more majesty than does OSS. Tito survived as a

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British Agent to the last. The British heir to the throne, Crown Prince Charles came to his funeral in the splendor of British royalty.

There was no American at Subasic's funeral and as already mentioned only a few were present, old acquaintances who came to witness the burial of the gravedigger of Croatia.

To relax from this heavy atmosphere, we quote a magisterial passage from the book of Margaret Stewart Omrcanin, *Norway, Sweden, Croatia: A Comparative Study of State Secession and Formation* (1976):

There are serious suspicions that it was Hopkins who was the biggest *artifex* of the procommunist attitudes of the White House, and thus the one who was more for a Communist Yugoslavia than for an independent Croatia and who finally made President Roosevelt switch to his Yalta pro-Communist attitudes towards a Communist Yugoslavia and similar pro-Communist policies, *i.e.*, policies that favored Communists in Yugoslavia and elsewhere.

Finally, Anthony Eden was also converted to the drive for an independent Croatia. In early April of 1944, Eden proposed to Slobodan Jovanovic, premier of the Yugoslav government-in-exile, that there should be a confederation of the states of the former kingdom of Yugoslavia with a joint, two-chamber national parliament in which would be included an independent Croatia and Slovenia. Eden made a concession to the Serbian chauvinists Slobodan Jovanovic and King Peter II, who thought that such a confederation should be held together by the crown.

But the peril came from inside: *perditio tua ex te Israel*. Just as President Roosevelt was speaking about a separate government for Croatia as well as Slovenia and Serbia, if the new Yugoslav government-in-exile did "not work out" the government of Ivan Subasic started to "work out," and with British blessings and pushing, Ivan Subasic made agreements with Tito on the island Vis on June 16, 1944, and later on November 1, of the same year in Belgrade. Thus it was a Croatian, the former viceroy of Croatia, Ban Ivan Subasic who buried Croatia for the time being. As we will see in the next section, he persuaded the United States and Great Britain that his ways were the best for Croatia. Roosevelt was persuaded that it was the right thing for Croatia and no more raised his own objections. Who exactly in the White House, in the Department of State, or elsewhere persuaded the president is not yet known. For the best part of his tenure from 1941 to 1944 Franklin Delano Roosevelt was for a sovereign Croatia. Therefore, it is a pity that President Roosevelt allowed Ivan Subasic to determine the destiny of Croatia. Subasic's policies proved fatal to Croatia. It would have been better if Roosevelt had insisted on an independent Croatia and an

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independent Slovenia. Instead, he accepted Subasic as the new premier of the Yugoslav government-in-exile. According to the American diplomat Harold Schantz, Subasic confessed that "his policies betrayed Croatia."

Schantz was more eloquent in his description of this betrayal of Croatia by Subasic. On September 27, 1945, he sent his report to Washington:

A relatively small group of Communists, inspired and directed by Moscow, has succeeded in foisting a ruthless totalitarian police regime on Yugoslavs. For this state of affairs, we, and to a greater degree the British, are partially responsible. . . . We are convinced of our obligation to make our position clear to (the) world and to attempt to redress (the) harm we have done ... in establishing Tito in power. . . . We owe it to ourselves and the Yugoslav people to state plainly that we do not consider conditions envisioned at Yalta and elsewhere to have been met.

Not only has the United States (and Great Britain) not redressed the harm it has done to Croatians and other people in Yugoslavia, but it is the United States (and Britain) which kept and keeps Tito's Communist regime alive by sending to Yugoslavia military, economic, and political help worth billions of dollars. Without that help Tito's regime would have been overthrown, and Croatia and other nations in Yugoslavia could have achieved their national sovereignty.

Croatian sovereignty was envisaged by President Roosevelt as late as May, 1944, as is shown in the documents.

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VIII

Pilgrim Churchill's Coup

On June 1, 1944, Winston Churchill got what he wanted: the appointment of Ivan Subasic as Prime Minister of the Yugoslav Emigre' Government by the decree of his King, the little puny youngster Petar II. Churchill cared less that the head of the Croats in that Government, Juraj Krnjevic, was opposed to that nomination which thus became illegal, because in the parliamentary system no member of the party can take any governmental position without the consent of the head of the party. It is well known that all heads of the Serbian parties, together with the head of the Slovenian party, were against Subasic's appointment. There had never been much of a parliamentary system in Yugoslavia since its creation on December 1, 1918 as the Kingdom of Serbians, Croats, and Slovenians. Especially no parliamentary system existed after Aleksandar I abolished that system, and on January 6, 1929, declared the Kingdom to be called Yugoslavia and to be a dictatorship. But even he played the game of parties, although as always in such cases it was a farce.

On that June 1 Churchill abolished all farces and Ivan Subasic became everything: State, Parliament, Government. All that in the person of Ivan Subasic: *l'e'tat c'est moi*. His bosses, FDR, Donovan, and Winston Churchill gave him his only task to perform and that was to come to agreement with Josip Broz Tito to merge the Yugo-Exile-Government with Tito's domestic, political and military order. Since Tito was the mountain, Mohammed had to go to the Mountain. Thus the British unloaded Subasic on the island of Vis at the threshold of Tito.

The two Croatian Quislings made and signed agreements, and FDR, Donovan, and Churchill were beaming. At that time, Donovan was already in Italy where, on Capri, his former manager of his gubernatorial campaign in New York, Mr. Harrison Williams, had a plushy villa and where his wife resided. In the olden times Donovan had thought that the governorship of the State of New York was a good stepping stone to the United States presidency. His boss, Franklin Delano Roosevelt thought the same with the

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difference that FDR achieved it, and Donovan was happy to be in his service especially since the Republican administration of Herbert Hoover did not think much of him. There at Capri, the biggest OSS diplomatic disaster happened. Donovan's stooges succeeded to keep Tito's Tigar away from the 4 o'clock tea ceremony. But Tigar became uneasy about his boss and began to howl. He was then accepted inside. After eating his cookies, he wagged his big long tail in cordial thanks to the hostess and with it dragged from the table all precious porcelains. After the War, Mrs. Williams applied for damages.

Churchill gave General Maitland Wilson the order to arrange staff talks with Tito "as one Commander to another."

But Churchill was in London, and to see Tito he had to pilgrimage to the place of Tito's choice and time. After a couple of hesitations, Tito finally agreed to come to the Allied Headquarters at Caserta, near Naples, to the biggest delight of the old Bulldog.

Churchill put all British diplomatic and military protocol on the move, and organized a spectacular event. The British put at Tito's disposal the best airplane on the premises, and at the beginning of August 1944, they flew him and his entourage from Vis to Caserta. Tito took with him his Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Sreten Zujovic; his Chief-of-Staff, Arso Javanovic, and the Head of his Military Intelligence, Medical and Supply Services. He also had permission to bring with him sixteen personal bodyguards, but he actually brought only twelve. Robert Murphy writes that his retinue was magnificent.

In Italy he was accompanied everywhere by his personal bodyguards and his dog Tigar. In his personal suite was his elder son, Zarko Broz, who had only recently returned from Russia to Yugoslavia. Since his departure in 1929, he had lived in the Soviet Union. He had lost an arm fighting in the Red Army and was convalescing. Robert Murphy writes that Tito wore a woolen uniform of his own design with a dazzling display of red facing and gold braid, with a tight collar reaching to his chin. Phyllis Auty calls it a new tight-fitting grey uniform with a scarlet stripe down the trousers and gold braid and insignia of his rank of Marshal. Churchill later called it his "gold-lace straight-jacket." Everybody, Tito and all of his retinue were lodged in splendid villas on the Gulf of Naples. Tito personally was put up at the guest house near the Supreme Commander's official villa. Wherever Tito went, the bodyguards accompanied him. When the Supreme Commander Wilson received him on August 6, Tito took three of his "formidable" Partisans with him who followed him closely into Wilson's reception room and stationed them-

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selves in corners with submachine guns trained upon the British host. Among his close companions Tito was accompanied by Tigar too, an unusually large Alsatian dog who had been trained for war duty and was allegedly captured from the Germans. In Yugo-Bolshevik mystique, even dogs make heroic legends. Even the poodles of Tito's wife treated Tigar with great respect.

After the official receptions the lunch was served in a small and stuffy room. Two of Tito's bodyguards pushed in and took corner stations with Tommy guns ready for action. Tigar also clung close to Tito lying at his feet under the table. The scent of Tigar and of the bodyguards filled all rooms and gave a special aroma to the food which was voraciously devoured by everyone present.

The most exciting attraction in the entourage of the Red upstart dictator was his secretary, interpreter, and mistress, Olga — Olga Nincic'. Murphy calls her a "statuesque girl dressed in partisan uniform." After the ceremonies with the Britons at the Italian royal palace, Tito undertook the pilgrimage to his old sacred patron and boss, William J. Donovan, in his villa on Capri.

On August 7, Field Marshal Alexander asked Tito to visit his Headquarters on Lake Bolsena, north of Rome. Alexander flew him in his own airplane. Alexander initiated him into all mysteries of the Allies in waging war and promised all help needed. On his way back, always in Alexander's airplane, Tito stopped in Rome to see St. Peter's. St. Peter's stood high in his nostalgia from the days when he was an altar boy in his native Kumrovec, north of Zagreb.

At the entrance to the Church, the Croatian priest in his entourage informed him that nobody, not he or his bodyguard, could enter armed into the basilica. Tito refused to deposit arms, the administration of the Basilica surrendered to his resolution, and Tito entered the Church with his armed bodyguards. Better armed than all the Swiss Guards surveying the Church.

Winston Churchill was so excited that he now wanted to see Tito too and planned his pilgrimage.

The Pilgrim arrived and met Tito on August 12. The photographs show the two as people enjoying each other's company. Tito in his resplendent uniform of the Bolshevik Marshal and Churchill in his boiler fatigues.

Tito, of course, was accompanied by his bodyguards, Olga, and Tigar. Murphy relates that Harold Macmillan told him "that the two men thoroughly enjoyed each other."

The Pilgrim Churchill achieved greater travel distance than the Anglican pilgrims pilgrimaging to Canterbury. His pilgrimage took Churchill from

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Anglia to the diplomatic residence of the Red dictator, in his own residence which thus enjoyed diplomatic extra-territoriality. The historians of terrorism and espionage never grasped the portentous circumstance of the boss of a terrorist and espionage Agent, pilgrimaging to his terrorist and espionage Agent.

I submit that Josip Broz scored.

Subasic was asked to come and he came. Nobody gave him an agenda in advance. Churchill's pilgrimage was secret, nobody knew about his whereabouts, neither the time of leaving London nor the time of arriving in Naples. Not knowing the scope of his trip to Naples and having been gravely ill, Subasic did not enjoy his trip at all but lay most of the time on the floor of the military airplane.

Since he was not in the graces of Olga, he had to look for a substitute among the locals. Not only was he not told about what was going to happen, but once in Naples he never knew what was happening. All meetings of Churchill with Josip Broz took place in four eyes, plus Olga. It is easy to guess that Subasic had no hard time to understand the situation. He was an agent of OSS, and Tito was Agent of SOE talking to his supreme boss, the pilgrim WSC. Here is additional admiration for the British selecting and treating their agent. Agents are usually squeezed out, and after the squeeze rejected like the window cleaning cloth. British honor their agents and usually nobody ever regrets having been a British agent. The Croatian Quisling capo, Tito from Kumrovec, had a goodtime with Olga gloating over the treatment given by SOE capo to the other Croatian Quisling, Subasic from Velika Gorica, terrorist and spy of OSS. Subasic returned to London from Bari August 21, 1944.

Did ever two little boys from neighboring Croatian villages have a better chance to thumb the nose at each other. Tito was aware of it. When, on October 13, the same year, Subasic arrived at the hidden place at the Soviet military headquarters in Vrs'ac, Vladimir Velebit put Subasic on a chair to wait for Tito. When Tito brushed out of his hole and saw Subasic waiting, he hollered at Velebit: I told you to always lead the Prime Minister to my presence as soon as he arrives. The Prime Minister should not wait for me. After the cure of his ulcers, Subasic had to eat the heavy food prepared for Tito.

Churchill and Tito met twice on August 12. Tito's chief interpreter and mistress was Olga Nincic, "the statuesque girl in Partisan uniform." The Britons licked their fingers and prepared the silk sheets for her and Tito's common bed as she was used to in her father's — Momcilo Nincic — rich house and possibly also in the "woods" with Tito.

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Not much has been written about the pourparlers of Tito and Churchill. The document that follows is the most important one besides the writings of Churchill himself, sent from the British Embassy, Washington, D.C., August 23, 1944.

Text of telegrams from Foreign Office to Dominions Prime Ministers dated August 15th, 1944

I. TOP SECRET — YUGOSLAVIA

During his visit to Italy, Prime Minister has had conversations with Marshal Tito.

Mr. Churchill told Tito we wished to see a strong, united and independent Yugoslavia with a really representative and united Yugoslav Government, and that we felt that the rightful position of the King should be duly respected. Tito understood our obligations towards King Peter, but felt he could do nothing until after war when Yugoslav people could pronounce upon question of future regime of the country. Mr. Churchill indicated that it would be helpful if he would meet the King preferably on Yugoslav soil.

Tito affirmed that he had no desire to introduce Communism into Yugoslavia, and remarked that Soviet Mission with Partisans had never expressed any idea of this happening. He thought that the country could develop along democratic lines.

Mr. Churchill expressed our intention to continue and, if possible, increase our supply of war material, but in return we expected, not only public statement from Tito regarding his intentions not to impose Communism, but also statement to effect that he would not use the armed strength of his movement to influence free expression of will of people on future regime of his country. This he has since undertaken to do (see account of his subsequent conversation with M. Subasic in my telegram Circular D. 1 146 of today).

Later Tito and M. Subasic informed Mr. Churchill that they both agreed it would be premature for Tito to meet the King at present, but that they would decide together the most opportune time for his doing so. Also, both agreed that the Royal Yugoslav Navy and the National Liberation Marine should be amalgamated and operate under the command of the Com-mander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The combined fleet would fly the Yugoslav flag and be known as the Yugoslav Navy.

II. Yugoslavia

Yugoslav Prime Minister and M. Tito met on August 12th. Yugoslav Prime Minister expressed himself as satisfied with results of their conversa-

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tion and said that Tito's attitude had been helpful. Tito had agreed to make a Declaration regarding his intention not to impose Communism on the country, and also a statement to effect that he will not use armed strength to influence free expression of will of the people on future regime.

Tito found fault with Yugoslav Government for not having been more successful in helping National Liberation Movement since date of their agreement. Yugoslav Prime Minister countered this most energetically, pointing out that he had come out to Caserta a month ago hoping to clear up a number of military and naval questions with the Marshal, and the latter had refused to attend the meeting. To this Tito could only reply that circumstance had prevented him.

Tito concluded by suggesting a visit to the Island of Vis after conclusion of meetings in Italy for settlement of terms of his Declaration. Yugoslav Prime Minister agreed.¹

More about it in yet unpublished documents. Freeman Matthews of the Division of European Affairs of the State Department sent on September 11, 1944 to the Secretary of State the following memorandum:

Mr. Pares of the British Embassy called yesterday afternoon and read to Mr. Cannon a telegram sent by Mr. Churchill to the President on August 14, concerning the meeting of Mr. Churchill with the Yugoslav Prime Minister and Marshal Tito in Italy. Mr. Pares said that the British Ambassador was sending a copy of this telegram to the Secretary.

The telegram in question is rather remarkably lacking in substance, and the following observations may be of some interest in this connection.

It will be recalled that about a month ago arrangements were made for the Yugoslav Prime Minister and Tito to have their second round of conversations, with the idea of effecting a real working agreement between the Government in exile and the forces within Yugoslavia. According to agreement, the Yugoslav Prime Minister traveled from London to Caserta, and General Wilson himself was ready to preside at the meetings, but Tito simply refused to come. Mr. Subasic waited a few days and then returned to England. Almost immediately after his return to England, Tito sent word to General Wilson that he was now ready to come to Italy.

General Wilson postponed the meeting with Tito for some days but ten days ago arranged for "strictly military" talks with him. Tito arrived in Caserta with a few staff officers and a bodyguard, was invited to visit the Italian front, and on his own initiative also spent some time in Rome. It was about this time that Mr. Churchill decided to go to Italy, and presumably the British felt that if Mr. Churchill should take the Yugoslav Prime Minis-

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ter with him, and General Wilson should hold Tito at Caserta, a way could be found to oblige Tito and Subasic to continue their talks together and perhaps come to some agreement. It is against this background that we must view the announcement that "the two leaders reached a satisfactory agreement on a number of practical questions".

As regards the "simultaneous declaration" which the two Yugoslav leaders have now agreed to issue, it will be recalled that there was also an agreement to issue declarations after the first meeting which took place in June. At that time there was clear evidence of Tito's bad faith. First, he allowed the terms of the secret agreement to leak out to the press, then he arranged that the "Free Yugoslavia" radio station, which operates by way of Russia, should give practically the whole text of the agreement, and finally he announced that the two ministers whom he had designated as representatives in the Subasic Government were really not representatives of the Liberation Committee. As a consequence, the official texts of the agreement have never been released by the Yugoslav Government, and Considerable misunderstanding has been caused by the mystery surrounding these negotiation, as well as the secrecy which the British Government has insisted on maintaining concerning the flight of Tito from Yugoslavia to Italy just before the negotiations began.

The question which is of chief interest to the United States at the present moment, in the matter of Yugoslavia, has reference to the supply of arms to the resistance forces, and to the reports that these arms, supplied by the Allies, are used, or are being held for use, in the struggle between the two major factions in Yugoslavia, rather than for use against the Germans. We have received several reports containing flat assertions that the American arms are being supplied to the Partisans to kill the Serbs.

There is no doubt that as of a few weeks ago it was Tito's plan to invade Serbia, and he discussed this matter with the British mission and we have record even of the officers who would command the operation. It was expected at that time that Brigadier Maclean, the chief of the British mission, would accompany these troops. About the same time the British Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government reported that such a project might well succeed since the Serbs had been greatly weakened and many of their best men are held as prisoners of war by the Germans. It is of course notorious that the Germans released what Croatian prisoners they had, and the reports of the Red Cross and other agencies who have studied the prisoner of war situation indicate that the Yugoslav prisoners of war, numbering some 140,000, are almost entirely Serbs.

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The Department has made clear to Mr. Murphy that we disapprove of any plan for building up the Tito forces at the expense of the Serbs, and naturally we are disturbed by the reports that American arms are being supplied to Tito for use in this civil war. This matter was taken up last week with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. According to a telegram received yesterday from Mr. Murphy, the arms sent to Tito are supplied by the British, but, says Mr. Murphy, it may be that some of them were manufactured for the British in the United States, and can be so identified.

In view of the foregoing we have some reservations concerning the success of the conversations referred to in Mr. Churchill's telegram.²

The chanceries were busy and papers flew back and forth. On August 17, 1944 Lord Halifax wrote to Secretary Hull that he is sending him the following:

COPY

Paraphrase of telegram from Prime Minister to President No. 753 dated August 14, 1944

top secret and personal

I have had meetings during the last two days with Marshal Tito and Yugoslav Prime Minister. I told both the Yugoslav leaders that we had no thought but that they should combine their resources so as to weld the Yugoslav people into one instrument in the struggle against the Germans. Our aim was to promote the establishment of a stable and independent Yugoslavia and the creation of a united Yugoslav Government was a step towards this end.

2. The two leaders reached a satisfactory agreement on a number of practical questions. They agreed that all Yugoslav naval forces will now unite in the struggle under a common flag. This agreement between Yugoslav Prime Minister and Marshal Tito will enable us with more confidence to increase our supplies of war material to Yugoslav forces.

3. They agreed between themselves to issue simultaneous declaration in a few days time which I hope will strengthen and intensify Yugoslav war effort. They are going off together today to Vis to continue their discussions.

4. I am informing Marshall Stalin of the result of these meetings.³

Everybody was happy with Tito, the old hold on the British was fastened. On August 14, 1944 Ambassador Murphy sent to the Secretary of State the following telegram:

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You may be interested in Medcos 145, August 12 in which SAC reports two conferences with Tito stating that all military points outstanding for discussion have been amicably settled. Where political considerations were involved questions at issue were reserved for future discussion.

Tito has agreed to undertake further coordinated attacks on enemy communications of larger scope than in past.

In order to allay Tito's suspicions that the air supply of his forces is not being efficiently handled SAC has agreed to accept a Yugoslav liaison officer to Balkan air force to cooperate on the despatch of supplies.

In reply to Tito's repeated requests for a complete armored brigade, he was told that all that can be done is to equip and train an armored regiment and an armored car squadron. Negotiations for any further equipment should be handled through Velebit in London.

Regarding recruiting by Tito of men of Yugoslav race with Italian nationality, Tito expressed his satisfaction with what has been done for prisoners of war. He raised question of former internees now at large in Italy and of Italian Slovenes employed as service troops under American command in

Corsica. He was told that report centers in Italy are being set up for the first category but that because of operational reasons no recruiting from latter category could be permitted for at least three months (repeated to Cairo for Shantz as 19. To London for Schoenfeld as 20 and to Kirk as 20).

Other matters dealt with satisfactorily included the evacuation and treatment of Partisan wounded as well as better security measures in Tito's organization.

SAC expressed opinion that Tito is frank, purposeful and modest and that he had gained a good impression of his bearing and ability throughout the discussions which have been valuable.⁴

Robert Murphy really was eager to keep up with Titoists. On August 16, 1944, Murphy sent to the Secretary of State the following telegram:

Tito has now departed from Caserta and is spending day in Bari. He planned to depart from Bari returning to Vis on 16 or 17 accompanied by Dr. Subasich. Tito while here in addition to military staff discussions reported in my 124 had three conversations with British Prime Minister and British political staff. Mr. Churchill expressed to me his satisfaction with way things have gone. Although conversations covered fairly wide range, results apparently boiled down to an agreement which Tito and Subasich agreed to reduce to writing after their arrival on Vis concerning future organization of Yugo navy. Latter will fly Royal Yugo flag but personnel will be allowed to wear either Royal Yugo or Tito insignia according to

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their individual preferences and they will function under operational command of Allied CINC Mediterranean.

According to British Tito is conscious that his present value to Allied cause is not as great or as necessary as it was in early 1944 or during 1943.

I believe British are satisfied they have impressed Tito with strength of their position in Mediterranean and are encouraged to believe they will obtain in the future understanding cooperation from Tito.

While I did not participate in Brit-Yugo military and political discussions I did have several informal conversations with him as well as with his Chief of Staff Major General Zukovich. Tito spoke to me at great length regarding important social possibilities of his movement for future of Yugoslavia and particularly its appeal to Yugo youth. He claimed it symbolizes a growing protest against reaction and that it was designed and would succeed in welding together all patriotic elements in country.

He was enthusiastic in his reference to United States and part Americans could play in reconstruction of Yugoslavia. In his opinion European War is rapidly drawing to a close and postwar problems assume ever growing urgency. I found him direct and able but I thought I detected in his conversation a certain lack of assurance regarding his eventual acceptance by majority of his fellow countrymen as the political leader of Yugoslavia. He spoke of democracy and the Four Freedoms. He welcomed members of American Mission now assigned to his headquarters. He gives every indication of a desire to cooperate.⁵

Here we want to reproduce a letter that Winston Churchill wrote to his Foreign Secretary on January 14, 1945 in which Yugo-Communist historians see a veiled significance, but do not say what:

1. If you wish it, I do not mind the sentence "He is a spirited youth and I think had been advised by some clever unofficial Englishmen" being cut out of my telegram to the President, though I do not quite see why this should be so.

2. I have cut out the Foreign Office expression "By taking this action however King Peter may well have burnt his boats", because I thought it altogether inexact. "Burnt his boats" does not seem to bear any relation to what he has in fact done. Invaders who land on enemy soil have been known to burn their boats in order that their army may not be able to run away home and will have to stay in the invaded country and fight it out. I cannot see any resemblance between this and what King Peter has done, which is to propose certain amendments to the Tito-Subasic Agreements. Moreover, your new argument is to the effect that nothing irrevocable has

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happened and there may be some compromise after all. Far from wishing to "burn his boats" and leave himself stranded on a foreign shore, King Peter now hopes to get hold of a boat which some day or other may carry him back to his native shore. I wondered whether the expression "cooked his goose"

might not have fitted the context, but on the whole I thought and still think it better to leave out the sentence altogether. Forgive my chaff and pendartry.⁶

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IX Tito's "Levanted" Coup

Nobody mentions that Tito's second secretary, interpreter, and mistress parallel to Olga, Zdenka, Davorjanka Paunovic, was in Caserta. Maybe the Communist organizers did not think that both of them were needed in Italy. In Italy it is easy to find the substitute. Zdenka and Olga were in succession to Tito's first wife, Pelagija (Pelagea, Polka) Belousova, whom he married in Omsk. She bore him a son, Zarko. When Tito got long prison terms in 1929, the Yugo-Communists sent both of them back to Omsk. Once Tito had served the long prison terms, he married a Slovenian German ethnic, Herta Has, from Maribor. Later Tito left Herta because neither Herta nor Tito could keep long separations. There were many young bachelors who claimed knowing Herta *more uxorio*. It is not registered when Tito left the mistress duo, Olga and Zdenka, but later on, September 18, 1952, he announced to the visiting British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, that he married Jovanka Budisavljevic. Jovanka was later unceremoniously dismissed from the court when she was involved in conspiracy with the butcher of the Communist regime, Aleksandar Rankovic, to overthrow Tito. Jovanka disappeared totally from the public life and appeared only under strong guard at Tito's funeral. After he dropped Jovanka, Tito was in the company *more uxorio* with a young, thirty-five years old, opera singer. He was her senior by fifty years.

Tito's vanity was evident to everybody in his lavishing in everything which was luxury and splendor. But nothing was as much a sign of it as his dyeing his hair. To Phyllis Auty and to Dedijer, he confessed that when he was under questioning by the Soviets in Moscow in 1938 to defend himself against Trotskyism, that he became white. That surely was true, but nobody ever saw Tito white or grey. To the last day of his life he dyed his hair to a glamorous reddish blond as the hero youngsters in his village are by nature. He was still dyeing his hair even when dying in the hospital when his limb was amputated. They succeeded to amputate only his right leg. After that he died, at least to go to his grave on one leg. Moreover, in

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underground in the "woods", Tito was never gray or white. He always dyed his hair following the episode in 1938 when he became white from the grueling by the Bolshies there.

The female company in the Communist "woods" was as abundant as possible. The Bolshies especially were eager to see that no member of the foreign military missions be left without female services.

There were three military missions: British, American and Soviet. The British Mission numbered up to 56 members at times. The Partisans and their stooges among the writers of history of those days want to emphasize that the Communists did not tolerate sex promiscuity in the "woods." That simply is not true. Females in their ranks were at the disposal of whoever wanted them, from Tito down. Maybe that is not any particular problem since it is characteristic of all armies. We know the case of Kathy Summerby and the Americanization of Emily. When some members of the British Mission got syphilis, the poor Bolshie girl was shot.

When visiting Tolbukhin's headquarters in Hungary, Field Marshal Alexander found a girl in his room for the night. When he asked why she was in his room, she had no answer so he asked her to sleep in the next room. Other members of his entourage got the same treatment, but nobody mentions that the same question was asked.

After British royal treatment in Italy where he saw among others the Pilgrim Churchill and enjoyed his tour in the company of Olga and Donovan, Tito returned to Vis and to his watching the almighty might of the British and American war machine.

Not long after his return to Vis he spirited away to the Mecca of Bolshevism. He left Vis incognito. Britons and Americans said that they did not know of his whereabouts, and that if any Briton knew it, he was hiding it from Churchill. Tito simply "levanted" said Churchill who later accused him of levanting to Stalin. Stalin pooh poohed that, saying that Tito was a Croatian peasant who liked mystery. Tito, in fact, did see Stalin and even Stalin did not care to inform the Anglo-Americans of his talks with Tito.

He was flown on the night of 18/19 September in an aircraft with Soviet pilots to the Headquarters of the Red Army of Marshal Feodor I. Tolbukhin in Craiova in Romania. Two days later, September 21, he was in Moscow. He was accompanied by General Kornieyev, Ivan Milutinovic of his Headquarters, and his secretary Mitar Bakic, and, of course, Tigar. Everything was staged as a secret departure so Tigar got a sack over his head to keep him from barking and revealing the "clandestine" escape. That made it possible for Tito to see Moscow again after five years. All the secret about the departure was, of course, a farce. Vis was well guarded by a brigade of British Commandos and was given air and naval support by the Allied Force Headquarters.

About his stay in Moscow at that time, Tito described it as follows:

'It was then for the first time in my life that I met Stalin and talked to him. Until then I had only seen him from a distance, as during the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. It seemed to me that he looked much shorter than he appeared on the photographs. On the other hand, he gave me the impression of a man full of energy, although a little bit tired. During my stay, I lived in a villa in which Winston Churchill stayed during his visit to Moscow.

"This time I had several meetings with Stalin, two or three in his study in the Kremlin, and twice at his private house, where I had supper with him.

'One of the first things we discussed was the question of joint operation between our two armies. It was in his study in the Kremlin. I asked for a tank division to help our units during the liberation of Belgrade. In the eastern parts of Yugoslavia we had no tanks or heavy artillery while the Germans were armed to the teeth with the most modern weapons. Stalin agreed to my request, and said:

"Walter (as they called me in Moscow), I shall give you not one division, but a whole tank corps!"

"We also reached an understanding as to how much of Yugoslavia to free with out joint forces, what point their troops and ours were to go to, and, finally, how long their troops were to remain in our country. We agreed that they were to give us a tank corps to liberate Belgrade with, and then their forces were to withdraw from Yugoslavia after Belgrade was freed, their left flank being thus strengthened for the attack on Budapest." A joint communique' was issued on September 28, 1944. It was

published by *Tass*.

One must read Tito's story with free mind. It is clear that he painted his story to appear heroic and statesmanlike. The reality was always that as presented throughout this book.

The Soviet armies were ready for invasion of Serbia. They started their invasion of Serbia on September 22 (1944).

The move of the Soviet armies probably was not secret to the British Army Intelligence. But it is not clear how much political involvement of the Soviets in the former non-Soviet territories was known to anybody in

England. Thus it is not clear how much the British were surprised at the next Cetnik move.

At the appearance of the Bolsheviks at the border of Serbia, Draza Mihailovic sent on September 10 a Mission to the Soviet forces in Romania with instructions to establish contact with them. The Head of the Mission was Lt. Colonel Velimir Piletic, Commander of the Cetnik bands in northeastern Serbia. The Cetnik Mission crossed the Danube on September 10 in Craiova. Communist members infiltrated

the Cetnik Mission and denounced them as British spies. The Mission was arrested, and, on October 1, flown to Moscow, imprisoned, and submitted to grueling interrogations by Soviet police. They watched Tito's entry into Belgrade from Ljubianka gaol. Piletic was sent back to Tito in November 1945 as a war criminal, but he succeeded to escape during the transit in Romania and joined his Cetnik fellow heroes in refugee camps in Europe.

When Churchill was informed about the move of the Cetniks, he raised hell against Draza Mihailovic who had accused him of "fighting to the last Serbian."

As we know, Draza had been in good company. In fact, in England nobody wanted to die. The Oxford Students Union adopted a resolution declaring that the youth of England should never again go forth to "die for King and Country."

Churchill, of course, had welcomed the drunken outburst of the Serbian leader, because he wanted to put the British Agent, Bolshevik Tito, on the throne of Serbia and possibly of Yugoslavia as requested by the Madam of the homosexual brothel. Churchill would not now impotently watch Draza's spoiling his chef d'oeuvre in foreign, political and military maneuvering.

Churchill and all his lackeys claimed ignorance of Tito's departure which Churchill called "levanted." That was a joke. Not only did the British know that Tito "levanted" but they told him that Draza was sending his Mission to talk to the Bolsheviks about military agreements on cooperation for the occupation of Serbia and possibly of Yugoslavia.

Nobody could leave Vis, a small island, without the British Commandos noticing it. It is, however, incredible how the British Secret Service could fool everybody in launching the disinformation that Tito "levanted" without the British knowing it. Even the Serbian omniscient intelligence service believed it. Namely, if Tito did escape the vigil eye of British Commandos, they should have been shot for badly performing their military duty of the watch on the Rhine. They were not shot; there was no reason for them to

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be. They watched and protected Tito's departure for Moscow as wanted and maneuvered by Churchill. Nothing more lapalissianly demonstrates the stupidity of the British ruling the lands of East Europe than the episode of "levanted." Whatever Cetniks had in mind, it was for their country which they had a sacred and natural right to run, just as Britons have the same right to run their country. The episode of "levanted" was not anything new in British criminal ruling those parts of East Europe, because it was planned as far back as 1927-28 when they selected Josip Broz to be their Agent for this British opportunity of Rule Britannia. Whether or not the British knew what they were doing, the results were the same. Tito returned to Serbia on October 5, via Craiova in Romania, where he spent several days. He was then flown by the Soviets to Vrsac in Banat, and after a wait of some days he flew to the air-strip outside of Belgrade, from where he entered the city by car on October 27, 1945. With him was also Ivan Subasic whom Tito had called on October 13, to join him there in the Headquarters of Marshal Feodor Tolbukhin.

X Operation Shepherd

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Subasic

William J. Donovan swore to British allegiance and secrecy. But as all Americans do, he never stopped working for American interests. "American interests" is the supreme ethic of U.S. foreign policy and Americans will never stop any step short of those interests. Donovan also from the first day started to work for his future position of supremo of the supreme American Intelligence agency, once the war was won.

Slowly he moved into the Balkan web and started to play a leading role.

In Ivan Subasic, the Ban of Croatia, he found his man, the maker of Communist Yugoslavia. These two Catholics building a Communist empire. Not much Catholic to be sure. Subasic was a former theological seminarian, but after he left the seminary he was erratic in his beliefs. After he divorced his

wife, he married a second wife by civil law (illegal in Croatia, and thus bigamy), and Donovan was a Catholic but not much of a believer.

Thus OSS agent Ivan Subasic was brought by his supreme boss, WJD, in all luxury of transportation to London and deposited with all of his ulcers at the Elizabethan manor Checkers. Donovan and OSS had a carefully designed plan for that mission. It carried the name of Operation Shepherd. It may be of interest to explain why OSS called the operation, "Shepherd." Bogdan Radica reports a promenade with the Ban (on about January 10, 1945), in Hyde Park between his office in Kensington Palace and his residence in Claridge's Hotel. The Ban, who liked to talk and was loquacious, mentioned that he was at Checkers and had talks by the fireside with Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and the Ambassador to the Yugo Emigre Government, Ralph Stevenson. He said to Radica how he had talked to them about the Partisans and about Tito's generals, "talked to

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them", as I would talk about our shepherds. I told them: "I am a shepherd too and you must comprehend the soul of the shepherd." Radica explains: "The Ban had a most admirable opinion of shepherds."

Subasic was well known for his long talks, long walks, asking other people to walk with him and probably eternally talking about shepherds. It has to be mentioned that because some kind of dictatorship had always reigned in Croatia and any philosophizing in schools about liberties of the human soul was taboo, the teachers talked mostly about pastoral literature of the Greeks and Romans. All thus knew that literature and to cover ignorance of everything else eternally talked about the bucolic and the campestrial. Probably also not to engage his supervisor in OSS with ticklish problems of European, Croatian, and Serbian politics, he entertained them with his tales about the soul of his shepherds. Probably as a peasant son he played for them the peasant willow flute as all little peasant sons do. Thus at the OSS he was called by the code name "Shepherd" and his mission "Operation Shepherd."

Subasic walked with OSS men. In OSS there were so many Communists that William Casey (later to be CIA Director under Ronald Reagan), resigned from the OSS.

With whom did Subasic walk. Probably he walked only with the Commies who always hated Croatia and Croatians. With all the individual stories published by OSS people, nobody has written about his association with Subasic.

The Operation Shepherd had all aspects for success. History credits WJD with successes in his terrorist operations as well as in those operations of pure espionage and politics. There were also failures, many of which are to be credited to the dislike of Wild Bill. In the United States, not everybody likes everybody. In his own Republican Party he had troubles, and F.D. Roosevelt offered him a cabinet post to repair the wrong done to him by Herbert Hoover.

As the meeting with Josip Broz on January 24, 1941 in Belgrade was a total success for Donovan so also was the Operation Shepherd a total success for Donovan.

From the end of 1918 to the Croato-Serbian Agreement of August 26, 1939, Croatia was not a subject of international diplomacy. To some extent it was a subject only of international politics. Diplomats ignored Croatia totally while politicians did take cognizance of Croatian political problems. Even the diplomats in Belgrade have been scared into keeping hands off the opposition. They did, to be sure, keep in touch with Serbian opposition which consisted of former prime ministers, or some other kind of ministers

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— in Serbia everybody is some kind of minister or former minister. But not with Croatians where nobody was ever prime minister, and the ministers or former ministers were all some kind of stooges of the Serbian Court.

As the new war was more and more on the horizon threatening the political balance in Europe, the victorious powers started to push Serbians to come to agreement with Croatians to stabilize, at least to some extent, that Great Serbia called Yugoslavia.' Among others, American diplomacy in Belgrade and in Zagreb also discovered Croatians and participated actively in the events.

The biggest international presence on the international, political, and diplomatic scene was the president of the Croatian Peasant Party, the only Croatian party in Croatia which collected all Croatian votes without exception. The president was Vladimir, Vladko (Vlatko) Macek, who on August 26, 1939, signed the Agreement. It was the first time since 1102 that Croats had renounced their kingdom of Croatia (it had stopped to exist on December 1, 1918, but against the will of Croats) and accepted the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The Assembly of National Deputies (Congressmen) in Zagreb approved Macek's agreement with only one dissenting vote cast by the Deputy Lovro Susie. With the signed Agreement, the Deputy of the Peasant Party, Ivan Subasic, came to prominence. In the Agreement was the provision to create in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia an autonomous province, Croatia, to be governed by a Ban or (about) a Vice-Roy. The Court in Belgrade pushed Macek, against his will, to appoint to that position Ivan Subasic. Macek wanted to appoint as Ban, August Kosutic, Vice President of the party, and son-in-law of the founder of the party, Stjepan Radic. Thus Subasic became the highest administrative authority in Croatia. Not because of his brains but because of his subservience to Serbian interests. The autonomy of Croatia was to be the first step to independence. But Serbs put Subasic as the guarantor against Croatian independence in the name of the Serbs who thus insured that that would not happen. He was anti-Croatian and pro-Serb, a Yugoslav, ready to kill all Croats who struggled for an independent Croatia and thus were against a Yugoslavia.

In the book, *The Pro-Allied Putsch in Croatia in 1944 and the Massacre of Croats by Tito Communists in 1945*, we published a telegram of the American Minister in Belgrade, Arthur Bliss Lane, of December 6, 1940, who referred the message from Consul Meily in Zagreb of December 5 to the Secretary of State as follows:

On Tuesday evening a confidential meeting was called by Ban Subasic. There were present the President of the Union of Reserve Officers, the

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President of the Union of Volunteers and sixteen others including personal friends of the Ban, retired officers, politicians, bearers of the Kara George Star, et cetera. The Ban informed them that the Axis intends to create in Croatia a situation similar to that obtaining in Rumania; that the Frankists have received funds to increase their subversive activities; that he has proof that the Frankists are preparing a massacre to include himself, Macek, and other prominent public men. The Ban concluded "I cannot ask help of Belgrade. That would humiliate me. I do not know all the persons involved in this plot, if I knew them I would be merciless and would have them killed if they were thousands — not in order to save my life but in order to save the country. Therefore I need you. You are the only men I can trust. I need your advice and help to avert this danger."²

Thus Ban Subasic in order to save Yugoslavia would kill all of those who would want a free Croatia, even if there were thousands. He had already organized concentration camps in Croatia to intern all Croatian freedom fighters the first concentration camps in Croatia.

Well, on April 10, 1941, he did not have those guts, and instead of fighting Germans who invaded Yugoslavia, he fled. He fled with all Serbs who also were fleeing. All fled who could flee. Nobody fought Germans.

Knowing this background of Subasic's determination to kill all enemies, Croatian and others, of Yugoslavia, Donovan installed the Shepherd on the throne of the Yugo premiership with the blessing of the supreme pontiff of the Yugoslav cause, Winston Spencer Churchill.

For some kind of informative background about American polity of that time, we give the following materials, an OSS potpourri, but for the purpose of the integrity of the documents we leave them as they are in their entirety as they are in the National Archives.

On December 3, 1942 David Bruce of OSS, Washington, D.C., sent to George A. Gordon in the Department of State materials, which had been obtained from "reliable sources." The materials were prepared in the office of OSS in Washington from various reports on Yugoslavia, as far as November 24, 1942:

The Yugoslav Government in Exile Against the Partisans

The Yugoslav officials in London have made it clear that they are completely unwilling to give any credit to those guerrillas in Yugoslavia who are popularly called the partisans and who are operating independently of Mihailovich.

The denunciation of the partisan activities have been till now expressed in the following manner:

1. In the Government-sponsored military broadcasts to Yugoslavia, all those who operate independently of Mihailovich's command are condemned as traitors and collaborators with the Germans, Italians, Hungarians and Bulgarians.
2. In an official note sent to the U.S.S.R. Minister to Yugoslavia, Bogomolov, the Yugoslav Prime Minister announced, referring to the partisans: "The people hate them and do not want them".
3. The Yugoslav Government in Exile also informed the American Government that the partisans are a "collection of international criminals, most of them brought in from abroad". The same statement was published in the New York Times, October 9, 1942, with the heading "Partisans Opposing Mihailovich Slain by the People, U.S. Learns".
4. "Yugoslav officials, notably the office of the Prime Minister, have informed some Allied Governments that at present Mihailovich is engaged in a battle against the "communists" in Montenegro, Sanjak and Bosnian Kraina.

Since the Yugoslav officials in London have devoted all their energy to repudiating the partisans and all those who are not subordinated to Mihailovich's control, it is altogether warranted to take the whole matter seriously and to subject it to a thorough scrutiny.

The condemnation, by Yugoslav officialdom, of all those guerrilla detachments who operate on their own initiative and independently of Mihailovich, is extended to Montenegrin partisans, the guerrilla forces of Western Bosnia, Lika, the Croatian Littoral and the Liberation Front of Slovenia. This is a logical development because none of these groups can be identified with General Mihailovich. It is pertinent to mention that the Yugoslav Military Attache in Washington, Colonel Radoychich, has also confirmed the fact that Mihailovich has no connection with the guerrillas west of the Bosna River. Consequently, the Yugoslav Government in Exile condemns the majority of all the guerrilla forces. The Yugoslav Government justifies its condemnation of these independent guerrillas on the ground of the following accusations:

1. The partisans supposedly consist of international criminals and have no connection with the political strivings of the Yugoslav people.
2. The partisans (under the term 'partisans' Yugoslav officials classify everybody detached from Mihailovich's "regular army") do not obey Mihailovich who alone is "empowered" by the Government in

Exile to dictate the guerrilla strategy and to decide when "the hour is come for a general rebellion and for the liberation of Yugoslavia". 3. The partisans have condemned Mihailovich for his "collaboration"

with the Italian Forces, and, naturally, the Government in London

has defended him because he is a member of it. Let us analyze these three accusations.

First, the accusation that the independent guerrilla detachments consist of "international criminals" can be refuted by the single fact that they constitute the majority of all guerrilla forces in Yugoslavia. The Liberation Front in Slovenia, which never had the least contact with Mihailovich, consists of the members of all Slovenian political parties including the Clerical Party and the Yugoslav National Party. The guerrillas of Western Bosnia are dominated by the conservative agrarians, while in Montenegro only a small number of partisans can be labeled as Communists. The sporadic attacks of small Croatian bands on the Ustashi units are led by and comprise chiefly the adherents of the Croatian Peasant Party. It is however true that all these guerrillas have no sympathies for the Yugoslav Government in Exile which, they feel, consists of politicians who played important roles in the dictatorial regimes. And it is true also that the Government is condemning the partisans primarily because they do not see in them a guarantee of their return to Yugoslavia. Consequently, the Yugoslav

Government in Exile wants to build up Mihailovich so that he can pave the way for their return to Yugoslavia the moment the Axis Powers are destroyed.

Second, the Yugoslav Government in Exile in its military broadcasts to the Yugoslav peoples commend Mihailovich as "the most loyal" and "dearest friend" of King Peter II, emphasizing that he alone is to take responsibilities for "the restoration of order until the return of King Peter II and his Government". In fact, the Yugoslav officials discourage the people from resisting, and order them to place themselves under Mihailovich's command until "the hour of decision" has arrived. Here lies the basic difference between the exiled officials and the independent guerrilla detachments. The partisans and the rest of the guerrillas unconnected with Mihailovich are determined to fight the enemy by all the means at their disposal and without delay. The Yugoslav Government in Exile wants a formation of a strong "army" under Mihailovich whose task would be not to fight the enemy but to restore order in Yugoslavia, and to secure the return of King Peter II and his government as soon as the Axis is defeated by the Allies. The partisans and similar guerrilla bands in Yugoslavia are fighting against the fascist forces, while the Jovanovich Government urges Mihailovich to establish a police army which would step into action when

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the Axis is destroyed, and whose primary task would be to fight all those who would not accept the resumption of power by the Karageorgevich Dynasty and its unconstitutionally formed Government. This is a matter of difference in *military strategy* as pursued by the Yugoslav Government, on the one hand, and the partisans, on the other.

The difference is *political strategy* is also of essential importance. The Yugoslav officials are bombarding the Yugoslav people with broadcasts politically colored. They are promising the people that the "old days" will return, that "their" King will again be amongst his people, and that the Yugoslav Government in Exile, as the only legitimate Yugoslav Government, will assume its old power. All these propaganda elements are apt only to antagonize the Yugoslav masses. The masses do not want the return of the "old days" because those days were characterized by the forceful rule of semi-fascist and pseudo-parliamentarian regimes. The majority of the people are not enthusiastic about the Karageorgevich Dynasty because it was identified with administrative centralism and political absolutism. Least of all do they want to see the resumption of power by the Yugoslav Government in Exile, which is a political hodge-podge and comprises many who approved of and took advantage of the dictatorship introduced in 1929. It is a short-sightedness on the part of the Government when they repeatedly insist that the slogan of the guerrilla struggle should be "For the King and the Country!" The harmful consequences of extolling this slogan are particularly noticeable when the broadcasts are directed to the young Croatian officers of the Yugoslav Army. The majority of these officers are strong proponents of Yugoslav unity but their sympathies for the Dynasty and Yugoslav dictatorial regimes are very questionable. Montenegrin partisans recognized the Yugoslav Government in Exile for a long time, but a period of coolness and antagonism began when Mihailovich received orders to fight against them and particularly when the Government decorated Colonel Jezdimir Dangich who had collaborated with the Germans.

Third, the partisans of Montenegro, Boka Kotorska and Sanjak have, on their part, condemned General Mihailovich for collaborating with Italian punitive expeditions against the Montenegrin guerrillas. It is premature to draw a definite conclusion as to whether this condemnation is warranted. But examination of intelligence reports reveals grounds for suspecting that such collaboration may exist. The Yugoslav Government in Exile insists that General Mihailovich is now engaged in a battle, the purpose of which is to clear Montenegro and adjacent provinces of all the "communists". At the same time, Axis sources as well as Allied reports indicate that the Italian forces are at present engaged in an annihilating war against the Montenegrin "communists". The Rome radio gives comprehensive reports about this total war. The *Grenzboten*, a German newspaper published in Bratislava, says in one of its September issues: "Since about the middle of June, military operations for defeating Montenegro Communist bands have practically been completed

(this is exactly what the Yugoslav Government in Exile attributes to Mihailovich as one of his basic successes) and during the last three months the Italian soldiers in these territories have suffered no casualties. Montenegro nationalists have understood former errors and abandoned communism and simultaneously joined the Italians to help remove Communist infection centers". *The Mideast* (the allied information) reports that *Glas Crnagora*, an Italian newspaper published in Serbian, writes of an agreement between the Italian Governor Birolli and Montenegrin "nationalists" to fight the Communist guerrilla bands, by the means of organizing their own Chetnik detachments.

Coming back to the official communiques of the Yugoslav Government in Exile it is necessary to note that they quoted Mihailovich as expressing his satisfaction with clearing Montenegro of the "Communists". Consequently, he is, although perhaps indirectly, collaborating with the Italians.

This is not to be taken as a final evaluation of Mihailovich's position in the present guerrilla warfare in Yugoslavia. There are two facts which need further corroboration and surveillance:

1. The advertised Italian collaboration with the Montenegrin nationalists against the partisans may be more wishful thinking on the part of the Italian forces in Montenegro. Perhaps this collaboration includes only a small group of powerless Montenegrin traitors.

2. The Yugoslav Government's announcement that Mihailovich is engaged in fighting the Montenegrin partisans might be an invention or a deliberate twisting of Mihailovich's reports.

It is therefore still premature to make any indictments of Mihailovich. But it is imperative to take the matter seriously and impartially and to undertake a further investigation.

This, however, does not exclude the fact that between Mihailovich and the partisans there exists a disagreement in views with respect to guerrilla strategy and political ideology.

It gives us, furthermore, a categorical warning that no special operation in Yugoslavia, undertaken by any Allied forces and depending on collaboration with the guerrillas, would be advantageous and successful until a harmony and understanding between Mihailovich's forces and independent guerrilla detachments has been attained.

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KING PETER'S SECOND COUP D'ETAT.

The following information was obtained from Dr. N. Mirkovich:

At the beginning of September, the Yugoslav Cabinet held a special meeting to decide what to do with Constantin Fotitch who was for months attacked by many Yugoslav circles as pursuing an outright anti-Yugoslav policy. The Yugoslav Ministers who are at present in the United States were also asked to express their views in *re* Fotitch's policy.

The Ministers were asked to vote whether Fotitch should or should not be removed from his position.

The result was as follows:

(a) *The following Ministers voted for the Removal of Fotitch:*

1. B. Jeftich
2. B. Cubrilovich
3. S. Kosanovich
4. F. Snoj
5. I. Shubashich
6. S. Budisavljevich
7. J. Banjanin
8. J. Krnjevic
9. J. Shutey

(b) *In Favor of Fotitch voted:*

1. S. Jovanovich
2. M. Nintchich

3. M. Gavrilovich
4. M. Trifunovich

(c) *Did not vote because they thought the question was not pertinent enough:*

1. B. Markovich
2. M. Grol

(d) *Absent:*

I. M. Krek

King Peter, involving himself in his second *coup d'etat*, ignored the majority vote and ordered Fotitch to retain his position. In addition, the

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latter was elevated to the rank of ambassador. As the King is influenced by the Knezevich brothers this particular case has ascertained their power as being stronger than that of the Cabinet.

SOME ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SHUBASHICH'S NOTE TO KING PETER II.

Ivan Shubashich, the Viceroy of Croatia, has recently sent a note to King Peter informing him on his resolution to cease every collaboration with the Yugoslav Government. His action was motivated by the failure of Yugoslav officialdom to attain an agreement in relation to vital national issues.

Shubashich asked for the removal of M. Nintchich who is protecting a score of anti-Yugoslav and anti-Croat officials. He does not agree with the official condemnation of the partisans and all other guerrilla forces which operate independently of Mihailovich's command. He thinks that the partisans are carrying on most of the real fighting against the enemy forces and that all efforts to identify them with communism are malicious.

It seems that Shubashich, who is known as an ardent proponent of Yugoslav unity, wanted to put pressure on the King and Prime Minister to use their influence to suspend further dissensions within the official circles, to formulate an unequivocal domestic and foreign policy, and to put an end to the Anti-Croat intrigues.

Shubashich's relations with his party-colleagues, J. Krnjevich and J. Shutey remain cordial.

He has also conveyed his feelings to Messrs. Roosevelt, Halifax, and Litvinov.

Mr. Snoj does not approve Shubashich's informing the foreign Governments about his decision because he feels it unnecessary to make of the Serbo-Croat conflict an international problem.

Shubashich had informed his colleagues at 812 Fifth Ave., New York, about his action when it was a *fait accompli*.

TOMASICH VERSUS THE SERBIAN PEOPLE.

Mr. Shubashich complains that Dinko Tomasich, a former Professor of the Zagreb University, is bombarding various American Offices (notably OWI and Justice Department) with various memoranda purported to represent the Croatian Peasant Party's view on the present situation. Shubashich claims that Tomasich has no authority to represent the C.P.P., from which he was excluded because of his passionate hatred of the Serbian people. (Mr. Tomasich's reports tend to interpret the guerrilla warfare in Yugo-

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slavia as a pan-Serbian movement. He tries to discredit all the Serbian guerrilla forces — the partisans as well as Mihailovich's detachments — and to stress an indispensibility for the Independent State of Croatia.)

Tomasich is known as a man who frequently changes his political convictions. Once he was the member of the *Orjuna*, a fascist organization of the Yugoslav youth, which terrorized the leaders of all democratic parties in Yugoslavia particularly of the Croatian Peasant Party.

After this he found himself in the ranks of the Matchek Party which he had previously condemned. His actions were soon met with criticism. The liberal elements criticized him for his obvious racism and many other fascist propensities. The conservative, notably clerical, elements critized his propagandizing a primeval Croatian racial mysticism, which according to him (here he is under Rosenberg's influence) is to be recognized as a new Croatian religion. He was trying to convince his party-colleagues that the Croats are racially superior to all other Balkan nations.

After he had caused much trouble in the ranks of the Croatian Peasant Party, Matchek tried to get rid of him and welcomed his decision to go to the United States. Here he has toured the country several

times trying to arouse an anti-Serbian feeling among the Croatian element. He greeted the fall of Yugoslavia and used the opportunity to intensify the breach between the Serbs and Croats. Soon, however, he was condemned by the majority of American Croatians and his anti-Yugoslav *National Council* languished soon after its establishment.

For awhile he was Shubashich's secretary but they parted because of his stronger sympathies for Pavelich than for the Yugoslav Government.

Now he is acting independently as a concealed and sly agent of the Independent State of Croatia.

It is positively ascertained that he is spreading among American Croatians the propaganda that the Croats cannot prosper lest all the Serbs are exterminated. This propaganda has been till now mostly orally transmitted, but he has his fingers involved also in the *Danica Hrvatska*, a Croatian newspaper that bitterly attacks the Serbs as a nation.

(Tomasich is trying to convince certain U.S. offices that some of Pavelich-devised machinations and propaganda correspond to the reality. The most important statements of this propaganda are as follows:

1. The guerrilla warfare in Yugoslavia is actually prosecuted by the Croats not by the Serbs. *Actually*, this is an obvious fallacy because, as all Intelligence reports agree, the Serbs represent the bulwark of the Yugoslav resistance. At least 80% of guerrilla formations consist of Serbs.

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2. The Croatian "Green Kader" represents the strongest guerrilla resistance in Yugoslavia. It is spread throughout Croatia, Western Bosnia and Dalmatia. *Actually*, (1) the "Green Kader" operates only in the northern regions of Croatia while in the other districts it is completely unknown; and (2) the "Green Kader" is concerned with sabotage rather than with direct attacks on the fascist columns and military objectives. The "Green Kader" prefers "passive resistance" to open clashes with the enemy.

3. The majority of the Serbs are against a restoration of Yugoslavia.

Actually, this Tomasich's invention is devised exclusively to prove his theory that the Independent State of Croatia is indispensable.

4. The Fascist "New Order" had brought to the Moslems a better life, and that in their gratitude to Pavelich they have become Croats. *Actually*, Tomasich wants to justify the inclusion of Bosnia and Hercegovina in the Independent State of Croatia notwithstanding the fact that these regions are preponderantly Serbian.

Tomasich in his reports constantly refers to "underground news channels" and specifies that "most of them are of an official nature."

But he is not an official either of the Yugoslav or of any other Government. Therefore, it is legitimate to raise the question how does he get his information? One can suspect that he maintains underground contacts with Pavelich's agents in Argentina, which appears the most logical source of his "facts" about the situation in Yugoslavia.

He should be subjected to a thorough surveillance and his reports should be accepted with extreme suspicion and their accuracy measured accordingly.)

FOTITCH IS APPROACHING SNOJ.

Mr. Franc Snoj, Minister of State, confessed that C. Fotich uses every opportunity to make a rapprochement with him as the only Slovenian official representative in this country. So far, Snoj claims, Fotitch has not succeeded.

(It should be noted that the pan-Serbian officials in London are busy persuading M. Krek, the other Slovenian representative, to collaborate with them and to come out against the Croats. It is not known to what extent they have succeeded, but Krek's deliberate abstention in September from voting against Fotitch can be taken as symptomatic.)

One bizarre piece of information was included as follows:

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From a confidential source this agency has received a report, dated November 30, 1942, concerning the illness of the Very Reverend V. Ledochowski, General for the Society of Jesus. The report reads as follows:

"From a most secret and hitherto reliable Catholic source, we have received information to the effect that the VERY REVEREND V. LEDOCHOWSKI, who underwent an operation upon his return to Rome, is now in danger of death.

"The death of FATHER LEDOCHOWSKI would present a very serious problem to the Society of Jesus. Pro-Axis priests of this order, principally those in Italy and Croatia, have been active in seeking to influence certain high prelates of the Catholic Church as to the advisability of seeing the Society adopt a more realistic policy in keeping with the times. It is reported that Axis elements within the Catholic Church would use all possible ecclesiastical influence in the nomination of a new General for the Society of Jesus."³

Slowly, *Mane, Thecel, Phares* was written for Petar. Everybody could see those words especially since those Serbians were living in the Orient where those words written on the wall originated.

On March 7, 1944 Lincoln MacVeagh sent from Cairo to the Secretary of State a most secret telegram: King Peter is leaving by air for London tonight taking with him the Prime Minister Pouritch and the Minister of the Interior Milichivitch plus various secretaries and the British Ambassador. The last named has no information regarding the subject of the forthcoming talks beyond that given in my YUGOS 53 of March I, 8 p.m. In this connection I sounded out the Prime Minister on his reactions to the Ambassador's suggestion that he show himself "constructively minded" and he replied that he has been a diplomat all his life and can be supple on occasions but that there is always a limit beyond which one cannot go; and regarding the suggestion that his government give its support to all resistance movements under the King he made another perhaps significant remark "in Yugoslavia the King cannot be a mere puppet. He must take sides".⁴

II

Yarrow

From January 1941, if not earlier, when the British, via Donovan, sought out Tito to give resistance to the pro-Axis factions of all kinds in

Yugoslavia, to depose Prince Paul, and crown the child King who too would be forced into exile with his Government, British and American forces worked steadily to achieve their goal. That goal was to eliminate all vestiges of old regimes (largely Serbian) and to establish a new Yugoslavia to their liking under Marshal Tito.

Throughout all turmoil and vicissitudes of interim governments from 1941-1944, Tito, as leader of the Communists under British tutelage, was being built into the figure who would take the reins when the British had completed their handiwork to form Communist Yugoslavia, without monarch, without Cetniks, with Tito as sole ruler.

That of course could not be accomplished overnight in one action. Changes had to be made step by step to give a semblance of lawful political developments. That required diplomacy, secret and otherwise, pressures applied openly and covertly, and players to move the pawns. It must appear to have the King's blessing. It required a Yarrow. It required Subasic'. It required Operation Shepherd. The unfolding plot is best set forth in the abundant documents that reveal the strategies on all sides.

Although Donovan swore his total allegiance to the British according to the Arcadia Agreements and especially to keeping their secrets as they do, he never ceased to be American and to the bottom Irish American, never trusting the Britons and therefore fishing always for the big fish for OSS, for the United States. After he enthroned Subasic as Prime Minister on the throne of the British outpost for their interests in Yugoslavia, as wanted by Churchill, Donovan proceeded to play with his toys.

That master toy was Bernard Yarrow of OSS. Yarrow, born in Russia, a lawyer, became assistant to Thomas E. Dewey, District Attorney in New York. He later became partner in Sullivan and Cromwell in New York, and then director of Radio Free Europe. The task of Bernard Yarrow was to spy on the British and American diplomatic and political intercourse with the Yugoslav Court of Petar II and the

Government of Ivan Subasic. Although Britons and Americans made solemn oaths not to spy on each other, Yarrow was to spy on Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, King George VI, the OSS, the U.S. Ambassador in London John Winant, and everything which could be of interest for Wild Bill and therefore for the Secretary of State and President Roosevelt.

The Operation Shepherd had to be organized so secretly that nobody could know of it. The Department of State declined to give diplomatic status to Yarrow. Secretary of State Hull informed Donovan that if anything went wrong with Yarrow he "would have to disavow him entirely."

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff washed their hands of Yarrow also. The author of the book, *Donovan, The Last Hero*, Anthony Cave Brown, suggests that Donovan never undertook any operation without authority, and thus in this case would have acted on the authority of President Roosevelt. Since there are no written documents, it had to be on a verbal agreement between the two.

Donovan wanted Yarrow to infiltrate the Yugo Court to the utmost. In that Court the factotum was Princess (of plebeian origin) Aspasia, the Greek mother-in-law of Petar II. For that reason Donovan authorized Yarrow to take his wife with him which was never the case with other spies of OSS.

From then on Yarrow would play godfather to the whole Operation Shepherd and especially to Ivan Subasic until the time of his demise in Belgrade. Subasic, of course, not only knew that Yarrow was his godfather, but also knew of the whole Operation Shepherd, but nobody else knew. It is strange that nobody guessed the role of the OSS godfather to the "Operation Shepherd" because Bernard Yarrow, as all people of his mold was ubiquitous, and Subasic could not even cough without permission of the godfather to whom he had always to announce his coughing in advance. Nobody has ever publicized his knowledge of Bernard Yarrow playing godfather to Operation Shepherd, not even Bogdan Radica, who from October 1944 until his departure for Belgrade in April 1945 was in London. Radica was in the service of the Yugo Emigre' Government, and the Minister of Finance, Juraj Sutej, a Croatian, paid him all his retroactive salary not paid to him after the Serbians closed the Yugoslav Information Office in New York and dismissed Radica without pay.

Petar wanted to have Yarrow around. On July 28, 1944 Donovan wrote to James C. Dunn at the Department of State:

Dear Jimmie:

I have just received another wire from David Bruce saying that King Peter was pressing again for his request that Yarrow be sent to London.

Upon inquiry I learned from our people that your department has been unable to give us any word on this matter. However, the impression seemed to be that you felt sufficient information was being obtained from your regular channel and that it would be unnecessary to make use of Yarrow.

As you understand, Yarrow was sent only because of the personal contact that he had been able to establish through his work for us. It was a relationship that certainly differed from anything of an official nature. We

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made him available only because your people thought he would be of value.

Now that it is evident they are not in need of anyone, I am writing you to say that we will put him on some other work and I will advise King Peter that Mr. Yarrow will be unable to go.

You are well aware that all we want to do is to be of such service as we can. I am taking this action now only because it seems that Yarrow cannot be used.

Already on August 16, 1944, a telegram was sent from Bari to Buxton and Shepardson from Wilson. The telegram follows:

Have just lunched with Tito and Subasitch. The latter urged me strongly to send Bernie Yarrow back to London. He said that he wanted the Americans to know in detail what he was doing and thinking. He liked Schoenfeld but the relation was not such that he could constantly confide in him and discuss problems with him. He urged that this be done at the earliest possible opportunity.

Sending Yarrow was of long making but Subasic insisted on it. On August 25, 1944 Charles S. Cheston of OSS wrote to Secretary Cordell Hull as follows:

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have just received from General Donovan (who is presently in London) the following message which he asked be sent to you from him:

"Subasic complained to me that all these weeks had passed and the promise to make Yarrow available to him had not been fulfilled. Shepardson has told me of his talk with Cannon last week. The situation however seems to me an urgent one not admitting of delay while further discussions take place concerning Yarrow's exact diplomatic status and where he shall be located. "Subasic is here and I believe Yarrow should be here also."⁵

Only on July 7, the ukaz for the appointment of other ministers was issued. Before that Subasic had been in charge of all cabinet posts. Tito was there at Vis after he escaped from Drvar. King Petar came with Subasic to meet Tito too but had to sun in Malta for the rest of his stay because Tito would not see him. British Secret Services and American OSS were in full escort of Subasic who on June 16 signed agreements with Tito as Tito wanted them.

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Subasic did not rush to see the King to submit the Agreements for approval so both of them travelled back to London their separate ways.

Whenever Anglo-Americans talked to anyone about war enterprises they always whispered to each other that they had better inform Stalin about them.

On October 27, 1944, Tito started to reign in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Subasic came with him to Belgrade and on November 1, 1944, they signed new agreements. Once more Subasic did not go back to London to inform his King but went to Moscow to talk to Stalin. In Stalin Subasic found one other keen soul and remained his admirer for the rest of his life.

But with Petar II, Yarrow had a more difficult time. By Christmas 1944, Petar II was in full rebellion against Anglo-American schemes opposing his running the Yugoslav affairs. Yarrow was doing his job, and early in December obtained a copy of a secret letter of Churchill's to Petar. As a trophy of his craftsmanship, Yarrow sent it to Washington where the letter was no more secret. Churchill, of course, was furious and said so to Donovan. Donovan gave instructions to Yarrow not to make such faux pas, and Yarrow had to curtail some of his activities in that direction.

Donovan's position was to be that much more enigmatic, the more that President Roosevelt remained aloof to most of the maneuvering of Winston Churchill in Yugoslav affairs. Roosevelt had his Serbians in Washington who were organizing a most ferocious campaign against Tito and were putting the stick in the wheel of American foreign policies in favor of Tito. Churchill by that time had sent most of the Serbians out of London and was talking to Subasic, and that was better than easy.

For so many years (1918-1941) the Serbs had kept Croats in slavery (killed Stjepan Radic); now we read how they scream like the serpent caught in the serpent trap.

On September 25, 1944, the former Yugo Ambassador in Washington Fotric sent to the Secretary of State the following:

Mr. Secretary:

On July 8, as Ambassador of Yugoslavia, I had the honor to draw your attention to the composition of the new Yugoslav government, formed in London on July 7 by Mr. Ivan Subasich as president of the Council of Ministers. In my letter I stated that this government does not represent the views of the great majority of the people of Yugoslavia, and that it does not include among its members one single Serb from Serbia, political leaders in exile, nor any true representative of the Serbian people, who number more than one-half of the population of Yugoslavia. I stated further that the

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fact "that the Serbs are not represented in this government shows beyond doubt that it is in opposition to the clearly expressed views of the Serbs, who have the right to feel that this government is directed against them".

Subsequent events and the acts of this government have amply confirmed the views I expressed in my letter.

For your information and for the record, I am sending you, Mr. Secretary, a list of the nominations and appointments made by the government of Mr. Subasich, which clearly show that his policy is directed against the Serbs by this wholesale removal of them from the diplomatic and consular posts of

Yugoslavia. Pursuing this policy, the government of Mr. Subasich has removed or dismissed all the Serbs from the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington, and the Consulates General in New York and Chicago, discharging most of them, without compensation, after many years of loyal service to their country.⁶

The Discharge and Transfer of Functionaries by the Subasitch Government

1. Dr. Ivan Soubotitch Minister Plenipotentiary
Delegate of. the Yugoslav Red Cross.....Discharged Serb
2. Mr. Miho Krek
Ambassador at Bari, Italy.....Discharged Slovenian
3. Mr. Jovan Djonovich
Minister in Algiers.....Pensioned Serb
4. Mr. Hadzi-Djordjevic
Minister to CairoPensioned Serb
5. Mr. V. Shaponjich
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs.....Pensioned Serb
6. Mr. Frano Cvjetisa
Minister to Rio de Janeiro.....Pensioned Croat
7. Mr. Oton Gavrilovich
Assistant Minister of Finance.....Pensioned Serb
8. Mr. Dragisha Stanoyevich
Consul General in New YorkPensioned Serb
9. Mr. Branko Denich
Director of Information in Cairo.....Discharged Serb
10. Mr. Radoye Nikolich
Charge d'Affaires in Ottawa.....Transferred Serb
11. Mr. Voyislav Mirkovich
Consul in ChicagoPensioned Serb

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12. Mr. Miloye Sokitch Former Member of Parliament Yugoslav Delegate for Information in United States.....Discharged Serb
13. Mr. George Radin
Delegate for Lend-Lease.....Discharged Serb
14. Mr. Franc Gabrovsek
Member of Delegation to the UNRRA.....Discharged Slovenian
15. Mr. Ratsko Petrovich
Secretary of the embassy — Washington . . Transferred Serb
16. Mr. Spasoye Yefremovich
Secretary of Embassy in Washington.....Transferred Serb
17. Dr. Bozidar Sarich
Secretary of Embassy in Washington.....Transferred Serb
18. Lt. Col. Zivan L. Knezevich
Military Attache.....Transferred Serb
19. Captain Borislav Todorovich
Assistant Military Attache in Washington . . Discharged Serb
20. Captain A. Vernazzi
Director of the Seamen's PoolDischarged Serb
21. Mr. Slavko Simich
Member of Delegation to the UNRRA.....Discharged Serb
22. Mr. Voyislav Nikolayevich
Member of Yugoslav Military Mission Discharged Serb
23. Mr. Dushan Obradovich
Clerk of Yugoslav Consulate in Chicago . . . Discharged Serb
24. Miss Ljubitsa Radonjich

Clerk of Consulate in ChicagoDischarged Serb
 25. Mrs. Mirjana Vujnovich
 Clerk of Embassy in Washington.....Discharged Serb
 26. Mrs. Rajko Ruzich
 Employee of Embassy in WashingtonDischarged Serb
 27. Mrs. Urosh Seferovich
 Clerk for the Delegate of Information.....Discharged Serb
 28. Mr. Leonidas Vodenlich
 Employee of Consulate General in New York Discharged Serb
 29. Mr. Petar Elakovich
 Employee of Consulate General in New York Discharged Serb
 30. Mrs. Ruza Trbovich
 Employee of Consulate General in New York Discharged Serb

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Nominations by the Subasitch Government

1. Josip Smolaka
 Ambassador to BariCroat [wrong]
 2. Iliya Jukich
 Ambassador to Paris.....Croat [wrong]
 3. Frano Petrinovich
 Delegate of Yugoslav Red Cross.....Croat [wrong?]
 4. Tomo Jancikovich
 Vice-Governor of the National BankCroat [wrong]
 5. Rudolf Bicanich
 Director of Reconstruction.....Croat [wrong]
 Member of the Council of UNRRA for Yugoslavia
 6. Mato Vucetich
 Director for Information in LondonCroat [wrong?]
 7. Mr. Kovacich
 Director of Seaman's Pool.....Croat [?]
 8. Mr. Matkovich
 Member of the Shipping Committee, New YorkCroat [?]
 9. Mr. Tomazeo
 Charge d'Affaires in Buenos Aires.....Croat [?]
 10. Srdjan Goce
 Secretary of Embassy, Washington.....Croat [Serb]
 11. Krsto Jadrijevic
 Clerk of Embassy, Washington.....Croat LYugo]
 12. Dr. Vladimir Rybar
 Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs.....Slovenian
 13. Mr. Stoyan Gavrilovich
 Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs.....Serb

Other Serbian Croatophobes resigned. OSS on July 15, 1944 filed the following aide-memoire.

YUGOSLAVIA: Announcement of Subasich Cabinet Precipitates Resignations

The following intelligence dated 14 July from a Yugoslav official in Cairo was transmitted by the OSS representative there:

The announcement of the new Subasich cabinet has been followed by a number of resignations of pan-Serbs in the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile.

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Among these are the Secretary Dujcinovich; Deputy Minister Saponich; Colonel Putnik, chief of staff of Yugoslav forces outside Yugoslavia; Colonel Kosta Simich; Colonel Mladin Zhujovich, former political advisor to Mihailovich and former delegate from Mihailovich to the Chetnik Father Djuich.

The resignations are reported to have taken place after receipt of the Fotich-Knezevich wire from Washington dated 10 July.

There is growing evidence that a pan-Serb combination for future resistance is being formed by Fotich, Purich, Knezevich, and Denich. Their reasoning and propaganda follow the current Nedich contention that the King is virtually a prisoner and that Subasich, being a Croat, does not represent the Serbs.

The Serbians, Fotic', were pulling the leg of the reader. He (they) knew better than anybody else how much the one Serbian position was more worthy than all Croatian positions. They had been masters from 1918-1941 and had absolute power. They tried to fool everybody by appointing some Croatian traitors to the lackey positions during that time of their satrapal supremacy.

Having a Slovenian and a Serbian appointed to the highest posts in the Bolshevik diplomacy and some Croats, hoi poloi, would hardly be a Croatomania. But for Fotic, (and all Serbians) even a Croatian fly in Bolshevik diplomacy would be an elephant. Since the beginning of Bolshevik Yugoslavia on October 20, 1945, all major posts in diplomacy were covered by Yugo Bolshies, most of them former Cetniks.

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade after March 7, 1945, there remained about 70 former Foreign Service officials. Since between 1918 and 1945 there were no Croats in the Ministry it means that all these 70 were Serbians.

The situation suffered from St. Vitus dance sickness: the Serbian Camarilla wanted to play games with (Yugo) Bolsheviks and win. That was insane. Nobody who plays (played) with Bolsheviks wins or has won.

Churchill had for some time already played with the situation of Royal Regents for Yugoslavia. It is to mention at this moment that the idea of Royal Regents has obscure origins. According to Petar, it was Subasic who was the originator of the idea and he intended to make himself a Regent. It was the Croatian hybrid member among the Croats of the Yugo government in London, Juraj Sutej, who said so to Petar. When Petar told that to Churchill, Churchill acted surprised. Was Churchill surprised or not nobody has ever said. However, it has to be pointed out that the idea of regents was a skillful strategy to deprive Petar of all little power left in his

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hand and to make it brilliantly easy for Tito to snatch for his Bolsheviks all power left with the ghost Government and ghost King in London. If it really was not Churchill who came to the idea of the regents, it probably was Tito, and since Tito was not a skillful idea man (he was a skillful itinerant, nomadic, gypsy-like locksmith) one must think that it was someone in his entourage. It has not yet been revealed by any Yugo Commie who was the creator of ideas in the Tito camp.

As the obstacles in the affair of the Royal Regents were piling up, the little Petar was more and more under the stick of his mother-in-law As-pasia. She arranged for him to see his godfather, King George VI, at Buckingham Palace on December 14, 1944. Yarrow sent his report which Donovan sent to the President.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

General Donovan has forwarded the following message which he asked be sent to you:

"I talked with Subasic on Monday (21 August 1944) and he told me the following:

" 'On August 20 I had a conversation with Adam Pribicevic, Vice President of Draga Mihailovic's Committee. When Pribicevic asked for my help to stop the Partisans' fight against the Chetniks, which is now raging with full intensity and when he asked me whether we could bring about a reconciliation between the Partisans and the Chetniks, I answered:

" ' "The King and the Royal Government cannot decree an agreement between you and the Partisans. You are in the country. You are Vice President of Mihailovic's political body. Only you and your collaborators in the committee can be the active factors bringing about such a reconciliation. I can do no more than what is in my power and that is to advise you, as political factors in this part of Serbia, to give an open declaration, in which you summon the people to turn their weapons around and direct them against the real enemy, and to fight against him. In this case, every one of them will see in the Partisans comrades-inarms fighting the same enemy. If you wish to fight the Partisans as Communists

— conscious of the fact that they are sons of our nation — and to this end, accept, the help and collaboration of the Germans, you cannot expect anything from the King, the Royal Government, or the Allies."

'Pribecevic asked me to arrange a meeting with Topalovic for him. He promised to send me a memorandum on such a meeting, should it take place. I intervened at Allied Headquarters in this respect. Also, I

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promised to send him the answer of myself and the Royal Government to his proposals and asked him, after this, immediately to return to the country and to carry out our desires and suggestions. Should he and Topalovic be ready to do this, then the Royal Government would do its best to help them in their endeavors. I emphasized that I had obtained from Tito that he should issue in his declaration a summons to all people in Yugoslavia, including the Chetniks, to join the liberation fight.

I think that the Pribecevic-Topalovic meeting is probably taking place while I am writing this memorandum, and that they will soon leave for the country.' "

There has also been received from our representative in Bern the following report which is of direct relevance to matters covered in General Donovan's talk with Subasic:

During the second week of August, 1944, Hermann Neubacher, German special plenipotentiary for the Balkan area, is reported to have made the following comments on Mihailovich and the political situation in Yugoslavia:

German intelligence from Mihailovich's camp indicates that the Chetnik movement has widened and is now a more important factor than ever in the Yugoslav situation. The influence of Nedich, Prime Minister of occupied Yugoslavia, has declined to such an extent that he has been supplanted in Serb Nationalists' eyes by Mihailovich, who now has practically full control of the political situation in Serbia. Among Mihailovich's followers there is increasing animosity toward the British who, it is felt, have betrayed the Chetniks by supporting and arming the Partisans. In addition, the Chetniks are uneasy over possible political developments in the Balkans consequent on the deterioration of the German military position, the Russian advances, and the obscure situation in Bulgaria.

Some of Mihailovich's old followers now consider that it is imperative to alter the movement's attitude toward the invaders and to protect Serbia from attack from beyond its borders. The position of those Chetniks who advocate cooperation with the Germans is strengthened by the fact that the latter may soon be forced to evacuate Serbia. This would be the signal for a show-down engagement between the Communists and the Nationalists. Mihailovich therefore probably intends to cooperate with the German Army while it is still in Serbia, in order to lessen the effectiveness of Tito's Partisans. By emphasizing the common fight against Communism, Mihailovich would obtain as many weapons as possible from the Germans. He feels that he will then be able to take over

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the German positions easily when the German army leaves. Informal negotiations between Mihailovich and the Germans are said to have been initiated, and may possibly be followed by an official conference at a later date.

German authorities in Croatia are reliably reported to be complaining of the increasing number of successful supply drops to Tito's Partisans. Among others, General Kammerhofer is said to have asserted that the Partisans now have better armament and there is successful delivery of heavy guns and their parts, artillery, ammunition, shoes, and uniforms. Kammerhofer also complained that he had recently lost five tanks in a few hours due to Partisan use of the latest type of anti-tank gun. It is believed in some German quarters that Tito's forces are receiving parts for tanks, several of which have already been assembled.⁷

Ill Petar

On December 14, 1944, Petar went to see King George VI at Buckingham Palace. His godfather, Yarrow, sent the following report to Donovan which Donovan gave to the President:

The following is a report which we have just received from Mr. Bernard Yarrow describing conversations which he has had with the King of Yugoslavia and the Prime Minister:

"On Wednesday September 27, I saw the King. He gave me a warm welcome and spent an hour with me chatting about the present situation. He told me that he regrets to say that his own mother is working against him by lending support to some Serbian political leaders who are trying to undermine his authority by criticizing his conduct and charging him with neglecting the Serbian people. He expressed satisfaction about the appointment of Ristich, an old Serbian General, as Minister of War. He told me further that Winston Churchill sent a sizzling telegram to Tito telling him in effect that the British Government has sent supplies and arms to Tito to fight the enemy and not to fight his own people. The King also said that this cable which was of a challenging tone and the sharpest yet delivered to Tito was provoked by a certain note sent by Tito to Churchill. Two days later this alleged cable by Churchill to Tito was confirmed by Subasic independently and without any questioning on my part. Subasic told me that Tito sent a cable to Churchill protesting vehemently against assistance rendered by the British to certain Chetniks in Switzerland and to other acts of assistance to

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Mihailovich. Subasic further informed me that Churchill sent to Tito a reply in which he rebuked him sharply for using arms and ammunition supplied by the British Government to fight the Yugoslav people instead of fighting the enemy."⁸

Yarrow reports that Petar was told by his godfather, King George, that he could not help him because it was the Government's policy and that thus he, Petar, must make his own decision. To be sure, King George told him that nobody could compel him to sign the agreement if he does not wish to sign. But he warned him that Churchill was in the habit of making a thorough study of every state matter and that that was one of his many babies.

After the failure of his step with the King of the United Kingdom, Petar went to see his uncle, King George II of Greece. Before Petar could open his heart, the Greek told Petar that Churchill had asked him to his house and talked to him from 10 o'clock at night to 5 o'clock in the morning, and that he had weakened and given in and that he wished Petar better luck. Petar boldly answered that he was younger and would hold firm.

In fact, Petar did become bolder and bolder because of American support from Washington. Petar or somebody for him became angry when Churchill demanded that he accept the Regency as agreed in Tito-Subasic's agreements. Petar, in a letter on December 29, 1944, rejected flatly Churchill's request that he accept the Regency. Subasic said that all Petar's papers in that period had been written by Slobodan Jovanovic.

Petar's resolution to fight Churchill went so far that he sent on January 1, 1945, the letter himself to King George VI with a note. He gave a copy to Yarrow. The letter follows:

Dear Uncle Bertie,

First, let me say again, on behalf of Sandra and myself, all my good wishes to you and Aunt Elizabeth and the girls for a very Happy New Year.

I am sending you a copy of a letter I wrote to Mr. Churchill. Please help me to make him understand my point of view. I cannot act against my oath to the Constitution. I know this is right and wise and will avoid a lot of trouble in the future, and will safeguard my people from untold miseries. I feel very hurt at the moment as it does not look as if I am given a fair chance just now.

I did not bargain in the dark days of 1941, when I came in on this side unhesitatingly.

I stood by our traditional friend, Great Britain, it is only right that Great Britain should stand fairly by me now. On my side, all my life, I will try to

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be worthy of their friendship and trust in me.

I am sending you also a copy of Dr. Krnjevic's letter to Mr. Churchill.

With Love. Peter⁹

Yarrow did not mention the woes of Petar II with his mother. As usual the bickerings at the Serbian Court were of a financial nature. They never discussed anything more than finances. Petar II had problems especially with his father, Aleksandar.

Aleksandar was the richest man in Europe, a most glamorous achievement, since, in 1903, when his father had the Serbian King Aleksandar Obrenovic assassinated with his Queen, the "hog dynasty" did

not possess anything besides their hogs. At the time of his assassination in Marseille on October 9, 1934, Aleksandar had with him the keys to his vault in the Swiss bank in which his will was deposited with other unknown contents. The keys were never found and nobody can open the vault in Switzerland in which is deposited his last will disposing of his residuary estate. French confidential sources have revealed that among others Aleksandar was the owner of more than half of the shares of the Parisian Metro.

Petar was in a very desperate state of mind: no money from his father's vault in the bank in Switzerland and now the Communists were menacing to confiscate all of his estate in Yugoslavia. His mother, a Romanian princess and thus through her German ancestors some kind of a niece of Queen Victoria, was told by her cousin King George VI that the Communists would not confiscate royal estates in Yugoslavia if King Petar II makes agreements with them. The Communists knew that in the referendum, on the constitutional form of the Bolshevik Yugoslavia, King Petar will be voted out but still they were ready to have the royal family enjoy their rich estates in the Bolshevik state. But if the King would not come to the agreements, all and everything would be confiscated i.e., the properties of the King and his brothers and of dowager Queen, Marie of Romania.

King Petar tergiversated because of the push of the Serbian hegemonists, but the Queen dowager Marie did not talk to them, despised them and was eager to keep her properties in Bolshevik Yugoslavia.

Hence her rift with the son, the King.

It is right to mention at this moment that Donovan had no troubles with Subasic whatsoever. Subasic was so imbued with his idea to save the state of Yugoslavia that he needed no prompting from any side. Donovan on his side was so much blindfolded by Churchill in putting all American resources for his purpose available that there was no need to prompt Donovan

in that direction. Ivan Subasic', the Croatian Catholic, and William J. Donovan, the Irish American Catholic, were putting together a Communist Yugoslavia better and with more enthusiasm than any Bolshevik would do it.

Subasic was appointed Prime Minister by King Petar on June 1. He did not prepare any proposals to the King for other Ministers in his Government and he became Minister for every department in his administration, ten or more, — whatever it was. He made the oath as Prime Minister and then the oath for each individual Ministry. The poor Catholic priest who administered the oaths had to listen to those perjuries so many times. Already on June 13, Subasic was on the island Vis in the Croatian Adriatic sea to meet Tito. They signed the Tito-Subasic Agreement on June 16, 1944.

Tito accepted this horseplay because Churchill asked him to do so, but as a peasant, experienced horseplayer with the dupes in the Free World, he knew that he would win the play and that he would appoint the Regents and have it his way.

Petar, on the other hand, wanted it his way, or whoever for him: to remain King without regents. But he had no power whatsoever, and for the past two years, according to his confessions, Churchill was running him and thus all Yugo ghost Governments in London. Churchill was determined to have the Regents as agreed by Subasic and Tito. To Petar, he said to pack his bags if he would not obey.

According to what is known about Yarrow's relations with Petar, it must be concluded that Petar did not sense that Yarrow was not the tool of American diplomacy in Washington ready to help him, to some extent, against British diplomacy. It is namely puzzling that he was putting his cards on the table before Yarrow so openly and blatantly which he definitely would not do if he knew that Yarrow was the tool of the Operation Shepherd that was to help Subasic and Tito in their endeavors to out-manuever the King in his opposition to their Agreement, especially as far as the famous establishment of the Regency which should rule in his name. It meant that from the moment Petar would accept the Regency and the Regents would be appointed by him, his royal prerogatives would cease. He was young and not a brilliant mind but that much even Petar could comprehend.

By January 5, 1945, Petar was in the clear that the British would compel him to accept their agreements and he said so to Yarrow.

After he saw the British Ambassador to his Court, Ralph Stevenson, he sent a new letter to Churchill reiterating his refusal to sign the agreement.

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So much did Petar and the mother-in-law Aspasia believe in Yarrow as a tool of American diplomacy that they went to see the Yarrows at their flat. Petar wanted to ask President Roosevelt to press on Churchill that he could not sign the Agreements which would bring an end to his reign.

Yarrow now had to put his cards on the table and to declare to Petar that he was not in position to transmit any message to anybody in Washington, but more to it, there was nothing to be changed because President Roosevelt had decided not to intervene, and the American Ambassador in London to Petar's Court had instructions for the King to sign the Agreements.

But London was no more the battlefield where the destinies of Yugoslavia were being forged. It was in Belgrade by the hands of the reigning ruler Red Marshal Josip Broz Tito. Tito let it be known that he would not wait longer, that "King Petar is a fool."

Churchill did not think much of these shenanigans of the youngster and on January 8, 1945 wrote a minute as follows:

To-day at 3.15 I shall see Dr. Subasic. At the Cabinet later the Foreign Secretary and I will propose that the arrangement suggested by Tito with Russian backing should be accepted for what it is worth by King Peter. It must be understood that this gives him a very poor chance of ever seeing his native land again, whether as King or subject. All the same, it is the best chance he has, and the arrangement preserves the principles of the Monarchy.

2. Thereafter, if the Cabinet agree, we will, on Tuesday, of this week, see King Peter and tell him that he must agree to the appointment, of a Regency. If he refuses everything will take place without him, and we shall have to recognize whatever government Tito sets up, and cease to recognize King Peter II. The King would therefore be wise to preserve the monarchical theme and keep in the picture.

I am sorry about all this, but I can do no more.¹⁰

On January 9, 1945, Churchill sent for Petar and talked to him in the presence of Ambassador Stevenson and Sir Orme Sargent. With his moderate ways of telling things to Petar, he advised the King that if he continues to sabotage the talks, they were ready to continue to deal with Tito, who could proclaim a Republic and put an end to the Dynasty. When Petar asked Churchill about going to Yugoslavia, Churchill answered: "Your Majesty, if you should go back to Yugoslavia, you would be compelled to sign many death warrants at Tito's request, and if you should refuse to sign

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them you would find that within twenty-four hours your own name would be added to the list."

One must have pity for the Serbian royal youngster. His advisers did not tell him that Yarrow was a member of the terrorist OSS organization and that Josip Broz Tito was a British Agent. They did not even tell him much about Churchill who said to him that the Big Three would not lift one finger or sacrifice one man to put any king back on any throne in Europe. If Petar could not understand it, Aspasia and the numerous Serbian Camarilla should have understood. But there was no need of Aspasia or of the Serbian Camarilla to tell him anything; Anthony Eden said to him, "Unfortunately, you are surrounded in London with incompetent politicians who indeed are of little assistance to you. Why don't they go to Yugoslavia, to carry on their political activities there?"

Petar jumped to the skies in rage and declared that he would not sign any agreement which meant that the Tito-Subasic Agreements were terminated. In the midst of this atmosphere of high tensions, Petar sent to Tito a telegram, a copy of which Yarrow sent to Donovan.

As Churchill who told to Petar that a Constitutional Monarch must always take the advice of his Ministers, Tito also gave his lecture to Petar by telling him that he would receive messages only through the Yugoslav Government.

Even the flippy floppy Yarrow was taken by surprise, and, full of exasperation, sent a telegram to Donovan that the British were sending the Yugoslav Government home and giving Subasic their full support with or without the consent of Petar.

All Yugoslavs in London, 200 of them, changed allegiance from Petar to Tito and in one snap of the finger declared themselves ready to go to Belgrade and help the Bolshevik cause. Subasic put guards through the corridor of Kensington House to prevent Petar from forming a new Yugoslav Government and from taking possession of the building. His mother called Subasic, denounced Petar, and demanded that he abdicate in favor of his brother. Petar clung to Yarrow and implored him to call for the help of the President and of Donovan. A real Greek tragedy.

On January 19, 1945, the Foreign Office sent to Washington the following:

The Secretary of State has enquired what names he can mention of prominent members of pre-war Yugoslav political parties who have rallied to Tito's Movement and who are represented in his Administration.

We recently asked Brigadier Maclean for such a list of people who have given their support to Tito which he has supplied in his telegram No. 25, of

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which a copy is attached. On the whole, this list is not particularly impressive, but it must be remembered that the leading Yugoslav politicians in 1941 left Yugoslavia with the then Yugoslav Government and rallied to it before Mihailovic or Tito were heard of.

The following names might, however, be mentioned:

Serbs. (1) Doctor Vukosavljevic, now a member of Doctor Subasic's Government.

(2) Doctor Belie (one of the proposed Regents), who is President of the Serbian Royal Academy and one of the most distinguished Serbian scholars.

(3) Doctor Dukanac, a prominent member of the Serbian Democratic Party (designated as Minister of Finance in the United Yugoslav Government).

Croats. (1) Doctor Ivan Ribar, President of AVNOJ and a prominent member of the Serbian Democratic Party.

(2) Doctor Ante Mandic (one of the proposed Regents), a member of the Yugoslav Committee in the last war.

Slovenes. (1) Doctor Marusic, a member of Doctor Subasic's Government and a former Ban of Slovenia.

(2) Doctor Dushan Sernec (one of the proposed Regents), an ex-Ban of Slovenia and a friend of King Alexander.

All the above names are beyond reproach but it might be unwise to mention any of the other persons included in the list in Belgrade telegram No. 25, since it might be claimed by Yugoslavs in this country that they are not really important or representative. It could, however, be stated in addition that a number, of well-known Serbian, Croat and Slovene professors and professional men have also rallied to Tito's Movement.¹¹

The FO document of January 9, 1945, gives more data about personalities on the spot in the Bolshevik Yugo empire:

Prominent figures in pre-war Yugoslavia who have joined the Partisans.

A. Serbs. Following well known Serbs have joined within the last few weeks. Dr. Aleksander Belie President of Serbian Academy and the most distinguished scholar in Serbia. Jasa Prodanovic well known Serb politician and leader of Republicans. Dr. Dukanac prominent leader of the Democrat party. His son is also an active leader of the Partisan movement. A group of Belgrade University professors including Professor Djordje Djordjevic, Professor J. Nedjelkovic, Dr. Vasa Cubrilovic. Many representative writers and poets including Isidora Sekulic head of Serb Authors Association, Djuro Gavella and Marko Ristic. Leaders of Cooperative and Trade Union Movements including Milorad Belie formerly a

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supporter of Zivko Topalovic Lazar Stefanovic and Miladin Mihajlovic. Many prominent businessmen and professional men such as Dr. Milan Prelic the legal authority and Dr. Mladen Josifovic the agricultural expert. Following prominent Serbs have been identified with the movement over long period of time: Dr. Vladimir Ribnikar owner of Politika, Vlada Zecevic Orthodox priest and member

of various Anglo-Yugoslav societies. (Zecevic was formerly Cetnik leader who came over to the Partisans in 1941 and is now Minister of Interior) Dr. Ivan Ribar formerly President of Assembly Vlada Dedijer formerly London correspondent of Politika, General Ris. . . formerly General in Yugoslav army Dr. Sreten Vukosavljevic now a member of Dr. Subasic's cabinet.

B. Croats. M. Rittig vicar of St. Marks Church Zagreb, Vladimir Nazor well known poet, Dr. I. Mandic formerly member of Yugoslav committee in the last war, Mladen Ivekovic formerly secretary of Zagreb Chamber of Commerce Franjo Frol formerly civil servant and leader of Croat Peasant Party. Autun Augustincic well known Croat sculptor, Dr. Zlatan Sremec Croat Peasant Party leader and Public Health expert, Dr. Branko Zlataric formerly economic expert of Croat Peasant Party, Dr. Ilija Jakovlevic formerly editor of Peasant Party daily newspaper, Dr. Josip Smodlaka formerly Yugoslav Minister and noted Anglophil now Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Catholic Bishop of Hvar one of the leading prelates in Dalmatia.

C. Slovenes. Josip Vidmar foremost literary critic of Slovenia, Edward Kocbek leader of Christian Socialist, Tomsk Faifer organiser of the Christian Socialist Trades Union, Dr. Krzisnik formerly President of the Supplies Administration, Courtier Dr. Dusan Sernec ex Ban and friend of the late King Alexander, Dr. Marusic ex Ban and now member of Dr. Subasic's cabinet, Dr. Josif Rus a leader of the Slovene Sokol movement.

D. Moslems. Of leading Moslems most prominent are Sulejman Fili-povic formerly Colonel in the Croatian Domobran now Commissar for [grp. undec.]s and poets Skender Kulenovic and Avdo Humo. Huska the well known and universally respected musket brigand unfortunately met his end shortly after joining the Partisans early last year.

2. Former statesmen now thoroughly compromised by collaboration with the enemy includes.

A. General Nedic and all who held office under him such as Tasa Dinic Dusan Djordjevic etc., some of whom have already been executed.

B. Pavelic and all his supporters including renegades from Croat Peasant Party such as Tortic and Toth as well as professed Ustashi.

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C. The majority of the old Moslem Party, including its leaders, the Kulenovic brothers who have supported Pavelic;

D. General Rupnik and the greater part of the old Slovene Clerical Party leaders.

E. The Partisans also regard as hopelessly compromised all Mihailo-vic's political advisers such as Moljevic Vasic and Topalovic together with Dr. Macek and the remnants of the Croat Peasant party in Zagreb such as Pernar Farolfi and Reberski.

3. As indicated in my telegram 79 of December 22nd, there are very few former political leaders who do not come under one or other of the above categories. Possible exceptions are Kosutic of the Croat Peasant party who made advances to the Partisans but was eventually rejected by them (see my telegram 45 December 13th) and Dragoljub Jovanovic the Left Wing Serb [gp. undec. ? Partisan] leader, whose party has mainly been incorporated in the Partisan movement, while he himself has not been admitted.

4. As most of the above proper names will doubtless arrive corrupt I am sending a confirmatory copy by bag soonest.¹²

The events had echo in the British public life. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden published the following letter:

Sir,

KING PETER of Yugoslavia came to see me this afternoon, having heard that I had intervened this morning to prevent the issue of his declaration to the press, a copy of which is attached hereto.

2. The King explained that it was in any case now too late for him to withhold the declaration from the British press, since he had already given it to two American correspondents.

3. I told him frankly that I feared that this public announcement, especially at this stage of the proceedings, would seriously endanger the whole of the Tito-Subasic Agreement. It would give Tito, if he wanted it, an opportunity of publicly repudiating the agreement, and such a public clash would seriously endanger the King's own future prospects in Yugoslavia. I called his particular attention to

two statements in the declaration which I considered particularly unfortunate. The first was the sentence in which he complained of the formation of the Regency, and the second was where he expressed his wish to pay a visit to Marshal Stalin.

4. As regards the first, I asked him whether he really meant that he was opposed to the creation of a Regency in all circumstances. If this was so the whole of the Tito-Subasic Agreement would collapse, since it was based

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entirely on the idea of a Regency. If, on the other hand, he merely objected to the form of the Regency or the manner in which it was appointed, then this was a matter which might be discussed. Although the King did not disguise the fact that he really was opposed to the whole idea of a Regency, he said that in drafting his declaration he had only had in mind to object to the manner in which it was to be set up. I suggested that in that case, if it were not too late, he would be well advised to alter the wording of this sentence, as at present it gave an entirely false impression.

5. As regards the reference to Marshal Stalin, I pointed out that such a proposal thrown out in this way in a public statement would almost certainly invite a rebuff, which would similarly be given full publicity.

6. The King held out no hope during the interview of being able to make any alterations in his declaration, but subsequently he wrote me a letter saying that he had been able to do so as he had been able to get into contact with the American correspondents before they had telegraphed his declaration in its original form to America. As amended, the declaration states that the King objects not to the formation but to the form of the Regency, and instead of expressing a wish to see Marshal Stalin merely says that he has a high regard for the Marshal.

I am, &c. ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure.

Communique.

THE Chancellery of the Royal Yugoslav Court, in connexion with the present Yugoslav situation, has issued the following communique:—

King Peter II of Yugoslavia has closely studied the draft agreement prepared by Dr. Subasic, Prime Minister of the Royal Yugoslav Government, and by Marshal Tito, President of the National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia, for a solution of pending problems. Faithful to the democratic traditions of his forefathers, King Peter II approves the basic proposals laid down in the draft agreement and its amendments, whereby the future Constitution and the form of Government of his country shall be determined solely by the free decision of the peoples of Yugoslavia. The King will accept such a decision, but, as a Constitutional Monarch, it is his sacred duty to see to it that the people shall be consulted and their freely expressed will given full respect. The King of Yugoslavia wholeheartedly welcomes the interest with which the Great Allied Nations envisage the reorganisation of post-war Europe on the basis of the freely recorded will of its peoples. He fully agrees with their established policy that the widest possible group-

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ing of democratic parties and movements from the Left to the Right, is the only guarantee of a really free expression of the popular will. He is deeply convinced that the same path must be followed in his own country, and even more so than in other countries, where the population is more homogeneous. In consequence His Majesty has raised two essential objections to the agreement in its present form. The first concerns the suggested formation of the Regency, and the second the provisions of Article 2 of the Amendment by which the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation would wield unrestricted legislative power until the Constituent Assembly *had finished* its work. This suggests a transfer of power in Yugoslavia to a single political group. King Peter believes, on the contrary, that the setting up of an all-party Government comprising every political movement would furnish the sole valid guarantee for a new and better future in the country to which he hopes shortly to return. King Peter, who brought his country into this war on the side of the Great Allies, like the whole population of Yugoslavia, has followed with the keenest sympathy and admiration the magnificent prowess of the Russian armies under Marshal Stalin. Fraternity with Russia is the basic sentiment of the Slav peoples,

and the King would welcome an opportunity to confer directly with Marshal Stalin, whose name has meant so much to the people in their heroic resistance.¹³

The U.S. Ambassador John Winant in London on January 11, 1945 filed with the Secretary of State the following telegram:

Yesterday King Peter talked to me at length about his conversation January 9 with Churchill and later Stevenson called to inform me about this and Churchill's previous talk with Subasic. Eden and Stevenson were with Churchill on both occasions. Principal points of interest made by King and/or Stevenson are as follows:

At Monday's meeting, Churchill showed Subasic the King's letters regarding unconstitutionality of proposed regency and interim legislative power for Avnoj. Eden had studied latter question and was impressed by King's views. Subasic replied that King under the constitution would appoint regents under article 116, second paragraph of which required all acts done under the article to be validated later; and it was clear that acts of Avnoj were subject to confirmation by the duly elected legislative body. Churchill remarked it was pity Subasic had not made this clear in the agreement nor to the King. Subasic replied he had not seen King in three weeks. He said that on his return to Yugoslavia he would try to broaden Avnoj by including in it some members of the pre-war Parliament.

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British cabinet discussed Yugoslav problem Monday evening and decided Churchill should advise King to sign agreement.

King Peter was pleased at his friendly reception by Churchill and Eden on Tuesday. Churchill earnestly advised King to sign agreement adding: "But I am not a Yugoslav. You know your people best. It is for you to decide." When King raised his objection to legislative power for Avnoj Eden brought up proposal to add to Avnoj some members of old Parliament and said he thought agreement should be changed to this effect.

King then said he wanted to choose his regents at which Churchill barked: "You cannot choose them yourself. As a constitutional monarch you must always take the advice of your Ministers" and proceeded to give King a short lecture on constitutional monarchy.

Churchill added emphatically: "The three great powers will not lift one finger nor sacrifice one man to put any King back on any throne in Europe." He said that if Peter went back to Yugoslavia Tito would ask him to sign many death warrants. If he refused his life would be in danger.

Churchill then spoke of his desire that liberated peoples have full and fair chance to choose their own Government. He was thinking of making proposals to Stalin and Roosevelt regarding methods of ensuring honest plebiscites — perhaps along lines of an international trust which he mentioned in Athens. But he thought King Peter might have a better chance of returning if decision were made by assembly rather than plebiscite. He also said that Tito would need King's help in many ways and want him for the peace conference. If the King signed he would retain his constitutional position. If he refused he would be by-passed and left "isolated and impotent."

Churchill asked King to give him prompt decision — a yes or no, or else state he could not make up his mind.

After conference with Churchill Eden offered to give King friendly help. He said he thought the King had too many incompetent advisers living in London on Yugoslav pensions. If they wanted to engage in politics they should go back to Yugoslavia.

Stevenson saw Subasic yesterday and asked him what he would do if King does not sign. Subasic replied that it depended on how King expressed his refusal; that he would either go back to Belgrade as Premier and try to effect changes or else resign.¹⁴

On January 13, 1945, the U.S. Ambassador to the Yugo Government Richard C. Patterson, Jr., in London sent to the Secretary of State the following letter:

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Referring to my telegram No. 10 of January 12, I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a letter which the Yugoslav Prime Minister sent to King Peter II yesterday concerning the King's press communique of January 11, 1945, text of which was transmitted in my telegram No. 7 of that date. I am also enclosing a copy of a statement of Dr. Subasic's views on the communique which he said had been prepared for the British and American Governments and approved by his Cabinet. He asked

me to transmit it to the Department, and said that although he would not send a copy to the King, the statement would form the basis for his forthcoming discussions with King Peter. Apparently the statement was hastily drafted and the fourth paragraph is particularly obscure in wording. In my conversation with him yesterday Dr. Subasic showed that he had been working under considerable strain and that he was much disturbed by King Peter's failure to consult him for the past three weeks. He expressed great confidence, however, that a way can be found to meet the King's objections to the Tito-Subasic agreement.

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 16, Yugoslav Series, dated January 13, 1945, from London
January 12th, 1945 Your Majesty,

I take the liberty to express my satisfaction at Your Majesty's decision to accept the Agreement which I have concluded with the National Committee of Yugoslavia in Belgrade on November 1st, 1944. As the authentic interpreter of this Agreement, I believe and am sure that the objections raised by your Majesty in your statement last night to the American and British Press can be resolved quickly and without difficulties.

Therefore, I beg to request Your Majesty to grant me an audience at the earliest possible convenience. Your Majesty's respectfully,

(signed) Dr. Ivan Subasic

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 16, Yugoslav Series, dated January 13, 1945, from London

The statement which was issued last night by His Majesty the King can be considered as satisfactory as far as its text runs. It really shows that the

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King accepts the Agreement which was concluded with Marshal Tito on the occasion of my last visit to Yugoslavia.

The King makes two "essential objections" to the terms of this Agreement. One of his objections concerns the "form" of the Regency. The other refers to the Anti-Fascist Council of Liberation and expresses his concern that it "will wield unrestricted legislative power until the Constituent Assembly *has finished* its work".

As regards His Majesty's first objection, it is not clear what is actually meant by the "form" of the Regency. If it refer to the "composition" of the Regency, it would not seem to be an objection at all. The agreement provides for a Regency which must enjoy the full confidence of the King; it must be formed in agreement with both the Committee of National Liberation and the Royal Yugoslav Government which, in the last resort, means the King. Moreover, the arrangements which have been proposed to His Majesty concerning the future Regents suggest the most suitable personalities, all of whom belong to the circles of distinguished pre-war members of these very groups which had been close to the Court; one of them having been even a member of the King's Household. His Majesty should indeed be very pleased that such personalities have been proposed. If, on the other hand, His Majesty has something else in mind — and I am at a loss to see what it could be, considering that the principle of Regency has been accepted long ago — I would be grateful to know what it is.

As matters the second observation, it is completely unfounded. There appears to be an error in the second paragraph of the text of the Amendment to the aforesaid Agreement, in which it is said that "the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia will wield the legislative power until the Constituent Assembly will have completed its task". The * words "will have completed its task" should be deleted, for it is obvious that as soon as the elections for the Constituent Assembly are announced, every other legislative body in the country must *ipso facto* cease its function and be actually dissolved. Any laws that may have been enacted by the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation until the elections to the Constituent Assembly, as well as all agreements concluded by Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic, be subjected to the Constituent Assembly for ratification.

H.M. King Peter, when speaking about the Anti-Fascist Council further seems to look upon it as "a single political group". This does not correspond to facts. On the contrary, the Anti-Fascist Council is composed not only of all the peoples, but also of all the political parties of Yugoslavia, just like the National Liberation Army and Movement. There is, besides, a

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tendency aiming at the enlargement of the Anti-Fascist Council by means of the subsequent inclusion of further Members from among political representatives "from the Left to the Right" such as have been elected in pre-war times to various legislative bodies in Yugoslavia, — insofar, of course, as these persons have not compromised themselves by any collaboration with the enemy during the war. Accordingly, His Majesty's "objections" are really tantamount to his acceptance of the Agreement, and there is no reason whatever why the Agreement should not be carried into full effect at once.

The only difficult point in regard to King Peter's statement is really of a purely formal nature: the King has published His views concerning the Agreement without previous consultation with His Government. Had the King consulted His Government, he would have avoided all the rumours to which His statement has given rise and which are not to the advantage either of Yugoslavia or of her Great Allies at the present moment. He would also have avoided the doubts which such a way of acting on His part must inevitably cause as to his observance of well-established constitutional practices. The whole political struggle in Yugoslavia is centered upon the very problem of the observance of these constitutional principles.

As regards myself, I have before me only the great national aim, for which I and my Government have stood throughout the last seven difficult months in working for the internal unity and external stability of Yugoslavia, and the interest of both the Yugoslav peoples and the common Allied cause. No personal sacrifice — whether it be my own or anybody else's — can be allowed to stand in the way of those great interests, and I am firmly resolved to continue — within the limits of my possibilities — calmly and patiently to serve this high purpose to the end.

Following is a copy of Petar's letter to Eden:

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Jan. 15th 45. Dear Mr. Eden,

Since I saw you this afternoon, I saw Dr. Subasic and General Velebit. I gave them both my counter proposals for the agreement which can be discussed and even altered [sic].

From the trend of my conversation with general Velebit I gathered [sic] that I could express through him wish to meet Marshall Tito soon.

I also asked Dr. Subasic to put my suggestions for the agreement to his colleagues.¹⁶

Very sincerely yours Peter II R.

On January 16, 1945, FO studied the problem and Sir O. Sargent gave an outline of recent developments in the Yugoslav political situation. Monsieur Subasic had returned to this country some weeks ago, but the King of Yugoslavia had taken no steps to see him. He had, however, called at the Foreign Office and, after full consideration of the Tito-Subasic Agreement, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had seen King Peter and had advised him to accept it. As was known, King Peter had subsequently published a declaration making certain reservations, without consultation either with his own Prime Minister or with H.M. Government. This action had of course given Tito an opportunity to back out of the Agreement if he wished to do so, and latest reports from Belgrade showed that a number of anti-monarchist demonstrations had in fact taken place there. So far, however, Tito had himself abstained from any overt action against the King.

Meanwhile, King Peter had now seen his own Prime Minister and persisted in making certain reservations to his acceptance of the Tito-Subasic Agreement. The exact scope of these reservations was not entirely clear, but it was evident that he wished to preserve his own royal prerogatives.

Diplomats are people and like other people they can be funny. See the following telegram of Ambassador Kirk to the Secretary of State:

MacMillan said last evening that he had just been informed that the Foreign Office was instructing Halifax to inform Department of British position with regard to Tito-Subasic agreement since recent declaration of King Peter. He stated that he gathered from message he had received that Foreign Office was preparing to "throw over" King Peter. He added that Halifax had been told to tell us politely that it was all very well and good for United States to stall on Yugoslav situation, but that British Govern-

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ment was obliged to take a definite position and could not afford to take same "waffling" [office note: Scottish, for waving or fluttering] line as the State Department.¹⁷

Eden sent Petar the following:

January 17th 1945.

I have received Your Majesty's letter of January 15th in which you were good enough to inform me that you had seen Dr. Subasic and General Velebit and had given them your counter proposals relating to the Tito-Subasic Agreement.

(Sd.) ANTHONY EDEN

His Majesty

King Peter of Yugoslavia.¹⁸

On January 20, 1945, Stevenson wrote to FO:

I saw Dr. Subasic and General Velebit this morning. General Velebit in my presence handed to Dr. Subasic the reply from Marshal Tito to the General's telegram reporting his audience with the King and the King's message.

This reply is as was to be expected, a resounding snub for King Peter. From the rough translation which Dr. Subasic read out to me, the telegram seemed to be more or less to the following effect:— Marshal Tito commended General Velebit's action in reporting his audience and in refraining from sending the King's message as a message. Marshal Tito declines to deal directly with the King. He urges that the agreement be put into force as it is, and stigmatises the King's action in seeking to delay its carrying out as dictatorial. Finally Marshal Tito suggests that if the King will not accept the agreement as it stands, Dr. Subasic should immediately come to Belgrade with his Government and take the necessary measures with the National Committee of Liberation to put the agreement into immediate effect.

Dr. Subasic will communicate the substance of this message immediately to King Peter. There is now no further excuse for delay on the King's part. I think that His Majesty's Government would be justified in conveying a blunt message to the King informing him that unless he is prepared to accept the agreement substantially as it stands his consent to it will be presumed and His Majesty's Government will concert with the Soviet Government the necessary steps to bring it into force.¹⁹

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The following is Text of verbal reply to King Peter for communication by H.M. Ambassador

The Prime Minister has received King Peter's letter of January 20.

Mr. Churchill understands that a reply to King Peter's approach to Marshall Tito has now been received from which it is clear that His Majesty's counter-proposal is unacceptable.

Therefore Mr. Churchill once again urges King Peter immediately to accept the Tito-Subasic agreement, as being the best possible in the circumstances, subject to such amendments as Dr. Subasic can authorise on his own responsibility and without further negotiation with Marshal Tito.

His Majesty's Government are convinced that it is undesirable in the Yugoslav National interest that the fulfilment of the agreement should be further delayed, King Peter should know that His Majesty's Government have to take action in the course of the next day or so without further communication with His Majesty.²⁰

On January 21, 1945, the FO sent to Washington the following telegram of particular secrecy:

It now transpires that King Peter asked General Velebit, Tito's military representative in this country, to send Tito a message putting forward the King's proposal that the Royal as well as the legislative power should be exercised by the Government and suggesting an early meeting between the King and Tito. This action was taken by the King contrary to our advice since we felt certain that it would only lead to a rebuff. Tito has in fact replied refusing to have any direct dealing with the King and the substance of this reply has been communicated to His Majesty. Tito has, however, pressed for Subasic

and his Government to go to Belgrade immediately and join his Government on the basis of the agreement.

2. When to-day His Majesty's Ambassador sought an audience with King Peter to convey the warning mentioned in paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 678, explaining that he was acting on instructions of the Prime Minister, King Peter refused to see him, putting forward as a pretext that he had to visit the King of Norway.

3. Events described in the preceding paragraph render it in our opinion necessary that we should carry out action described in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 678 as soon as possible, more particularly since Marshal Stalin is pressing for such action and since Tito may well go back on his offer to deal with Subasic unless a decision is taken without delay.

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4. In these circumstances it is most important that we should learn immediately the views of the United States Government. I shall be glad, therefore, if you will see Mr. Stettinius and in informing him of the substance of the preceding paragraphs, invite his urgent observations.

5. For your own information and for use with Mr. Stettinius if you think fit, we shall not now go ahead on January 23rd, if no reply has been received from Mr. Stettinius by then in order to give an opportunity for the United States Government to express their views. At the same time I know that he will understand the dangers of further delay.²¹

The Chancellery of the Yugoslav Royal Court on January 22, 1945 had issued the following communique.

"In the interval of time between his communique' of January 1 lth and to-day, the King of Yugoslavia has left no stone unturned to speed up the solution of pending Yugoslav problems. As it was said in the communique' to the Press of January 1 lth, he accepted the basic proposals put forward by the National Liberation Movement of his Country. There remained open only the question of how to bring into operation these proposals. The King has been ready to approve any method provided that it would fully guarantee free expression of the popular will regarding the future organization of the Country and the form of Government. When no proposals were forthcoming from the National Liberation Movement, he took the initiative and on January 15th addressed to Dr. Subasic' and Marshal Tito a proposal to the effect that, being in accord with the rest of the draft-agreement, he was ready to transfer the Royal constitutional rights and legislative power to the Royal Government, under the leadership of Marshal Tito provided that it is appointed in a constitutional way. In addition, on January 19th he readily gave to the Government the requested explanation with regard to his proposal. On January 20th, the Prime Minister of the Royal Yugoslav Government communicated to the King the reply of Marshal Tito in which he expressed the desire to continue to deal with him in a democratic and constitutional way, only through the Royal Government.

"By this a completely new situation was created. The King appreciates Marshal Tito's desire and accepts it, but he regrets that he is unable to continue negotiations through the services of Dr. Ivan Subasic. He has lost confidence in Dr. Subasic, without which collaboration in any serious matter is out of the question. Faced with this situation and with a view to finding as quick a solution as possible, the King has requested Dr. Subasic's resignation and told him that the Government is in demission.²²

On January 22, 1945, Petar wrote to Subasic. The letter was written on his stationery and probably was signed by him.

London,

January 22nd 1946. My dear Prime Minister,

I have received your letter of January 20th. I have given my definite reply. I am not against the agreement, however I cannot but maintain what I have said publicly in my communique of January 1 lth., and in my replies to the Royal Government of January 15th, and 19th.

As King I have defended the democratic rights and liberties of my people and cannot cease to do so. That is where I stand.

I am in favour of the agreement, but the pressure, communicated to me in your letter, savours more of an ultimatum than an agreement.

I have given many proofs of my gratitude to the National Liberation Movement of my country and I have supported it wholeheartedly in the struggle against the enemy, but as King I have sworn an oath on the Constitution to protect the lasting interests of the whole nation. Being guided only by this duty towards my people and by my own conscience, in the present grave times I must not make any omission which could have undesired consequences after the liberation of the country.

You are fully aware, Mr. Prime Minister, that you have acted without my knowledge and without consultation with me. As my Prime Minister you have completely ignored me and thus brought myself and my Government into an extremely difficult and uncalled for situation. I am against the departure of my Government from this country until my point of view has been accepted. I can neither accept to be asked at the last moment to reply with "yes" or "no", nor can I be asked to reply unconditionally with a "yes" or "no".

It is my duty to draw your attention to your behaviour towards me. While Marshal Tito previous to any decision, had informed and consulted the AVNOJ and the National Committee, you put before myself and the Government an accomplished fact. That is the reason for all present complications. Moreover, you should have put off asking endorsement of our Great Allies, before having received my own and my Government's consent.

I profoundly disapprove of your conduct in this matter, in view of the fact that I have never deviated from a correct attitude towards yourself.

n. T o i

I remain,

Dr. Ivan Subasic,
Prime Minister,
Royal Yugoslav Government,
London.²³

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There are two other copies with the same Register number in PRO which are slightly different. The punctilious pedant might find the comparison interesting and discover two different ghost characters, know them, and identify them.

On January 22, 1945 the British Ambassador to Petar wrote to his superior in FO the following:

TOP SECRET.

BRITISH EMBASSY TO YUGOSLAVIA,

Devonshire House, Piccadilly, London, W. 1. 22nd January, 1945. Dear Douglas,

My letter of January 20th. I enclose herein, for purposes of record, copies of the two messages which King Peter requested General Velebit to send to Marshal Tito. As you know, these messages were not sent as messages from the King. The reply which was returned to them was summarised in my letter under reference.

My United States colleague told me this morning that King Peter had summoned him to an audience and had given him a copy of the letter which His Majesty had received from Dr. Subasic reporting on Tito's attitude to the King's approach. (I left a copy of this letter at the Foreign Office on January 20th). Mr. Patterson told me that as the King had sent for him he had an opportunity of giving His Majesty some idea of the State Department's attitude. This he did, I gather, briefly; and urged His Majesty to face the realities of the situation. He made it clear that in the view of the United States Government the sooner their Embassy could begin work in Belgrade the better. Mr. Patterson assured me that the King fully realised the significance of what he was saying and appreciated that he had for the first time some direct advice from the United States Government. This is all to the good as far as it goes and I am sure that Mr. Patterson, who is most anxious to get to Belgrade and start work, made the most of the vague instructions which were sent him by the State Department. A clear expression of the views of the United States Government would of course be preferable and it is to be hoped that Lord Halifax will succeed in extracting one from the State Department.

This morning I duly sent a message to His Majesty King Peter saying that I was awaiting fresh instructions and begging that the audience granted to me for midday today should be postponed. When a final decision in the

matter is taken I think that we must make some communication to King Peter at least forty-eight hours before the time fixed for action.²⁴

IV Tito

On the same January 22, 1945, the FO sent an outward telegram to the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth as follows:

Prime Minister is warning King Peter that unless he is ready immediately to accept Tito-Subasic Agreement with such modifications as Dr. Subasic can authorise on his own responsibility and without further negotiation with Marshal Tito we shall be compelled in the course of the next day or so without further communication with King Peter to invite Dr. Subasic and his Government to proceed to Belgrade and there carry out Tito-Subasic Agreement in concert with National Committee of Liberation. United Kingdom Ambassador to Yugoslav Government would then be accredited to Regency set up under the agreement and would proceed forthwith to Belgrade.

2. It now transpires that King Peter asked General Velebit to send Tito a message putting forward King Peter's proposal that the Royal as well as the legislative power should be exercised by the Government and suggesting an early meeting between King Peter and Tito. This action was taken by the King contrary to our advice and as we expected Tito has replied refusing to have any direct dealing with the King. Tito has, however, pressed for Subasic and his Government to go to Belgrade immediately and join his Government on the basis of the Agreement.

3. We are consulting with the United States Government and impressing on them the urgency of this matter. Marshal Stalin has already approved our proposed action and is anxious that there should be no delay.

4. Brigadier Maclean reports that in many parts of Yugoslavia demonstrations against King Peter are taking place. Speeches are all on identical lines and he considers that the present organised agitation is clearly the result of a general directive from central authority. This is the first time since he has been in Yugoslavia that there has been any general departure from the rule not to attack King Peter personally.²⁵

Ambassador Stevenson, on January 19, 1945, wrote that, in case of problems with the King, he "urged Doctor Subasic to send a message to-day to Marshal Tito through General Velebit asking the latter to authorise the General to reply both to the King's counter proposal and to the

suggestion for a meeting. Doctor Subasic agreed to do so and said that he expected that he would receive a reply within twenty-four hours.

Doctor Subasic complained of the King's unwillingness to receive him and discuss matters with him. He added, however, that he would maintain his reputation as a "patient and persevering man" and would not let the King's treatment of him get on his nerves.

In sending a message to Tito I think that the King was probably ill-advised. He certainly acted with complete disregard of his Prime Minister, who, so long as he remains Prime Minister, should be his principal adviser. But as the King honestly believed that his message had been sent to Tito, there is some excuse for his declining to make up his mind until he receives the reply. I recommended therefore that we should hold our hands until Tito's reply has been received."²⁶

Earl Halifax on January 22, 1945 answered FO as follows:

I have been pressing State Department since last night. In Stettinius' absence I urged Grew this afternoon to give us an immediate expression of American views. I rubbed in the urgency of taking early action which was reinforced by an agency report I have just received that the King had dismissed Subasic. I underlined the foolish way in which the King was acting and the probable consequences that might ensue if matters were allowed to run their course. I laid special emphasis on the undesirability of a divergence or the appearance of a divergence between the Americans and ourselves, and the embarrassment which their continued silence was causing us. Grew seemed to appreciate our

point of view and said that he was doing everything he could to obtain a favourable decision from higher authority tonight.

2. Grew showed no (repeat no) signs of resenting mention of time limit of January 23rd for action by us, and I did not therefore encourage him to think we could postpone for long. But I hope you may feel able to await a further telegram from me tomorrow morning. If I can extract anything tonight I will of course telegraph sooner.²⁷

This is a Telegram from King Peter to the President of the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito:

I should be very pleased to hear if you share my opinion that, in the interests of our peoples, there should be a personal meeting between us in the near future.

I am sure that you agree that in such important times, it is necessary to

group all national forces, and in this you and I, desire to participate to the greatest extent.

If this is in agreement with your personal views, I should be very grateful to you if you could send me your practical suggestions so that this meeting may take place as soon as possible.²⁸

Reactions to Petar's telegram to Tito are expressed by FO in their letters to H.M. Ambassador in Washington on January 21, 1945

It now transpires that King Peter asked General Velebit, Tito's military representative in this country, to send Tito a message putting forward the King's proposal that the royal as well as the legislative power should be exercised by the Government and suggesting an early meeting between the King and Tito. This action was taken by the King contrary to our advice since we felt certain that it would only lead to a rebuff. Tito has in fact replied refusing to have any direct dealing with the King and the substance of this reply has been communicated to His Majesty. Tito has, however, pressed for Subasic and his Government to go to Belgrade immediately and join his Government on the basis of the agreement.

2. When today H.M. Ambassador sought an audience with King Peter to convey the warning mentioned in paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 678, explaining that he was acting on instructions of the Prime Minister, King Peter refused to see him, putting forward as a pretext that he had to visit the King of Norway.

3. Events described in the preceding paragraph render it in our opinion necessary that we should carry out action described in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 678 as soon as possible, more particularly since Marshal Stalin is pressing for such action and since Tito may well go back on his offer to deal with Subasic unless a decision is taken without delay.

4. In these circumstances it is most important that we should learn immediately the views of the U.S. Government. I shall be glad, therefore, if you will see Mr. Stettinius and in informing him of the substance of the preceding paragraphs, invite his urgent observations.

5. For your own information and for use with Mr. Stettinius if you think fit, we shall not now go ahead on January 23rd, if no reply has been received from Mr. Stettinius by then, in order to give an opportunity for the U.S. Government to express their views. At the same time I know that he will understand the dangers of further delay.²⁹

Churchill's order on January 23, 1945 follows:

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Prime Minister.

I suggest we should proceed as attached in Yugoslav business.

I presume that there is no need to consult colleagues and will go ahead unless I hear to contrary.³¹

On January 23, Petar sent to Churchill the following:

Dear Mr. Churchill,

I am sending you a copy of my letter to Dr. Subasic, and one of my statement, which I thought you might like to have.

Very sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) PETER II R32

On January 23, 1945, Eden sent the following to Belgrade:

Please inform Tito of the substance of paragraph 1 of my telegram under reference, adding that we are consulting Moscow and Washington very urgently in regard to the next step and that we will communicate the result to him at the earliest possible moment.

2. You will see from my telegram No. 739 to Washington the line we are suggesting to the United States and Soviet Governments. You may use your discretion in informing Tito confidentially of this if you consider it desirable.³³

On January 23, 1945, the FO sent to the Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, the following top secret telegram:

King Peter, without consulting us, dismissed Dr. Subasic and his Government on 22nd January. It is not known whether King Peter intends to try to form another Government, but even if he does we are not prepared in present circumstances to recognise it.

2. Subasic has been informed this morning that King Peter's action does not affect the intention of United Kingdom Government to see that the Tito-Subasic Agreement is carried out and that for this purpose we are ready to transport him and his Government to Belgrade, together with all Yugoslav politicians who desire to go there. We are also informing Tito to this effect.

3. King Peter's action may cause trouble in Yugoslavia and we consider united action by United States Government, Soviet Government and ourselves to be essential and the quicker and more decisive it is the better.

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4. We are therefore informing United States State Department and Soviet Government of the above and suggesting that the three powers should decide to put the Agreement into force and should inform Tito that, if he will concert with Subasic and his Government to carry out the Agreement, the powers will recognise the United Government formed in accordance therewith and will accredit Ambassadors to the Council of Regency. We are also suggesting that, pending the formation of this United Government, no Government formed either by King Peter or Marshal Tito alone should be recognised.

5. We have asked the United States and Soviet Governments to give us their views on the above at earliest possible moment.³⁴

On January 24, 1945, PM Churchill sent to Marshal Stalin the following secret and personal telegram: Please pass the following personal message dated January 23rd from Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. Begins. King Peter, without informing us of his intention, dismissed Subasic and his Government last night.

2. We are informing Dr. Subasic that the King's action does not affect H.M.G.'s intention to see that the Tito-Subasic Agreement is carried out and that we are therefore ready to transport him and his Government to Belgrade.

3. I suggest that the Three Great Powers should now decide to put the Tito-Subasic Agreement into force and that Tito should be informed that, if he will concert with Subasic and his Government to carry out the Agreement, the Three Great Powers will recognise the United Government formed in accordance therewith and will accredit Ambassadors to the Council of Regency. I also suggest that, pending the formation of this United Government, no Government formed either by King Peter or Marshal Tito alone should be recognised.

4. I am also putting this proposal to the U.S. Government and trust that you for your part will agree to it. I will let you know directly I learn American reaction, so that we can concert simultaneous action.³⁵

On January 23, 1945, FO sent to Washington this telegram of particular secrecy:

King Peter, without consulting us, dismissed Dr. Subasic and his Government last night. It is not known whether His Majesty intends to try and form another Government, but even if he does His Majesty's Government are not prepared in present circumstances to recognise it.

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2. Subasic has been informed this morning that King Peter's action does not affect the intention of His Majesty's Government to see that the Tito-Subasic Agreement is carried out and that for this purpose we are ready to transport him and his Government to Belgrade, together with all Yugoslav politicians who desire to go there. We are also informing Tito to this effect.

3. King Peter's action may cause trouble in Yugoslavia by encouraging adherents of the old regime to oppose the Tito-Subasic Agreement, counting on dissension among the Great Powers. United action

by the Three Powers is therefore essential and the quicker and more decisive it is the less is the likelihood of trouble.

4. Please inform the State Department most urgently of the above and suggest that the Three Great Powers should decide to put the Agreement into force and should inform Tito that, if he will concert with Subasic and his Government to carry out the Agreement, the Powers will recognise the United Government formed in accordance therewith and will accredit Ambassadors to the Council of Regency. We also suggest that, pending the formation of this United Government, no Government formed either by King Peter or Marshal Tito alone should be recognised.

5. I should be grateful to learn at the earliest possible moment whether the United States Government agree to the above proposal.

6. A message on similar lines is being sent to the Soviet Government.³⁶

Churchill in the note of January 23, 1945 about

Dismissal of Yugoslav Government by King Peter. Action Proposed.

(1) Tell Dr. Subasic that King's action does not affect intention of His Majesty's Government to see that Tito-Subasic Agreement is carried out. For this purpose we are ready to transport Dr. Subasic to Belgrade with his Government and all Yugoslav politicians who desire to go there.

(2) Telegram to Tito informing him of this.

(3) Telegram to Moscow and Washington informing them of action set forth above and suggesting that Three Great Powers should decide to put the Agreement into force and should inform Tito that, if he will concert with Dr. Subasic and his Government to carry out Agreement, Three Great Powers will recognise the United Government formed in accordance therewith and will accredit Ambassadors to the Council of Regency. We should also suggest that, pending the formation of this United Government, no Government formed either by King Peter or Marshal Tito alone should be recognised.

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(4) There is no necessity to inform King Peter of our intentions at this stage.

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Churchill expressed his constitutional doctrine in January (1945) as follows:

My suggestion is, that the royal and legislative power, should be exercised by the Royal Government, appointed in a constitutional way, till free elections be held for the constitutional assembly.

As regard the rest I fully agree with Marshal Tito-Dr. Subasic agreement.³⁸

Eden thanked Petar on January 25, 1945.

I write to thank Your Majesty for your letter of January 23rd enclosing a copy of your letter to Dr. Subasic. (Sd) ANTHONY EDEN. His Majesty

King Peter of Yugoslavia.³⁹

On January 26, 1945, FO sent to Washington the most immediate cypher

During the last few days conversations have been proceeding between King Peter and Yugoslav Government during which the King has maintained his demand for the Government's resignation. Dr. Subasic has refused to resign on the grounds of the bad effect which this would have in Yugoslavia and on the prospects of the Tito-Subasic Agreement. Dr. Subasic 's intention is to leave with his Government for Yugoslavia next week. He hopes that he will be able to obtain the King's consent to this move and his signature to a decree appointing the Council of Regency. He has asked for air transport for his Government on Monday January 29th or as soon after as is convenient. Should he fail to persuade the King to give way he will nevertheless leave for Belgrade with his Government next week.

2. Meanwhile Marshal Stalin has expressed the view that the Tito-Subasic Agreement should be put into execution without further delay and that the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States should recognise the United Yugoslav Government thus set up. He considers that no reservations of any kind should be made in carrying out this plan.

3. In the light of Stalin's views we cannot help feeling that further delay would be dangerous and we therefore are in agreement with Dr. Subasic's plans as described in the first paragraph above. Please inform Mr. Stet-tinius of above and say that I hope that he will feel able to send instructions

to Mr. Patterson over the weekend which may be helpful in deciding King Peter to play his part.

4. The memorandum which Mr. Patterson has handed to Yugoslav Government and King Peter as a result of instructions foreshadowed in your telegrams under reference seems to indicate that if King Peter does not accept Tito-Subasic Agreement and United Government is set up without his approval United States Government will only have "provisional representation" in Belgrade, by which I suppose is meant that the United States Representative will not be formally accredited to the Regency. If this is the intention of the United States Government the result will be that they will find themselves out of step with the Soviet Union and Great Britain. We wish of course to avoid this contingency and I hope that you can persuade State Department to agree to accredit Mr. Patterson with Regency at the same time as we and the Russians accredit our Ambassadors.³⁹

On January 30, 1945, the U.S. Ambassador in London, John Winant sent the Secretary of State the following telegram:

Diplomatic correspondents of London papers this morning report the resignation of the Yugoslav Government and the appointment of Mr. Subasic to form a new government. Most papers print the text of the communique issued by the Yugoslav Government yesterday.

Diplomatic correspondent of DAILY TELEGRAPH writes: "I learn that in all probability Dr. Subasic will delay the departure of the government to Yugoslavia until the formation of the new government is complete and until King Peter has appointed his Regency Council. The Ministers named in the communique were members of the former government. They agreed to take office again. No definite indication can yet be given as to who will join the new administration though it would appear that likely candidates are Dr. Milan Groll, a Liberal and former Foreign Minister, and M. Budisch-levitch, a former Minister of the Interior who was in office when Prince Paul former Prince Regent left Yugoslavia. In agreement with Dr. Subasic King Peter is now able to nominate his own Regency Council. This is a modification of the original agreement between Dr. Subasic and Marshal Tito. Under this agreement it contained three members nominated by Dr. Subasic and Marshal Tito. The attitude which Marshal Tito will adopt towards the new decision arrived at last night cannot at this stage be foreseen. Up to the present he has confined his communications with the Yugoslav Government in London to an urgent request that the government should leave for "Yugoslavia as soon as possible."

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The TIMES diplomatic correspondent comments: "A virtual settlement of the differences between the King of Yugoslavia and his government has been reached, the Tito Subasic agreement will be put into force and Ministers will leave in the course of a few days for Belgrade to set up a united government. The crisis was ended after a day of discussions. In the morning the members of the government met the King for a further review. In the afternoon the cabinet met and it did not disperse till late at night. An official statement was then issued. This made clear that, although there has been no concession on essentials, every effort has been made to consider the interests of the King."⁴⁰

The same Ambassador Winant on February 6, 1945, sent to the Secretary of State the following telegram:

Last night Subasic gave a small official farewell dinner where I learned that the Cabinet's scheduled departure for Belgrade February 7 has been postponed for several days.

Today King Peter told me that after hearing from Tito, Subasic had informed him that General Simovich and Sutej were unacceptable as Regents and must be replaced by Vukosavljevic and Mandic. The King told me that he would insist upon having Sutej, who was his friend. Subasic, he said, had withdrawn his approval of Simovich because he has found evidence of latter's collaboration with the Germans in an unsigned letter of April 4, 1941 in which Simovich offered military support to Germany. The King observed that this letter was obviously written to gain time for Yugoslav army to prepare for German attack and should not be held against Simovich.

The King added emphatically that he would not permit his Government to depart for Belgrade until he appointed the Regents and if they went without permission, there would be no Regency and would publish his White paper.

King Peter arranged an official Yugoslav luncheon today but at last minute his Cabinet declined to attend because Simovich was to be there. The luncheon was called off.⁴¹

Finally the Big Three in Yalta ordered Subasic to leave urgently.

On February 13, the King appointed Regents, Dr. Milan Grol, Dr. Juraj Sutej and Ing. Dusan Sernek and Subasic left London the same day.

Tito told Thayer that he would not accept Sutej and on February 22 that he would not accept either Sutej or Grol.

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Eden sent telegrams to Subasic and Tito; gave the order not to jeopardize the Agreement and to accept the nomination.

Subasic arrived in Belgrade on February 16. Ambassador Winant on February 19, 1945 filed with the Secretary of State the following telegram:

Before departing for Belgrade today Grol told me about a talk he had with Krekic, Socialist member of Yugoslav delegation to Trade Union Congress. According to Grol, Krekic suggested that he take out plenty of life insurance before departing. Krekic went on to say that Partisans have put twice as many people in concentration camps as Germans did; and that though only 105 executions were announced, many hundreds more took place and anti-Partisans are still being liquidated.

Grol said he saw only three alternatives for himself. (One) To go to Belgrade and fight openly for democracy, (Two) To take to mountains with opposition groups, or (Three) To remain an emigre and carry on struggle from outside. He said he chose the first and was too old for the second.

Grol also said he talked to a friend in the Soviet Embassy and told him that Soviet Government is badly informed about conditions in Yugoslavia; and that the actions of Tito's followers are injuring the Russian position and unless stopped will bring on civil war.

In a talk with me last week Grol expressed regret (for reasons similar to those given in Caserta's No. 532 to Department, February 15) that Yalta statement on Yugoslavia referred only to the "last Parliament". Grol said that in order to include democratic representatives in Avnoj the Yalta statement should be amended at least to extent of changing word "Parliament" into plural form.⁴²

The political adviser in Caserta and Ambassador to Italy Alexander Kirk on February 20, 1945 sent to the Secretary of State the following telegram:

Thayer has reported from Belgrade that on February 17 an interview with Subasic was printed in BORBA in which he was quoted as stating that the question of the Regency and the Government crisis had been in great part resolved and the specific naming of regents had been facilitated by the arrival of the government in Belgrade. Subasic stated in reply to a question regarding Crimean Conference suggestion to expand AVNOJ that he had discussed this subject when he had been in Belgrade before and that this could apply the principles of democracy which "we all desire to put into practice". He implied that AVNOJ and the new government would choose the new members of AVNOJ.

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Subasic in commenting about foreign affairs said that Yugoslavia had attained among the United Nations a very favorable position by her heroic struggle and that with respect to territorial aims Yugoslavia would with Allied cooperation attain satisfaction. With respect to problems facing Yugoslavia regarding war prisoners, gold reserve, UNRRA, etc., Subasic said all the great Allies were understanding and sympathetic. He also stressed the friendship which the peoples and statesmen of Great Britain and the Empire had for Yugoslavia and particularly the support of Churchill to the Tito Subasic agreement. No specific mention was made of the United States.

The arrival of Subasic and his party was not commented upon in POLITIKA.⁴³

About new developments the following telegram was sent by Ambassador Kirk in Caserta on February 28, 1945 to the Secretary of State.

Norden saw Subasic yesterday at latter's request Yugo Prime Minister explained agreement was reached previous evening on regency problem and that a message for King was sent through Yugo channels to Yugo Embassy at London. He gave Norden text of this message which is contained in our immediately following telegram.

Subasic was not willing to guess concerning King's probable reaction and choice among the four Serbs' but stated he had no alternative other than acceptance.

Since Subasic had made large concessions to Partisans, Norden asked him in view of this if he was receiving a similar concession in return with regard to their pending decisions. Since both Belie and Mandic had been his suggestions to King and since none of proposed Serbian candidates for regency were members of liberation movement, Subasic protested that this was not at all the way to look at it.

Regency should be above politics, he felt, and it was an error to wish to put political figures into regency. (Both Budisavljevic, a Croatian Serb and Mandic, nevertheless, have been active in politics). Beyond stating that both London Ministers and most of present Partisan group would probably be included he was unwilling to discuss formation of new government. He hesitated when asked whether Sutej would be Finance Minister. When later in conversation he was asked if Sutej might not make a good head of an economic mission to United States or Ambassador to Washington, Subasic stated that though Partisans were beginning to take more kindly to him, he felt he would wish to send Sutej abroad fairly soon.

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Subasic in a rather prolonged conversation persisted in taking a philosophical view of situation; he feels time to be in his favor. But before the Ustachi problem was settled, he foresaw much bloodshed in Croatia and expressed fear that general political situation in Yugo would hardly go down to normal without some flareups and incidents. He again expressed hope for American economic aid and states that the providing of normal juridical procedure effective administration and economic reconstruction were true means to internal appeasement. Finding of suitable Ambassador to Washington he considers to be one of his most difficult tasks. Subasic expects to be Foreign Minister and hope to go to America soon after new government is formed.⁴⁴

The same Ambassador Kirk on February 28, 1945 filed with the Secretary of State the following telegram:

"Royal Government having reached an agreement with National Committee and AVNOJ they unanimously submit to your Majesty following candidates for Regency Council:

1. One of following four candidates: Dr. Alexander Belie, President of Serbian Academy of Science. Dr. Srdjan Budisavljevic, former cabinet member. Obzad Blagojevic, president of corporation of barristers. Kikilo Savic, professor of University of Belgrade.
2. Dr. Ante Mandic, barrister and during last war member of Yugo committee in London.
3. Ing Dusan Sernec.

The proposed candidate Dr. Sutej is to enter new government.

We beg to assure Your Majesty that above proposal is a result of a careful scrutiny of situation from all angles. We request Your Majesty to be so good as to communicate to us Your Majesty's decision before end of this week because the interests of the state and people require most urgent settling of this question.

Yalta decisions will be respected in their entirety.

All members of royal government are to enter new government. Belgrade February 26. "⁴⁵

Ambassador Winant on March 1, 1945, sent to the Secretary of State the following telegram:

Last evening Yugoslav Charge Rybar delivered to King Peter a message from Subasic, substance of which follows: Royal Government in agreement with National Committee and *avnoj* unanimously submit the following candidates for regency council:

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- (1) One of the following four candidates: Alexander Belie, Srdjan Budisavljevic, Obrad Blagojevic, Kirilo Savic.
- (2) Antemandic.
- (3) Dusan Sernec.

Please communicate Your Majesty's decision before end of this week, since interest of state and people require most urgent settling of this question.

Yalta decisions will be respected in their entirety. All members of Royal Government are to enter new government."

The King received this message without comment.

Val Stevenson told me he was instructed to see the King and press for his immediate acceptance of regents. He is to see King tomorrow morning. Stevenson also suggested that I ask Department for similar instructions. He said that the telegram from Serasic conveying above message to the King added that the proposals are the last word from Belgrade on the subject and if King does not agree by

this week end, his consent will be presumed and the United Government formed. A statement to this effect appears in an item by the diplomatic correspondent in today's TIMES.

The King informs me he will meet Eden tomorrow morning and he has asked to see me in the afternoon. He is much disturbed by unconfirmed report that Grol has been imprisoned in Belgrade.⁴⁶

Winant on March 2, 1945 informed the Secretary of State that Petar had yielded.

The King informed me in confidence tonight that he intends tomorrow to appoint regents from nominees agreed upon by Tito and Subasic and will so notify Subasic by wire tomorrow. He also plans to issue a communique Sunday or Monday outlining his position.

Ambassador Stevenson stated that in his talk with Eden, the King did not commit himself (repeated to Moscow as my 83 and Caserta as my 42) but indicates that he would give a favorable answer to Subasic.⁴⁷

More on March 3.

Following communique was issued to press by King's Chancellery last night:

"King Peter II of Yugoslavia has received from his Prime Minister Dr. Subasic, who is in Belgrade, a list of four Serbian candidates, one Croat and one Slovene, acceptable to the National Committee of Liberation and to the Royal Government as members for the Regency Council. From this

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number King Peter has chosen three Regents to compose the Council which will act on his behalf and in his name during his absence from Yugoslavia.

The Regents are Dr. Srdjan Budisavljevic, the Serbian member; Dr. Ane Mandic the Croat member; Ing. Dushan Sernec the Slovene member. King Peter has accordingly communicated his choice to Dr. Subasic in Belgrade. Under an agreement arrived at in London on January 29, 1945, between King Peter and Dr. Subasic, the King maintained the right to nominate and appoint members of the Regency Council. In pursuance of this agreement King Peter put forward the names of Dr. Milan Grol, President of the Serbian Democratic Party; Dr. Juraj Sutej, Minister of Finance in the present government and representative of the Croat Peasant Party; and Ing. Dushan Sernec, member of the Slovene Clerical Party with which the Yugoslav Government were in complete agreement. The candidature of two of these, Dr. Grol and Dr. Sutej proved unacceptable to the National Liberation Committee and modifications became desirable in order not to retard the establishment of government in Yugoslavia and subsequent material relief which is of such urgent necessity for the population. The King came to an immediate decision on the appointment of the candidates submitted to him for his approval in the sincere wish that this will facilitate the restoration of normal life to his stricken countrymen. The King has every confidence that the three Regents will fulfill their exacting duties loyally and conscientiously both to the King and to the people."⁴⁸

Causa finita. Winant on March 3, sent a telegram to the Secretary of State about business done.

Late last evening chancellery of King Peter issued a communique to the press, text of which is contained in my next following telegram giving the King's decision on the choice of regents.

The government was taken by surprise. Dr. Rybar, Under Minister of Foreign Affairs and Charge d'Affaires, told me angrily by telephone at one a.m. today that in an audience he had six hours before with Peter, the King said he would publish his communique on Sunday or Monday. Dr. Rybar called it "unfair" of the King to publish the communique now without first consulting with him and Dr.

Subasic. He said the statement in the communique that the King "has communicated his choice to Dr. Subasic" is incorrect. The King had told Dr. Rybar that he would sign the Royal Decree on the regency at three p.m. today and indicated he would advise Subasic at about the same time.⁴⁹

On March 4, 1945, Winant filed with the Secretary of State the following telegram:

King Peter received Dr. Rybar yesterday at 2:45 p.m. in the presence of the Queen and gave him the decree appointing Budisavljevic, Mandic and Sernec the Royal Regents. Decree bears signatures of King and Dr. Subasic by whom it was signed beforehand in blank and is back-dated to March 2nd to correspond with communique issued by King Peter to the press.

Dr. Rybar told me he thought the King, who appeared to be in good spirits, was finally persuaded to sign by his talk with Eden and messages he received from Molotov and Subasic. The message from

Subasic repeated Molotov's telegram already handed the King by the Soviet Embassy and described by Rybar as "approximately the same" as message Department gave Yugoslav Embassy in Washington and referred to but did not give text of Department's message.

Commenting on King's choice of Budisavljevic Rybar said he thought King had chosen him in order to have someone who had been in exile. The choice is also popular in Serbia Rybar added and went on to say that he had seen a message to that effect last night from Reuter's correspondent in Belgrade which stated that his reputation for honesty is enough to offset his being a Serb from Croatia instead of Serbia proper.

Simultaneous with the issuance of the decree King Peter signed a telegram notifying Subasic of his choice of Regents.^{so}

The wording of the Royal Decree about the Regents sent by Ambassador Patterson to the Secretary of State was as follows:

1. The following is text of decree signed by King Peter on March 3rd, 1945 in the presence of the Queen and Dr. Rybar, appointing the Royal Regents. The decree was back dated to March 2nd, 1945 to correspond with communique issued that day by King Peter to the press. It had been signed in advance in blank by the Prime Minister, Dr. Subasic.

"WE PETER II

By the Grace of God and the will of the people

King of Yugoslavia

at the proposal of the President of our council of Ministers and in accordance with Our Decree to transfer Our Royal Powers to a Regency Council, Pov. No. 54. of the 29-th January 1945, have decreed and

DECREE: to appoint as Royal Regents:

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Dr. Srdjan Budisavljevic', former Minister,

Dr. Ante Mandic', lawyer, Member of the Yugoslav Committee in London

during the last War, Eng. Dusan Sernec. The President of Our Council of Ministers shall execute this Decree.

(Sgd) PETAR

London, 2nd March, 1945. The President of the Council of Ministers, (Sgd./ Dr. Ivan Subasic'.

2. At the time he signed the decree, the King sent a telegram to Dr. Subasic informing him of his choice of Regents. Following is text of telegram, despatched by Dr. Rybar.

"H.M. The King has communicated to me that, in accordance with the proposal submitted to Him, He accepts as candidates for the Regency Council;—

Dr. Srdjan Budisavljevic Dr. Ante Mandic Ing. Dusan Sernec

H.M. the King regrets that Mr. Grol was not accepted as a candidate.

At the same time His Majesty informs you that He has taken this decision in order to expedite and facilitate the most rapid despatch possible of relief to the sorely stricken people.

His Majesty also stated that He for His part will take all possible steps with the Allies to accelerate the despatch of relief.

His Majesty recommends the Regents to do everything possible, while respecting the expressed will of the people, to defend the Crown and the Dynasty."⁵¹

The Charge d'Affaires a.i. of the Yugo Royal Embassy in Washington, Ivan Franges, highest ranking Yugo diplomat in the United States after the demise of the Ambassador Constantine Fotic, announced the constitution of Regents to the Department of State on March 13, 1945, as follows:

Acting upon instructions of my Government, I have the honor to inform you that in accordance with the Constitutional Act of His Majesty the King of Yugoslavia, dated in London January 29, 1945 concerning the transfer of the Royal Powers to a Regency Council, and in accordance with the Royal Decree of March 2, 1945 concerning the nomination of the Regents, the Yugoslav Regency Council was formed. The members of this Regency

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Council are: Dr. Srdjan Budisavljevich, Dr. Ante Mandich and Mr. Dusan Sernec.

The Regents gave their oath on March 5, 1945 and immediately assumed the high functions which they will exercise until the Constitutional Assembly decides upon the future Constitution of Yugoslavia.⁵²

With all events from June 1, 1944 to March 7, 1945, the Serbians achieved what they had bitterly wanted since August 26, 1939. Serbians wanted that with Subasic' the office of Ban disappear. They achieved that. There was no more Ban and no autonomous Croatia; they had what they wanted — Tito.

The success of "Operation Shepherd" was total and unscratched. Petar signed the Agreements and appointed Regents. Subasic with his Government and 200 Serbian Yugos in his coffers left London and arrived in Belgrade on February 16.

That exodus marks the end of the Yugoslav Emigre' Government in London. The new administration of Prime Minister Josip Broz Tito was sworn in Belgrade. Subasic became Foreign Minister. He was from then on and for a short time only a figurehead because the Bolsheviks put him under the rule of the foxy Slovenian, limping school teacher as they called him, although he had never graduated from the Slovenian normal school, Edvard Kardelj.

Tito and his stooges gave the oath to the Regents.

It was the only function ever performed by the Regents: the oath from Communists. I never heard who was *primus inter pares*.

Subasic and Sutej left the Government on October 11, 1945.

Only then did the Department of State give full recognition to the new administration. The State Department avoided the Thayer (OSS Lieutenant Colonel Charles Thayer) — Tito channel because it did not wish to give the National Committee of Liberation in Belgrade implied recognition or suggest that Thayer had diplomatic status.

Abyssus abyssum invocat. Since the famous February in Lipovo when Draza sang at the Serbian wedding that the Britons will "fight to the last Serbian," Draza had been falling and falling. By June 1, 1944 the government of pan-Serb Bozidar Puric had fallen, and with it Draza was ousted and dropped as Minister of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

On June 1, 1944, the Agent of OSS, Ivan Subasic, was anointed as Premier, the sole one in his Cabinet without any other Minister in his Cabinet.

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On June 30, Mihailovic named a six-man committee of experts to act as an advisory body on non-military matters, with each of the six to be responsible to different departments. One of the Committee's first decisions was to condemn the new Subasic Government as a government of Croatian separatists and Communist friends.

Just like that, the super-Yugo, Pan-Yugo Subasic, a bigger Yugo than Draza, is a Croatian Separatist. He, Subasic, anointed by Winston Spencer Churchill, Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan, FDR and Donovan, as the political head of exile-Yugoslavia, is called by Draza's flunkies a Croatian Separatist. They likely said Ustasa as they always did when talking about Croatians. A Croatian, Yugo-minded as Subasic, is a separatist although Premier of Yugoslavia.

If anything, that engrosses the ontological background for choosing the British Agent Josip Broz Tito to be the lord of the Serbians and of Draza included, the lord of his life and death. Tito did rule really about his death as Draza was shot by Tito's death squad.

The Cetnik Central National Committee on July 23 also condemned the Subasic Government, declaring that it was unauthorized to speak or act in the name of Yugoslavia.

O tempora, o mores. From 1918 to 1944, Serbian premiers of Yugoslavia usurped for themselves the right to speak in the name of Croatians, killing those who did not accept their divine supremacy. The first Croatian to be premier of Yugoslavia, with the blessings of the Anglo-American godfathers, had no right to talk in the name of Croatians and Serbians and others in Yugoslavia.

But, according to them, Mihailovic, as no other Serbian, had that supreme divine right to speak for Serbians. There was their divine oracle, the King, whom they accepted as the one who had the right over their life and death. One can imagine the bitterness of Draza Mihailovic and of all Serbians adoring him as the soul of Serbia, in September 1944, when King Petar, under intense British pressure to be sure, appealed over the London, radio to all Serbians (Croats and Slovenians) to shift their allegiance to Marshal Tito and thus to accept Subasic as their Premier. Truly, it was over the head of all Cetniks. The former ambassador in Washington, the Cetnik supremo, called Petar "that young unfortunate," explaining that neither his youth nor pressure exercised upon the King "will help him as an excuse."

From March 27, 1941 to June 1, 1944 there were the governments of: Dusan Simovic (March 27, 1941 to January 9, 1942); Slobodan Jovanovic (January 11, 1942 to June 26, 1943); Milos Trifunovic (June 26, 1943 to August 10, 1943); Bozidar Puric (August 10, 1943 to June 1, 1944).

Serbians, like Bozidar Puric, Milos Trifunovic, Slobodan Jovanovic, and Dusan Simovic, all Premiers as Subasic but before Subasic, were not Serbian separatists, as not all Serbians from 1918 to 1941 were for Draza who served under all the named premiers.

We have other voices about the problem and we reproduce here one of those documents; Ambassador A. Kirk on February 17, 1945 filed with the Secretary of State the following telegram. Norden has reported February 15 from Belgrade that eye witnesses from Srem front confirm that partisan casualties are heavy due to inadequate arms, clothing, medical supplies and transport, as well as non-professional and inexperienced officers. Commissars daily indoctrinate troops with promises of Russian aid based on industrial might of Soviet Union, deification of Stalin and Tito, unfavorable comparison of Allied stalemate in Italy and France with great Russian advances and promise of post-war liquidation of all internal enemies. Such propaganda is reported to have reverse effects due to continued lack of equipment and results in desertions and talk of going to the forests and Draza, latter representing Anglo-Americans to ignorant recruits.

Political commissar's lecture on UNRRA to workers at a Belgrade hospital explaining UNRRA as device for penetration of American capitalism to take away Russian markets; that Tito in signing recent agreement made certain partisans will handle distribution and pay cash to avoid success of capitalist plot. Latter point emphasized and UNRRA attitude unfavorably contrasted to generous gift of Soviet wheat without prior conditions. Same commissar in recruiting adherents to partisan organization claims Russians will be free after war to organize Yugoslavia and threaten workers who refuse to join now.

Crimean declaration on Yugoslavia pleased public who see hope for peaceful solution in development of crisis in direction of broader representation. Credit is given to the United States initiative in recommendation that uncompromised members of former Skupshpina be included in Avnoje. Among partisan opposition, event is regarded as a defeat for Tito and large Macek blocs are expected to present stubborn resistance. . .

Drazist sympathizers believe partisans will resort to force rather than lose power.⁵³

On February 26, 1945, Ambassador A. Kirk from Caserta filed with the Secretary of State a bizarre document, as a secret telegram:

Broad informed us this evening that he had authorized British intelligence radio operators at Bari to maintain contact with Mihailovich for last few months. He stated that he had done this on his own responsibility and without consultation with Foreign Office. He added that this contact was purely one sided and that no messages were ever sent to Cetnik operators from British end. Whenever contact was established British radio operator merely returned brief acknowledgment signal. Broad said that a few days ago he thought he had better inform Foreign Office of his unauthorized action and when Foreign Office learned of it, an immediate telegram was sent to MacLean at Belgrade informing him of the matter and suggesting, if MacLean perceived no objection the entire affair should be "confessed" to Tito in view of British assurances to Tito that they had absolutely no contact of any kind with Mihailovich.

MacMillan, a deputy, then produced a copy of a telegram which he stated had been given to him by the British side of MAAF and which purported to be a message received by United States Fifteenth Air Force from Doctor S. Golghahn and Tibor, Czechoslovak Jews with Mihailovich forces, addressed to Jewish World Congress and Federation of American Jews in Washington. This communication requested in the names of Jewish doctors in Mihailovich's army assistance in combatting a great epidemic of typhus exanthemicus. It was stated that in this telegram that many people are dying in Mihailovich territory without assistance and there is no means of combatting the epidemic. The appeal was made on humanitarian grounds and the message states in part "as doctors we are not involved in politics but only want help for people who welcomed and saved our lives". From this it would appear that the United States Fifteenth Air Force had been or is in touch with Mihailovich and we will obtain more information on this point tomorrow.

Broad suggested that it would be unwise to take any action on this appeal at this time as it might jeopardize Tito Subasic conversations now going on in Belgrade and requested us to concur in his recommendation that nothing should be done for the moment. We stated that we took a very serious view of a typhus epidemic anywhere in the Balkans as a possible menace to Allied operations on the continent of Europe and quite aside from the humanitarian phase of the question we could not disregard the matter. We suggested further that the matter must be referred to Washington.⁵⁴

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Soon after March 7, 1945 Americans packed their satchels in London and went to Belgrade. They were:

Staff of American Embassy Near the Government of Yugoslavia

Richard C. Patterson, Jr., Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, now at Naples, Italy.

Harold Shantz, Counselor of Embassy, now at London. William N. Fraleigh, Second Secretary of Embassy and Vice Consul, now

at London. Major Caleb F. Gates, Jr., Assistant and Acting Military Attache, now at Naples.

Lieutenant Commander David E. Frierson, Naval Attache, now at London. Lieutenant, J.G., John E. Kasunic, Assistant Naval Attache' and Assistant

Naval Attache' for Air, now at Cairo (USNB) Emil A. Kekich, Senior Economic Analyst, now at Cairo. Albert E. Evans, Senior Economic Analyst, now *en route* to Belgrade from the United States.

Eric L. Pridonoff, Economic Analyst, now in the United States. (Miss) Jean Matscheck, Vice Consul, now at London. Steve John Cebuhar, Clerk, now at Moscow. Harriet Jane Downs, Clerk, now at London. Alice V. Walkup, Clerk, now at Naples. Dorothy F. Fowler, Clerk, now at Naples. Blanche E. Thompson, Clerk, now at Naples. Catherine G. Fleming, Clerk, now at Naples. Lieutenant Andrew Kristovich, attached to staff of Military Attache, now at Naples.

Technical Sergeant Robert B. Aiken, now at Naples (Staff of Military Attache).

Staff Sergeant Charles R. Bruce, now at Naples (Staff of Military Attache). Corporal Joseph Mervish, now at Naples (Staff of Military Attache). Private Arthur D. Allison, now at Naples (Staff of Military Attache). Chief Yeoman Edward E. Martin, USNR, now at London (Staff of Naval Attache). Yeoman First Class Elmer J. Beiseigel, USNR, now at London (Staff of Naval Attache).

Richard Patterson was appointed Ambassador on November 17, 1944. With that the "Operation Shepherd" was closed and sealed. Yarrow packed his bag and left to pursue less flamboyant endeavors: to fight

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Communism at Radio Free Europe. He never regretted having enthroned Communism to reign in Yugoslavia. *Idem de eodem non est idem?*

Later that year, 1945, after the slaughter which started at Bleiburg, and after he realized that his tower of Babylon was a crime, Subasic expressed his mea culpa, to be sure: crocodile tears. Tito was stupid to think that Subasic would defect to the West after he saw that the Communists used him as a stooge

and were discarding him like an old window-washing cloth. Subasic created that Bolshevik Yugoslavia and stood by patiently to die in it.

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XI

Emptio - Venditio

When I presented myself for the (Oral) examination in Roman Law at the School of Law in Paris on March 3, 1940, Professor Girard asked: *Emptio-venditio*.

I had arrived before the professors with all tremor of such a student. The exam comprehended four semesters of studies, about five hours weekly — five credits: About twenty credits in all.

I also studied Roman Law at Lateran University under Emilio Al-bertario, the greatest Italian Romanist, also at the University of Rome, and in Paris for one year under Professor Girard, the greatest French Romanist, who wrote more books than Mommsen. I was studying Canon Law and was slated also to make my doctorate in Canon Law at the School of Canon Law at the Catholic University in Paris. I had been able to stay because of the scholarship of the Baroness Rothschild bestowed upon me the previous month. It was providential because my poor personal means were too deficient to pay all the registration and exam-tuition fees at the School of Law and the School of Canon Law at the Catholic University, where I was to make my doctorate in Canon Law a few days later.

I had seven minutes to answer questions, in French of course. I could not understand the question pronounced *modo Francorum*, the first time. He repeated — I reacted the same way, and then finally I jumped: Ah, and said it *modo Romanorum*. "C'est ca, C'est ca," said the good bearded professor who looked like Socrates. I thought I was Plato and continued answering in Latin, and passed the exam with flying colors.

The mystery of Roman *emptio-venditio*, buying and selling. The Romans as a state usually did not buy, they took everything. All palaces built in Britain, Gallia, Germania, Rome, Syrmium (my native neighboring county), Ephesus, and Caesareas were all built by workers who were "delighted" to work for their sovereign as the workers who built the Pyramids from "delight to serve the Pharaohs." No *emptio-venditio*.

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Emptio-Venditio happened in Rome at the chicken market, where probably the slaves sold and bought their chicken, used sandals and similar barter. But in Carinthia, in mid May 1945, *emptio-venditio* happened between the British Empire and the Bolshie Empire of Tito's Yugoslavia. For more than forty years there has been hardly a pip about this *emptio-venditio*. Only this year (1984) in January, this *emptio-venditio* was brought clearly, unconfutably to the light of history by the unconfutable British Broadcasting Corporation Services.

The London weekly, *The Observer*, on December 4, 1983, recommended to its readers to watch on December 6, the Television show "which investigates the massive massacre committed by Tito's Partisans in 1945 on the refugees from Yugoslavia." Not many people read it because of the strikes in the land. Because of the same strikes the show was not presented as scheduled. Therefore, a large part of the British public was stunned by the visible article of *The Times* on January 3, 1984, with a surprising title: "Macmillan and Alexander—'liaison in Tito's Massacres.'

The article was an exhaustive resume of the TV program about Bleiburg which was given the next day on the second channel of the state television. The Britons for the first time were able through their most massive medium to know about Tito's atrocity in the first days after the War and about the co-conspiracy of some of their most renowned army leaders and politicians in one of the biggest and most cruel genocides of this century.

To understand what that meant, it is necessary to mention that the former British Premier, Harold Macmillan, is still living and is counted as one of the most prominent and most venerated leaders of the reigning Conservative Party. The British public had never before heard such a public acknowledgment of the British conspiracy in the atrocities committed in the first days after May 8, 1945, not even in the case of the extradition of the citizens of the Soviet Union, especially of the Cossacks among whom surviving were the most prominent army leaders of the White Armies fighting the Bolshies.

The show was on the program "Timewatch" under the direction of the executive producer, Tim Gardam. The narrator was the renowned BBC commentator, John Tusa.

Participants were:

LORD ALDINGTON — formerly Brigadier Toby Low

SIR FREDERICK BOLTON — Captain, Welsh Guards, 1945

OLIVER BROOKE— Lieut. Col., Welsh Regt., 1945

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SIR JOHN COLVILLE — Foreign Office, 1945 JOVO MILETIC — Pte. Serbian Volunteers, 1945

NIGEL NICOLSON — Intelligence Officer, 1945 ROBIN ROSE PRICE — Lieut. Col., Welsh Guards, 1945 DR. Z.R. PRVULOVICH — Officer, Serbian Volunteers, 1945

The BBC Timewatch program, "The Klagenfurt Affair," did not present a clear idea of all the extraditions of the anti-Yugoslav Partisans by the British. But we do not challenge anything which they say and leave to the scholars to see how much truth they possess and confess and how much of the truth they did not possess.

However, they do know that the Foreign Office called the extradition of those prisoners of war and the civilian refugees a "ghastly mistake," and condemned it as a "serious blunder," and that all that shames those who were involved in it.

As the history of events shows, the Commanding Officer of the British 5 Corps in Klagenfurt, Carinthia was Lt. General Charles Keightley who was under the command of Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Mediterranean, Field Marshal Alexander, whose headquarters were in Caserta, Italy. General Keightley's Chief of Staff was Brigadier Toby Low. Probably like any other commanding officer, Keightley, more so because of his proclivity for avoiding hard decisions, delegated the responsibility for all the surrendered anti-Partisan forces and civilian refugees.

According to BBC "on May 14, Low received this order from Allied Forces Headquarters in Caserta. It authorised the return of some of the Yugoslavs. 'All surrendered personnel of Yugoslav nationality who were serving in the German forces should be disarmed and handed over to Yugoslav forces.' "

Lord Aldington, former Brigadier Toby Low, appearing on the program declared: 'So far as I remember the orders, it was that we should collect up all Yugoslavs and return them to Yugoslavia.'

The events show that Brigadier Low met a local Tito Partisan Commander the day after he received the order, May 15, to negotiate the settlement of difficulties. About that meeting Lord Aldington declared: "I agreed that we would as soon as possible send into Yugoslavia *all the Croats* in our area." He signed on May 17, the following order: "All Yugoslav nationals at present in the Corps area will be handed over to Tito forces as soon as possible. . . . Those forces will be disarmed immediately but *will not be told of their destination.*"

EMPTIO-VENDITIO

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On the very same day, Alexander was warning London: "To return the refugees to their country of origin immediately might be fatal to their health."

At that moment begins the formal treaty of the British empire with the Yugo Bolshevik empire of *emptio-venditio*.

It is known that the Slovenians wanted the ethnic Slovenian territories of Austria to be united with Slovenia and so with Yugoslavia. The Slovenian Communists had made much inroad into Slovenia and into Carinthia among the non-Communist Slovenians, permitting them their union of the Carinthian Slovenians with the motherland Slovenia. The Yugo-Communists had an easy way to reach Carinthia as a military organized force after the armies of Croatia abandoned the fight, on May 6, and retreated without fight to Carinthia. Thus there were organized military units of the Yugo Communist army in Carinthia up to Klagenfurt and Villach.

As the events show the Anglo-American authorities did not intend to accept the advances of the Bolshevik Yugoslavia or to concede to the detachment of Slovenian ethnic territories. How much the Yugo-Bolshevik diplomacy knew about that is not recorded. However, the deal, the horsetrade is registered.

On May 19, Brigadier Toby Low hit a straight bargain with the Yugo Bolsheviks: 1. The Yugo Bolsheviks to withdraw from Carinthia to the borders of 1918; 2. For that the British will hand over to the Yugo Bolsheviks all refugees from the territory of Bolshevik Yugoslavia.

In the words of Lord Aldington: "The important part of that agreement was that the Tito forces voluntarily had agreed with us to withdraw south of the border. They were at that time claiming Carinthia as part of Yugoslavia, and they were now getting out. That was the important thing about that. In the course of that we also dealt with the administrative arrangements for handing over to them, and arranging for the transport back to Yugoslavia of these large number of Croats in particular but also the other named Yugoslav nationals."

According to the Lord the two things went hand in hand because they were both discussed at that meeting. Here he finally admits that "Now it looks as if there may have been a bargain."

The Intelligence officer Nigel Nicolson opines that the bargain was perpetrated "perhaps in Belgrade." The deal was that "if the Yugoslavs cleared out of Carinthia and withdrew into their own country — south; we would hand over to them all the anti-Tito prisoners who we'd collected at Viktring. And there were other camps as well."

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Lord Aldington declared that everything that was done was reported to the Eighth Army. He also believes that it was known by Allied forces headquarters, saying "that day after day, what we were doing was reported every evening."

Nigel Nicolson further said that he thought it was one of the most disgraceful actions that British troops had ever been asked to carry out.

In its program, BBC thus brought to light this disgraceful action so long concealed and covered-up. The significant contribution of the BBC show is that it not only established responsibility for the extradition but also brought witnesses to the fact that the decision to hand over those victims to certain death was no blunder or mistake but the result of a calculated and clear cut trade — a bargain — with the Yugo-Partisans.

The Allies got Tito out of Carinthia. Tito got his victims.

We wanted to publish the BBC "Klagenfurt Affair" script in entirety. After numerous exchanges of correspondence and delaying tactics, we received the following letter, written on July 16, 1984.

Dear Dr. Omrcanin,

Thank you for your letter dated 3rd June 1984. As you would like to reproduce the script of the Klagenfurt Affair in entirety, you will have to obtain clearance from the contributors to the programme. The easiest method for you to do this is to write directly to the producer of the programme, Tim Gardam, who will supply you with the names and addresses of the contributors to the programme. If all the contributors are in agreement, then we can negotiate clearance rights.

Yours sincerely

Geraldine Van Bueren Copyright Department

XII

Bleiburg's Smoking Gun

Since the events of Bleiburg on May 15, 1945, historical research has concentrated on the search for the smoking gun: Who gave the order for the surrender of Croats to the British and for the extradition by the British to the Yugo-Bolsheviks. The research was partially non-intelligent because in the British Army, as well as in all civilized armies, orders of that portent are given by the Supreme Commander. But so many arguments have been in favor of exculpating the Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Harold Alexander, that nobody dared to assert that the order was given by that Supreme Commander, this author included. Somehow the writers have let it be understood that the "ghastly mistake" was executed by the lower echelons of the Western Allies.

The short scenario goes as follows: The Jupiter Tonans, WSC, had his kiester full of the offensive practice of the leader of the Yugoslav Bolsheviks, Josip Broz Tito. He said that he nourished that "viper on his breast."

It was at this time that the question of surrender of anti-Tito forces arose. British Ambassador in Belgrade Stevenson proposed on April 27, that they be disarmed and placed in refugee camps.

Churchill on April 29, 1945 gave the following order to Sir Orme Sargent:

There is no doubt that his para. 5 (c), i.e. that they should be disarmed and placed in refugee camps, is the only possible solution. You should inform the State Department accordingly, as from the Foreign Office. It is no good worrying Mr. Eden with this.

See also my telegram to President Truman. I am willing to hear your comments, but I expect it to go off tonight.¹

On May 1, 1945 this order was sent to all members of the Commonwealth: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the UK Delegation in San Francisco:

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United Kingdom Ambassador Belgrade reports that very shortly troops of 15 Army Group may make contact with considerable anti-partisan Yugoslav Forces, whose passage northwards has been deliberately assisted by the Germans in hope of creating political confusion in an area of conflicting international interests, and of disturbing our relations with Yugoslavia and Russia.

2. As these units have been openly collaborating with the Germans, we propose that, when the commanders of these units offer their services to Allied Commanders in North Eastern Italy, they should be disarmed and placed in refugee camps.

3. We are informing State Department of our views and, as soon as we hear of their approval, United Kingdom Ambassador Belgrade will inform Yugoslav Government accordingly.²

On April 17, 1945, Churchill was calling names:

Let me have a full account of the number of British Officers and men who are at present at the mercy of these wild people.³

On April 1, 1945 (? , date not clear on copy) in a telegram to the Secretary of State, Churchill broods:

1. You know my views about Tito, whom I have never trusted since he levanted from Vis. We should stand on the broad position that no transferences of territory can be settled except at the Peace Conference or by interim agreement between the parties concerned.

2. I therefore fully agree that all supplies to Tito should be shut down on the best pretext that can be found. I have referred this matter to the Chiefs of Staff asking that effective measures should be proposed.

3. I also agree with your para. 3 which corresponds with what I wrote to you on this subject some weeks ago. The only way to split the Communist Party in Italy is upon Tito's claims. It is in our interests to prevent the Russian submergence of Central and Western Europe as far as possible. The Italians would certainly form on this front.⁴

On April 20, 1945, the Prime Minister sent to the Secretary of State the following cypher:

This is another proof of how vain it is to throw away our substance in a losing game with Soviet Russia in Titoland. The harmony of British, United States and Italian interests about the Adriatic should henceforward be one of our main themes. Please let me know what is thought about this both in the State Department and at the White House. My appreciation is

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that the new man is not to be bullied by the Soviets. Seeking as I do a lasting friendship with the Russian people, I am sure this can only be founded upon their recognition of Anglo-American strength.⁵

On April 20, 1945 Churchill is full of ontological thoughts about his relations with Tito and the USSR: The kind remarks of Marshal Tito in para. 2 of No. 484 from Belgrade should encourage the fading away of British arms and, so far as possible, supplies of food. It is no use our running a race with Russia in bringing utmost help to Marshal Tito. Let him continue to count primarily on the Soviet Union.⁶

At the same time, Churchill gave orders on May 2, 1945 to Sir Orme Sargent and General Ismay for COS:

They should dwindle and die without another moment's delay. No new shipment of any sort or kind is to start. Those ships that are on the seas may deliver their burdens.

The above must be taken as a decision.⁷

FO sent on May 6, 1945 the content of the previous document to Stevenson in Belgrade:

For your personal information only, Prime Minister ruled on May 2nd that no further military supplies are to be given to Yugoslavia from British sources. Shipments at present on their way may be delivered; but no new shipment of any sort or kind is to start.⁸

On May 7, 1945 the order was repeated from Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) to Alexander, Eisenhower, and the British Chiefs of Staff:

Supplies to Tito other than U.N.R.R.A. should dwindle forthwith and ultimately die. No new shipment of any sort or kind should be made. Those ships that are on the seas may deliver their cargoes.

Further instructions will be sent to you about long term policy regarding supplies to Yugoslavia with particular reference to R.A.F. interests in that country.⁹

FO wanted on May 11, 1945 to know from Resident Minister in Caserta the following:

There can clearly be no question of informing Tito of this decision at present. But we should like to know for our own information whether it

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cuts across any outstanding commitments which Sacmed may have entered into.¹⁰

Churchill's anger rose higher every day after he started to boil in April (1945). At that time, Churchill said to his subordinate highest officials that he would greet the Ustasa resistance to Tito in Zagreb and that of the Slovenian White Guard in Ljubljana to impede the march to the north and west of the Partisan bands which at the time were totally and fully equipped with the most modern and most heavy battle arms by the Anglo-Americans. The answer of the subordinate high officials, as well as the order in that sense, we publish in Chapter XIII of this book, "Croatian Putsch." Throughout the book there are more expressions of the British Prime Minister in the direction of stopping the march of those Communist hordes.

The order of Churchill to put the anti-Partisan forces in refugee camps after the surrender was executed by Alexander. We published all documents carrying his order.

And yet, this same Alexander gave the order to extradite Croats. The crime becomes of even more pregnant significance when we know that he asked the at that time Yugoslav Prime Minister, Josip Broz Tito, to accept all surrendered Croats and said that he "would be grateful if Marshal Tito would agree to instruct His Commanders to accept them and to arrange with GOC Five Corps the rate at which they can be received and handing-over point on Austrian frontier south of Klagenfurt for return to Yugoslavia."

Field Marshal Alexander sent to British Military Command in Belgrade on May 15 the following order by telegram:

From AFH. signed Sacmed cite FHDSC

Action MACMIS rptd 15 Army Group Main 8 Army

FX 75902. TOP SECRET Pass following to Marshal Tito. Quote.

Commander of Allied troops in Austria reports that approximately 200,000 Yugoslav nations who were serving in German armed forces surrendered to him. We should like to turn these over immediately to

Marshal Tito's forces and would be grateful if Marshal Tito would agree to instruct His Commanders to accept them and to arrange with GOU Five Corps the rate at which they can be received and handing-over point on Austrian frontier south of Klagenfurt for return to Yugoslavia. Unquote."

See Appendix IV

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From his side the Yugoslav Prime Minister Tito sent to the British the following answer:

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And the Americans. On August 6, 1945 Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew sent to AMPOLAD Caserta the following telegram:

Please inform Field Marshal Alexander that DEPT is unable to understand why upon receipt of DEPT's 484 May 15, the instructions contained in Robertson's draft telegram which did not conform to view of British and U.S. GOVTS and in our opinion could not be justified on grounds of administrative expediency were not repeat not countermanded in time to prevent transfers which, you indicate (urtel 3187, Aug. 4) did not begin until May 23. You should add that we assume that further transfers of such persons to Yugoslav forces have now been halted in accordance with instructions contained in Fan 576, June 20, to Sacred.¹²

The British always declared as sacred that they perform all diplomatic, political, and military activities and operations in agreement with Americans, which means that they do nothing in disagreement with Americans. As we already know the British told Ambassador Kirk that they will extradite Croats notwithstanding American opposition or non-approval. Here, Acting Secretary Grew says that Americans do not understand why the British did not stop with the extradition of Croats as Americans demanded. The American position is clear: no extradition of Croats. The British position is clear: extradition of Croats.

Evidently, there is no agreement between British and Americans on extradition of Croats. Crystal clear: there is disagreement. It is not evident whether the Americans knew about emptio-venditio.

Crystal clear: British Field Marshal Harold Alexander and Resident Minister Maurice Harold Macmillan did not oblige to the agreement with the Americans. The British simply acted openly against the agreement with the Americans: not to extradite Croats. Emptio-venditio is a British political, diplomatic, and military act of war — crime of war — committed by criminals of war.

There must be no one at liberty to doubt the authenticity of these documents. There is also no reason to doubt that the order was given by Field Marshal Alexander. The document says it was issued at the instructions of the Field Marshal.

All of us in the civilized world and the cognoscenti of the political, diplomatic, and military establishment in the countries of Western civilization are aware that such an order can not be given by irresponsible subordinates. Air-Vice Marshal Arthur Lee definitely was not any irresponsible

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rebel, and *sine dubio* gave the instructions at the order of Alexander. We are fortunate to have a British voice about the chain of command in the British Army. She is no less than Elisabeth Barker, famous SOE agent, more knowledgeable than anybody else in Great Britain and the United States about the British chain of command, and higher than anybody else in the executive branch of British terrorism and espionage. On February 11, 1984, she wrote a letter to the *Times* about Tito and Alexander as follows:

Tito and Alexander

Sir, In connexion with Timothy Gardam's letter (January 20) on Field Marshal Alexander's responsibility for the repatriation of anti-Tito Yugoslavs in May, 1945, it is perhaps worth pointing out that there is no need to go to American records to establish this.

In the Public Record Office in Kew there are documents showing that on May 15 Alexander sent a request to Tito to accept "approximately 200,000 Yugoslav nationals who were serving in German armed forces" who had surrendered to the British and "to arrange with GOC Five Corps the rate which they can be received and handing-over point on Austrian frontier south of Klagenfurt for return to Austria" (WO 202/319 FX 75902).

I am told by those who are in a far better position to know than I am that this request could not possibly have been sent in Alexander's name without his knowledge and approval. It also seems totally understandable why he made it. At that moment he was under instruction to close the Austrian frontier to Tito's forces (and to induce the Tito forces already inside Austria to withdraw), but at the same time 'to avoid a clash with the Yugoslav forces except in self-defense' and "to hold the position without using force

This was mainly because President Truman had not yet agreed to the use of force. Alexander had one division in Austria to cope with this situation and with the many thousands of disintegrating enemy formations, German, Cossack, Hungarian and various types of Yugoslavs. Given these circumstances, fair-minded people would, I think, not be in too much of a hurry to throw stones.

At least the events of May, 1945, do not seem to have haunted Alexander unduly. In March, 1953 — as just-released British documents show — he helped to welcome Marshal Tito to London and, as Defence Minister, had talks with him on closer cooperation against aggression in Europe (meaning Soviet aggression).

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Thus, here it is: the smoking gun of Bleiburg fired by Field Marshal Harold Alexander, Supreme Commander, Allied Forces, Mediterranean. It was Alexander who gave the order forcing the Croatian Armies and civilians to surrender at Bleiburg on May 15, 1945. Gracious as he was, he asked the Yugoslav butcher, Tito, to be gracious enough to accept all Croatians forced by the British to surrender to slaughter. The butcher slaughtered all of them.

British history has perpetrated a mystery by concealing the explicit, peremptory and categorical order of British Prime Minister Churchill to lodge all anti-Partisan Yugoslav forces in camps for refugees as prisoners of war. In contradiction of that order, the British Supreme Commander in Mediterranean ordered the surrender of those anti-Partisan forces and gave the order to extradite them to the Yugoslav Communist butchers. Fortunately, Nikolai Tolstoy came to the rescue, to the solution of the mystery.

In the already mentioned book, *Stalin's Secret War*, describing the fate of the Cossacks and all other members of the Soviet Armies extradited by the West to Stalin's Bolsheviks, Tolstoy narrates the conversation of one of those extradited, Nikolai Krasnov, the son of the highest personality among them. Nikolai Krasnov describes in his book, quoted by Tolstoy, his talks with the Soviet prosecutor of the supreme elite of the Russians extradited by the West to Stalin in 1945. The name of the prosecutor is Merkulov, who in 1954 was himself executed in the big purges of the Soviet supreme butcher, Beria, and his associates. According to Nikolai Krasnov, Merkulov, under Beria, was the most knowledgeable Soviet Agent in the Soviet secret services. He said, "For twenty-five years we have been waiting for this happy meeting with you! Victory is with us, with the Reds. As it was in 1920, so it is now"

Tolstoy continues to elaborate on the problem of the extradition of all people mentioned above and on the episode of Merkulov, the brothel, and the Madam.

Merkulov enjoyed himself as all sadistic torturers in the torture chambers of Lubianka gaol do enjoy themselves, and as the Tito butchers enjoyed torturing the Croatian extradited soldiers and civilians during the death march from Bleiburg to Belgrade on May 15, 1945. They derived a special pleasure in torturing and mocking, as the torturers did to Christ on the Cross, the old Prime Minister of Croatia, Nikola Mandic, extradited with other Ministers, a 72 year old man, innocent even in the British eyes as expressed in the published documents. Merkulov said:

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But the fact that you trusted the English — that was real stupidity! Now there are history's shopkeepers! They will cheerfully sell anything or anyone and never bat an eyelid. Their politics are those of the prostitute. Their Foreign Office is a brothel, in which sits its head — a great diplomatic 'madam'. They trade in foreigners' lives and in their own conscience. As for us, we don't trust them, Colonel. That is why we took the reins into our own hands. They don't appreciate that we have checkmated them, and now they are forced to dance to our tune, like the last pawn on the board.

I do not understand the sublime style of the Tolstoyan genius. Is Count Tolstoy telling us only that Merkulov says that the whole formidable building of the Foreign Office of the perfidious Albion is a brothel presided over by the supreme madam, Anthony Eden-Lord Avon, or does he understand from Merkulov that Anthony Eden, Lord Avon, is presiding over the brothel of homosexuals in Whitehall. In addition to all homosexuals among the British diplomats exposed publicly and irrevocably, there is a litany not yet recited in its totality. Everybody familiar with world espionage is familiar with the Operation Cicero, SD's code name for the Albanian Elyesa Bozna (alias Diello) who used his intimate access to the British Ambassador's quarters in Ankara for photographing the embassy's most secret documents, delivering them to the Germans. The Ambassador was Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen. As British Minister to the Baltic states in the mid 1930's he had given the run of the Legation in Riga to one of the footmen, a homosexual Bait, who was later discovered to be with the Gestapo.

About Eden there was always a hullabaloo of that kind. During his visit to Rome and Mussolini the Romans would call him "*Froscio*." I needed a long time to finally know what exactly it meant because the society in which I was conversant, the union of University Catholic Students, shunned such jargon. After I knew the portent of the word, I discarded it, opining that it was Fascist propaganda. My Union at that time was very anti-Fascist and produced some giants of Italian anti-Fascism like Giulio Andreotti who was in contact with Alcide de Gasperi, a former leader of the abolished Catholic Populist Party and a librarian in the Vatican.

Thus we have the smoking gun. Only the question of responsibility remains. Churchill was the supreme Englishman who ran the Empire on which the sun did not set. Was it possible that something of that magnitude a genocide of Croats — happened without his order. If it could happen without his order, could it happen without his knowledge. If it

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happened without his orders and without his knowledge, who then gave the order. After Churchill, three names in the Supreme Command of British policy, diplomacy, and military are: Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan and Marshal Alexander.

The weakest among them was Alexander, followed by Eden. The man with the strongest will among them was Macmillan. Besides having a strong will, Macmillan is known as a man of supreme arrogance. In other books we showed that Alexander was a Fabius cunctator, of weak will and of some ontological goodness. He knew that extradition of all those extradited Croatian military and civilian personnel will be "fatal to their health." The good sanctimonious Harold could have said straight that they would be slaughtered, as they have been. Of course, that fatality to their health, the slaughter was originated by the good Harold. The good Harold could at that time have known the evil of his crime, genocide, committed against Croats because of him.

About Eden, nobody has written with so much knowledge about his evil character as Nikolai Tolstoy, and we consider that chapter closed, at least for us. Thus remains the personality of M. Harold Macmillan.

Macmillan has been shown in our books to have been a hater of Croatians. We agree with Tolstoy that all extraditions of Croatians and millions of others; various nationalities of the Soviet Union, of the Slovenians, Serbians, and Montenegrins was done by the maneuvering of Macmillan. He is the supreme Albion who maneuvered Alexander and Eden in his horrible crime, the extradition and subsequent slaughter.

In his article, "British 'Heroes' Unmasked" published in *Spotlight* (Washington, D. C.) July 2, 1984, Vivian Bird, a British historian, challenged some of Britain's World War II "heroes" to answer for their complicity in the murder of all those hundreds of thousands of anti-Partisan soldiers and civilians. He writes:

In London, the government had decided not to deliver the refugees to Yugoslavia, and the British Field Marshal Harold Alexander, who commanded the 8th Army stationed near Klagenfurt, was ordered to keep the refugees in the camps although the news of their handing-over had already arrived at his headquarters. Alexander, along with the resident Cabinet minister, Maurice Harold Macmillan, were unmasked as liars and hypocrites.

In the course of a televised program — objective and controversial — the London BBC accused Macmillan (later prime minister) of bearing a great responsibility in this affair and also attacked Alexander and his officers and accused them of having concluded a secret agreement with the partisans with regard to handing over the anti-communists. Of the 26,000 persons, including many women and children, Croatians for the most part, only a few escaped. They are witnesses, not only of the Titoist war crimes, but of cowardice and dishonorable behavior on the part of the British military authorities.

Several months ago, this writer and Count Nicholas Tolstoy had accused Macmillan of being the principal person responsible. On television, high-ranking British officers at the time declared: "It is all a long time ago . . . to remember exactly what went on ... We had to obey orders."

Particularly, Lord Toby Aldington, an officer under Alexander at the time, revealed himself as very embarrassed.

The senile Macmillan, today chancellor of Oxford University, has not made any reply. His family are also silent.

As prime minister, he had defended the traitor and Soviet spy Kim Philby in Parliament, right until Philby's final unmasking.

Macmillan is known as a man of the most supreme arrogance.

In view of the proceedings against Klaus Barbie, it is worthwhile to pose the question if Macmillan and Alexander's officers still living ought to be taken to Nuremberg or elsewhere, in order to answer charges of crimes against humanity.

Horrible crimes, war crimes, were committed by Americans and Britons: killing (by direct or indirect action) and extradition of the millions of prisoners of war and civilians.

War crimes committed by all kinds of Bolsheviks, Soviet and Yugoslav in particular, by slaughtering those extradited prisoners of war and civilians.

Every German who committed crimes of war was executed by the Anglo-Americans and the Bolsheviks.

All Germans who were covering up the crimes of war were executed by Anglo-Americans and the Bolsheviks.

Anglo-Americans and Bolsheviks who committed these crimes of war should have been tried and executed as war criminals as were the Germans.

Anglo-Americans and Bolsheviks should be tried and executed for covering up the facts of these war crimes committed, as the Germans were executed for covering up their crimes.

All Anglo-Americans and Bolsheviks who organized the execution of

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Anthony Eden, M. Harold Macmillan, Harold Alexander are no less guilty of war crimes than are Herman Goering, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Rudolf Hess, Marshals Keitel and Jodl, and all the rest of Germans executed for their variegated participation in war crimes. To the three British names, we must add all the names mentioned in the chapter, "Emptio-Venditio," and the American participants in the crimes.

Not only the crime of genocide was committed, the extradition of the Croats and others to the butcher for slaughtering, but also the crime of cover-up was committed. The extradition by the British of the Croatian prisoners of war and the civilians was a War Crime (extradition of all others mentioned here was also a War Crime). The slaughtering of all prisoners of war and of civilians surrendered to British was a War crime. The criminals were Josip Broz Tito, Ivan Subasic, and the rest of the band of Josip Broz Tito: Milovan Djilas, Edvard Kardelj, Josip Smoljaka, An-drija Hebrang, Vlado Zecevic, and others down to the last Communist in the apparatus of the Yugo-Bolshevik Red Satrapy.

As early in the War as October 1942, Anthony Eden in the House of Commons declared that the proposal for the establishment of a United Nations Commission for the investigation of War Crimes had been submitted to the Allied Governments. In 1943, the Big Three, Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt, in Teheran proclaimed that Germans responsible for War Crimes would be punished at the end of the War. This decision of those three big ones was publicly declared as law at Yalta in February 1945. In his article, "Yalta Victims" published in *Encounter*, London, May 1983, under the title, "The Klagenfurt Conspiracy and War Crimes and Diplomatic Secrets" Nikolai Tolstoy writes:

Had defence counsel at the War Crimes Trials at Nuremberg and elsewhere been in possession of the facts of what happened in Eastern Austria and North Italy within a week of the German surrender, the entire process of trying war criminals might have ground to a halt. For was it not an indictable war crime knowingly to despatch tens of thousands of defenceless men, women, and children to execution squads and deathcamps?

There may be those who regard the whole episode as an unpleasant piece of long-dead history, now better forgotten. Regrettably this is not so. Thousands of grieving relatives of the victims survive, and the killing still goes on.

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1 FO 371-48812 30 R7601/G.

2 FO 371-48812 30 R7601/G.

3' FO 371-48812 9394 R74601G. 4 FO 371-48812 9394 R7022/G. 5' FO 371-48812 9394. 6 FO 371-48812 9394 R7345/G. 7' FO 371-48812 9394 R7779/G. 8' FO 371-48812 9394 R7779/G. 9' FO 371-48812 9394 R7779/G. 10 FO 371-48812 9394 R7779/G.

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12 NA Doc 740.001 19 Control (Italy) /8-445.

XIII Croatian Putsch

The following script of OSS is published in a chapter separate from the previous one to emphasize the most important point in it and that is about the Pro-Allied Putsch in Croatia in 1944.

On December 23, 1944, the Director of OSS, William J. Donovan, sent to James C. Dunn of the Department of State for the Secretary of State the following report from Bernard Yarrow:

I believe the Secretary of State will be interested in the attached report. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I am enclosing a report from our representative Mr. Bernard Yarrow on a conference he had with Prime Minister Subasic. This report supplements data forwarded to you in previous memoranda.

William J. Donovan Director

REPORT OF DISCUSSION WITH PRIME MINISTER SUBASIC

"Yesterday, December 15, [1944] I had a long discussion with Prime Minister Subasic. Knowing him as I do for the last two years, I should like to say that I am pretty certain that he spoke his mind to me and was utterly frank in those matters which he related. It is possible, of course, that he held back certain things from me but my distinct impression was that he was truthful to me in accounting as he

did yesterday his views, feelings and ideas on those matters which he discussed with me for a period of four hours.

"When Subasic got to Bari on his last trip, he was met by an official of the British Foreign Office, Mr. Philip Broad. Mr. Broad suggested that he accompany the Prime Minister on his trip to Yugoslavia, to which the Prime Minister replied that he appreciated very much the kindness of Mr. Broad to be of assistance to him but he preferred to conduct his negotiations with Tito alone. He amplified his statement by saying that he did not wish it

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to be said among the National Committee of Liberation that he was traveling around with a British representative of the Foreign Office. Mr. Broad accepted the Prime Minister's explanation in good grace and stated that he would not insist, of course, upon accompanying him. His only wish was to assist the Prime Minister in every way he could.

"The Prime Minister related to me that when he first got to Belgrade after its liberation he knew by that time that he was condemned on an alleged indictment that he was responsible for the death of many communists, whom he interned before the Germans advanced into Yugoslavia, because he did not release them in time. Instead of evading the issue, said the Prime Minister, he delivered a two hour talk before the National Committee of Liberation in the presence of Tito, who brought him into the Assembly. He told me how, after the two hour talk, he convinced them that he was not responsible in any manner for the deaths at the hands of the Germans.

"He told them of his impressions of America and I could gather that he tried to give them the impression that he was very well acquainted with the policy of the American Government, has contacts with officials of that Government and would be in a position to handle Yugoslav affairs more successfully because of his presence in America for two years and the contacts established by him there.

"The attitude of the members of the National Committee of Liberation towards him was, according to Subasic, most cautious and distant. He heard rumors that they were regarding him as a spy and agent for King Peter II and were most uncommunicative with him.

"The Russians, during his stay in Belgrade, were exceedingly cordial to him and showed every sign of consideration and attention. He struck up a friendship with General Kornieff, who was the head of the Russian military mission in Yugoslavia. It was Kornieff who had a large comfortable chair built in the Douglas plane which took him eventually from Belgrade to Rumania. Later on Subasic got to know and became very friendly with Colonel Melnikoff, who, although a colonel in rank, has more authority and power, according to Subasic, than General Kornieff. It was Melnikoff who accompanied the Prime Minister to Russia where he undertook his trip to see Stalin.

"The Prime Minister related to me the following incident: Before his departure from Yugoslavia to Ploesti, General Kornieff asked him whether he would prefer to fly in a Russian or Yugoslav plane, that they were both of the Douglas model built in Russia. Kornieff said he was asking the question because on the Yugoslav plane there was the Red Star emblem.

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The Prime Minister replied to Kornieff that he did not mind the star as long as the plane was a Yugoslav plane.

"The Prime Minister spoke to me at length about Tito. He told me he found Tito to be exceedingly reasonable, that although he is a devoted communist by 'religion' he found no traces of his ideology as far as Yugoslavia is concerned. He regards him primarily as a Croat and a good Yugoslav. Tito became exceedingly friendly to Subasic, according to his report.

"Tito told Subasic that he is surrounded by a bunch of incompetent persons who, although good communists at heart, know very little about how to handle affairs of state. He complained to him time and again the troubles they cause him by their ignorance and incompetence. Said Tito, 'You, Subasic, can be of the greatest assistance to me and Yugoslavia. You can handle delicately and tactfully our relations with the western democracies and America. It is too bad that we are both Croats but we shall manage and make Yugoslavia in the future a happy democratic state.'

The Prime Minister related to me that when he was brought by Major General Velebit to Yugoslavia, it was to Vrsac where Tito's headquarters were located that he was escorted. The General left him in the hall where he waited for fifteen minutes and when Tito came out he turned to Velebit in great rage and said, 'My instructions were not to bring the Prime Minister to me. You always mix things up. You know that I wanted to come and greet the Prime Minister at his villa instead of his coming to me.' The Prime Minister cited to me that incident as an example of the respect with which Tito is treating him. He said that it was at Tito's request that he saw Stalin. He stated that it was exceedingly important for him to meet with Stalin and discuss with him in detail the state of affairs of Yugoslavia and therefore he took the trip at Tito's request.

"Another incident related to me by Subasic as proof of Tito's trust in him was that the Prime Minister suggested to appoint Dr. Ante Pavelic, formerly his secretary in New York, as Counsel [Consul] General and perhaps Minister in South Africa. Subasic told Tito that of course it was a bit embarrassing to appoint Dr. Pavelic to that post because he bears the very same name as the Croatian quisling. Tito, however, dismissed that obstacle saying, 'What difference does it make what his name is. If you find him reliable I shall appoint him as Minister to South Africa when I become Prime Minister.'

"They also discussed Sava Kosanovic. The Prime Minister told Tito that Kosanovic had been after him for many months imploring him to appoint him Ambassador to the United States. The Prime Minister told Tito that he

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regards Kosanovic as a man who is sick with 'ambitionitis' and that he would not qualify because of the part he played in American politics among Americans of Yugoslav extraction. Tito readily agreed with him and accepted the Prime Minister's suggestion.

"Tito told the Prime Minister that he is thinking of appointing Andric, the well-known Croatian poet who served in various diplomatic posts in various countries as the future Ambassador to the United States.

"Tito begged the Prime Minister to accept the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to the Prime Minister, Tito assured him that he will give him complete freedom of action and will be guided entirely in the field of foreign policy by Subasic's suggestions and ideas. Tito told the Prime Minister that he is contemplating to cultivate the close cooperation of the western democracies and America.

"The Prime Minister told me that he is determined to take a trip to Washington as soon as he assumes the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. He will see the President and Secretary of State and try to convince them that Yugoslavia is determined to follow a policy of a free and independent democratic state, that he will bring with him a group of specialists of industry and commerce of Yugoslavia with the thought of making arrangements for a comprehensive trade treaty. 'We are', said the Prime Minister, 'looking towards America as the only country who can put Yugoslavia on her feet. We shall attempt to attract American capital by giving concessions because we know the American Government has no imperialistic designs on Yugoslavia.'

"He told me that Tito informed him that the Germans discovered in Yugoslavia huge untapped mines of a metal which hardens steel and makes it elastic. He did not know the equivalent of the name in the English language. He told me that the Germans had developed it to a great extent during their occupation and he is planning to attract American capital to develop these mines to their utmost capacity.

"Prime Minister related to me further that Tito, although he will never pursue a policy against the interest of Russia, will nevertheless attempt his utmost to build up a closer economic and diplomatic relationship between Yugoslavia and Great Britain and the United States.

"The Prime Minister told me that Tito was distressed a couple of weeks ago when he received a letter from Churchill, couched in the sharpest language he has ever received from Churchill. Subasic told me that he personally saw that letter and gave me the following account of same:

"It seems that Churchill recently sent a request to Tito for permission to land several divisions of Anglo-American troops in western Croatia along

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the Dalmatia coast. Tito refused categorically to permit Anglo-American troops to land in Croatia. Thereafter Churchill sent his famous letter to Tito in which he upbraided Tito in no uncertain terms and told him that Allied troops can land wherever they wish if the military operations require it.

"Tito, according to Subasic, was terribly shaken up and distraught over the message and took the point of view that he would not give in to Churchill because he was fearful, as he stated to Subasic, that the Croatian separatists and all elements in Croatia who are against Tito, would seize upon the opportunity to separate from Yugoslavia. Tito was very nervous that the presence of Allied troops in Croatia and Dalmatia would jeopardize his position and would afford the Croatian nationalistic elements an opportunity to rally against the National Committee of Liberation.

"Subasic told me confidentially that he shared entirely Tito's point of view. He told me that he knows only too well that the Vatican is trying to organize a federation of Catholic states into which Croatia should be included and that he favors Tito's feeling that Croatian separatists would avail themselves of the opportunity when the Allied troops landed in Yugoslavia to march against the Partisans.

"Subasic told me that Churchill was exceedingly nervous and jittery when he left for Moscow but that he, Subasic, could see no other way and hopes to pacify Churchill when he sees him. He will try to explain to him that he did it for one reason only: to come to an agreement with Tito and that he needed Stalin's backing in dealing with the members of the National Committee of Liberation.

"In relating his story yesterday, Dr. Subasic told me that at the very beginning Stalin opened the conversation saying, 'You understand, Ivan Oissipovic [Jossipovic] (addressing him in Slavic [Russian] style, calling him by his first name and the first name of his father) that Churchill and I have agreed to work out our arrangement on Yugoslavia on a fifty-fifty basis.' He said Stalin was very cautious with him when they spoke about diplomatic matters, but again, the Prime Minister reiterated, Stalin warned him not to try to emulate Soviet Russia. Stalin allegedly said, 'You have not the territory of Russia nor the people of Russia. You are a small country of small landowners in the heart of Europe. You will have to build your state upon democratic principles with equal representation for all the national groups of Yugoslavia. You will have to seek economic assistance from America the way we here in Russia are planning to do after the war is over.' Stalin, according to Subasic, spoke in 'very warm terms about the United States'.

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"Discussing the monarchy, Stalin wanted to know from Subasic what the people's feelings are about King Peter, II. Subasic confided in me for the first time that the King is not popular in Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia but that he has some following, of course, in Serbia, and that he told this to Stalin. Stalin replied that he does not care whether there is a monarchy or a republican form of government but no one should force the people to accept a monarchy if they do not wish it.

"Upon returning to Yugoslavia from Moscow, Subasic told me that his prestige went up tremendously in Yugoslavia. The members of the National Committee of Liberation who condemned him first and treated him like a spy and agent for the monarchy made every effort to cultivate his friendship. He told me that he found an entirely different attitude when he returned to Yugoslavia. That was one reason why he is glad that he took the trip to see Stalin.

"Tito asked Subasic whether he would be willing to accept General Velebit as Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs because that seemed to be the wish of the National Committee of Liberation. Subasic told me that he consented for the time being to have him in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the Under-Secretary but that he regretted that General Velebit is entirely ignorant of the art of diplomacy and foreign policy. He related to me that only the day before yesterday he chastised Velebit for issuing a statement about Yugoslavia and warned him that he is a general and to stick to his profession instead of discussing international affairs and to leave that business to him, Subasic.

"Talking further to me about King Peter, Subasic confided in me in no uncertain terms that he regards King Peter's chances to return to Yugoslavia as absolutely nil. He said that he is convinced that King Peter will never return but added, 'Why should I destroy his hopes.'

"He told me that in Yugoslavia they all talk about the King being influenced by the Princess of Greece and know about the King's quarrels with his mother. 'The Greeks,' said Subasic, 'were never popular in Yugoslavia. They still cannot forget that Olga, wife of Prince Paul, was a Greek Princess.'

"Towards the end Subasic told me that the only thing that the King can do now, in his opinion, is to sign the agreement and that by signing the agreement he will arouse the sympathy of the Yugoslav people because of the clauses preventing him from returning to Yugoslavia. As time goes by he feels that sympathy for the King may be translated into a strong movement for the King's return. This latter statement seems a distinct contra-

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diction to his previous one when he stated that the King will never return to Yugoslavia as its monarch.

"Another point mentioned to me by Subasic was that Sutej, the present Minister of Finance, is not included in the present list of members of the future Cabinet because of Sutej's request not to name him as a Cabinet Minister. Sutej requested to be sent as Ambassador to Switzerland and Tito indicated his approval.

"Subasic discussed in detail the attacks of the National Committee of Liberation upon Macek and he requested Tito to promise him that when they liberate Macek he, Subasic, will be the first person to speak to Macek. Subasic promised in return to Tito that he would exert every effort to keep Macek in line with Subasic's policy and that if necessary he would request Macek to appoint him as his successor.

"Subasic further told me that he received a request from the Queen Mother, Marie, to see her for she had a letter for him from the Princess of Montenegro. Subasic told me that he is going to see her and have a good talk with her and try to impress upon her to stop quarrelling with King Peter because that situation is a bad example for the country. He will also tell her not to undermine the authority of King Peter by intrigues with various politicians in an attempt to persuade them to place Prince Tomislav on the throne instead of Peter. He will tell her, said Subasic, that by agitating against her own son she is undermining the whole monarchy.

"Subasic told me as a deep secret that there are several Partisan divisions at the Dalmatian coastline and that if the British troops should land in Yugoslavia along the Dalmatian coast they will meet with a formidable resistance on the part of the Partisans. He said that he hopes Churchill will not repeat the mistake in Yugoslavia that he made in Athens.

Finally, Subasic told me he prepared a report for the British and handed it to Mr. Sargent of the Foreign Office. The British were not quite satisfied with it and sent him a questionnaire of 14 questions. He told me that he finished answering the questions and that he forwarded them to Mr. Sargent. He expressed willingness to let me examine them this weekend and I shall try to avail myself of his offer.

"He told me of his contemplated meeting with Churchill on Friday, December 16th, and that it was postponed until Monday, December 18th.

"This I believe is a fairly accurate resume of my talk with Dr. Subasic which lasted for four hours."

William J. Donovan

Director¹

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In my article "Il putsch croato nel 1944," (*Rivista di studi politici internazionali*, Florence: 1950), I wrote that the organizers of the putsch in Croatia in 1944 were working with Juraj Krnjevic' in London. I was told that Krnjevic sought advice from Ivan Subasic who immediately informed Stalin about the imminent putsch in agreement with the British. I did not know at that time and do not know yet whether Subasic also informed Tito, or whether it was Stalin who informed Tito.

Our information was true as far as the episode deals with Subasic, and now finally the cat is out of the sack.

As it becomes evident from the preceding document, the British did plan to disembark in Croatia in agreement with the organizers of that putsch.

Subasic organized the opposition to the British disembarkation which was to achieve a new democratic regime and therefore to replace the Ustasa regime in the Independent State of Croatia, by which the Independent State of Croatia would side with the Allies. The opposition was led by himself and Tito.

Later on, the question of an Independent Croatia and United Yugoslavia was still on the table between Churchill and Subasic. On or about January 10, 1945, Subasic talked with Churchill and Anthony Eden at Checkers. At that time Churchill told to Subasic, according to Bogdan Radica, that he was just back from Athens and that he had big reservations about the assault of the Communists in Greece and was alarmed about what would happen to Europe if the Communists got the upper hand everywhere. Churchill said that he still was of the view that maybe it would be necessary to send a little of the English Army — two Brigades — into western Yugoslavia so at least some of Yugoslavia be saved from Communism. "I rejected it categorically" said Subasic to Radica, "and I said: 'that would be civil war between Croats and Serbs. Enough have these people killed each other. Enough have they shed blood for the Occident. Never! That would forever break Yugoslavia. I am not as these our Croatian and Serbian politicians who denounce Yugoslavia. Did I do good or not, I do not know. But I do know that I remained consistent with myself and with my ideals that Serbs and Croats remain together that Yugoslavia not be cut into western and eastern.' "

Ivan Subasic learned later that, because of that Bolshevik Yugoslavia created by him to impede civil war between Croats and Serbs, he was the cause of the massacre of 300,000 Croatian military and more than 250,000 civilian personnel who were massacred by the Yugo-Bolsheviks after the British extradited them to the Yugo-Bolsheviks on the fields of

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Bleiburg in Austria, May 15, 1945. The same fate happened to thousands of Slovenians, Serbs, and Montenegrins.

History did not register one tear of Subasic over the massacre of over half a million Croats by Yugoslav Bolsheviks whom he helped to get their power by slaughtering Croats. In no other situation, like the civil war between Croats and Serbs which Subasic avowed to impede, would so many of his fellow Croats and Slovenians, Serbs and Montenegrins have been slaughtered as by the Yugo Bolsheviks whom he helped to rule in Croatia.

Since Titology remains taboo and the scholars of the Free World are muzzled (another taboo: by whom) and do not touch it, the real polity of Churchill as far as Croatia goes, remains as unknown as ever. Documents show that he had the sovereignty and freedom of Croatia in his polity to the last. In April 1945, the Foreign Office wrote as follows:

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have already discussed Field Marshal Alexander's telegram FX 58101, in which Marshal Tito's request for an additional 3,000 tons of rations to assist his present offensive on the Adriatic coast is reported. We understand that, subject to detailed examination by the departments concerned, they are in favour of refusing this request, proffering the best excuse available in the circumstances.

2. In general, and from the political point of view, we are not in favour of giving Marshal Tito any supplies or assistance over and above what is required for the purpose of immediate operations against the enemy. If Field Marshal Alexander considers that any particular request from the Yugoslavs is justified on the grounds that the granting of it will materially assist him in his immediate operations against the enemy, we could not offer any objection. But we should be opposed both to giving Tito any assistance for the specific purpose of strengthening his position in Yugoslavia or for the long-term equipment of the Yugoslav forces, and to providing him with gifts not justified on immediate military grounds in the doubtful hope of thereby being able to win his gratitude when it comes to negotiating about Venezia Giulia.

3. It follows from the foregoing that we would not wish to advance any political arguments in favour of granting Tito's present request for 3,000 tons of rations to influence you in your consideration of the question on purely military grounds. In particular we do not support the argument in the penultimate sentence of the telegram that the supply of the extra rations would produce a "grateful Tito" who would be easier to deal with in future negotiations. Moreover it is at present unlikely that the difficult question of

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the administration of Venezia Giulia will be settled between Field Marshal Alexander and Tito; we hope that the solution will be achieved between the British, U.S. and Soviet Governments and presented to Tito for his acceptance.

4. From the narrow, and rather cynical, political point of view, there seem indeed to be certain disadvantages in assisting Tito at all in his present offensive in Bosnia. Tito's advance northwards, however acceptable it may be from the military point of view, nevertheless brings him nearer to the vexed provinces of Venezia Giulia and Carinthia. It would in many respects be convenient if events should develop in such a way that Tito is temporarily held up by the opposition of the Ustashi and White Guard Forces round, say, Ljubljana and Zagreb while the Allied forces from Italy are enabled to occupy Venezia Giulia and Carinthia in comparative tranquillity.²

In April 1945, JM Addis of the Foreign Office sent to General Hollis in the War Cabinet Offices (from Sir O. Sargent) the following "Dear Hollis" draft:

I understand that the Prime Minister has informed the Chiefs of Staff that he considers that all supplies to Tito should be shut down on the best pretext there can be found, and wishes effective measures to this end proposed for his consideration.

2. As I understand it, the question of Allied supplies to Tito can be considered under three heads:

(a) The normal monthly deliveries authorised by SACMED. (NAF 924 of April 17th).

(b) Additional supplies specially granted for the purpose of assisting Tito in his current offensive (AFHQ telegram FX 51826 of March 29th.)

(c) Supplies requested or proposed not for the immediate purpose of operations against the enemy but for other reasons of longer term policy.

3. As regards (a) we have little comment to make from the strictly political point of view. We do not altogether endorse the views of H.M. Ambassador in Belgrade as set out in his telegram No. 503 of April 19th. We should be opposed to providing Tito with gifts not justified on immediate military grounds in the doubtful hope of thereby being able to win his gratitude when it comes to negotiating about Venezia Giulia. But if Field Marshal Alexander considers that a measure of support is justified on the grounds that it will materially assist him in his immediate operations against the enemy, we could not offer any objection from the strictly political point of view.

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4. As regards (b) I have one further consideration to add to my letter to you of March 22nd (circulated as COS(45)204(0) of March 23rd). It has no doubt already occurred to you that any assistance given to Tito in his present offensive, besides assisting Field Marshal Alexander in the large scale operations which he is directing against the enemy, is also bringing Tito and his regular army nearer to Istria, Venezia Giulia and Carinthia, where his presence will be an embarrassment to the Field Marshal after the defeat or collapse of Germany and from which, if the latest draft instructions before the Combined Chiefs of Staff are approved, he will be obliged to instruct Tito to withdraw his forces. We recently received some evidence which has not, I think, reached the Chiefs of Staff, indicating that Tito is likely to have a more difficult time in pushing northward than we at one time supposed. I enclose as an illustration some extracts from a report by Lt. Col. Moore, who was Liaison Officer of the Partisan Headquarters at Slovenia from October to February last. In sending us this report Brigadier Maclean wrote that he had no hesitation in accepting Moore's evaluation of the situation. This report prompts the very cynical reflection that it would be not at all inconvenient if events should develop in such a way that Tito is temporarily held up by the opposition of the Ustashi and White Guard forces round, say, Ljubljana and Zagreb while the Allied forces from Italy are enabled to occupy Venezia Giulia and Carinthia in comparative tranquility.

5. In category (c) there is Tito's request for clothing and equipment for one hundred thousand troops to enable him to take part in the invasion and occupation of Austria. On this point I have nothing to add to my letter of March 22nd, in the absence of any report on the subject from Field Marshal Alexander.

6. There is also the question, which is of rather a different order, of long-term assistance to the Yugoslav air force (see Foreign Office telegram No. 4036 to Washington of April 22nd). This question is at present under direct discussion between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary; and I suggest therefore that the Chiefs of Staff leave it out of consideration.

7. I hope that whatever the Chiefs of Staff decide on the question of supplies to Tito, they will give Field Marshal Alexander a full explanation of our present policy towards Yugoslavia. There is some reason to believe that in recent months Field Marshal Alexander has been pursuing a policy of

generosity and considerations towards Tito which differs considerably from the Prime Minister's and our own present ideas. We should, of course, be very glad to collaborate in the drafting of such an explanation

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which must necessarily include political as well as strategic considerations.³

Finally Undersecretary Sir Orme Sargent on April 23, 1945 wrote to Major-General L.C. Hollis, C.B., C.B.E., War Cabinet Offices the "Dear Hollis" letter:

I understand that the Prime Minister has informed the Chiefs of Staff that he considers that all supplies to Tito should be shut down on the best pretext there can be found, and wishes effective measures to this end proposed for his consideration.

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likely to have a more difficult time in pushing northward than we at one time supposed. I enclose as an illustration some extracts from a report by Lieutenant-Colonel Moore, who was Liaison Officer of the Partisan Headquarters at Slovenia from October to February last. In sending us this report Brigadier Maclean wrote that he had no hesitation in accepting Moore's evaluation of the situation. This report prompts the very cynical reflection that it would be not at all inconvenient if events should develop in such a way that Tito is temporarily held up by the opposition of the Ustashi and White Guard forces round, say, Ljubljana and Zagreb while the Allied forces from Italy are enabled to occupy Venezia Giulia and Carinthia in comparative tranquillity.

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7. I hope that whatever the Chiefs of Staff decide on the question of supplies to Tito, they will give Field Marshal Alexander a full explanation of our present policy towards Yugoslavia. There is some reason to believe that in recent months Field Marshal Alexander has been pursuing a policy of generosity and consideration towards Tito which differs considerably from the Prime Minister's and our own present ideas. We should, of course, be very glad to collaborate in the drafting of such an explanation which must necessarily include political as well as strategic considerations.

8. The Prime Minister will expect in due course a statement showing what has been done to give practical effect to his wish that supplies to Tito should gradually cease. Perhaps it might take the form of a joint minute from the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office.⁴

About the British plan to disembark in Croatia we have the testimony of Lazar Brankov, who at the process of Rajk in Budapest, spoke of the working out of what he called the "Churchill plan:"

"The other case was — more Churchill's plan — that the Anglo-Americans should during the War occupy the coast of the Adriatic Sea. This was no longer necessary, because the coast was already mainly liberated by the Partisans and was in their hands. But for Churchill it was necessary then to extend his influence upon Yugoslavia and the neigh-

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boring countries. At that time, too, Maclean succeeded in gaining Rankovic, Djilas, and Kardelj for this plan. There was a great argument in the General Staff; Tito agreed with that again, for he thought that Yugoslavia would, at any rate, be liberated by the British. . . . The Soviet Command had another opinion on this question and gave Tito advice, so that he retreated, and thus Churchill's plan to invade the Balkans and the Adriatic coast became a failure during the War."

The Croats in the United States during WWII had hard times, because Fotic, Subasic and their stooges accused them as Nazi agents. Still they kept their faith in the sovereignty of Croatia. On August 25, 1944, the State Department sent the following confidential message.

To the Officer in Charge of the American Mission Near the Government of Yugoslavia, Care of the American Legation, Cairo.

The Secretary of State transmits, for the confidential information of the Officer in Charge, a copy of a report prepared in the Foreign Nationalities Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, entitled "Croatian Catholic Union Supports the Independence of Croatia".

Enclosure:

As stated.

The Croatian question indeed had been the target of discussion among Churchills, Father and the Son. It is Dedijer who relates:

The same day some partisan commanders from Croatia arrived at headquarters. They had many things to tell us, including a talk with Randolph Churchill, son of the British Prime Minister, who had been parachuted into liberated territory as a member of the British military mission.

Randolph Churchill had inherited his father's courage, but he was rather short-tempered and at some headquarters or other had once become very angry when they did not immediately give him a horse.

One of our officers, a Dalmatian, had been with him and tried to calm him down. But Churchill's temper showed no signs of waning. In his fury he said: "My father wrote to me that he has made an agreement about division of spheres of influence in Yugoslavia with Uncle Joe [Stalin], and then we'll show you partisans a thing or two."

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I immediately linked this up with what I had heard from my American friends in Italy, but again it all seemed impossible, like a joke Stalin was playing on old Churchill. Five or six years had to pass before we got a clearer picture — from statesmen's memoirs and the archives of the big powers — of the real intentions of the three Allied powers, and particularly the U.S.S.R., toward Yugoslavia during the war.

In assessing these agreements dividing Yugoslavia into spheres of influence, it is necessary to ascertain whether they pertained to division of *territory* or of *influence*, and also what internal forces in Yugoslavia aided and abetted the powers in their plans.

As we know, Hitler dismembered Yugoslavia in April 1941, piecing it out to Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Albania, while at the same time setting up the "Independent State of Croatia" under Ante Pavelic and of "Serbia" under General Milan Nedic. The Soviet government recognized this subjugation, as it broke off diplomatic relations with the Yugoslav government after Hitler's invasion (as it had done with Norway under similar circumstances). After June 22, 1941, when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, the latter withdrew this unfortunate decision.

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XIV

Military Aid

Titology is a taboo science. As with Stalin before the Cold War, the rule of not angering Tito prevailed. All is full of mystery without end. All those arcane murky stories about Tito and Camp X and his reign as supreme czar of the Spanish Civil War Headquarters in Paris.

During his reign as the supreme czar of all activities connected with the Spanish Civil War in Paris, beginning in 1936, Tito was in touch with all scientists who were working on atomic bombs. It is notorious that Robert Oppenheimer had "extensive pre-War association with Communists in California, including the party organizer in San Francisco and later in Alameda County, Steve Nelson, and with the front groups that under Willie Muenzenberg's direction from the Comintern headquarters in Paris sprang up at the time of the Spanish Civil War." How much of all those connections will be revealed in 1995 when the file on Tito in the PRO will be opened to the public remains to be seen.

Was Harry Hopkins a Soviet mole? "Two of the officers who had served with him in Moscow charged that through Harry Hopkins, Faymonville arranged to send the Russians specimens of uranium ore and salts and technical data related to the development of an atomic bomb."

That is the same crime committed by the Rosenbergs. "Another allegation of help for the Russians involved the former American Military Attache' in Moscow, Colonel Faymonville, and was to lead to accusations against one of Faymonville's admirers in the White House, Harry Hopkins. The War Department had recalled Faymonville and posted him far from Washington to minimize his contacts with Mrs. Roosevelt, Henry Wallace, and Hopkins, but when the White House insisted on sending him back to Moscow as Lend-Lease representative, the War Department reluctantly agreed."

The U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Admiral William H. Stambley, told to Faymonville "You are not worthy of wearing the uniform you have on."

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When Faymonville asked "You mean that I am a traitor?", Stambley responded: "That's just about what I mean."¹

Henry Wallace was under investigation that, while a member of the top policy group, he had furnished the Soviet Union with specimens of the isotope vital to the making of a bomb, the U-235. Mrs. Roosevelt had her merits. Stalin would be accused by Tito of depriving the Yugoslav secret armies of help, even though they held down, says Tito, a significant part of the German army and relieved pressure on Russia.

All that money and that economic aid as well as military aid came from the West. It is therefore most revealing information that William Stephenson had business relations with Josip Broz.

Since Josip Broz in Yugoslavia was not a business man, the reference that Stephenson had business relations with him must refer to the activities of Tito outside of Yugoslavia as the supreme czar for the activities of the Spanish Civil War, in Paris, beginning in 1936. Tito's organization might have needed everything in the arsenal of the business man Stephenson, beginning with expertise and equipment in electricity and electronics.

"Stephenson's interests were immensely varied, but basically they involved the application of scientific discovery and inventions—many of his own—to the burgeoning new industry that developed in the years after World War I. ... [By then a multimillionaire] Stephenson's investments in new processes and products extended his interests and his knowledge into industries from mining to steel, from shipping to automobile production. His corporations were international and so were his connections. It was no wonder that when he visited Germany in 1933 all doors were open to him."²

Our study is a first study of denuding Tito as a British Agent. Not all mysteries are solved, but little can be added in the future. Only more documents and arguments to corroborate our facts. We assume

that on the following pages we do exhaust the publishing of all materials available to scholarly research. All still classified materials will bring only more of the same even if they be startling. The most poignant factor to emerge from the following pages is the frantic effort of OSS and of Donovan himself to gain supremacy in helping Tito. He succeeded as far as materiel goes, but Churchill put him aside with the consent of FDR, as far as the supreme conduct of politics goes, and so that went as Churchill, or the Madam of the homosexual brothel, dictated. The Americans took second seat in politics and kept the first seat in supplying the destruction of people and of the land.

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How was it possible that Josip Broz so much imbroiled in the conspiracies of all kinds with the British as their Agent, could induce Stalin to chop off the head of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Milan Gorkic, and he himself become that General Secretary (of YCP) in early 1939. As we said before, Tito accused Gorkic of being a British Agent.

On April 1, 1944 the Captain, Hans V. Tofte, AUS, sent from Washington, D. C. to the Deputy Director of SSO a report covering shipping operations from Italy to Yugoslavia during the period of October 15 to December 31, 1943:³

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Letter from Major J. Burke, Essex Regt. Commendation from NOIC, Bari
 OSS-SO SHIPPING OPERATION, ITALY — YUGOSLAVIA
 1943

SUMMARY

In October 1943 OSS officers of the Special Operations Branch, M.E., proceeded to South Italy, set up a base at the port of Bari, established contact with Marshal Tito's National Liberation Army in

Yugoslavia, penetrated through enemy lines to Tito's Headquarters at Jajce in Dalmatia, collected, organized and operated a fleet of some forty steamers and sailing vessels with which they maintained a supply line under Partizan colours from Italy to Yugoslavia across the Adriatic Sea.

In spite of increasing enemy activity during November and December 1943 on land, at sea, and in the air, in the territory through which this operation was carried out, shipments of food, clothing, medical supplies, arms and ammunition were made from the OSS Partizan Base, Bari, to Yugoslavia on a steadily increasing scale.

In the period 15 October to 31 December 1943 OSS officers thus dispatched approximately 6,500 tons of essential supplies to the National Liberation Army, sailing altogether sixty ships across the Adriatic. A British naval base for motor torpedo boats and other craft of the PT boat type was established in the Dalmatian Islands primarily on OSS initiative and OSS officers delivered more than 150,000 gallons of hundred octane gasoline to the base.

Naval craft from this secret base patrolled the sea route of the clandestine supply line from Italy to Yugoslavia and kept losses of Partizan ships to a minimum. One German cruiser, three E-boats, one Siebel ferry, one German gunboat and two armed enemy schooners were sunk during the above-mentioned patrol activities.

Apart from supplies already referred to, the OSS-Partizan shipping operation delivered thousands of gallons of diesel oil, kerosene, gasoline and lubricating oil, causing a large fleet of local inter-island tonnage to be activated along the Dalmatian coast and among the Dalmatian Islands.

Further as a result of OSS initiative, a brigade of more than 2,000 troops, recruited among Yugoslavs in internment camps in Italy, was transported across the Adriatic to join the fighting Partizans in Dalmatia. In

cooperation with the British "Special Force 133" this brigade was fully equipped for active service in the field before leaving Italy.

Many thousands of refugees were evacuated and brought safely to Italy in connection with the operation in question, and 800 critically wounded Partizans were sailed from Yugoslavia to Italy for hospitalization.

A Partizan supply base was established at Vis Island in Dalmatia, where one OSS officer was permanently stationed to supervise the landing of supplies from Italy and their trans-shipment and redistribution to the mainland.

Even during the most severe German occupation of the coast in December 1943 an estimated 50 tons of supplies were landed nightly at three secret pinpoints on the mainland from where Partizan caravans and escorts transported the materiel into the hinterland.

As part of the operation, a shipping line between Bari, Italy, and Palermo, Syracuse and Catania, Sicily, was established to assist in transporting 7,000 tons of captured enemy materiel to Bari for trans-shipment to Yugoslavia.

By the end of December 1943 four Partizan bases at Bari, Monopoli, Molfetta, and Manfredonia were in full operation under the command of OSS officers with a staff of some 600 Partizans.

Although every one of the three OSS officers directly responsible for this operation was reported missing at sea at one time or another, no OSS personnel was lost. Partizan losses during the same period were two ships, one of which was dive-bombed by enemy aircraft; the other was mined. Less than 25 Partizans were killed. Several vessels were damaged by strafing.

OSS officers further collected considerable quantities of important intelligence with regard to both Partizan and enemy positions in Yugoslavia. As a result of intelligence obtained and brought back, the towns of Mostar and Metkovic were bombed by allied aircraft, enemy columns on coastal roads were strafed and one large German supply steamer was sunk.

Close liaison and cooperation with the British "Special Force 133", the Royal Navy, and other authorities were maintained throughout the operation.

To the report are added many sketches of the "Yugoslavia Partisan Supply Line," compiled and drawn in the OSS Branch of Research and Analysis. The charts of the shipping follow:

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, M.E. SHIPPING OPERATION, S.O. ITALY TO
YUGOSLAVIA 1943

CARGO shipped to: National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia from Bari and Monopoli, Italy 15, Oct.-31, Dec. 1943							
		UNIT	OCTOBER 1943	UNIT	NOVEMBER 1943	UNIT	DECEMBE R 1943
							TOTAL
1	Field Artillery, 2 Pounder Guns	pcs.	6			pcs.	14
							20 pcs.
-)	Ammunition, 2 Pdr.					pcs.	2164
							2164 pcs.
3	Ammunition, 20 m/m Cannon	c/s	5	c/s	104	c/s	100
							209 c/s
4	Ammunition, 47 m/m Cannon			c/s	620		
							620 c/s
5	Trench Mortars, 81 m/m	c/s	15	c/s	14	c/s	4
							33 c/s
6	Bombs, Mortar 81 m/m	c/s	517	c/s	1102	c/s	68
							1687 c/s
7	Artillery and Mortar Accessories, Tools, etc.	c/s	4	c/s	6	c/s	677
							687 c/s
8	Rifles	pcs.	9988	pcs.	512	pcs.	8432
							18932 pcs.
9	Ammunition, Rifle 6.5 m/m	c/s	1552%	c/s	102	c/s	801
							2455 >/2 c/s
10	Anti-tank Rifles, "BOYS"						
11	Ammunition Anti-tank Rifle						
12	Automatic Rifles, "BREDA"						
	pcs.						
	72						
	c/s						
	-						
	pcs.						
	10						
	72 pcs.						
	54 c/s						
	10 pcs.						
	rr						
	C						
13	Machineguns, 8 m/m		pcs.		77	pcs.	247
							324 pcs.
14	Ammunition, Machinegun 8 m/m		c/s		221	c/s	690
							911 c/s
15	Sub Machineguns, "STEN" 9 m/m		pcs.		508	pcs.	1615
							2123 pcs.
16	Ammunition, Sub Machinegun 9 m/m		c/s		99	c/s	327
							426 c/s
17	Machineguns, 6.5 m/m	pcs.	95	pcs.	73	pcs.	167
							335 pcs.
18	Ammunition, Machineguns 6.5 m/m	c/s	384	c/s	97	c/s	395
							876 c/s
19	Machinegun Accessories, Tools etc.		c/s		327	c/s	105
							432 c/s
20	Magazines spare, Machineguns		c/s		41	c/s	48
							89 c/s
21	Hand Grenades, "Mills bombs"		c/s		2468	c/s	4163
							6631 c/s
22	Mines, Land		c/s		162	c/s	349
							511 c/s
23	Anti-tank Mines		pcs.			pcs.	5140
							5140 pcs.
24	Shrapnel Mines					c/s	2138
							2138 c/s
25	Explosives		c/s		30		
							30 c/s

26	Ammunition Pouches	pcs.	340	pcs.	1103	1443 pcs.
27	Fieldpacks	c/s	50			50 c/s
28	Pickets 0.500 & 2.000m.	pcs.	3948	pcs.	1200	5148 pcs.
29	Barbed Wire, "Dannert"	coils	692	coils	142	834 coils

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CARGO shipped to:
National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia from OCTOBER
Bari and Monopoli, Italy 15, Oct.-31, Dec. 1943 UNIT 1943
-fe.
NOVEMBER DECEMBER
UNIT 1943 UNIT 1943
TOTAL

30	Stores, Miscellaneous	pckg.	187	pckg.	16	pckg.	4	207 pckg.
31	Tobacco, Cigarettes					c/s	338	338 c/s
32	Medical Supplies	c/s tons	45 5	c/s	382	c/s	37	454 c/s 5 tons
33	Motor Vehicles, Lorries, w/t Trucks					cars	7	7 cars
34	Motor Cycles			pcs.	2			2 pcs.
35	Coal			tons	12	tons	90	102 tons
36	Gasoline, 100 Octane in barrels @ 45 gallons	barrels	181	barrels	1212	barrels	1380	2773 barrels
37	Gasoline, 100 Octane in cans @ 4 gallons					cans	224	224 cans
38	Gasoline, 80 Octane in barrels (w 45 gallons			barrels	371	barrels	103	474 barrels
39	Gasoline, 80 Octane in cans @ 4 gallons	cans	178			cans	25	203 cans
40	Oil, Diesel in barrels (a 45 gallons	barrels	31	barrels	1225	barrels	442	1678 barrels
41	Oil, Diesel in cans (a 4 gallons	cans	525	cans	1477			2002 cans
42	Kerosene	barrels cans		barrels cans	17	barrels cans	54 171	71 barrels 171 cans
43	Flour	bags	798	bags	10670	bags	2090	13558 bags

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44 Sugar
45 Margarine
46 Olive Oil in barrels
47 Olive Oil in drums
48 Milk
bags
208
bags
108
bags
c/s
254
c/s
715

19
barrels
drums
1682 drums
84
drums
572
c/s
992
c/s
2360
1031 bags
273 c/s
11 barrels
2338 drums
3352 c/s

49	Bisquits, tons and cases	cases tons	10	cases tons	12	cases tons	10281	10281 c/s 10 tons
Si)	Meat, Preserved			c/s	263	c/s	9368	9631 c/s
5 1	Misc. Food tinned					c/s	9864	9864 c/s
Si	Dehydrated Food					bags	3420	3420 bags
-S3	Misc. Food	cases tons	3566 10	cases tons	2568	cases	1677	78 1 cases 10 tons
S4	Clothing, Battle Dress, Greatcoats Woollens	bales	290	bales	1063 1/2	bales	2344	3697 Vi bales
55	Shoes, G. 1. pairs	bales	256	bales	450	bales	619	1325 bales
Total estimated cargo in tons (a 2240 lbs. shipped on 60 ships as from 15 Oct. 1943 to 31 Dec. 1943			685 tons		2475 tons		2079 tons	5239 tons 6500 tons gross

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BACKGROUND

Since 1942 British military agencies based at Cairo had maintained contacts in the Balkans primarily through observers and liaison officers who had been parachuted to the Headquarters of leaders of resistance groups notoriously active against Axis occupation forces.

British officers of "Special Force 133" had been stationed for a considerable period of time with both General Mihailovic (Chetniks) and Marshal Tito (Partizans) by the time Special Operations Branch of the OSS became actively interested in Yugoslavia in the summer of 1943.

A supply line from North Africa by air had been established and plane loads of military equipment were being flown alternately to Mihailovic and Tito to be dropped over prearranged pinpoints in the interior of Yugoslavia.

Since the middle East was a British theater of War, OSS Cairo was entirely dependent on the British for air transport and other facilities. When OSS officers were parachuted to the Headquarters of Mihailovic and Tito in August 1943, they were attached to British military missions commanded by Brigadier Generals already stationed there.

All information from these allied missions was pooled at Cairo, where cooperation between the OSS and "Special Force 133" was cordially close, although American penetration into the Balkans was watched with a certain apprehension by the English.

From records available at Cairo in September 1943 it was evident that interesting developments had taken place in Yugoslavia. At that time, King Peter and his exiled government moved from London to Cairo from where they kept in touch with Mihailovic.

Tito and his Partizan forces, intensely active against Axis occupation troops in Western Yugoslavia, had virtually gained control over the Dalmatian coast shortly after the surrender of Italy. The Partizans had taken much valuable equipment from surrendering Italian divisions and were fighting the Germans, who were taking over the occupation of former Italian-controlled areas and establishing garrisons along a main line of large cities and main roads extending roughly from Fiume and Susak in the North to Dubrovnik in the South.

The Partizans had been welded into organized military strength: The National Liberation Army. The passive attitude of Mihailovic, docile to the point of actually cooperating with the Axis in various instances, coupled with a growing popular resentment against the King and the exiled government, had served to enhance Tito's popularity as a leader and helped his National Liberation movement gather momentum.

His originally communistic party, the most forcefully organized underground movement, after the fall of Yugoslavia, had served to unite the majority of Yugoslav resistance groups in the West. Now all races and creeds of the Balkans were to be found in Tito's ranks, attracted by his policy of immediate, all-out resistance against enemy occupation.

For once in Balkan history, a coordinated and spirited popular movement, embracing all the bewildering factors in Balkan traditions, internal difficulties, and civil strife seemed to be underway identifying itself in the common will of a great part of the population of Yugoslavia to fight enemy suppression.

All intelligence reports available at Cairo with OSS and "Special Force 133" seemed to confirm the above situation — Mihailovic's star was on its way down. In October 1943 it was obviously eclipsed by the red star of Tito.

OSS CONTACT WITH TITO VIA ITALY PLANNING

In view of the situation in Yugoslavia in September 1943, as outlined above, General William J. Donovan approved a plan concerning aid to Tito's Partizan forces. The plan was placed before the General by OSS officers of the Special Operations Branch, M.E., during a meeting in Algiers the 16th September 1943.

The plan was, roughly, to establish an advanced OSS base on the Adriatic Coast of Italy by having officers of SO, M.E. follow the British Eighth Army, then fighting its way up the "Heel" of Italy and select a suitable site from which contact could be made with the National Liberation Army in Dalmatia with a view to organizing a supply line across the Adriatic Sea.

According to well-established procedure in the Middle East Theater of War, such an operation would be a joint British-American effort.

MISSION

In the first days of October 1943, OSS officers proceeded to Italy via Algiers. Details with regard to Anglo-American cooperation were to be worked out at Cairo upon the return of a British survey party, which was to follow the OSS officers to Italy during the first half of October. By a fortunate coincidence, the American officers enroute to Italy came into contact with two Partizan delegates who had arrived in Algiers simultaneously with the Americans.

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After having registered their mission and obtained the approval of AFHQ in Algiers with the consent of representatives of the British "Special Force 133", the Americans proceeded to Bari, Italy, accompanied by the Partizan delegates.

Records are already at hand at OSS, Cairo, and OSS, SO, Washington reporting fully on operations carried out relative to this mission during October 1943. For reference's sake, a short synopsis of same is given on page 11 of this report.

PERSONNEL

The following OSS officers proceeded to Bari in connection with the mission:

Major Louis Huot, U.S. Inf. Lt. R.E.S. Thompson, A.U.S. They were joined at Bari on 19 October by: Captain Hans Tofte, A.U.S.

SYNOPSIS OF OPERATIONS October 1943

13 October First reconnaissance operation across the Adriatic is carried out by Major L. Huot in the H.M.S. "Seahawk" placed at his disposal by the Royal Navy.

15 October First Partizan ship leaves Bari for Dalmatia with 100 tons of mixed cargo obtained from British naval authorities.

16 October Second reconnaissance operation across the Adriatic is carried out by OSS officers, Major L. Huot and Lt. R.E.S. Thompson, in R.A.F. crash boat commanded by F/Lt. J. Wall.

Contact is made with Col. Ilic of Partizan VIII Army Corps.

A British Naval Base is established at Vis on OSS initiative after agreement with Comdr. Welmann, Coastel Forces Western Mediterranean.

21 October Capt. Tofte & Lt. Thompson organize Partizan fleet of 24 ships as well as Partizan base at Bari.

22 October Third reconnaissance operation across the Adriatic is carried out by Major L. Huot, who penetrates to Tito's Headquarters at Jajce.

Loadings at Bari are carried on, ships sailing regularly for Yugoslavia with cargo obtained from "Special Force 133" in Algiers.

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700 tons of flour are obtained from AMGOT. A Parti steamer is sent to Brindisi to sail this cargo to Bari for tri shipment to Yugoslavia.

29 October Meeting with General Gubbins of "Special Force 13 London, visiting Bari where the British are now setting I base.

The General recognizes OSS initiative in regard to orga ing the supply line Italy-Yugoslavia. Promises British operation.

30 October Fourth reconnaissance operation across the Adriatic is cai out by Lt. Thompson

OSS, SO SHIPPING OPERATON Italy — Yugoslavia

After completion of the first contact — operations in October and initial work in connection with the establishment of an OSS-Partizan si ping base at Bari, Italy, Major L. Huot was transferred from his post, his way to Cairo, he was instrumental in obtaining the release of 7,0001 of captured enemy materiel in Sicily at AFHQ in Algiers. This materiel placed at the disposal of the joint OSS-SOE Mission with a view to ak the National Liberation Army in Yugoslavia.

Captain H. Tofte was appointed Chief of Shipping Operations; R.E.S. Thompson was appointed executive Officer. The management ol Partizan ships and the Partizan personnel stationed at the shipping bas Bari, all movements of supplies on the sea transport route to Yugosl and the immediate liaison with the Partizan delegation at Bari were ex sively an OSS, SO, responsibility.

An OSS headquarters, known as "Hq., SLS, Bari" was in the proce: being organized under the command of Lt. Comdr. T. McBaine, US and later Major R. Koch, U.S. Signal Corps.

PARTIZAN BASE Bari

On November 1st 1943, the Partizan shipping base in the Port of was situated at Berth No. 2 where one steamer was used as base ship fo fleet of 25 vessels under Partizan flag. These ships had been taken ov(the responsible OSS officers in the name of the Allied Commande280

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Chief and were held by Partizan crews on his behalf, according to arrangements made with representatives of the Mediterranean Shipping Board.

A permanent staff of one hundred Partizan dock laborers and armed guards was maintained at Bari under the command of the two OSS officers in question but headed by a Partizan delegation accredited for this work by Tito. Owing to an acute shortage of OSS personnel in M.E., no further American officers could be assigned to duty with "Shipping Operations" until the beginning of December 1943 with the exception of one American Captain who had originally parachuted to Tito's Headquarters at Jajce. He was later stationed in Dalmatia.

During November and December, the Partizan base at Bari developed and expanded with unforeseen rapidity. The fleet soon numbered some 40 vessels from steamers too large for clandestine operations to small schooners averaging 100 tons cargo capacity.

The permanent personnel increased during November and December to 600 men. Loadings were carried out on a rapidly increasing scale, all by Partizan labor under the most primitive conditions.

The work at the base included all the many details and unexpected problems in connection with operating a fleet of ships: bunkering, watering, fueling and provisioning; the transport of cargoes and

personnel; tallying and accounting; the housing, clothing and feeding of the permanent staff of members of the delegation, dock laborers and armed guards. Rations were drawn from the Royal Navy.

Repairs and maintenance of ships were carried out only with the greatest difficulty owing to the scarcity of essential spare parts and ships stores.

Flag Officer Taranto, Royal Navy, stationed a "Staff Officer Special Operations" at Navy House, Bari, with whom a close liaison was maintained at all times. Courses had to be planned with great care; the Partizan captains had to be briefed in minute detail in order to make the greatest possible use of the hours of darkness during their 24-hour run across the Adriatic, and the Navy and Air Force had to be kept informed about the movements of ships.

Working hours at the Shipping Base at Bari averaged 16-18 hours a day.

BASE AT Vis

According to agreement with Tito, a Partizan Economic Delegation had been stationed on the Island of Vis to take care of the reception and distribution of Allied supplies from Italy. In order to secure the complete

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OSS control of the shipping line, it was necessary to station an American liaison officer there to supervise the turn-around of the ships from Bari.

Early in November, Cap. H. Toft visited Dalmatia, contacted Cap. M. O. Benson, formerly stationed at Tito's Headquarters at Jajce, and after having cemented the already cordial relations with Partizan commands in the Islands, the two OSS officers landed at Vis.

Captain Benson remained there throughout the operation and maintained a remarkably successful liaison with Partizan authorities at Vis, as well as with the Partizan Naval Headquarters at Hvar. Many valuable intelligence reports were received in Italy from Captain Benson regarding up-to-date developments in Yugoslavia.

No supplies were at any time permitted to pile up at Vis from where a large fleet of local tonnage distributed the cargoes efficiently and adequately to other islands and to the mainland even during the heaviest German occupation of the coastline. The ships would arrive at Vis shortly before daylight, drop anchor in various coves and fjords where waiting Partizans would immediately camouflage them by covering them with quantities of freshly cut foliage.

The vessels would hide out during the day and proceed into the harbour the following night to discharge their cargoes under cover of darkness. German aircraft patrolled Vis regularly during the daytime.

SUPPLIES

The establishment of the Shipping Line from Italy to Yugoslavia had been unexpectedly swift. The establishment of adequate depots of bulk supplies from North Africa and Sicily developed but slowly. As a result, the newly organized Partizan fleet operated under a severe handicap after the first 600 tons of supplies obtained from the Royal Navy and "Special Force 133", Algiers, had been forwarded to Yugoslavia.

Local sources, such as AMGOT, various British military authorities, and the Adriatic Base Depot of the U.S. Army were most helpful and contributed substantially to the cargoes shipped to Yugoslavia in October and November. On one occasion, AMGOT released 700 tons of food; on another occasion, British "Q. Section" released 1,000 tons of mixed cargo to the OSS officers of "Shipping Operations." Meanwhile, arrangements for regular supply routes from North Africa were being organized in order to meet the Allied commitment of 2,000 tons monthly to the Partizans. Priority for this quantity was obtained from the Mediterranean Shipping Board, however, when it was learned in Bari that the transportation of the

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7,000 tons of captured enemy materiel in Sicily would be delayed owing to shortage of tonnage;

"Shipping Operations" immediately organized their own line between Italy and Sicily, serviced by the largest available steamers and sailing vessels of the Partizan fleet.

OSS Captain Gordon Browne was already in Sicily with officers of "Special Force 133" to supervise the sorting and preparing of cargoes at Palermo, Syracuse and Catania. Captain Brown later returned to Bari with a convoy of 30 loaded trucks. On the way back he was severely injured in a motor accident when his car plunged over the side of a mountain road into a ravine.

"Special Force 133" was organizing large new depots at the Port of Monopoli some 30 miles South of Bari. These depots were ready by the end of December 1943.

According to agreement with Tito regarding priorities for needed supplies, "Shipping Operations" endeavored to arrange the average 100 ton cargo in equal parts of:

1. Clothing and shoes;
2. Food and medical supplies; and
3. Arms and ammunition.

Besides, cargoes of coal, diesel oil, kerosene and gasoline were carried across to Vis to cover the needs of local Partizan tonnage and transportation, and deck cargoes aggregating approximately 150,000 gallons of hundred octane gasoline were shipped to the Naval Base at Vis primarily established on OSS initiative in agreement with Comdr. E. Wellmann, Coastal Forces Western Mediterranean.

This fuel was chiefly obtained from local Allied depots at Bari in cooperation with the Royal Navy.

SECURITY

Military security at Bari was non-existent for a considerable period of time after the establishment of the Partizan Shipping Base. The base was conspicuous, to say the least, and the OSS officers in charge of operations were known by name everywhere in Bari and beyond. The lack of security was not only deplorable but dangerous.

An armed member of a "Royal Yugoslav Committee" forced his way into the Quarters of the Partizan Delegation and threatened the lives of the members of the delegation and "the American bandits" who operated the Partizan fleet in the Adriatic. This committee was in due course diplomatically run out of town.

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War correspondents, both British and American, were regular visitors to the Shipping Base at Bari, as were members of military and other Allied and Italian organizations. The Italian Port Commandant officially in charge of the Port of Bari was a former Fascist with a black record of atrocities during the Italian occupation of Dalmatia. Thirty-four enemy agents with secret wireless sets were arrested in Bari during the early part of November.

There were absolutely no secrets about the OSS-Partizan shipping activities from Bari to Yugoslavia. It was at the time considered the most spectacular effort based on Bari and a considerable amount of publicity centered around the busy base — a publicity which can be expected to have reached far beyond Italy. No security officers were available at Bari at the time they were most needed.

[Page 20 is missing in the files]

steamer, the position of which had been reported from the base at Vis.

OSS and Partizan officers would at all times find space available on Royal Naval craft whenever needed, and the Shipping Base at Bari provided Yugoslav pilots for the Navy.

COOPERATION

with "Special Force"

According to directive from Cairo, the Allied aid to Tito and his National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia was a joint Allied undertaking. Since, however, the initial operations in the Adriatic had been started by the OSS and the contact with Yugoslavia across the sea had been opened up by OSS officers, the control of all operations carried out on the sea transport line remained an American, OSS, responsibility.

Thanks to abundant personnel, especially of field ranking officers, "Special Force 133" was able to take a great part in many of the responsibilities which grew up on all sides in connection with and as a direct result of the establishment of the Partizan supply line.

"Special Force 133" played a very large part in the organizing of depots for bulk supplies, the collecting and sorting of materiel in Sicily, the hospitalization of wounded Partizans of whom 800

were sailed to Italy from Dalmatia, the organizing of refugee camps for the thousands of refugees evacuated to Italy, and numerous other enterprises.

As far as "Shipping Operations" were concerned, the British tried in

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many subtle ways to gain control over the sailings and thus over the Partizan fleet and the deliveries of supplies to Yugoslavia.

It is at least of academic interest to note that if these attempts had not been diplomatically and persistently realized, the American side of the OSS-SOE partnership would have rapidly decreased in importance. Also, the speed of the operation would beyond any doubt have decreased considerably.

SHIPPING OPERATIONS November — December 1943

Sailings from Bari to Vis were carried out regularly through November and December 1943. As the work increased, the base kept expanding accordingly; all clerical work was being taken care of by a selected staff of experienced Partizan key men who were in charge of various branches of the operation under the supervision of either Captain Tofte or Lt. Thompson. Extensive and exact records were kept of all shipments with a view to post-war settlements of accounts.

At times when supplies were plentiful, loadings were carried out day and night without interruption; at other times ships would be held up by the Port's being closed for short periods owing to mines sown in the harbour entrance by enemy planes.

During one critical week in November, one British destroyer, one fleet minesweeper and a Partizan four-hundred ton schooner were mined off the Port of Bari. On each occasion, Partizan and American personnel of the Shipping operation took part in the rescue work in the minefield and received a commendation from the Royal Navy for their efforts.

In the beginning of December Bari was heavily bombed by enemy aircraft and severe damage was inflicted in the harbour area. Seventeen large cargo vessels were destroyed; however, no Partizan losses were sustained. Throughout the night of the bombing, American personnel and Partizans of the Shipping Operation worked voluntarily in the Port, removing dangerous cargo from the docks and taking active part in the rescue work among the burning and exploding ships under extremely hazardous conditions.

A report on the heroic behavior of Lt. Thompson on this occasion has been handed to the Commanding Officer, HQ., SBS, Bari, by the Chief of Shipping Operations.

Immediately after the bombing, Lt. Thompson proceeded to the Island of Hvar onboard the Partizan gunboat "Krka", which had been taken over

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from the Italian Navy and been repaired and outfitted with guns and ammunition at Bari. The gunboat was handed over to the Partizan Naval HQ. at Hvar. It was later dive-bombed by enemy aircraft and sunk.

On his return, Lt. Thompson handed in a full intelligence report concerning the new government of Yugoslavia proclaimed by Marshal Tito (Josip Broz) on December 5th. The OSS Lieutenant had attended a mass meeting at Hvar, had interviewed the new foreign minister, Dr. Josip Smodlaka, and had obtained all data regarding this new and important development.

In the beginning of December, the Commanding Officer of the OSS HQ at Bari visited the Shipping Base in the Port, and shortly afterwards two OSS officers were assigned to duty at the base, thereby increasing the American personnel to five.

The additional personnel were: Lt. Ward Ellen, USNR, and Lt. John Hamilton, USMC.

MAINTENANCE SECTION

Lt. Ellen established a maintenance section at the Port of Molfetta ten miles North of Bari, where two dockyards were requisitioned for the use of "Shipping Operations." There, he operated a Partizan repair base with a crew of Partizan shipwrights from Dalmatia.

Thanks to the efforts of Lt. Ward Ellen, the ships of the fleet were kept in the best possible running order and formerly inactive steamers and sailing vessels were brought into action. Towards the end of December, Shipping Operations at one time managed to have twenty ships at sea simultaneously, including vessels enroute to Sicily.

MONOPOLI BASE

Lt. John Hamilton left Bari in the middle of December with a base steamer and sixty Partizans to open up a new shipping base at Monopoli, a small port some 30 miles South of Bari where the British "Special Force 133" had organized large supply depots and were in the process of collecting bulk supplies which were beginning to arrive in quantity from North Africa. These supplies were drawn from Allied stores and were chiefly of British origin.

During the week 12-19 December, loadings were carried out both at Bari and Monopoli. Twelve ships were sailed across to Yugoslavia carrying close to 1,000 tons of cargo during that week, although sailings from Bari were hampered by nightly air raid alarms and enemy activity had increased

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to a considerable extent both along the sea route and in the territory adjacent to the Vis base.

On 19 December, the Partizan shipping base was evacuated from Bari and moved to Monopoli. A new 2,000 ton base ship had been acquired, also an Italian palazzo had been requisitioned as Partizan barracks and Headquarters for Partizan and OSS officers.

Dr. Smodlaka, Foreign Minister of Tito's new Yugoslav government, arrived in Monopoli and was established in another Headquarters by OSS officers. Many Partizan officials were by then travelling back and forth between Yugoslavia and Italy and were accommodated either by general officers of "Special Force 133" or the Partizan Headquarters at Monopoli. (An official letter from Dr. Smodlaka, addressed to Capt. H. Tofte in the name of Tito's government of Yugoslavia is attached to this report). During the latter part of December 1943 sailings were carried out from Monopoli. Winter storms in the Adriatic hampered the shipping to some degree; ships were weatherbound in various ports enroute to Yugoslavia for longer or shorter periods of time and the move from Bari to Monopoli had lengthened the sea route so that it was necessary to make the run across to Vis in two hops. This necessitated the establishment of a Partizan shipping base at Manfredonia as a checking post on the route.

Between Christmas and New Years, Lt. John Hamilton made a reconnaissance trip to the Islands to obtain the latest intelligence concerning enemy activity in the area of immediate interest to the shipping line and to replace Cap. M. O. Benson, who had been called to HQ. at Cairo on 20 December.

The Germans invaded the Island of Korcula and threatened the Islands of Sholta, Brae and Hvar around Christmastime. Lt. Hamilton returned on New Years Eve and reported in detail on these enemy operations. British naval activity was intensified among the Islands. The Partizans foresaw the fall of Sholta, Brae and Hvar but were determined to hold Vis and the supply base. British military authorities had promised to assist in the holding of Vis; OSS was preparing to dispatch OG troops to take part in the defense of Vis.

The shipping line was seriously threatened but carried on without interruption of sailings. Shipment No. 60 left Monopoli immediately after New Years, bringing the total of cargo shipped since the middle of October to 5,239 tons net — an estimated 6,500 tons gross.

As a result of the German attacks in the Islands, Vis was crowded with thousands of refugees who became an acute military problem as preparations for the defense of that Island were hastened.

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During the first weeks of January 1944 all Partizan steamers and sailing vessels were engaged in evacuating refugees from Dalmatia to Italy; even the 2,000 ton base ship "Ljubjana" was activated and sailed to the Islands under Royal Navy escort.

TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL

In the beginning of January 1944, Capt. H. Tofte, Lt. R.E.S. Thompson, and Lt. J. Hamilton were transferred from "Shipping Operations" to other duties.

FINANCE

The operations covered by this report were financed by HQ, SBS, Bari, from where funds were drawn at regular intervals and handed over to Partizan accountants who kept all books and records in connection with the shipping operations.

A letter from the Chief of the Partizan delegation addressed to Lt. R.E.S. Thompson is attached to this report, serving as receipt for U.S. \$27,950. used in financing the operation up to 15 January 1944.

Contents of the letter speaks for itself.

RECAPITULATION OF CARGO

Recapitulation of total cargo shipped to Yugoslavia during the period 15 October to 31 December 1943 is attached to this report, giving all details about fifty-five different items shipped.

Copies of this specified statement are held by representatives of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia.

APPENDICES

Dr. Josip Smodlaka

1. January 1944

COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Monopoli

COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA

No: 4/44

Dear Captain,

Upon arrival in Italy I feel very glad to be able to thank you personally for your kindness towards my family when it arrived at Monopoli, and I ask

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you to be good enough to pass on my thanks to Lieutenants Thompson and Hamilton. —

At the same time I am pleased to let you know about my absolute satisfaction with the organization of the Yugoslav base at Monopoli, which I inspected in my capacity of Commissar of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia.

I have ascertained that this base has been able — thanks to you and your colleagues of the United States Army — to continue with complete success the dispatch of War materials and food to Yugoslavia, a task started under the alert direction of Major L. Huot.

In the hope that nothing will be able to disturb the perfect collaboration now in actual existence between the delegates of our Army and the representatives of our great Ally, The United States of America, I express the hope that you and your valiant assistants, Capt. Benson and Lieutenants Thompson, Hamilton, Geer & Ellen will continue and be able to bring to a fine conclusion your efforts towards the final victory of the United Nations over our common enemy.

I ask you, dear Captain, to accept the expression of profound gratitude, which I address to you in the name of the Government of Yugoslavia, and at the same time the assurance of my high esteem. —

DR. JOSIP SMODLAKA

(sign) To: Hans V. Tofte,

Captain of the Army of The United States, Monopoli, Italy.

10. December 1943 To: Captain M. Benson

From: Captain H. Tofte Subject: Shipping Operations.

1. According to directive under which the OSS/SOE shipping operations between Italy and Yugoslavia are carried out, said operations are exclusively a O.S.S., SO. responsibility.

2. The O.S.S. officers operating the shipping in question are: Captain Hans Tofte, Chief of Shipping Operations 1st Lt. R.E.S. Thompson Executive Officer Ship. Opr. 1st Lt. W. Ellen i/c Maintenance of vessels

2nd Lt. J. Hamilton i/c Loading and Dispatch of ships

Captain M. Benson Liaison Officer at Vis & Hvar.

3. Complete list of ships as per today's date attached for your guidance.

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4. Today's Ships Position list attached for your guidance.

5. According to arrangements made to ensure communication between this base and yourself during Lt. Thompson's recent visit to the islands we shall inform you by wireless of all sailings from here simultaneously stating ETA for each vessel as well as description of cargo carried.

6. Likewise you are to inform this base by wireless about all return sailings from your port or other ports in the islands.

7. Your duties are as heretofore:

(a) To maintain satisfactory liaison with the Partizan Economic Delegation sent to the islands by Marshall Tito and now stationed at Vis i/c of reception and distribution of supplies.

(b) To maintain satisfactory liaison with Naval, Military and political commands on the islands.

- (c) To supervise — in cooperation with the proper Partizan authority — the off loading, camouflate and return dispatch of all vessels arriving with supplies from Italy.
 - (d) To supervise that adequate local tonnage is available at all times for distribution of supplies.
 - (e) To send to this base a weekly report on shipping activities, conforming wireless messages and giving an accurate picture of the current situation in the islands from a shipping point of view.
 - (f) To send to this base all information and military intelligence, which you may pick up through the liaison outlined in p. "a" and "b".
 - (g) To send to this base every suggestion which may serve to enhance the efficiency of Shipping Operations in question. —
 - (h) To keep a record of cargo landed at Vis by obtaining
- As regards our cable dated 9.Dec. 1943 ordering you to hold up all sailings from the islands until you received further instructions, take due notice of the following:
- A. As from today you should visit every captain before he sails from your port and brief him as follows:
1. Make sure he knows the new route. You must obtain same from the Captain of m/v ORIEN, who is due to arrive on 13. Dec. 1943.
 2. Make sure he sails immediately it is dark, not before and not later. It is essential that he aims at being as close to the Italian coast as possible by daylight.
 3. Give absolute orders to the effect that under no circumstances must any ship attempt to enter a port on the coast of Italy after dark. The Navy has flat orders to shoot without asking questions, and they shoot to sink. Ships which cannot make port till after dark must heave to for

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the night, and as regards the port of Bari, ships arriving late must keep well clear of the harbour, say 10 miles (rpt. ten miles). All ships from now on should sail to Monopoli as we are in the process of shifting the shipping base to that port, where Lt. Hamilton is temporarily in charge.

All Captains must be questioned by you upon arrival at Vis about enemy activity observed, if any. Radio us any "gen" which we should know in planning sailings, routes, etc. — All vessels leaving your port should sail only the route given to the Captain of m/v ORIEN until further notice. (Ref: par.

1) For your information the m/v SLOBODA, a newcomer, had a very narrow escape when she attempted to enter the port of Bari the other night. She was nearly sunk and, of course, placed under arrest. Confirm receipt of this letter of instructions at your earliest possible convenience by safe hand, addressed to the undersigned.

B.

BARI, Italy Nov. 28.1943 REPORT on voyage Bari-Vis-Bari.

Objective: To escort Partisan supply vessel S/S GALEB to Vis and inspect facilities made, available for camouflage and discharging of her cargo. Also, to obtain latest news regarding the present situation in Dalmatia. Submitted by: CAPT. HANS TOFTE, A.U.S.

Nov.25.1943

0200 hrs. Boarded H.M.L. 286 in the harbour of Bari.

0600 hrs. H.M.L.386 sailed Bari on norhterly course along the coast of Italy.

Sighted squadron of 26 "Mitchell" bombers flying East.

Sighted same squadron returning towards Italy.

Arrived at rendezvous point and kept lookout for the S/S "GALEB".

Sighted and contacted same off Vieste; commenced escorting. Weather changing; strong westerly wind, heavy sea. Left S/S "GALEB" and set course for Vis island, E.T.A. 2300 hrs.

2100 hrs. Strong westerly gale, very heavy seas, position estimated as "somewhere South of Vis island".

Nov.26.1943

0145 hrs. Starboard engine dead owing to water in gasoline tanks.

1100 hrs. 1130 hrs. 1200 hrs.

1300 hrs. 1600 hrs. 1800 hrs.

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0215 hrs. Port engine dead for same reason.

0217 hrs. Radio dead. Ship rolling helplessly drifting before the gale at an estimated speed of 2-3 knots. Position, say: 15 miles South of Vis off coast of Korcula. Situation serious.

0300 hrs. Radio repaired. "SOS" dispatched to Navy House, Bari, giving approximate position and asking for fighter protection by daylight.

The S/S "GALEB" sighted 4-5 miles to port of the "386". Unable to signal her owing to her lack of radio equipment. Sighted Motor Torpedo boat "298". Position now: some 25 miles South of Vis drifting in general direction of Dubrovnik. M.T.B. "298" alongside to take the H.M.L. "386" in tow. Towing commenced, course northerly for Vis harbour. S/S "GALEB" still in sight to port. Sighted aircraft, all guns manned.

Aircraft passed abaft of "386", veered off to starboard and set course for Yugoslav coast.

Aircraft circled, the S/S "GALEB" and returned towards the "386".

Aircraft came in behind "386", veered off to starboard and set course for Yugoslav coast. Aircraft sighted, all guns manned.

Aircraft identified as "Boston" light bomber and believed to be our protection. Weather now clear, sea still heavy. M.T.B. "298" towing H.M.L. "386" arrived at Vis harbour. S/S "GALEB" arrived at Vis and anchored at Stonchitsa anchorage for camouflage.-----

1430 hrs. Lunch with Captain Benson, AUS, Lt. Co. Street, SOE, Captain Pears, SOE, Cmdr. Karlic, Staff Officer, Partisan VIII Army Corps, and various British Naval Officers. (Report on reception of S/S "GALEB" and general shipping situation at Vis attached as Appendix #1).

1700 hrs. Meeting with Commander Savicevic Joko and his staff.

1800 hrs. Called on various officials in the company of Captain Benson.

1830 hrs. S/S "GALEB" entered port of Vis, moored alongside and commenced discharging. All preparations for labour, storage, stevedorage, etc. made satisfactorily by the local Partisans. The vessel to discharge throughout the night, shift to Stonchitsa cove at dawn and return into the harbour the following night to complete discharging.

07 h

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30 r

s

09 h

45 r

s

09 h

48 r

s

09 h

51 r

s

09 h

55 r

s

10 h
15 r
s
10 h
25 r
s
13 h
30 r
s
14 h
00 r
s

1930 hrs. Conference with Captain Benson and Captain Pears, SOE. 2230 hrs. Proceeded by Partisan motor boat to rendezvous position at the entrance to Vis bay to be picked up by M.T.B. coming from Hvar.

2345 hrs. Boarded M.T.B. "297" and met Colonel ManoJa of Partisan Command, Hvar, who was on his way to Bari to visit and inspect the Partisan Delegation there.

2400 hrs. M.T.B. "297" sailed for Bari. (Report on general situation, based upon conversations with Col. Manola, attached as Appendix #2).

Nov.27.1943

1130 hrs. Arrived at Bari.

APPENDIX #1.

SUBJECT: General Shipping Situation at Vis (Dalmatia). TO: CO., S.B.S., Bari.

1. The following is based upon personal observations in the field and conversations with Captain Benson, O.S.S., SO., now stationed at Vis as American Liaison Officer with the Partizan Shipping Committee.
 2. Attached: Copy of letter of instructions dated Nov. 17, 1943 from the undersigned to Capt. Benson concerning the s/s "GALEB".—
 3. The undersigned proceeded to Vis as per report covering voyage. It was found that all preparations had been duly made for the reception of above vessel, which was the first ship above 500 tons DWT to carry supplies from Italy to the Partizan base at Vis.
 4. Camouflage had been prepared at Stonchitsa anchorage, sufficient labour was standing by, some fifteen schooners and a number of small craft were available in the harbour and storage space had been adequately prepared ashore.
 5. s/s "GALEB" carrying approximately 500 tons mixed cargo of Food, Clothing, Arms, and Ammunition represented the 25th shipment made by OSS/SOE to the Partizans since October 16th, 1943.
 6. The Partizan Committee at Vis has proved itself capable of handling our shipments efficiently and without undue delays.
 7. Distribution of supplies to other islands and the Mainland has been carried out regularly and no stocks have been allowed to pile up at Vis. It is estimated that sufficient inter-island and coastal tonnage is available to handle shipments up to 1000 tons weekly.
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- g. Adequate storage space is likewise available at Vis for shipments on above scale.
 9. Local craft has been loading regularly at Vis and is at present running cargo to the mainland at the rate of up to 50 tons nightly. In spite of recent German seizure of the Dalmatian coast, the fall of Podgura and the cutting of the inland road from there, three pinpoints are at this moment in operation on the coast and mule and donkey caravans handle the overland haul.
 10. No enemy aircraft has been sighted over Vis for several weeks.

11. The Partizans are endeavouring to adhere strictly to the agreement: that all vessels above 100 tons cargo capacity service the Bari-Vis route, whereas all smaller tonnage remain in Dalmatia.

12. The Partizans have dispatched fuel to places where suitable shipping is lying in hiding, for instance in the area of Ist. (m/v "JADRAN" and the m/v "MORAVA" 350 tons and 180 tons respectively have already arrived in Bari from Ist. Five more vessels are reported en route to Bari).

13. The relations between the local American liaison officer and the Partizans are most cordial. Also, the relations between this officer and the British L.O., Captain Pears, SOE, are satisfactory.

14. The Partizans insist on Vis as the ONLY agreed port of destination for shipments from Bari.—
(sgd) Hans Tofte Capt. AUS

November 17, 1943 To: Captain Benson

From: Captain Tofte Subject: Sailing of 500 tons cargo vessel to your port.

Today I handed a signal to ISLD for you via Minchall, reading as follows:

"Through Minchall you will receive details and measurements concerning 530 tons cargo steamer GALEB which will discharge at Vis early next week. Utmost secrecy and local security essential. Elaborate and exact arrangements camouflage, labour, transport, storage necessary. Please see only top local men emphasizing security angle."

The details regarding the ship are the following:

Length of steamer: 44Vi meters

Width max. of steamer: 11A meters

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Load Weight of steamer: 620 tons Cargo Capacity: 530 tons

Draught, loaded: 13 ft. (estimated)

Speed, at present: 4-4Vi knots

As you will understand, it is quite a ticklish business to send a ship of that size and speed to Vis, however, the present situation on the islands seems to warrant the operation. Complete secrecy is essential and you must take all steps to ensure local security. In the course we shall inform you as to the exact E.T.A., the course of the ship will be laid on with great care, and we expect cooperation from the Navy and the Air Force with regard to some sort of protection at sea and fighter cover during the approach to the islands. We hope to sail her Sunday; however, this is not yet definite. Her cargo will include some 15 mortars and some 12000 rds. Mortar bombs. (In this connection please note, that fuses for mortar bombs as usual are packed separately as will be indicated in the manifest). Besides she will carry machine guns with ammo, clothing, food, etc.

You must arrange for: (a) a place to put her in the harbor, (b) very elaborate camouflage material in large quantities, (c) labour, (d) transport of cargo after discharge, (e) storage space and adequate camouflage in case of open air storage, also (f) local tonnage to be available for distribution to other islands or the mainland.

For your information: the ship has steam winches. I would suggest to take the following steps and lay on the show somewhat like this:

.... select a good anchorage. Have some 8 or 10 local schooners handy at time of arrival and have two at a time, or perhaps 4, go alongside the steamer. Discharge straight from the holds onto the schooners, which can be sent alongside in fairly rapid rotation, stop discharging long enough before daylight to camouflage the ship effectively. The loaded schooners can be dispersed in the harbour and will look quite innocent. Continue the following night if necessary. (This is just a suggestion, you must work out the entire plan with the local Partisans and have everything laid on and everybody standing by as from Sunday.

The steamer must return here without undue delay. Also, all other ships dispatched from here must return without ANY delay, except the small fry. Please speed up the turn-around time as much as you can at all times.

APPENDIX #2.

REPORT ON GENERAL INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING DALMATIA

as per Nov. 26, 1943.

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SOURCE: Lt. Col. Srecko Manola, Vice Chief of Staff, H.Q. of Navy, National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, H v a r.

1 Present strength of Defence of islands in the area directly concerned with Bari-Vis supply line.

BRAC: 6 battalions — 4 batteries (66 m/m & 47 m/m pcs)

SHOLTA: 2 battalions — 1 battery VIS: 2 battalions — no batteries

HVAR: 6 battalions — 1 battery

KORCULA: 5 battalions — 4 batteries.

The strength of a Partizan battalion is 200-250 troops and a battery would average 1-3 guns at present fairly well supplied with ammunition for most pieces. Optical instruments, sights and range finders, however, are badly needed in order to enhance efficiency.

2. As regards details concerning the VIII Army Corps, ref. Major Huot's report with appendixes dated Nov. 8th 1943.

3. During recent weeks the Dalmatian coast has virtually fallen into the hands of the Germans. They hold all key positions along the coast and in the hinterland. As to the above mentioned area directly concerned with the Bari-Vis supply line a "pincers movement" is in progress having so far reached Drvenik Veliki island in the North and the whole of Peljasac Peninsular in the South, with ultimate rendezvous at Vis.

4. According to Col. Manola four German Divisions are now operating in Dalmatia: the 118th, 114th, 371st and 373rd (or 374th). None of these divisions are pure German but contain Chechs, Poles, French a.o. The S.S. Division "Prince Eugen", which was fighting on Peljasac recently is reportedly being replaced by the said 118th Division and withdrawn to Eastern Herzegovina.

German air strength in Dalmatia is — in Manola's opinion — very limited, however, it can at all times be reinforced quickly from the main German Air Force concentrations in Yugoslavia at Sarajevo and Zagreb.

German naval strength in the Adriatic is scarce, however, the Germans are attempting to secure their hold on "the inshore channel" Fiume-Zara-Sibenik. An ex-Yugoslav naval vessel, the "Dalmatia" of 2700 tons DWT, speed 17 knots and two torpedoboats as well as a number of small craft have moved South along the coast since the 20th November and are, it is believed, based at Sibenik. Likewise German E-boats are moving northwards from the South along the coast and 7 E-boats are at present stationed at Dubrovnik and adjacent ports.

To the question: "Why the Germans were hesitating in carrying their attack on Peljasac Peninsular on to the island of Korcula", Col. Manola

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replied that the main reason would seem to be German lack of shipping and secondly the presence of British naval craft in the waters around Sholta, Brae, Hvar, Vis & Korcula. 5. The Partizan view is, as set forth by Col. Manola, the following:

a. The German Divisions now operating in Dalmatia between the coast and the mountainous interior will almost exclusively depend on supplies by sea transport.

b. Partizan winter operation will to a great extent be aimed at isolating said divisions and prevent overland supply.

c. The Germans realize their position and are at present endeavouring to close the entire Dalmatian coast and seize all islands off this coast line in order to secure the inshore channel.

d. If they do not succeed in closing their 'pincers movement' at Vis, a critical break in their projected supply line will occur as the islands adjacent to Vis will serve as Partizan fortresses and allied naval bases. Also allied supplies will continue to reach the mainland in worthwhile quantities.

e. The Partizans therefore intend to hold the islands of Sholta, Brae, Hvar, Vis and Korcula "at all cost".

f. OSS/SOE are consequently endeavouring to assist their effort by:

I. Sending to the islands 2000 fully equipped Partizan P.O.W.'s

and Internees released ex camps in the vicinity of Bari. II. Rushing arms, ammunition, clothing, medical supplies and food to Vis in quantity (hence the operation with the slow and vulnerable s/s "Galeb" with a 500 tons cargo).

III. Establishing wireless contact between Italy and islands by shipping especially equipped W/T vehicles across.

IV. Evacuating wounded from Dalmatia to allied military hospitals in Southern Italy.

V. Organizing increased allied naval and air support ex Italian bases.

VI. Increase Allied-Partizan liaison on the mainland and pursue all possibilities for establishing supply lines Italy-Yugoslavia.

(s) Hans Tofte Captain, AUS

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APPENDIX #3

Partizan Organizations and Personnel concerned with the Bari-Vis supply line.

A. ECONOMIC DELEGATION OF G.H.Q.

Vis, Vis Island.

Major Savicevic Joko & Staff, accredited representatives of Tito sent to Vis to organize and control reception and distribution of all allied supplies arriving from Bari, Italy.

B. HEAD QUARTER OF NAVY, NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY OF YUGOSLAVIA,

Hvar, Hvar Island.

Uros Mardesic, Chief of Staff

Josip Cerny, Commander

Srecko Manola, Lt. Colonel, Vice Chief of Staff

Petar Radovic, Political Commissar.

This H.Q. stationed at Hvar on the island of Hvar are the military command for the Dalmatian coastal areas between the rivers Socha in the North and Boyana in the South as well as all islands in the Adriatic off this coast line.

The above H.Q. is directly responsible to G.H.Q., Tito's H.Q., Jajce.

The coastal areas referred to are divided into 6 districts of which 4 are organized at the present time with regard to military command and civil administration. The latter administration is taken care of by sub committees of the "Zavnoh", i.e. the Anti-Fascist Committee of National Liberation of Croatia.

District I not yet organized

District II Islands: Krk, Cres, Lussin, Rab; Karner Bay. District III Islands: Uglan, Pasman, Dugi; Zara area. District IV Islands: Sholta, Brae Hvar & Vis; adjacent coastline. District V Islands: Korcula, Mljet, Lastovo; adjacent coastline. District VI Kotor Bay, not yet organized.

C. H.Q. VIII ARMY CORPS, Livno.

Colonel Ilic & Staff.

Area of command: hinterland behind abovementioned coast areas in cooperation with the XIII Division in the North. This H.Q. is directly responsible to Head Quarter of National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, CROATIA.

(s) Hans Tofte

Capt., AUS

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Bari, January the 25th 1944 Dear Lt. Thompson:

Having been informed that you and Captain Tofte have both got a new duty and as Major Huot has earlier been transferred we judge it necessary to inform you which is the amount of money that we have received from Major Huot, Captain Tofte and you during the whole time that we are in relation, you as representative of the U.S.A. and our Delegation of the N.L.A. of Yugoslavia, for the supply of our army, until the date of the 15th of Jan. 1944.

For the whole time of our cooperation we have received from you Lit. 2,795,000 (two million seven hundred and ninety five thousand). From the hundred gold pieces, we got from you, we have spent

already 16 pieces for supplies, which sum is included in the stated amount calculated at the rate of one gold piece equal Lt. 2.000. — That means that to the sum of Lit 2,795,000. — are to be added the remaining 84 gold pieces. From the mentioned sum of Lit. 2,795,000. — only Lit. 2,053,217.19 have been regularly registered through our book-keeping meanwhile the rest has been received in that time, in which we had not started any book-keeping.

By this occasion I would like to express you my thanks for the work you have done for our country, which we appreciate very much.

Death to Fascism, Liberty to the people!

THE CHIEF OF THE DELEGATION

MAKIEDO N.O.V.I.P.O. JUGOSLAVIJE DELEGACIJA ITALIJA

TO: Mr. Robert Thompson, Lt. of the Army of the U.S.A., Bari.

Delegation

NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY of Yugoslavia

Bari, 1 Jan. 1944

Dear Captain Tofte,

On the occasion of the New Year kindly accept personally from myself and from all our comrades connected with the Partizan work in Italy most cordial felicitations.

I am wishing you the best success in your work as an officer of the Allied Army, and also every happiness in your private life as father and husband.

I take this opportunity to thank you for your devoted work in the matter of sending help to our National Liberation Army during the last year. The exceptional devotion with which you pursued this work is the best proof of

your thorough understanding of the importance of our effort and the greatness of our National Liberation struggle.

During the last months of 1943, not sparing any effort or sacrifice you have given all your time to connect yourself with our common work and fight, and you have given all that you could in the face of innumerable difficulties in order to make it possible that our work could be carried out and achieve the best obtainable results.

Your effort is deserving any praise, and I feel obliged as representative of the Supreme Staff of the National Liberation Army and the Partizan Groups of Yugoslavia to express to you our full appreciation with the hope, that you will in the coming year continue with your work and attain still greater successes, in that way enabling our National Liberation Army to increase its share for the final victory and the destruction of Hitler's hordes.

With the comradely greeting,

DEATH TO FASCISM — LIBERTY TO THE PEOPLE!

The Chief of the Delegation

(Signed) MAKIEDO.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Cairo, M.E.

(C.C. reed, by Captain Hans Tofte from Lt. Col. West, O.S.S., Cairo).

2 Dec.

1943

SUBJECT: Naval Operations

TO: Joseph M. Scribner, Esq.

1. Herewith is copy of commendation from British Flag Officer, Bari area, on action of vessels under our supervision.

2. As Captain Tofte is in command of this detail, this commendation has been placed on his service record.

Paul West,

Lt. Col., Inf.,

Chief Operations Officer,

OSS-ME.

TO: Capt. Hans Tofte, U.S.A.

FROM: Lt. Cmdr. Morgan Giles, Royal Navy.

The naval officer in charge, Bari, has made a signal expressing his gratitude for the prompt and efficient work carried out by small craft when H.M.S. "Hebe" was sunk.

Please convey this message to Partizan ships who were concerned upon this occasion and also when H.M.S. "Quail" was mined.

5 Nov. 1943 In the Field To: Captain Hans Tofte

O.C., Shipping Operations, Bari. From: Major J. E. Burke

O.C., British Military Mission, Dalmatia.

Sir -

Herewith my most sincere thanks for the material assistance you provided at such short notice to assist the Yugoslav Partizans in their splendid fight against our common enemy.

The Officer commanding, First Dalmatian Brigade, has asked me in the name of his troops and the people of Dalmatia to thank you again for the timely arrival of those weapons that saved the Peljasac Peninsula and possibly the inland route to the heart of Germany.

I hope it may be possible for us to work together again in the way that we have done, the true definition, if I may say so, of Anglo-American cooperation.

A survey of all OSS endeavors in favor of Tito was given by Kermit Roosevelt, on page 337 in his book:

The Overseas Targets

War Report

of the

OSS

(Office of Strategic Services)

Volume 2 with a new introduction

by Kermit Roosevelt

Prepared by

History Project, Strategic Services Unit,

Office of the Assistant Secretary of War,

War Department, Washington, D.C.

1976

MILITARY AID

E. BELGRADE

In September 1944, command of the fifteen OSS teams in the field was taken over from Brigadier Fitzroy MacLean (British SOE) by the Independent American Military Mission to Marshal Tito (IAMM).*

The joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff authorized IAMM to:

- (1) Establish military liaison with the Partisans;
- (2) report to AFHQ on military developments;
- (3) handle all U.S. supplies to the Partisans; and
- (4) command U.S. personnel in Yugoslavia.

An IAMM base at Partisan Headquarters had been established in August on Vis Island. Four of its members arrived at Valjevo on 9 October and, from there, advanced with the Partisan I Corps. They entered Belgrade on 20 October, with the last German units still surrendering in that city. The group sent in reports on economic conditions, war damage, military developments, a breakdown of the Partisan I Corps, and analyses of Partisan and Russian battle techniques.

The Mission established itself in Belgrade and became a city team. By January, this consisted of thirteen men, including four SI, three R&A and two X-2 representatives. The fifteen teams accompanying the Partisans Corps in the field were cut to eight by May. Liaison with the Partisans produced little on German battle order, Partisan cooperation having been notably poor since mid-1944. Political coverage was somewhat better. OSS maintained contacts both in the various government ministries and with the more or less silent opposition groups. Since the State Department did not arrive for several months, these OSS reports formed the only U.S. coverage of Yugoslav political developments.

An X-2 hope for the exchange of information with Yugoslav counterespionage services came to nothing.

Economic and medical reports were also prepared. Members of various U.S. agencies (Typhus Commission, Red Cross, ATC, State Department, MAAF) were at one time or another attached to the mission. Until the arrival of an OWI representative, OSS itself distributed OWI publications. While the principal commitment for supplies to the Partisan army was British, OSS arranged for a contribution of some ten tons of drugs and medical equipment, and of eighty jeeps. About one hundred additional U.S. airmen, downed in Yugoslavia, were evacuated.

On 31 March 1945, the U.S. Ambassador arrived, and the Embassy took over many of the functions which the mission had been carrying out in the

For background, see "Yugoslavia", above.

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interim. Since the Yugoslavs refused clearance for a coexistent OSS unit, it was withdrawn in July. All field teams followed suit, excepting one in Trieste, which was transferred to Si/Italy jurisdiction.

In the same book, page 127, he writes:

C. YUGOSLAVIA

Fifteen Reichswehr divisions, aided by some 100,000 well-armed native occupation troops, were detailed to maintain order in Yugoslavia against the large-scale resistance activities. It was of importance to Allied forces in Italy, confronted by twenty-six German divisions, that the fifteen in Yugoslavia remain there. SO teams, with OG aid, joined British forces in effecting military supply of resistance groups by sea and by air, while SO and SI liaison officers attached to guerrilla units radioed enemy battle order, bombing targets and other strategic intelligence to bases in Bari and Cairo.

U.S. officers were recruited in Washington and Cairo to act as uniformed liaison with units of the Partisan (Tito) and Chetnik (Mihailovich) resistance groups. They parachuted from Balkan Air Force (British) planes and were received by British groups already operating with the resistance. Trained in SO, they were to lead guerrillas in the destruction of strategic installations.

Arrival in the field soon showed that the Partisans already had efficient officers (many of them Communist), not disposed to U.S. leadership, and desirous only of the weapons to work with. The SO men became in effect intelligence officers and were instructed to send in enemy battle order, economic information, and political and military intelligence on the resistance.

Lack of SI training was evident on political and economic reporting. In general, the SO officers had little conception of economic intelligence and sent none. Their political appreciations compared unfavorably with those prepared by their British colleagues. Understandably, they usually supported the groups they were living and fighting with. Liaison officers with the Chetniks favored the Chetniks, while those with the Partisans supported the Partisans. Even more unreliable were agents of Yugoslav descent, who usually were predisposed to one side or the other and reported the situation in moral black and white.

But military intelligence was valuable. The Partisans at first knew little of battle order reporting and needed the aid of OSS liaison officers to build up efficient and widespread intelligence units with each Partisan Corps.

The first officers were flown from Cairo and parachuted 18 August and 22 August 1943, to the headquarters of Mihailovich and Tito, respectively. As in Greece, both were SO officers attached to the British missions already there and had to use SOE communications and SOE code.

Using British facilities meant British control plus unnecessary delay in transmission of messages. However, the agreements signed in London in June 1942 between SO and SOE gave the latter the right to coordinate SO activity in the area.* Furthermore, the British in Cairo controlled air transportation to the Balkans, and had the network in the field which must arrange for the arrival of new agents. Considering, perhaps, that their own organization was successfully carrying out the job required, or for other reasons, they opposed any independent SI operations in Yugoslavia—the Americans would be under British command in the field and would have to remain at base in order to wire through British radio. SO teams arrived successfully, once having agreed to use SOE communications, while SI teams found it difficult to obtain air priority from the (British) Balkan Air Force.

Donovan's trip to Cairo in November 1943 established the right of U.S. operatives in the Balkans to independent communication. Later, during the summer of 1944, SO personnel in Yugoslavia were redesignated SI (thus releasing them from the restrictions of the SO/SOE agreement), and, in September, command of OSS teams in the field was transferred from the British Military Mission to the Independent American Military Mission to Marshal Tito.

On 26-27 December 1943 the first two OSS/Yugoslavia teams (ALUM and AMAZON) to carry their own radios were dispatched to Slovenia by SI. Faulty navigation resulted in the parachutage of three of the seven men directly into a camp of White Guards (pro-Axis native troops). Fortunately, the White Guards concluded that an Allied air invasion was upon them, and the three were able to make a quick retreat, returning later at considerable personal danger to retrieve their secret code books.

ALUM sent in volumes of intelligence collected by the two teams. While the political information lacked balance (the leader of ALUM was of Yugoslav descent and 100% pro-Partisan), the military reporting was excellent. Locations of anti-aircraft fields, interceptor fields and locator points in Slovenia were cabled out. Battery sites, gun calibres and serial numbers were given. From a captured German, two men obtained the

* See "Introduction", above.

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complete AA and locator system of southern Austria. They worked out two safe flight paths, one northeast to Wiener-Neustadt, and the other northwest toward Munich.

During 1944 the group expanded to fourteen men, a fifteenth being killed when his parachute failed to open.

A spectacular achievement was the crossing of an advance section of the group, consisting of one American and two Partisans, over the border of the Greater Reich. Arriving on 23 June 1944, the section survived 44 days. The men constructed a bunker of logs, cut by themselves, on the side of a hill overlooking the main rail line from Zidani Most to Ljubljana. Transmitter, battery and pedal generator were installed underground and the whole camouflaged, so that it was invisible from ten yards. Villagers, contacted by the Partisans, left food baskets nearby twice a day. Railroad workers turned in daily manifests of traffic on the line and also on the Zidani Most-Maribor line.

A railroad guard discovered them, and they moved several times, continuing to transmit daily railroad intelligence. After 5 August 1944, they were not heard from.

SO's and OG's worked together with British forces to supply the Partisans. Following the Italian surrender in September 1943, Tito's forces had advanced and occupied the whole Dalmatian coast, opened up the port of Split and appealed for an Allied landing and/or military aid. On 5 October, a mission from Tito arrived at Algiers and was contacted by members of the Yugoslav Desk from Cairo. On 11 October, one of the Americans reconnoitered Vis Island (where the Partisans proposed to unload military supplies), in a Royal Navy gunboat provided by the Allied Naval Command and camouflaged as a fishing smack. On 15 October, at OSS initiative, the first load (200 tons of coal), provided by the same Command, left for Vis on board a Partisan vessel.

OSS organized the shipping operations at Bari, negotiated for the supplies and obtained the ships. By 25 October, there were 25 vessels smuggling goods the 120 nautical miles to Vis; and by 31 December, there were 40. These consisted of small vessels owned by the Partisans, and of ships in Italy, formerly belonging to the Royal Yugoslav Government.

Following the German raid on Bari in December, the base moved to Monopoli. Normally the ships left Monopoli at daybreak and arrived at a checking station at Manfredonia at 2000. Here they lay until 1300 the following day. The Italian Adriatic could be traversed by daylight. By nightfall the ships would enter the danger zone, and by 0300 be at Vis, in

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time to be camouflaged before daybreak brought German air reconnaissance.

In January 1944 the British, who had contributed all the military supplies, took over the operation.

During the period of OSS direction, the following had been accomplished:

Number of loaded ships sailed from Italy..... 155

Total tonnage shipped.....11,637 tons

Partisan troops shipped*..... 2,000
 Partisan wounded evacuated*..... 700
 Partisan refugees evacuated*20,000
 Number of ships repaired and operated..... 44

It is estimated these supplies made possible the activation of 30,000 guerrillas.* Two thousand Yugoslav guerrillas were equipped in Italy and shipped into Yugoslavia.

On 20 December the Germans diverted three divisions (the 1 Mountain, 114 Light and 755 Infantry Divisions) to clean up the coastal activity. They recaptured all the Dalmatian Islands but Vis, which was defended by a large force of Partisans, British Commandos, and 211 OSS OG's. Fifteenth Air Force bombings of Mostar Island and of the ports of Zara and Fiume assisted its defense. The holding action was intended to maintain the flow of material, but the three Reichswehr divisions directed against the supply line closed off the coast.

OG's and Commandos remained to harass enemy forces on other Dalmatian Islands and to obtain enemy battle order there and on the coast. Operations included:

- (a) Destruction of the German garrison on Solta Island and capture of the town of Grohote by OG's and British Commandos.
- (b) An attack on Brae Island. British troops, to which OG's were attached, forced the enemy into an inner defense ring, inhibiting his movement.
- (c) Destruction of an enemy patrol on Hvar Island.
- (d) Attack on Korcula Island. OG's and Partisans cleared two-thirds of the Island.

* Partly by Royal Navy vessels. These figures are taken from "Final Report on SBS Supply Line to Partisans", 20 May 1944, History File 137.

* For breakdown of supplies sent in, and above estimate, see publication "Partisan Supply Operation," p. 25, History File 199f.

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- (e) Repeated reconnaissance to obtain battle order on the islands of Mljet and Lagosta, and on the mainland.

A typical attack was that on Solta Island, carried out by a force of 600 troops, principally Commandos, but including an OG detachment of 150. A landing on the southern coast was effected from LCI's at 2400. Troops proceeded to move into position around the town of Grohote under cover of darkness. Due to the extremely difficult terrain, positions were not taken up until 0600 and the presence of Allied troops was prematurely disclosed to the enemy, who opened fire. Troops moved up under fire to assault positions, and at 0700 the RAF dive-bombed the town with P-40's, according to plan. The bombing accomplished its purpose of softening up resistance, the enemy was attacked and the town taken. The enemy garrison of approximately 110 men was killed or captured. American casualties were one killed and five slightly wounded.

This and other operations were commanded by the much larger British force, and served mainly as initiation for the OG's in preparation for action in Greece, Italy, France, Norway and the Far East. The Group was withdrawn in July 1944 upon the retreat of German occupation troops.

Meanwhile, on the mainland, the U.S. network in Partisan country spread. Along with its British counterpart, the Yugoslav Desk had moved, at the time of the shipping operation in October 1943, from Cairo to Bari. There Serbo-Croatian-speaking agents could be recruited in greater numbers than in Cairo. A training school was established. In April, control of OSS operations in Yugoslavia and Central Europe, was transferred from Cairo to AFHQ, MedTO.

By October 1944, forty OSS officers and men were running fifteen intelligence teams, attached to the various corps of the Partisan army. Intelligence included daily battle order cables, with map locations of important targets. The teams served as liaison to coordinate air attacks with Partisan operations. In December 1943, the two-man Air Section had moved up from Cairo to Bari to take over the job of transmitting Partisan bombing requests to the Fifteenth U.S. Air Force. Since targets were cabled without integration from American and British officers accompanying all Partisan corps, some priority system was necessary. Conference with Marshal Tito's representative in Bari produced a decision to use only those bomb requests approved by him. Target bombing in support of Partisan offensives

commenced in late March 1944, and, besides offering tactical assistance, served to raise Partisan morale.

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The Fifteenth Air Force was of considerable assistance to the Partisans in late May. The Germans attacked Tito's Hq. at Drvar on 25 May, with glider troops landing in the area itself, and with armored columns closing in on all sides. Due to the surprise of the attack, request for air support was not cabled out until the 27th. On 28 and 29 May, B-17's, B-24's, P-38's and P-47's of the Fifteenth Air Force bombed and strafed German troop concentrations around Drvar, and, on the following day, the Partisans broke through German lines to the South. Marshal Tito noted this in an order of the day: "American and British prestige is now equal to that of the Russians."

The Air Section of OSS/Bari also served A-2, Fifteenth Air Force, in preparing a basic map survey of rail and water communications in the Balkans, and in selecting interdiction points, using OSS, Photo Reconnaissance and other intelligence sources.

Drops of men and supplies were carried out by the Balkan Air Force, which had earlier moved from Cairo to South Italy. The actual task of parachuting to guerrilla groups in Nazi-controlled territory was complicated and dangerous, the average experience being something like that of SPIKE team:

After being recruited in Cairo by Major
the first of

March 1944, we moved up to Bari, 7 April 1944. At Bari we expected to stay only a few days before taking off for our job in Macedonia.

We made our first attempt to enter the country 25 April 1944. This attempt failed due to the plane having to turn back before reaching the pin point because of bad weather. We turned back that night and arrived in Bari being greeted by a bit of anti-aircraft fire, as the pilot thought we were over Brindisi and came in unidentified. We made several more attempts to get in until the night of 23 June 1944. We jumped into the British Mission "Burlesque," headed by Major Saunders. This was a bad night for all. Major _____ hurt his ankle, Sgt. _____, his leg, and radioman _____, his back, in a fall from the tree he landed in. I drifted several miles away from the drop zone and after four or five hours of wandering around the mountains found some Partisans, and later the British Mission After being chased around the mountains by the Bulgarians, we made our way to Vueje.*

* Report of SPIKE team, 9 August 1944 to 14 November 1944, p. 1, OSS Director's File 15,868.

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Four secret meteorological stations, staffed by OSS, radioed weather reports every six hours, sending measurements taken with technical equipment which had been parachuted in; balloon runs, for example, were made daily. The transmission of weather intelligence received special handling, and reached the 19th Weather Squadron at Cairo on the average of seven minutes after it had been put on the air in Yugoslavia.

Escape routes for U.S. fliers were organized. Partisans, under OSS direction, brought in downed fliers, and housed them in barracks near fields they had constructed. Working with the Air Crew Rescue Unit (Fifteenth Air Force), OSS arranged for planes to transport the men periodically. By VE-Day about 1,600 had been safely flown out.

The first "Safe Area" maps to be issued by any U.S. Air Force in any theater were prepared by the Air Section for the guidance of airmen over Yugoslavia. These showed areas under Partisan control, toward which downed fliers should attempt to make their way, and were reproduced in 500 copies for distribution to the Fifteenth and Twelfth Air Forces, the Desert Air Force (British), the Balkan Air Force (British) and MACAF. First issued in January 1944, they assisted in the recovery of 467 airmen during the first four months of use. Beyond this concrete effect, they fortified air crew morale during operations over Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Austria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and northern Greece.

From August to October 1944, an X-2 unit was active in Bari, briefing SI agents destined for Yugoslavia and Albania. Results were, however, small compared to those obtained by liaisons in London, and from the documents and personnel of the Italian services that came under Allied control after the surrender of Italy. In October the unit began to close, and two of the personnel entered Yugoslavia with the Independent American Military Mission.*

Subversive propaganda was sent in by MO. Specially packed leaflets, pamphlets and posters were dropped to U.S. representatives with Partisan forces. These were intended to demoralize German garrisons and terrorize native collaborators. An MO officer concluded, however, that the results were smaller than in more highly educated countries. The illiterate half of the population not only was unaffected, but could see little reason for risking lives to get the leaflets to the enemy. Many of the three million pieces delivered found other uses.

See "Belgrade", below.

MO was also criticized by the Partisans for distributing surrender leaflets, which brought German deserters and German satellite troops flocking to Partisan strongholds. Inasmuch as the Partisans had inadequate food and clothing, no place to keep the prisoners, insufficient personnel to guard them, and a degree of inimical sentiment toward them, they shot them. The MO leaflets had the net effect of stiffening German soldier morale.

Meanwhile, of the two competitive resistance groups, the Chetniks had lost favor with the Allies. OSS liaison officers at the two Hqs. had submitted reports respectively favorable to the group to which they were attached and unfavorable to the opposing group. Allied policy was eventually settled in favor of Tito, and, in early 1944, all U.S. and British representatives with Mihailovich were withdrawn.

U.S. airmen, however, continued to bail out over Chetnik territory, where they could not be contacted and evacuated by U.S. agents. Further, it was felt that the U.S. should maintain intelligence units in all sections of Yugoslavia. With the support of Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, General Eaker (MAAF) and General Twining (Fifteenth Air Force), the point was finally won. On 3 August the HALYARD team parachuted to Pranjane, eighty kilometers south of Belgrade, where Mihailovich had collected, housed and fed 250 U.S. fliers. The three members of HALYARD directed 300 laborers, using sixty ox-carts, in the construction of an airfield 600 yards long and thirty wide. On 9 and 10 August, C-47's evacuated all 250 airmen. On 26 August, 58 additional U.S. fliers and two British came out. By the time the team left in November 1944, the total was over 400.

A six-man mission, intended for the acquisition of intelligence in Mihailovich territory, parachuted successfully to the air rescue team on 25 August 1944. This move proved to be an unfortunate one. The Chief of Mission, a Lt. Colonel, explained to General Mihailovich that his assignment was purely to collect military intelligence, and that his presence did not constitute political support of the Chetnik Government. Nevertheless, an imaginative leaflet in Serbo-Croatian appeared, reading in part: The delegates of the Allied American Government and the personal representatives of President Roosevelt, the tried friend of freedom loving small nations, have arrived.

Immediately, upon his arrival, Colonel_____ and the members of his mission went to the headquarters of the Supreme Command. On this occasion he presented a written message from President Roosevelt The whole meeting and the discussion at the headquarters of the

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Supreme Command was photographed by an American photographer, who was chosen to be present at this important event as an official war photographer for Fox Movietone News.*

The false claims made by this leaflet had just the effect on the Partisans which the British had wished to avoid. Tito, who had not been consulted, took the opportunity (coinciding as it did with the arrival of the Red Army) to cease active cooperation with U.S. and British liaison officers. One after another, teams at the various Partisan corps reported they were tied down to headquarters, could not travel without Partisan "guides," and received, together with their British colleagues, only the skimpy daily Partisan communiques. English and American representatives duplicated the radioing of this intelligence, and were able to collect little else.

On 1 November 1944, a month after arrival, the Mission returned (to submit reports favorable to Mihailovich). The Partisan attitude, however, never changed,** and OSS, unlike the British Military

Mission, had few bargaining points. The British were able, as before, to obtain concessions from the Partisans due to their strong position: they had direct radio contact with the Balkan Air Force, and were able to produce air support for Partisan military operations more quickly and more often than could OSS teams; this same contact insured efficient air supply of British teams; finally, the British (like the Russians) spoke as official representatives of their Government, which the American agents did not.

To remedy this last weakness, the Independent American Military Mission to Marshal Tito arrived in Valjevo 9 October 1944, and took command of all U.S. teams formerly attached to the British Military Mission. Negotiations with Marshal Tito, to improve intelligence coverage with greater freedom of movement for U.S. teams, proved relatively unsuccessful. Difficulties in obtaining permission for entry and movement of U.S. personnel continued on a smaller scale.

The Mission prepared medical, economic and battle order reports, including one of the first American war intelligence reports on the Russian Army's combat methods. On 20 October, with Belgrade still half in German, half in Russian, hands, the Mission entered that capital and be-

* Copy in the Director's Files, File 13,860, OSS Archives.

** To a certain extent, members of the mission to Mihailovich encouraged misunderstandings by speeches at Chetnik meetings and over the Chetnik radio. It may be argued, on the other hand, that Marshal Tito would have found some other opportunity, if this one had not occurred, to cease cooperation with the Western Allies.

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came a City Team, gathering political and economic intelligence, and acting as U.S. liaison until State Department representation arrived.*

Prior to the Mihailovich set-back, OSS/Yugoslavia had turned in some outstanding successes.

Continuous relay of German battle order was important to the armies in Italy. The coordination of air bombing with Partisan activities helped detain fifteen German divisions in Yugoslavia. It was always difficult to evaluate in tangible form the results of secret intelligence and operational activity. But the equipping of tens of thousands of guerrillas and the evacuation of some 2,000 downed airmen were concrete accomplishments.

As soon as OSS made it known to the Yugo-Bolsheviks that they will give them all and more than they request, the Juggs put forward in writing all and more than they needed, as follows:

REVIEW OF STRENGTH

UNIT

NUMERICAL STANDING COMMENT

I Corps

II Corps

III Corps

IV Corps

V Corps

VI Corps

VII Corps

VIII Corps

IX Corps

X Corps

XI Corps

Total

HQ Vojvodina HQ. Serbia HQ. Macedonia Independent Partisan Groups

Sub total Grand Total

* See "Belgrade", below.

1 00

7 0

,

2 00

1 0

,

1 00

4 0
 ,
 2 00
 4 0
 ,
 2 00
 2 0
 ,
 1 00
 9 0
 ,
 2 ,0
 0; 00
 1 ,0
 8 00
 .
 1 ,0
 6 00
 1 ,0
 5 00
 16,0
 00
 2 ,0
 0 00
 2
 2 ,0
 1 00
 1 ,0
 6 00
 5 ,0
 00
 4 ,0
 8 00
 9 ,0
 0 00
 2 ,0
 9 00
 2

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REVIEW OF NECESSARY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

NO.	NAME	Number
1	Rifles	100,000
2	LMG	16,000
3.	SUG	14,000
4.	MMG	2,800
5.	Heavy Mortars	1,220
6.	Light Mortars	5,100

7.	ATK Gun	280
8.	Mtn. Gun	280
9.	ATF Rifle	2,800
10.	AA/MMG	280
11.	Radio Sets (assorted)	400
12.	Telephones and Telephone exchanges	1,400
13.	Hand Grenades	70,000
14.	Uniforms, jacket, pants, shoes, overcoats, 2 prs. underwear, 2 pairs of socks, rucksack, towel	167,000
15.	Medical	70 tons
16.	Explosives	70 tons
17.	Food	700 tons

Notes: The amount of armament requested would supply only the needs of the Army Corps and HQ unit.

Within four months we can mobilize another 200,000 men provided that the Allies can send us the arms and equipment in time.

In addition to arms the requirements are: 50 rds for each rifle, 200 rds for each IMG, 300 for MMG, 60 bombs for heavy mortars, 80 bombs for light mortars, 100 rds. for Mtn. gun and ATK gun, 80 rds. for ATK rifle. For further needs it is necessary to anticipate a reserve.

Order of urgency for supplying arms and equipment: medical, rifles, MMG's Mortars explosives, clothes, equipment for signaling communications sets and telephones, guns MMG's.

With the radio sets are required the necessary material, accumulators, [?] generators. Additional sets are required to those already asked for. Besides the ammunition required for the mentioned arms, we also request tons of various ammunition for the arms we have at present.

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UNIT	MTN GUN	ATK GUN	HEAVY MORTARS	LIGHT MORTARS	RIFLES	MMG	MMG	SMG RIFLE	ATK	AAIMG
General Staff for Macedonia	8	8	30	190	2000	200	60	300	50	10

Total

280 280

1220

5100

100000 16000 2800 14000 2800

280

Note: Along with the arms and equipment necessary spare parts should be included, such as straps, cases, lubricating oil, etc.

AALMG SETS	RADIO PHONES	TELE-GRENADES	HAND UNIFORMS	B. D. CAL	MEDI-SIVE	EXPLO-
20						
25						
30						
100						
5000						
14,000						
5 t.						
5 t.						
100						
5000						
10,000						
5 t.						
5 t.						
FOOD						
POINT OF						

24	30	120	7000	9000	5 t.	5 t.	80 t.	Prekaja
24	40	140	7000	15,000	5 t.	5 t.	100 t.	Berane
20	30	130	5000	10,000	5 t.	5 t.	40 t.	Vlasenica
24	30	120	6000	15,000	5 t.	5 t.	20 t.	Kordun
24	30	100	5000	15,000	5 t.	5 t.	80 t.	Bos. Petrov.
20	25	100	5000	15,000	5 t.	5 t.	—	Slavonija
20	25	100	5000	10,000	5 t.	5 t.	—	Nogtrenje
20	30	110	5000	10,000	5 t.	5 t.	80 t.	Ticevo
20	25	100	5000	10,000	5 t.	5 t.	60 t.	Primorje
30 t.	Zagorje							
80 t.	Lika							

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The SOE and OSS were ready to extend their war strategy to the postwar Bolshevik Yugoslavia even before they knew that Bolshevik Yugoslavia would be a reality on October 20, 1944 when Moscow Bolsheviks created the Bolshevik Serbia with their occupation of Belgrade, capital of Serbia. How the SOE and the OSS knew already in March 1944 that there would be a Bolshevik Yugoslavia after May 8, 1945, is an unreachable phantom. Churchill did not know. Up to January 1945, he was speaking about a Croatia free of Communism. As late as April 18, 1945 he wished that the Ustasa in Zagreb would resist the advance of the Yugo Bolshie hordes and so save the so-called western Yugoslavia from Communism.

Whether old Jupiter Tonans, WSC, knew that the Bolshies in Whitehall, presided over by the Madam, and Bletchley presided over by all kinds of Philbies, were undermining his military strategy in which there was no place for Bolshevik Yugoslavia, remains an unknown. As we know, nobody wants to study that part of the strategy of WSC. The only writer to ever mention this part of the overall strategy of WSC is this author.

We cite the next page of our documentation which shows that SOE AND OSS were planning the strategy for the Bolshevik Yugoslavia after May 8, 1945.

On the following page we read:

War material which will be needed for post-war reconditioning of Yugoslavia.

Railroad needs:

Railway material for normal and narrow gauge,
without iron Rails

Window glass for passenger cars (10,000 cars) Slauh [?] for air brakes (for 500 cars) Rail cars
accumulators Rail car lightbulbs

Industr. and Railroad needs.

Lubrication Oil (for 6 months) Fuel Oil (for 6 months) Yellow grease Black sheet-iron Zinc sheet-iron
Zinc tin Aluminium thin Brass tin

1,500 tons 100 tons 50 tons 10,000 pieces 100,000 pieces

4,000 tons

2,000 tons

100 tons

1,000 tons

1,000 tons

200 tons

200 tons
 200 tons
 MILITARY AID
 Copper tin
 White tin
 Pewter
 Lead
 Metal stock (crude)
 Blacksmith iron
 Iron pipes and steel pipes
 Copper pipes
 Armature for steam boilers
 Dynamo motors varied with total strength up to 100,000
 K.W.tro [?] motors, total strength up to 70,000 K.W.
 Machine Belts
 Tool hammers
 File
 Rubber products and raw rubber
 Steel ropes
 Tools for wood workers and bricklayers
 Digging tools
 Blasting and Mining tools
 Locksmith tools
 Blacksmith tools
 Complete Gateri (about 100 pieces)
 Saw for Gateri and circular
 Iron saws
 Spiral drills
 Pumps, hand and motor
 Chains, varied
 Sand paper
 Material for drilling
 Carbide lamps
Electrical material.
 Copper wire (naked wire) varied diameter
 Underground cables
 Insulated wire, varied diameter
 Light bulbs
 Armature
 [?]
 Instruments
 Insulation material
 317
 200 tons
 50 tons
 50 tons
 50 tons
 300 tons
 2,000 tons
 1,000 tons
 2,000 tons
 500 tons
 1,200 tons 1,000 tons 300 tons 500 tons 200 tons 100 tons 100 tons 200 tons 500 tons 500 tons 1,000
 tons 500 tons 50 tons 100 tons 100 tons 100 tons 50 tons 250 tons 200,000 tons
 2,000 tons

3,000 tons
2,000 tons
100,000,000 pieces
100 tons
200 tons
50 tons
100 tons

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KNIGMA TITO

4. Telegraph and Telephone.

Telephone brass wire (naked)
Telephone insulated wire
Telephone insulators, exterior
Telephone French (desk)
Telephone on walls
Telephone exchange — from 50 to 500 numbers
Telephone spare parts
Telephone sets
Ribbon for telephone sets

5. Printing and Office material needs.

Paper different type (daily need in our country
is about 30 tons) Printers ink Typewriters Lithographic material Metal for melting of letter types
Office material and ink

6. Chemical products.

Glycerine
Liquid chloride (for industrial papers and for
textiles for six months) Lime, Bren oil, linseed oil, turpentine, acids,
caustic, salts, vitriol, sulphur, etc.
2,000 tons 100 tons
2,000,000 pieces
100,000 pieces
10,000 pieces
3,000 pieces
250,000 pieces
10,000 pieces
1,000 pieces
10,000 tons 500 tons
50,000 pieces 200 tons 50 tons 100 tons
50 tons 50 tons 250 tons

7. Oil and its products.

Oil for Diesel motors, benzine, gasoline, lubricating oil 20,000 tons

8. Agricultural Tools.

Plows (in the country there is not enough
cattle for reserve) Small hand agricultural tools Thrashing machine and other machines
(about 12,000 pieces) Jute products (bags, ropes, etc.)

9. House needs.

Petroleum lamps and lanterns 1,080,000 piec
Dishes enamel (for one million families of 4 members) 2,000 tons Mess equipment (for one million
families of 4 members) 500 tons Kettles, Pots, pans, etc. 100 tons
5,000 pieces 1,000 tons
10,000 tons 500 tons
1,080,000 pieces

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5,000 tons 15,000 tons 1,000 tons 50 tons 15,000 pieces 200 tons

MILITARY AID

10. Assorted material and tools.

Window panes
 Nails (assorted)
 Bolts and hinges for doors and windows
 Brushes (assorted)
 Serving machines
 Photographic materials

11. No estimation in quantities but surely will be needed.

Locomotives and railroad cars Iron rails for railroad Auto-cars of all types

Melting coke
 Weight scales
 Canvass tops (for R.R. cars)
 Mill fixtures
 Waterworks fixtures
 Motion picture machines
 Oxygen tanks for welding
 Electrodes for welding
 Compressors and penumatic tools.
 Supreme HQ M.L.A. and P.O.
 — Economic Department —

Material Section

No. 211

24 March, 1944 year

SURVEY

Food demands for People's Liberation Army and Partisan Forces of Yugoslavia

I

One day needs in food For present situation of292,000 fighters there is needed:

Flour	175 tons
Smoked bacon	73 tons
Beans	14 tons
Rice	14 tons
Macaroni	14 tons

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ENIGMA TITO

Farrina	14 tons
Canned vegetables	14 tons
Lard (Fats)	11 tons
Red pepper	1 ton
Onions	3 tons
Coffee	6 tons
Tea	1 ton
Sugar	11 tons
Tobacco	6 tons

II

Monthly needs in food for same number

Flour	5,250 tons
Smoked bacon	2,190 tons
Beans	420 tons
Rice	420 tons
Macaroni	420 tons
Farrina	420 tons
Canned vegetables	420 tons
Lard (Fats)	350 tons

Red pepper	15 tons
Onions	90 tons
Coffee	180 tons
Tea	15 tons
Sugar	330 tons
Tobacco	180 tons
	Chief, Colonel
	Mitar I. Vujasic

MILITARY AID

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The author was faced with the problem of photostats in the library which were not clear. The photoprints made by professionals could not bring to light all contents and thus that unreadable material is lost to research.

The second problem is spelling. The copies were typed, to be sure, at Bletchley and on 24th Street in Washington, D. C, the headquarters of OSS, but even so the spellings present a problem and we have kept to the original most of the time.

It is evident that those requests could not have been made in the "woods", or for that matter not until the years following 1945.

One part is in the English of London and the other in the English of Washington. That means that Britons and Americans made requests for the

Yugo-Bolsheviks. The Yugo-Bolsheviks did not write them, did not request, and did not know what was going on. The Britons and Americans made the lists of materials requested and since they were not requested by Yugo-Bolsheviks, the Anglo-Americans were inundating the Juggs, like pouring water out of the sleeves. One must admire the generosity of the Anglo-Americans but there in that bush hibernates the rabbit. Nobody ever received all those blessings anywhere in the world without request. Only the British agent Tito and the OSS agent, Subasic, and all others in the British and American service with them. A most enigmatic single event in the total enigma of the whole business.

But the shopping list did not stop with requests for abundant military equipment and commodity supplies. The additional items requested would indicate that the Yugos, or whoever compiled the list of needs for them, were knowledgeable and desirous of large quantities of modern sophisticated scientific equipment and supplies. The list that follows reflects no reticence in making further requests.

List of Veterinary Necessities

1. Vaccine against sheep small pox (variola)
2. Vaccine against hog small pox (variola)
3. Serum against hog plague
4. Virus against hog plague
5. Serum and vaccine against scarlet fever of hogs
6. Vaccine against paratii of hogs
7. Vaccine against hog diseases
8. Serum against meningo-ence phalo-myelitis-enzootica suis
9. Vaccine against gangrenae emphysematosae of cattle
10. Serum against gangrenae emphysematosae of cattle
11. Isoaceles vaccine against anthrax
12. Serum against horse anthrax
13. Serum against cattle anthrax
14. Vaccine anti-rabis doe veterinary use
15. Tuberculin
16. Cafein [?]
17. Serum against tetanus with 3,000 units for vet. use

100,000 doses

100,000 doses

20,000 liters

2,000 liters

20,000 doses

20,000 doses

20,000 doses
100 liters 5,000 doses
500 liters 5,000 doses 1,000 liters 1,000 liters 1,000 doses 10 kgr. 2kgr.
3,000 doses

322 18
19
20 21
22 23 24.
25. 26.
27.
28.
29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.
41.
42. 43. 44.
45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

ENIGMA TITO

Serum and vaccine against cholera poultry Ergotin (?) amp. ad usum veterinarium Aives (?) pulvis
. Hocarpinum (?) hydrochloricum in amp. ad usum veterinarium
. "Vistol" (?) for sheep
. "Vistol" (?) for cattle
. Theobrominum (?) natr. salicyl.amp ad usum veterinarium
. Hydrargirum (?) oxidatum rubrum Methylenum coeruleum tubes Equipment for lay of horses with
cuffs for all/4 legs
Complete instrument set for abortion of mares and cows
Complete veterinary surgical bags Metal kateters (?) for udder, variable size Metal kateters for small
animals Metal kateters for large female animals Rubber kateters for horses Needle for bleeding
(artificial) of large animals Syringe glass of 50 cc with kurzer (?) Syringe glass (type "Record") of 20
cc Syringe glass (type "Record") of 10 cc Syringe glass (type "Record") of 5 cc Syringe glass (type
"Record") of 2 cc
Needles for injections assorted thickness for
vet. use
Different surgical needles in different sizes
Troicart (?) for cattle and sheep
Emasculator type Serra for stallions
Emasculator type BURDIZZO for bulls, rams
and he-goats
Emasculator type SERRA small
Ambricton (?) by Beneschu
Ambricton for big animals
Complete small blacksmith shops
Veterinary thermometers
?enendoscopes for veterinaries
[?] for opening of mouth in horses (Maulgater)
50,000 doses 1,000 amp
500 kgr
5,000 amp 200,000 pieces 100,000 pieces
5,000 amp 50 kgr. 1,000 pieces

ENIGMA TITO

23.
Surgical equipment to deal with cases of abortion
24. Complete dental surgical outfits — including foot operated drills
25. Complete dental prosthetic outfit

26. Complete set of tooth extraction forceps
27. Thermo-cautery outfits non electric
28. Complete anaesthetic equipment
29. Electric auriscope-complete with battery and spare lamps
30. Complete cystoscopic & retrograde pyelo-graphie equipment with spares
31. Complete set of rectal cathetore
32. Complete set of rectal bowics-Listor type
33. Complete set of gur-electic . . . gics
34. Complete set of rubber catheters Catheters rubber medium size (size 8 or 10) Catheters de Petzer self-retaining — medium size
37. Complete apparatus for blood transfusion Syringes — metallic Thompson Wallace type
- 35 36
- 38
39. Syringes - serial 50 cc
- 40 41
- 42 43
- complete
- Syringes — serial 20 cc capacity complete Syringes — serial 10 cc capacity complete Syringes — serial 5 cc capacity complete Syringes — hypodermic 2cc capacity complete
44. Equipment for 1. .bal puncture and spinal anaesthesia
45. Syringe anaesthetic Labat complete
46. Needles for above serum syringes
47. Needles exploring 3 in x. 2.10 mm
48. Needles for suture complete set
49. Needles for intestinal suture complete set
50. Tourinquets bandage ES march
51. Instruments first aid -sets complete
52. Scissors surgical dressing one shearing point
53. Shears plaster Lorenz type
54. Knives plaster of Paris — trethowen type complete with snare blades
55. Silk surgical suture complete range of size
- 250
- 50
- 1,200
- 200 1,700
- 200
- 100 200 100 100 200 3,000
- 1,000
- 900
- 400
- 400 1,000 3,000 3,000 8,000
- 200
- 200 5,000 dozen
- 100 dozen 2,000 dozen
- 300 dozen
- 200 dozen 1,500 dozen 1,500 dozen 1,500 dozen
- 1,000 dozen 20 pieces
- MILITARY AID
56. Catgut Lorenz hospital & person type 20, 30, 40 [?] sizes 2/0
57. Scissors, surgical, [?] type — straight
58. Scissors surgical [?] type [?] on flat
59. Forceps, [?], ordinary [?] 5
60. Forceps [?]
61. [?]
62. Forceps — artery — Spencer Wells type toothless [?].

63. Holders, needle — Macphail type
64. Sterilizers — high pressure [?] largest size-electric if available (220 volts) complete with all spares
65. Ditto — Primus stove [?]
66. Ditto gas [?] complete

Total number of autoclaves [?] shall be 200 and when one type not available others should be substituted.

67. Sterilizers high pressure-drops deep & [?] shallow for to fit the autoclaves supplied
68. Forceps dissecting of ophthalmic-not toothed
69. Forceps dissecting of ophthalmic-toothed
70. Forceps cilia - straight
71. Scissors ophthalmic - straight
72. Scissors ophthalmic curved on flat
73. Ophthalmic diagnostic apparatus complete [?]
74. Magnets, electric portable complete
75. Complete equipment, surgical electric [?] modern orthopaedic institute
76. Calico — unbleached — 32 "-4 c" wide
77. Gauze — absorbent, bleached [?] wide [?]
78. Wool cotton absorbent bleached
79. Wool cotton non-absorbent unbleached
80. Lint cotton absorbent white
81. Plaster — adhesive — zinc oxide [?] yards
82. Bandages elastic adhesive 3 Yds long (elastoplast type) 3" wide
83. Ditto 6" wide
84. Thermometer clinical centigrade scale in metallic containers

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10,000 dozen tapes [?] 000 dozen tapes 5,000 dozen tapes ,000 6,000 1,000

[?]000

1,000

1,000 60

50

50

0

20

0

20

0

10

0

10

0

20

0

20

0

30

10

1 ,0 tir

5 00 es

0

3 ,0

00

1 ,0 kgr

0 00

1 ,0 kgr
0 00
1 ,0 [?]
0 00
[] 0 doz
? 00 en
5 ,0
00
5 ,0
00
20,000

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ENIGMA TITO

3.

4. 5. 6.

7. 8.

The next page has no numbers legible. The first item reads: Ac. acet. galicylic (aspirin); "quennine" and quenino" are mentioned and the request is mentioned in millions. With hand was written: Extr. pituitary gland, a 5 I.U. 3,000.000.00. Hormon lobi posterioris hypophyseous 50,000 amps.

On page 9 it begins with number 2 and continues. 2. Sphygnomafomet [?] — Baumanometer/mercurial type

Sphygnomafomet [?]/non-mercurial or aneroid type

Stethoscope binaural complete/with tubing/ Stethoscope wooden/for midwifery/ Poly incers/French model/for internal & external measurements Bags policer complete Hammers percussion/neurological/

9. Specula vaginal — Siri double duck bell type 10. Blood sedimentation apparatus Wester green type-complete with accessories . Apparatus for producing artificial pneumothorax —Maxwell type complete with all accessories . Aspirators Potain complete . Auriscopes / Brunton-type/complete .

Specula nasal . Thompson Mirrors laryngeal with fixed handle/sizes 2, 3, 4, 5 5 6/

Apparatus for continuous rectal infusion complete

Depressors tongue metal elated Specula rectal Naunton Nargan type electric with batteries & spare

bulbs — complete Complete X-ray apparatus for diagnostic purposes of about 90 kw Watson of

Solus type with all accessories including applicators lead glass, apron protective, boxes wiring

[?] & screening stands, fluoroscopes & hoods, glass [?], gloves protective, glasses, dark for screening, lead rubber, letters & figures, shock proof X-ray tubes

11

12 13 14 15

16

17.

18.

19.

1,000

1,000 2,000 1,500

1,500

12,200

2,000

1,000

1,000

450

[?] 1,500

[?] 1,500 sets

200 3,000

200

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spare, film or cassette tunnels spare valves both X-ray & timing circuit; also cassettes aluminium all sizes, developing slips, developing dishes/enamelic iron/immersion heaters with spare elements, white ink, ceiling reflector lamps. Written type for use with electric light with lamps & bulbs, vulcanite stirring rods intensifying screens / all sizes /, developing tanks suitable for largest size film-with baseboards, X-ray thermometers, Eastman 5 minutes alarm timers etc.

20. Portable X-ray units 80-15 type complete
 21. X-ray films 15" x 10"
 22. 12" x 10"
 23. 10" x 5"
 24. 8.5" x 6.5"
 25. Films X-ray dental
 26. Developing powder X-ray Kodak type in 2 gallon tins — sufficient to make developing fluid.
 27. Fixing salt X-ray Kodak type in 2 gallon tins sufficient quantity to make mixture sol.
 28. Switchable / pantostat / therapeutic producing galvanic faradic, & sinusoidal current complete with all accessories.
 29. Diathermy apparatus complete with foot-switch and all accessories.
 30. Ultrashort wave apparatus therapeutic complete with all accessories
 31. Lamps infra-red with spare elements
 32. Stand balances to measure weights less than 1gm
 33. Ditto to measure weights greater than 1 gm
- 100 100
 500 dozen 500 dozen 500 dozen 500 dozen 500 dozen
 5,000 Liters 5,000 litres
 200 100
 200 200
 1,500 1,500

[The following page is without number because of illegibility. Anti diphtheria— 10.000 Units
 10,000 doses

Anti tetanus — prophylactic / 3.000 units/	40,000 doses
Anti tetanus therapeutic/30.000 units/	4,000 doses
Anti gangrene serum / therapeutic/	2,500 doses
Anti anthrax serum	2,000 doses

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Anti meningococcal/40 poly-valent/
 Anti streptococcal antitoxin cone. / for scarlet
 Serum antivenereum / antiviperum/
 Smallpox vaccine
 T. A. B. vaccine
 Typhus vaccine
 Anti diphtheria vaccine
 Anti dysentery vaccine — entero vaccine
 Tuberculin / old / diagnostic /
 Anti rabies vaccine
 Anti pertussis[?] vaccine
 Sulphanilamide
 Sulphanilamide in ampc.
 Sulphanilidine
 Sulphagamidine
 Sulphathinol
 Sulphade . . ine / in [?] 100cc/
 [the next two numbers illegible]
 Bismuth for injection/inject, bis EP /
 Bismuth Salicylate

Atebrine/ne. ocrin/0.1 gm
Atebrine or quinine dihydrochl. for injection

P . . . quin/plasmoquin/0.0

01 camphoratum / camphor in oil/ in 5 cc

01 camphoratum 20%

Cardiazol 10 cc bottles

Cardiazol 1 cc caps

Nicomide 15 cc

Nicomide hypoloid amps .20cc

Coffeine sod benzoate/ citrate/pulvis

Coffeine sod benzoate/ citrate 0.25 gr cup

Adrenaline 1/1000 1 cc amps.

Lig. adrenaline 30 cc

[The next five numbers are not legible.] Digitalis empoules Digitalis leaf. tab. 1/2 gr Strophanthus in
amp. 0.0005 gr Dextrose 50% in amp. 10 cc

2,000 doses fever/ 2,000 doses 3,000 doses 30,000 doses 3,000 x 1,000 cc 3,000x 1,000 cc 20,000
cc 250 x 1000 cc 1000 cc 6000 doses 30,000 doses 5,000 kgr 50,000 [?] 2,000 kgr 1,000 kgr 1,000 kgr
800 100 cc

55,000 [?] 100 kgr 500 kgr 200,000 [?] 10 Kgr 1,000,000 [?] 1,000 kgr 100,000 bottles 300,000 cups

100,000 bottles 500,000 amps

200 kgr 800,000 amps 35,000 amps 1,000 bottles

300,000 amps 600,000 tab.

13,000 amps. 600,000 amps

MILITARY AID

The next page begins with Number 3 as follows: 3/ Balance pharmaceutical table to measure up
to 2 kgm 4/ Pestles & mortars for pharmaceutical work in

5 different sizes — of each size 5/ Glass & porcelan measures graduated, 5 different sizes of each size

6/ Wafer material of size to make 0.5 gm & 1 gm 7/ Bottles glass narrow mouth of 0.10, 10, 20, 30,
50, 75, 100, 120, 150, 200, 300, 400 & 500 gm of each size 8/ Ditto of 600, 750, 1000, 1500, & 2000
gm of

each size 9/ Ditto of 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000, 6000, 7500

& 10000 gm of each size 10/ Corks or stoppers for above bottles varied

sizes 11/ Card board containers for powders — to

contain 5, 20, 50, & 100 gr 12/ Boxes ointment willow cardboard bakelite &
metal varied sizes 13/ Pots, ointment, porcelain & bakelite of
various sizes

14/ Sieves, hair of mesh 1-6 15/ Papers to contain powder 16/ Labels white & red

17/ Glass stoppered bottles to contain 5, 10, 20, 30, 50, 75, 10 [?]sic 125, 150, 200, 250, 300, 400 &
500 gr of each 18/ Glass stoppered bottles to contain 600, 750,

1000, 1500, & 2000 gm of each size 19/ Glass stoppered bottles to contain 25000, 3000, 4000, 5000,
6000, 75000, & 10000 gr of each size

20/ Cardboard boxes of various sizes 21/ Pharmaceutical paper 22/ Glass demijohns wicker covered of
5, 10, 25,

& 60 litres of each size 23/ Square tin boxes of 1, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20 & 25 litres
each size 500

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300 300

300 [?]000

20.000

5.000 3.000 500.000 30.000 1,000.000

30.000

100 nesto 50.000 1.000 kgr

200

50

30

10,000 kgr 10,000 kgr

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ENIGMA TITO

24/ Tablet making machines	5
25/ Ampoule making machines	5
26/ Ointment mixing machines to mix 1,000 kgm/day	2
27/ Machines for filling metal foil tubes	15
28/ Water distillation apparatus 50 litres capacity for use with wood fires	100
29/ Ditto of 100 litres capacity — electric heated	10
30/ Ampoules, glass, empty 1 cc	1,500.000
31/ Ditto 5 cc	1,000.000
32/ Ditto 10 cc	L?,000.000
33/ Metal foil tubes empty — complete	100,000
34/ Tin boxes squared of 1, 3, 5, 10 [?] capacity of each	[?]
35/ Apparatus for signing ampoules 36/ Apparatus diagnostic for histology, bacteriology . . .],000	

5

200

On page 11, II. 2/ and III. 1/ begins as follows: 2/ Apparatus for urinalysis complete with
re. .gent test tubes spirit lamps methylated
spirits graduated glass measures, ureometers
pipettes etc.

1/ Gloves india rubber — operating — rough or smooth — sizes 7, 7.5 & 8 of each size	1,000
2/ Gloves india rubber outfits for mending	4,000
3/ Hot water bottles india rubber	200
4/ Bags, ice	3,000
5/ Electric torches — pocket size with batteries and lamps	2,000
6/ Batteries & lamps for above of each	10,000
7/ Sheeting water proof india rubber	5,500 yards
8/ Tubing drainage, india rubber 1/8", 3/16", 1/4", 5/10" 11/32", & 1/2" internal diamter of each	1,200 yds
9/ Tubes stomach complete	1,500
10/ Pillows air circular india rubber 18"	2,000
11/ Brushes nail operating room	5,000
12/ Brushes scrubbing/for floors/	5,000

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13/ Basins dressing enamelled iron kidney shaped
10"

14/ Bottles urine/urinals/ 15/ BedpausL^c] enamelled iron 16/ Irrigators 2 pints complete with rubber
tubing screw clamps glass tubing attachment & rectal tube — for enemata

17/ Apparatus for subcutaneous infusion complete 18/ Batist/fine water proofed material/ 19/ Clippers
hair 20/ Razors ordinary 21/ Razors safety — Gillette type 22/ Razors safety — Gillette type blades
for 23/ Shaving brushes 24/ Shaving soap sticks 25/ Syringes urethral glass 20 z 26/ "French letters"
"Capotte anglaise" or

rubbers

27/ Soap in bars — white 28/ Nipple guards

29/ Relievers breast with I.R ball 2 oz for 30/ Comforters/teats/infants 31/ Safety pins varied sizes 32/
Splinting wire Cramer, Co x 8 cm & 100 x 10

cm of each 33/ Frames extension Bohler thigh & 1 eg
complete

34/ Cord extension/ Stout blind cord/ 35/ [?] mugs — enamel iron — for war use 36/ [?] mugs pocket
size

37/ Tubes dropping glass with india rubber teats 38/ Rods ointment glass 39/ Linen white for sheets
etc. 40/ Linen coloured — course 41/ Blankets wool 42/ Mattresses hair 43/ White-cotton thread 44/
Cotton coarse

45/ Complete kitchen installation for hospital of 800 beds

5,000 5,000 5,000

3,000 500 5,500 yds

1,000

1,000

1,000 dozen

3,000 doz

1,000 12,000 10,000

5,000,000

50,000

10,000

5,000

30,000

100,000

5,000 yds

100

400 dozen yds 15,000 10,000 50,000

2,000 doz 800,000 yds 170,000 yds 80,000 40,000

5,000 doz reels 8,000 yds 200

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ENIGMA TITO

46/ Douches eye- undine 5 oz

47/ Bottles drop glass with glass pipette & india
rubber teat

48/ Bucket/pails, enamelled iron 49/ Formalin spray pumps for interior disinfection

The last two items are on page 12. Nothing else is legible on that page. One can read numbers 50, 51,
and 52 and nothing else.

Page 13 begins. Few items are legible. We give the legible items without number which are not
legible. They all appear to be some kind of drug tablets.

8,000

8,000 2,000 2,000

Anti rheumatic plaster

Coagulen Ciba

Iron & arsenic comp. tabs.

Ferrum reduct

Ferrum oxid. saccharatum

Codein phos.

Opium pulv.

Ethyl morph hydrochlor. /dionine/

Ipecacuanha radix

Ipecachuana pulv.

Extr. thymi fluidum /of thyme/

Radix polagalae sengae

Potass, sulphguoiscol

Creosot lact

Guaiacol liquid .

Guaiacol carbonate

Ephed hydrochlor. 0.0 5 gm / amp /
 10,000 tine
 4,000 amp
 15,000,000 tabs
 50kgm
 1,000 kgm
 20kgm
 50 kgm
 3 kgm
 50 kgm
 30 kgm
 100 kgm
 1000 kgm
 500 kgm
 200 kgm
 100 kgm
 500 kgm
 10,000 amp

The next page would contain pharmaceutical oils from different parts of the body and plants. Only possible to read is vaselinum: white, yellow and one other in the quantities of 50,000, 50,000 and 20 kgm.

The next page is a listing of sulphamides. Most of the page is impossible to read and we will cite what is possible.

g/ Ammonium sulpho ichthyolic	1,000 kgm
r/ Calcium carboras	1,500 kgm
o/ Lard	10,000 kgm
p/ Sulphur, ointment	10,000 kgm
a/ Zinc, sulphate. . . for ophthalmic use	5 kgm
a/ Barium sulphate for X-ray use	1,000 kgm

MILITARY AID

h/ Saccharum . . . Dextrose

Resorcin

s/ Pyrogall. acid. t/ Sodium sulphite u/ Alumen crudum v/ Zinc, sulphate w/ Gentian violet jelly

Maetisol

1,000 kgm

200 kgm

100 kgm

10,000 kgm

1,000 kgm 250 kgm

5,000 tubes

1,000 kgm

The next page is signed II (No II). Only names are visible, no amount is visible.

Medical & surgical requirements

1/ Sera & vaccines

2/ Sulphonamides

3/ Antisyphilitic drugs

4/ Antimalarial drugs

5/ Cardiac & stimulants drugs

6/ Antipyretics & antinouralgic

7/ Narcotics

8/ Anaesthetics

9/ Morphine derivs 10/ Atropine drugs 11/ Vitamins

12/ Hormone preparations 13/ Disinfectans & antiseptics 14/ Antirheumatic drugs 15/ Calcium preparations 16/ Hac.ostatic 17/ Tonics 18/ Cough mixtures 19/ Expectorants

20/ Respiratory tract, disinfectants 21/ Anti asthmatic preparations 22/ Liver preps.

23/ Acids, antacids & enzyme preps. 24/ Laxatives 25/ Anti diarrhoeic drugs 26/ Anti helminthic drugs 27/ Haemorrhoidal preps.

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28/ Citolagogues

29/ Uro genital tract disinfectants

30/ Sedatives & hypnotic

31/ Diuretics drugs

32/ Requirements for making ointments

33/ Ophthalmic preps

34/ Contrast media

35/ Miscellaneous

Instrument and surgical requirements

Surgical Dressings

Requirements for Internal diagnosis

Physical Therapy

Pharmaceutical requirements

Laboratory requirements

Miscellaneous

At a certain time among the items requested there are 5 million condoms. Evidently, fornication was epidemic. Moreover the question is asked if 5 million were fornicating, who was fighting.

It is worth noting that the famous guerrilla warriors of Tito needed linen, white or colored sheets. We have never heard that any army in the world uses linen, white or colored sheets. Not in the regular barracks life — the less so in the "woods" where Tito's partisans were supposed to be fighting.

That is all a Greek parody, because as it is well known and documented Tito's Bolsheviks did not fight before October 1944, but were always in flight or hiding in the bushes. Of course, we know that British propaganda, abetted by Americans was speaking of 300,000 guerrilla Tito Communist fighters. In reality there were a few thousand of those Bolshies hiding in the bushes or fleeing. We do not even know whether they did fight in September and October in Serbia. The fighting supposedly happened between Tito Bolsheviks and Draza's Cetniks.

As we know, neither one ever fought before. Whether they really did fight each other, it is impossible for a non-eye witness to say because they claim so. In fact, Draza's Cetniks were either fleeing from Serbia with him at their head, or were fleeing to the Communists with the most famous Cetnik leaders at their head.

Therefore, the question is: Where is (was) the fight?

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Since there were no fallen, evidently there was no fighting. Those who died were victims of Typhus. More would have died from Typhus if the Croatians had not supplied Draza with anti-typhus vaccines. On January 8, 1945, Ambassador Kirk sent from Caserta to the Secretary of State the following telegram:

Thayer has reported from Belgrade that during a conversation on January 6 Tito discussed at length attitude of American officers and officials in Italy toward Yugoslavia and (his movement). When Thayer *sjtgesmeq* (suggested?) that lack of cooperation and hospitality experienced by American field officers was causing suspicion as to Tito's real objectives both military and political, Tito denied he had anything to hide and expressed bewilderment at (amazing) political attitude of some Americans in Italy. Tito said he had just received reports from Smoljak of (incredibly irritating) actions of American officials; said that American reactionaries incited by Fotich had damaged his (Tito's) reputation; and that "majority of Americans were opposed to his regime but what were they going to do about it". Thayer refuted Tito's statements and suggested he study President's statements and American press on which he has ample material.

When Tito complained about meager supplies furnished him by Allies, Thayer quoted official figures to prove Allies had equipped almost half the partisans. Tito requested and was furnished complete lists of equipment supplied him by the Allies, which figures apparently impressed and surprised him.⁵

About military aid to Tito, the British think in their way:

Aid for the Partisans was mainly a British responsibility because it was in the Mediterranean theatre of war. Russia gave token help with a small group of six Dakotas under Allied command at Bari. But the main Russian aid arrived in the terminal stages of the war when the Partisan forces were moving over from guerrilla to frontal warfare. According to Soviet sources this totalled 20,528 rifles, 68,819 machine guns, light machine guns and automatic weapons, 3,797 anti-tank rifles, 3,364 mortars, 170 anti-tank guns, 898 varied types of guns, 491 aircraft, 65 tanks, 1,329 radio stations, 7 base hospitals, 4 surgical field hospitals and other items of various kinds. It is very difficult to calculate the full extent of western aid, since British records are not yet all open to inspection and Partisan records are of necessity incomplete and in many cases non-existent. Supplies were parachuted into most parts of Yugoslavia; they were also taken in by plane and by small boats of all kinds. At first about a dozen or more special

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British units of all three services were sending supplies. In an attempt to coordinate these activities a new authority, Balkan Air Force, was created in June 1944 under the command of Air Vice-Marshal Elliot, with headquarters at Bari on the east coast of Italy. But many of the eccentric individualities of the special units still remained, and there was no uniform or central system of recording despatch of supplies. During 1944 'something like' 9,000 tons of supplies were dropped to Partisans in Yugoslavia, including 100,000 rifles, 50,000 machine guns, 1,400 mortars and one million mortar bombs and handgrenades, and 100 million rounds of small arms ammunition. This did not include supplies that went by sea, among which were food and medical materials, trucks and quantities of fuel, as well as 107 tanks and 346 planes, a number of landing craft and small boats. In addition two squadrons of Partisan pilots were trained by the RAF. An aspect of Allied aid which was immensely helpful to Tito — and gratefully acknowledged by him—was the evacuation of sick and wounded to Italy, and their treatment in special hospitals which the British established for them. In 1944 alone 11,842 wounded were evacuated in this way and the total figure ran into tens of thousands. The British also helped by sending doctors and surgeons to work in Partisan field hospitals in Yugoslavia.⁶

According to the British account (see chapter I, p. 33) the British "dropped" to Tito as follows:

COPY

1943

1944

Gold		Into Missions Attached to Partisans		
Infiltrated	Sovereigns		Napoleons	
April	900	1943	Oct.	300
May	1,600		Nov.	450
June	450		Dec.	50
July	1,175			
Aug.	1,075			800
Sept.	600			
Oct.	975			
Dec.	450			
	<hr/> 7,225			
Jan.	570	1944	Jan.	10
Feb.	275		Feb.	350
		MILITARY	AID	
Mar.	20		April	120
April	130		May	250
May	530		June	310
June	396		July	160

July	205	Aug.	140
Aug.	135	Sept.	70
Sept.	130		<u>2,210</u>
	<u>9,616</u>		

Rtd by Personnel

Rtd by Personnel

Evacuated from
the Field

1,796
7,820

Evacuated from
the Field

328
1,882

On January 8, 1945, the FO sent to Stevenson in Belgrade the following:

Please convey following message from Prime Minister to Marshal Tito.

I have now the return of the munitions sent by air or sea to the forces under Your Excellency's command in the month of November:—

Rifles and MGs21,800

Grenadesover 40,000

Mortars 128

A/Tk Weapons over 1,000

PIATS 88

SAAover 16 million rounds

Mortar bombsnearly 20,000

PIAT and Rocket Bombsover 22,000

Apart from other stores of food, clothing and supplies. The total weight was over 7,300 tons.

2. I am very glad we have been able to achieve this import and I hope that none of these stores will find their way to E.L.A.S. for use against us, but that, on the other hand, they will be of real service to Your Excellency's armies in cutting off the Germans or at least clearing them out of Yugoslavia.⁷

On April 17, 1945, AFHQ sent to AGWAR and AMSSO the following secret cypher telegram:

Subject is maintenance for Yugoslav Army.

1. Maintenance provisioned by SOM ceases 30 June 45.

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2. To cover possibility that Yugoslav Army may be engaged in operations after 30 June request you authorise me to take provisioning action through normal British channels to cover consumption July, August, September as shown Paragraphs 3 to 5 below.

3. Food, clothing, small arms, ammunition, MT fuel to be scaled on same basis as previously provisioned by SOM. Issue of arms and ammunition will only be made to partisans fighting Germans and will in any event cease when this condition no longer obtains. Ceiling for food, clothing, arms to be one hundred thousand troops.

4. Minor spare parts for weapons and vehicles already held by Yugoslav Army to be provided to extent such parts are within repair capacity of Yugoslavs.

5. Medical stores at normal scales for ceiling one hundred thousand operational troops. Normal scales are in excess of SOM scales.

6. Propose augmenting medical stores provisioned by SOM for April, May, June to ceiling one hundred fifty thousand by such advances as can be made available from theatre stocks without prejudice to current requirements. Request authority to demand replacement.⁸

On April 17, 1945 a conference was held at FO as follows:

Southern Department.

Extract from the *Provisional* Minutes of the Fortieth Meeting of the Foreign Office-S.O.E. Committee held at the Foreign Office on Tuesday, April 17th, 1945.

Yugoslavia.

Sir Orme Sargent asked whether S.O.E. were still responsible for sending supplies to the partisans. Mr. Sporborg replied that they were responsible until, he thought, the beginning of June.

In Washington telegram No. 2613, the Secretary of State suggests to the Prime Minister that the question of sending military supplies to Tito should again be reviewed. In telegram No. 3856 to Washington, the Prime Minister replies that he fully agrees that all supplies to Tito should be shut down on the best pretext that can be found and that he has asked the Chiefs of Staff to propose effective measures to this end.

Before the Secretary of State's telegram had arrived, the Prime Minister had sent a minute to the Foreign Office calling for a "full account of the number of British officers and men who are at present at the mercy of these wild people".

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The following minute is an attempt to collect the various questions which this exchange of telegrams and minute raise and review their present position.

2. *Tito's recent actions.*

Tito's activities in recent months have given offence more by omission than commission. Every occasion has been taken to emphasise Yugoslavia's gratitude to and dependence on the Soviet Union and by comparison Great Britain's contribution to the liberation and reconstruction of Yugoslavia has been slighted. The following particular incidents are worth mentioning:

(a) The incident which prompted the Secretary of State's telegram from Washington was Tito's interview with the "Red Star" on April 15th (Moscow telegrams No. 1350 and 1353), in which bouquets were handed even to the Americans and U.N.R.R.A., but no reference at all to Great Britain was made.

(b) Tito's intention to ask for a treaty with the Soviet Union must have been formed long before he left Belgrade for Moscow. Tito himself never mentioned this project to Mr. Stevenson (or so far as we are aware Mr. Paterson) or Sir A. Clark Kerr. The first we heard of the plan was when Dr. Subasic informed Sir A. Clark Kerr in Moscow shortly before the signature of the treaty was announced and no doubt after the negotiations had been completed.

(c) Yugoslav war communiques consistently play down or do not mention the air support given by the Balkan Air Force, which has in fact played an important if not a decisive part in the recent Yugoslav military successes in Croatia.

(d) Yugoslav Partisan forces in Istria have recently arrested three separate British patrols (Caserta telegram No. 656 of April 15th). In general the Yugoslav Partisans in Istria and Venezia Giulia have in recent months attempted to prevent the fulfilment of the proper functions of British liaison officers in that area.

(e) In recent weeks the Belgrade press has been conducting a violent campaign in favour of Yugoslav territorial claims against Italy. A high light in this campaign has been the incident of the small bomb that was thrown into a nuns' garden in the vicinity of Yugoslav Military Headquarters in Rome. Both Sir N. Charles and Mr. Stevenson consider that the rapidity with which "spontaneous" mass demonstrations against this outrage were organised in Yugoslavia points to the fact that the incident was engineered by the Yugoslavs as part of their campaign.

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3. *Yugoslav Military Operations.*

(a) Throughout the winter and spring months, the Yugoslav Army has been fighting a regular campaign against strong German forces on the so-called Srem front to the west of Belgrad, as the left wing of the Red Army. The Yugoslav Army suffered heavy casualties and there is no doubt that considerable effort was put into the campaign. Simultaneously with the Russian drive on Vienna, the Yugoslav wing also moved successfully forward.

(b) Throughout the winter and early spring the Yugoslav Partisan forces (in the true sense) in Slovenia have, according to our information, been almost entirely inactive. They have taken no part in interfering with German communications and have failed to exploit the openings made for them by Allied air attacks. It is considered that Allied air support has alone saved them from rout and defeat.

(c) A month ago the Yugoslav Regular Army opened a successful offensive in Western Croatia and along the Adriatic coast. They have liberated Bihac and Sarajevo and the islands of Rab and Pag. It appears that Field-Marshal Alexander considers this offensive as a valuable adjunct to his own operations on the Italian mainland.

4. *Allied Supplies to Yugoslav Forces.*

It is rather difficult to get accurate and up to date figures of Allied supplies to Yugoslav forces, more especially as A.F.H.Q. appear to have some reluctance in communicating information on this subject to London.

(a) *Regular supplies.* It appears that Field-Marshal Alexander is sending to Marshal Tito as a regular monthly commitment (for which, however, there seems no written agreement) equipment and supplies for 100,000 Yugoslav troops "on a guerilla basis". This appears to mean that these regular deliveries comprise machine guns, rifles, ammunition, clothing, medical supplies and food, but not such large items as field-guns and tanks. By a curious anomaly these supplies have been drawn up to the present from S.O.E. stocks, although the vast majority of them are sent in to liberated Yugoslav territory for the use of the Regular Yugoslav Army. This arrangement is due to come to an end of June 30th, and Field-Marshal Alexander has just referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for instructions on the new arrangements for continuing this commitment (see NAF 924 of April 17th, attached to this minute). This telegram gives a convenient opportunity to review the regular supply of the Yugoslav armed forces.

(b) *Supplies to Yugoslav Partisans proper.* As far as I have been able to make out only a comparatively small quantity of supplies is at present being

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sent in to Yugoslav Partisans operating behind the enemy lines. I am told that the figure is probably not higher than an over-all total of some 200 tons a month.

(c) *Extraordinary supplies to Tito for special purposes.*

(i) For Tito's offensive in Western Croatia and along the Adriatic coast Field-Marshal Alexander presented him with 106 field-guns and 40 tanks, as well as a considerable quantity of ammunition and other items (R 6178/ g). This was done without reference to London.

(ii) Also in connexion with his Croatian offensive, Tito asked Field-Marshal Alexander for additional rations over and above the 2,000 tons a month which he normally receives. Field-Marshal Alexander gave him 1,000,000 rations at once and a further 500 tons some time later. Tito then asked for a further 3,000 tons, which Field-Marshal Alexander was obliged to refer to London. This request was turned down by the C.I.G.S. (War Office telegram to A.F.H.Q. No. 85077 of April 13th).

(iii) Tito asked Field-Marshal Alexander in Belgrade for clothing and equipment for 100,000 Yugoslav troops to enable him to send a force of 200,000 Yugoslav troops to invade and occupy Austria. Field-Marshal Alexander has never yet reported on this request, despite frequent prompting from London. The last paragraph of the C.I.G.S.'s telegram of April 13th should at last elicit the required information on this point and indeed on the whole question of military supplies to Tito. Our views on the political implications of this request have already been made known to the Chiefs of Staff (R 5477/G).

5. *Present Status of Yugoslav Questions.*

(a) Our proposal for a division of responsibility for the re-equipment and maintenance of the Yugoslav armed forces has met with no response from the Soviet Government. Meanwhile, we have learnt that they are muscling in on what we had proposed should be our province and establishing a Russian air training school in Yugoslavia.

(b) The Combined Chiefs of Staff have just reached agreement on the administration of Venezia Giulia. (The solution proposed is the one recommended by Field-Marshal Alexander, which is incidentally the least favourable to the Yugoslavs).

(c) The Allied air base at Zadar (which is Italian national territory administered by Yugoslavs) is in process of being developed. It is estimated that there are at present about 1,000 members of the British Army and Air Force employed at the base and that the number will be eventually increased to about 3,000. (There is no intention at present of introducing

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British troops into Yugoslav territory in any other area or for any other purposes).

(d) Besides the British Military Mission in Belgrade, there are 16 submissions, each consisting of 3 or 4 individuals only, with the various Yugoslav corp headquarters in the field. Our intention has been that regardless of the military value of these sub-missions, they should be retained if possible until the requisit number of consular posts has been reopened in the various areas.

(e) Relief for Yugoslavia ceased to be a military responsibility and was taken over by U.N.R.R.A. on April 15th. Any observers now in Yugoslavia in connexion with the relief scheme are likely soon to be U.N.R.R.A. personnel and not officers of SACMED.

6. Action Required.

The Prime Minister has never given any written comment on the Secretary of State's minute on the general question of our policy towards Yugoslavia in R 5969/G. It is understood, however, that he accepts the general lines of the Secretary of State's minute and that the Prime Minister's subsequent minutes and telegrams have not been intended to question the basis of that policy. The broad question of our Yugoslav policy thus seems to require no further argument or exposition from the Foreign Office.

The question of military support for Tito is likely to be at last fully reviewed and considered as a result of the C.I.G.S.'s telegram to Field-Marshal Alexander of April 13th and of the Prime Minister's minute to the Chiefs of Staff sent within the last few days. The Chiefs of Staff already have our views on the political aspect of this question (R 5477/G).

A reply is presumably required to the Prime Minister's enquiry about the number of political officers and men at the mercy of Tito's wild men. We can reply that there are at a rough estimate about 1,000 at Zadar and about 50 serving in a liaison capacity in various parts of Yugoslavia, apart from the members of the British Military Mission in Belgrade, adding that more precise information could only be obtained from Caserta. Perhaps, however, no written reply is now required to this question, which is clearly tendentious in character, seeing that Sir O. Sargent has since discussed the general question of policy towards Yugoslavia with the Prime Minister.

We have not yet given the Chiefs of Staff the evidence of the inactivity of the Slovene Partisans or suggested to them the argument that any assistance given to Tito in his drive northwards brings him nearer to Venezia Julia and Carinthia. The latter argument has a new force now that it has

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been decided that Tito should be asked to withdraw his forces from the Italian territories claimed by Yugoslavia. (The draft on R 6611/G was held up when it was learnt that the C.I.G.S. had already sent a reply to Field-Marshal Alexander about Tito's extra rations). This might be done now in a further letter to General Jacob, which should arrive in time for the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on assistance to Tito, which may be expected very shortly. We might at the same time urge that, whatever the Chiefs of Staff decide on the question of supplies to Tito, they should supply Field-Marshal Alexander with a full explanation of our present policy towards Yugoslavia, in the drafting of which we should be glad to cooperate. It seems fairly clear that in recent months Field-Marshal Alexander has been pursuing a policy of generosity and consideration towards Tito which is quite out of keeping with the Prime Minister's and our own present ideas.

J.M. Addis 19th April, 1945.

This is an excellent minute and ought to be entered.

Could it also be put into a form suitable for submission to PM.

Copy might in that case also go to the COS.

Meanwhile certainly write to Col. Jacob as suggested in last SOE minute. In doing so he should be reminded of the letter of the 22nd March or R 5477 (which he never seemed to have answered).

O.G. Sargent⁹

On April 25, 1945, WSC gave General Ismay's view for Chiefs of Staff Committee:

GENERAL ISMAY FOR CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

In view of the unsatisfactory attitude recently shown by Marshal Tito and of his ingratitude for the substantial help which we have provided for his forces, I consider that the time has now come to discontinue the assistance which we have hitherto afforded. A good pretext should be found on which this change of policy can be based and a gradual scheme for its execution.

I shall be glad if the Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the Foreign Office, will give the matter their consideration and propose effective measures towards this end.
W.S.C. 25 April, 1945.¹⁰

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Tito requested "additional supplies" for extra rations. Field Marshal Alexander on April 30, 1945 sent a personal top secret cipher telegram to CIGS:

Thanks for advice contained your 85077 (MO5) of 13 April. I have informed Tito that I regret I cannot furnish additional supplies. We have however helped him by transporting by air 500 tons of his own supplies from Belgrade to Zemunik and we are helping him with medical supplies."

On April 10, 1945, the AFHQ sent to the War Office a most secret cipher telegram:

Personal for C.I.G.S. from F.M. Alexander.

I have recently had pressing demands from Marshal Tito to furnish rations for (?portions) of his forces numbering about 60,000 engaged in his offensive on Adriatic coast. I have already given him 1,000,000 (rpt 1,000,000) rations as result my talks with him at Belgrade and further 500 tons later. This is additional to 2,000 (rpt 2,000) tons per month (?ex) SOM stocks. He now asks for 3,000 tons more and says that without this his successful offensive must be halted. I am advised that although my reserve stocks are adequate for feeding requirements for own troops the very large commitments with which I may be faced make it very undesirable to reduce these reserves by further issue to Tito. These commitments include Italian partisans liberated allied PW captured enemy PW. At worst these commitments could absorb our present reserves in 3 months. In brief on an actuarial basis no further supplies should be given to Tito. However, there is another side of the picture. The Yugo-Slavs are paying a useful dividend and operations on Balkan front are making C.in.C. South West very nervous as to position in his rear at head of the Adriatic. Recent shifting of German troops to this area is materially assisting my present battle in Italy. Further, if I have to negotiate an agreement with Tito over Venezia Giulia it will be easier for me to get what I want from a grateful Tito who will be under some obligation to me for help I have given him. If further assistance is to be effective it must be given without delay. I should be grateful for your guidance in light of fuller information available at WO as to general supply situation and of the factors in favour of giving help which I have mentioned above.¹²

As the British do, the War Office on April 13, 1945 dispatched to AFHQ a long most secret cipher telegram:

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Personal from C.I.G.S. to Field Marshal Alexander.

1. Tito's request for rations represents about one days feeding for your present strength, and if issued by you would decrease your G.S. reserve from 45 to 44 days. We would not replace this issue.
2. Closest watch must be kept on food stocks because of known world shortage and your own probable future commitments.
3. With regard to political issues, solution of Venezia Giulia problem will be negotiated on Governmental level, hence you will only have to implement decisions arising therefrom. Foreign Office moreover would not press on political grounds for those supplies to be made available to Tito.
4. Agree that Tito's efforts are assisting your battle, but doubt whether they are of sufficient importance to justify increase to considerable supplies which he is already receiving. In view of foregoing we are reluctant to accept this additional commitment. If however on operational grounds you are anxious to do so, you might accede to this particular request, but you should make it clear to Tito that it is for the last time.
5. As you know (see A.M.S.S.O. 2216 of 7 April to Washington) we are having difficulty in obtaining agreement in America to use of Lease-Lend foodstuffs for Greek National Guard and Police. If you decide to give this food to Tito would therefore urge you to refer Tito's request and your action to CCS. for covering approval since food is partly of Lease-Lend origin.
6. It is of utmost importance that we know full extent of supplies promised to Tito and of operations to be undertaken by his forces as result of your conversations at Belgrade. Use of Yugoslav troops for operations against Austria or for occupation of Austria and Yugoslav seizure of LUS-SIN PICCOLO

are all liable to political objections of varying degrees which Foreign Office are anxious to avoid unless operational needs are of over-riding importance. Request therefore you reply most urgently to War Office 80527 of 28 March will outline of supplies promised to Tito beyond those in your 51826 of 29 March and of your proposals for dealing with Tito's suggestions for these operations by Yugoslav troops.¹³

Churchill had his kiester full on April 26, 1945. V.G. Lawford of FO sent to J.R. Colville, Churhcill's secretary, the following letter:

The Prime Minister's minute M 351/5 of the 17th April asks for an account of the number of British officers in Yugoslavia.

An exact figure could only be given by Caserta. But from the information available here it appears that there are about 1,000 officers and men at the air-base at Zadar, formerly known as Zara, which though Italian terri-

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tory is controlled and administered by the Yugoslavs. In addition there are probably about 50 in the various liaison missions at Yugoslav regional military headquarters, not including the staff of the Military Mission at Belgrade itself. The number of men engaged at Zadar is likely to be increased eventually to about 3,000. We understand that there is no present intention of sending British service personnel into any other part of Yugoslavia for any other purpose.¹⁴

On May 7, 1945, O. Sargent sent to Major General L.C. Hollis the "Dear Joe" top secret letter: You have a copy of the Prime Minister's minute M.443/5 of the 2nd May about the stopping of military supplies to the Yugoslavs.

2. We do not know whether this decision involves a breach of any outstanding commitments which Field Marshal Alexander may have towards Tito. I should be grateful if you could let me know the facts on this point, so that we may be able to advise on the timing and method of any notification to Tito which may prove to be necessary.

3. We are informing Mr. Stevenson and Mr. Macmillan of the Prime Minister's ruling, for their personal information only.¹⁵

With that we exhaust our collection of documents. When other documents are released, we will search for the relevant ones for our studies.

At the same time we would like to go into an analysis of the whole problem of the enigma in the attitudes of the free world toward the Communist hell called Yugoslavia.

As a specimen of these problems, we quote Robert Murphy:

For instance, one day in 1953 I was authorized to inform the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington that thirty-three million dollars had just been granted for the purchase of cereals and cotton under the aid program for his country. At that time the total amount which the United States had given to Yugoslavia exceeded a billion dollars in economic and military assistance, and I thought the Ambassador would express some appreciation. Instead, without a word of thanks, he said brusquely: "Yes, yes. I know all about that. But what about the additional twelve million dollars for wheat?" Apparently the Ambassador already had learned informally about the latest American grant, perhaps even before I heard of it myself. I let the thermometer drop about twenty degrees and then ushered him out of my office with some noncommittal remarks. . .

Cooperation between Belgrade and Washington seemed to deteriorate. The United States Government had transferred hundreds of millions of

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dollars worth of equipment to the Yugoslav Army, and it was the duty of the American Military Assistance Mission in Belgrade to report on the use made of this equipment. But General Peter C. Hains, who was in charge of the military group, notified Washington that he could not get access to much of the information to which we were entitled by our agreement.¹⁶

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XV Economic Aid

At the beginning of the guerrilla in Yugoslavia, a guerrilla actually non-existing but created by BBC, most of the economic aid came exclusively from Great Britain as we show in different places in the book. The explanation for Great Britain being the sole aid to those guerrilla forces lies in the circumstance that Americans were not in any way involved in it. The reason for that was that Americans did not have a terrorist and espionage organization until the foundation of OSS, and OSS was founded only on July 13, 1942. The beginnings of OSS were modest since its director, Brigadier General, at that time, William J. Donovan, had to begin from scratch. Since there had been no such organization in the history of the United States, there was no American professional in the field, and it took a long time to educate Americans in the art of terrorism and espionage. This education was conducted in many a British center for terrorism and espionage, but, especially, American education in terrorism and espionage was carried on at Camp X. But with the growing impetus of OSS men and women and of their director, who by November 1942 was created a Major General, Americans looked forward to having more involvement with the guerrilla in Yugoslavia, then already in the hands of the guerrilla band leader, Josip Broz Tito. The first glamorous enterprise mentioned by everyone is that of Major Louis Huot. He described his adventure in "Advance Base, OSS, Middle East, Bari, Italy: Report of Operations for Period 5 October to 1 November, 1943."

Dedijer expressed the enthusiasm of all Yugo-Bolshies as follows:

One day, a rather strange man appeared on Partisan territory. He was an officer of the United States Army, a major, who said that his name was Huot. He asked to see Tito, but inquired all the time whether there were any British officers in the vicinity. At that very moment a British officer came along. The American immediately asked the town major to hide him in another room so that the Englishman should not see him. The

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town major did as he was asked, but was at a complete loss to understand what the American officer was after.

The facts were simple, however. Major Louis Huot had not obtained permission from the Allied Command to come to Yugoslavia. He had come on his own initiative to assist the Partisans, whose representatives he had met in Bari. Huot was received by Tito and had a long talk with him, after which he returned to Italy. He kept his word. He sent us over four hundred tons of uniforms, medical supplies, ammunition and other items, which could not be found in Yugoslavia, from certain U.S. quartermaster stores and by means of the small Yugoslav boats. This assistance amounted to more than the total aid we had hitherto received from the Allies. We were planning on further quantities of supplies when one day this energetic American disappeared from Bari. He had been posted elsewhere.¹

All of his adventure Huot described in his book, *Guns for Tito*.² It is hard to say whether his was the first contact of OSS with Tito, and whether it opened the big door that from that point Americans kept wide open. It happens that already on March 15, 1944 Tito, signing as Marshal of Yugoslavia, sent to General Wm. L. Donovan, Commanding General Director, OSS, Washington, D.C., the following letter:

"Sir:

The message you sent me through Lt. Col. Richard Weil, Jr., AUS. has reached me, and I deeply appreciate your greetings.

I am convinced that the visit here of Lt. Col. Weil will have very useful results, as he was able to realize on the spot our needs and wishes. He will personally inform you of our conversation here. The main point, for the time being, is that the material which, at the moment, cannot come by sea should be brought by air with as large as possible a number of planes.

Owing to the exhaustion of the population on the territory where ceaseless battles take place, we are really in need of great assistance, not only in armament, but also in food for the army and for the population. I hope for your full support in this matter."

From this time on money and supplies poured into Yugoslavia as the many documents that follow demonstrate.

Already on March 6, 1944, Donovan wrote a memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject: "Report on the Island of Vis."

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1. There is submitted for your information, without comment, certain facts and observations contained in a report on the Island of Vis which we have recently received from our Inspector, Colonel C.S. Vanderblue, S.C. The report is dated 20 February 1944.

2. Vis is located in the Adriatic Sea off the Coast of Yugoslavia on the approaches to Split. It is presently held by the Partisans, who have undertaken the organization of the military defenses under Commander Chernee (phonetic spelling). Under him he has a Military and Naval Commander for each of the Ports, Vis and Camisa. Sitting side by side with all the Partisan Commanders are political commissars who, we understand, enjoy the same position their counterparts enjoyed in the Russian Army prior to the German invasion of Russia. These commissars, we further understand, have been trained in Russia — some coming out as much as three years ago.

The Partisan forces were stated to consist of 12,000 individuals made up of men, women, boys, and girls. Boys as young as 14 were found serving at outposts. We did not get any breakdown of the number of women and boys, but from what was seen, it is believed that there were not more than about 500 of each in the military forces. The Partisans are equipped with miscellaneous weapons of Italian, German and Yugoslavian manufacture. In addition to small arms they have British and Italian two pounders and some field artillery pieces, the largest of which are 105mm howitzers. There do not seem to have been more than 12 field pieces larger than the two pounder.

3. Allied forces are also on the Island. These forces are composed of the Second Commando Unit, numbering about 500 men; OSS OGs, of which 200 were on the Island at the time of Vanderblue's visit, and another 100 enroute, making a total of 300; about 300 British anti-aircraft troops, manning 12 Bofers which were in place, and 18-50 cal. machine guns which were scheduled to arrive in about a day or two; a British naval unit of about 100 men, operating approximately 7 MCDs and MTHs; and a medical unit which had not arrived, but was scheduled to be on the island shortly, consisting of about 100 men.

4. The principal mission of the commandos, the British HOBs, and the OSSOGs is to conduct coup de main and reconnaissance operations, and of course in the event of an attack on the island to help defend it. Major Lovell, who is the commanding officer of the OGs, was fully aware of the situation facing him in the event of an attack. We had plans for the disposition of his troops to get them out of the town of Vis into the hills. He was

planning to move the people from their present billets into tents as soon as the weather permits.

5. The probability of a German attack was discussed with the British who advised their reconnaissance showed a concentration of German shipping on the inner side of the island of Uljan. This concentration was being watched closely by the RAF for any signs of movement. We were further advised aerial support could be given the island within 30 minutes, and naval support in the form of destroyers in 72 hours. In Col. Vanderblue's estimation the correct defense of the island was to

have a regiment of British or American Infantry with attached anti-aircraft and artillery units. He found that the British, particularly General Miles, concurred in this feeling. The situation, he was told, has been outlined to the appropriate military authorities by Force 133, and there is a hope that some regular Army units will be sent.

6. The British are conducting a gunnery school for the Partisans on the island. The instructor related he was having difficulties. He has been training the Partisans to fire howitzers at a pre-determined range from positions on the reverse slope of the hills overlooking the beaches. When left on their own, the Partisans invariably run the pieces to the top of the hills so that they see the target areas from the gun positions.

7. We learned there was one enemy agent radio set operating. Ways and means of detecting this set were discussed with the OSS OGs and the British. Suggestions were given to have the OGs and Commandos in company with the Partisans make a coordinated house to house search of the island looking for radio equipment, batteries, charging units, etc. It was also suggested that anyone connected with the medical profession, particularly those who may have had diathermy equipment, be observed closely because of the ease with which a transmitter can be made from such equipment.

8. There were also on the island about 4000 refugees whom the Partisans plan to evacuate to the Italian mainland where the British are providing haven. The rate of evacuation was set at 200 per day, but on a recent afternoon word was received to send 700 on the vessels leaving that night.

Unfortunately only 500 could be brought to the port in time to depart. Apparently the British are now able to handle more than the 200 per day and the evacuation can be completed earlier than thought possible.

On March 15, (? date not clear on copy) Tito signed as Marshal of Yugoslavia, wrote to His Excellency, Franklin Roosevelt, President of the United States of America:

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Sir:

The departure of Lt. Col. Richard Weil, Jr., AUS. offers me the opportunity of expressing my gratitude to you for the assistance in material and in the cooperation of your Air Force, rendered to our Army of National Liberation by you and the people of America.

The superhuman struggle which has been waged by the people of Yugoslavia for the last three years, aims, not only at clearing our country of the criminal occupiers, but, also at the creation of a better and more righteous order, which would guarantee true democracy, equal rights, and social justice to all nations of Yugoslavia. These aspirations and perspectives have given our nations the strength to endure all difficulties and suffering this unequal struggle. For the fulfillment of their strivings the peoples of Yugoslavia expect the aid of the great democratic country of the people of the U.S. [The remainder of the letter is not legible except for the last sentence which reads as follows:] Lt. Colonel Weil will be able to express to you our needs and wishes. I am convinced that they will be granted.

Yours respectfully,

/signed/ Tito Marshal of Yugoslavia

14th March 1944

On March 28, 1944, the Department of State wrote to the American Embassy in Mexico as follows: Supplies from the United States destined to Yugoslavia are at present being forwarded by the United Yugoslav Relief Fund, 11 West Fifty-seventh Street, New York, through the International Red Cross. The Mexican "Committee for Aid to the Liberating Army and Guerrillas of Yugoslavia" may wish to avail itself of this channel, either by getting in touch with the United Yugoslav Relief Fund or through the intermediary of the Mexican Red Cross and International Red Cross. No other channels are at present available. However, UNRRA is perfecting arrangements for the despatch to Balkan areas immediately following their liberation of medical and other technicians to be recruited by private organizations.

The Committee may wish to look into the possibility of participating in this work, through Mexican UNRRA channels.²

For the help in many a problem of need caused by the War, the United Yugoslav Relief Fund of America was created, sponsored by The American Friends of Yugoslavia, Inc. Their News Bulletin, November-December

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1944, carried a statement of money spent for relief during a nine-month period.

\$995,890.87 Spent for Relief

For 9 Months Ending Sept. 1944

Shown in U.Y.R.F. Financial Report

In accordance with the established policy of the United Yugoslav Relief Fund of America to publish reports on its financial transactions, the following condensed summary of cash receipts and disbursements for the nine months ending September 30, 1944 is herewith submitted. Receipts:

National War Fund Contributions.....\$794,685.54

War Chests Contributions 8,570.54

Donations 2,061.53

Other..... 2,652.06 \$ 807,969.67

Disbursements: Relief:

American Red Cross\$859,895.00

Invalid Food Parcels, Medical Kits and Sanitary Items for Yugoslav Prisoners of War, \$757,725.00

Medical Supplies Inside Yugoslavia, \$100,000.00 Soap for Yugoslav Civilians and Escaped

Prisoners in Switzerland, \$1,170.00

Allied Control Commission—Cost of Manufacturing Artificial Limbs in Italy for Yugoslavs injured in combat, \$1,000.00.

Parcels for Hospitalized Yugoslav

Prisoners of War..... 59,000.00

Clothing Project (Collection, Cleaning, Storage, etc., of Used Clothing)..... 19,737.12

Aid to Yugoslav Refugees in the

United States..... 2,712.15

Aid to Yugoslav Refugees in Switzerland 10,000.00

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International Y.M.C.A. — Books and Recreational Material for Prisoners of War..... 31,500.00

Near East Refugee Aid 10,440.00

Layettes and Children's Clothing . . . 2,606.60

Merchandise Purchased for Resale 1,00.97

Publicity Expenses..... 11,853.99

Administrative and General Expenses . 36,672.79

Excess of Disbursements over Receipts.....

Add:

Balance of January 1, 1944.....

Balance September 30, 1944.....

1,045,427.62

237,457.95 274,527.89

37,069.94³

Involved in this Communist enterprise were such personalities as: Hamilton Fish Armstrong. Mrs. Lawrence M. Tibbett. James H. Cushman, Walter H. Mallory, Thomas J. Watson. Win. M. Chadbourne. Rev. James C. Flint, Mrs. Lazar, L. Dropa, et al.

On December 29, 1944. the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in Washington. D.C. issued the following statement by Herbert H. Lehman. Director General of UNRRA:

I have just returned after six weeks at our European Regional Office at London. During the course of my work there I spent 10 days on the Continent becoming acquainted with relief problems in liberated areas.

On 9 November, two days before I left for London, I met with the Washington press, reporting to them the then current position of United Nations relief programs and the UNRRA part in them. There have been many new developments since then. These have been reported in part. This summary will give the present situation.

1. Greece

Under an agreement with the Allied Military Liaison (which is responsible for the civilian relief operations for which the military has assumed responsibility in Greece), detachments of UNRRA personnel went into the liberated areas of Greece soon after the Germans were expelled. There they have been operating as agents of the military authorities who have the responsibility for providing civilian relief supplies and services. Since all transport and stocks of supplies must in the early period after liberation be under military control, it was long since agreed that the liberating military authorities will carry the responsibility for procuring and shipping imported

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relief goods during the first six months after liberation of any United Nations area by them. The military relief authorities in Greece have been making the imported goods available to the local authorities in the various communities and districts. UNRRA has been assisting the military authorities. This continues to be the case in and about Salonika and Patras on the mainland, and in the Aegean and Cyclades Islands, and will shortly be true in Crete. In the Athens-Piraeus area, where combat conditions prevail, members of the UNRRA contingent acted as volunteers, working on both sides of the lines to help in moving civilian supplies, evacuating wounded and needy people to hospitals and other refuges, and gathering and burying the dead. In the course of this work seven of them were wounded. Last week on the advice of military authorities we evacuated some thirty of the UNRRA personnel from this combat area, sending them to Cairo. From Cairo they will be transferred to the islands and provinces in Greece where relief operations continue at full scale. Some forty UNRRA personnel remaining in the Athens area are assisting in the operation of soup kitchens, hospitals, etc. The executive chiefs of the UNRRA mission for Greece, who remain in Athens, are proceeding with plans to cooperate with the military authorities during the period of military responsibility and with the Greek Government following that. 2. Yugoslavia

I am considerably concerned at some of the stories which have been appearing in the press indicating that there are serious disagreements between UNRRA and the Yugoslav authorities with respect to the administration of relief in that country. This is not the case. It is important to understand that two series of negotiations have been going forward with respect to relief for Yugoslavia. One is carried on by the Yugoslav Government and the Allied Military Liaison which represents the American and British military authorities. Their aim is to reach agreement on the terms and conditions of relief operations to be carried on with military supplies under military direction during the period of military responsibility for civilian relief in Yugoslavia. A second series of negotiations has been going on between Yugoslav and UNRRA representatives both at Washington and at London. These discussions have to do with the relief program for Yugoslavia in the post-military period when UNRRA will assume responsibility for the provision of supplies and the overseeing on its own authority of relief activities in Yugoslavia. With respect to arrangements for this post-military period I can report that there is virtually complete agreement between the representatives of this Administration and the representatives of both the Royal Yugoslav Government and Marshal Tito. UNRRA, as

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has always been contemplated, will permit the Yugoslav authorities themselves to handle all distribution of supplies provided by UNRRA. The only condition that UNRRA has made is that it be permitted a sufficient number of observers so that it will be possible to certify to the contributing nations and other members of UNRRA that distribution has been made in accordance with the principles laid down by the Council of UNRRA. I have been informed by Yugoslav authorities that they are in substantial agreement with the principles which we have established concerning the administration of relief where supplies are provided by UNRRA and the conclusion of this agreement awaits only the further clarification and consolidation of the political position in Yugoslavia. UNRRA has a staff of relief specialists and administrative personnel assembled in Italy ready to go to work

assisting either the Allied Military Liaison during the period of military responsibility or directly assisting the Government of Yugoslavia when UNRRA assumes a direct responsibility for relief operations in this area. **3. Western Europe**

During my stay in London a formal agreement was signed by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and myself fixing the responsibilities of UNRRA for assisting the Allied military authorities, in occupied Germany and in Western Europe during their period of responsibility for civilian relief. Under the agreement we are placing a liaison officer and such staff as the military decides is necessary with the G-5 division of SHAEF. He reports to us through military channels. He works under the direction of the military authorities. This officer calls forward the UNRRA personnel desired to give assistance to the military authorities in carrying on relief and rehabilitation work. His detachment coordinates and supervises the activities of non-governmental civil agencies other than those of the individual liberated nations that are doing relief work in the liberated territory. Under the agreement UNRRA personnel on field service will wear a distinctive uniform and will carry identification as persons accompanying the armed forces. The chief responsibilities of UNRRA in the paying countries of Western Europe for assistance to the military are in the fields of health, welfare and displaced persons operations. In occupied Germany UNRRA will work with displaced persons under the direction of the military.

It is important to realize the magnitude of the problem of caring for and repatriating displaced persons. There are some 9 million of these most unfortunate victims of war in Germany alone. Under the excellent cooperative arrangements between UNRRA and the United States and United Kingdom military forces the latter will take on a good deal of the burden in

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the area which they occupy, particularly in the initial periods. Even so, UNRRA will need at least 2,000 people to handle this gigantic humanitarian task.

While I was in London we also concluded agreements with the Governments of all the Western European United Nations—Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Luxembourg—for the dispatch of UNRRA liaison missions to them. These missions will be concerned mainly with assistance to these governments in the parts of their relief programs having to do with health, welfare and displaced persons activities. It is hoped that all relief imports to these nations will be financed by their own governments, thus making more of UNRRA's limited supply of goods available to the people whose governments lack foreign exchange resources. It has never been contemplated that UNRRA would furnish supplies to countries with adequate foreign exchange resources.

4. Eastern Europe

The headquarters office of UNRRA in Washington has just completed arrangements with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board for the assignment of a moderate amount of shipping space to carry relief supplies for Poland and Czechoslovakia—contingent upon assurances that these supplies will be accepted in ports of the U.S.S.R. and given internal transport by U.S.S.R. facilities. These assurances have not yet been received but it is hoped they will be forthcoming shortly. We have accepted the invitation of the Czech Government to send a representative with a group of Czech health experts to the liberated parts of that country. Medical supplies will make up an important part of the first relief shipments to Czechoslovakia. As previously announced, we stand ready to send a delegation of technical experts to Poland. Personnel for the mission is recruited. It will move forward upon the completion of arrangements for transport and for transit visas. We are likewise ready to send an initial mission to Czechoslovakia as soon as circumstances permit.

5. Italy

The UNRRA mission is in Italy. It is concluding detailed arrangements for the relief program authorized by the UNRRA Council at its recent meeting in Montreal. Meantime, on this side of the water arrangements have been completed with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board which assure a moderate amount of tonnage to transport supplies in the months of January and February.

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6. Progress of Other Relief Programs

The mission to Ethiopia has gone forward. This mission will report on the needs of the Ethiopian people for relief, particularly in the field of health.

Dr. Eduardo Santos, Deputy Director General, and Lawrence Duggan, Assistant Diplomatic Adviser, and their party have completed visits to eleven Latin American republics and a report on the results of their discussions will be issued next week when Dr. Santos comes to the headquarters office in Washington.

The Southwest Pacific office in Sydney, Australia, has been opened. The staff for the office in Chungking is assembled and will leave shortly. The problems of relief in the Far Eastern United Nations, liberated and to be liberated, are being outlined for consideration by the UNRRA Committee of the Council for the Far East which will meet in Sydney on 15 February.

During my stay at European headquarters, the staff there worked with me on tightening up the organization for action after the completion of the planning stage and in the light of relief problems as they have now become clarified.

To date UNRRA has been primarily a planning organization. It is only during the last three to four months that areas have been liberated that are accessible to United Nations shipping. Initial responsibility for civilian relief has been the military's. We are on the threshold of our first major operations. The highest authorities of the major supply and shipping countries are aware of this. We are counting on them to provide us with the goods and the ships. We know they will give us fullest possible support.

Among the worries of the protective Allies is also pertinent the taking care of Yugoslav protocol with all its problems and expenses.

On January 4, 1945, Stoyan Gavrilovic of the Royal Yugoslav Embassy in London wrote to the Foreign Office as follows:

With further reference to your letter No. R 11652/658/92, of the 2nd August last, regarding the account for a party of Yugoslav officials who travelled on the ss. "Mooltan" in 1943, I wish to inform you that the Yugoslav Ministry of Finance, after examining the list of officials, has discovered that out of the 53 persons mentioned ten did not travel with that party. Two, for instance, went with the first party on the mv. "Reina del Pacifico".

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The Ministry of Finance has therefore deducted the cost of ten first class tickets (£350) and has requested the Embassy to forward a cheque for £1,505, which I am enclosing herewith.

So soon as the examination of the list of the first party is completed, the cheque in respect of those costs will also be sent to you.⁴

A. R- Dew of the Foreign Office answered to Gavrilovic on Jan. 19, 1945 as follows:

I write to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter P. No. 1496 of 4th January to Mr. Reed enclosing a cheque for £1505 in respect of the journey of Yugoslav officials to Port Said in the S.S. "Mooltan" in 1943. I note that you intend to write further in regard to the settlement of the account for passages on the "Reina del Pacifico" and shall hope to hear from you on this point shortly.⁵

On January 25, 1945 the Ministry of War Transport wrote to the Foreign Office as follows:

I am directed to refer to my letter dated 8th June 1944, and subsequent reminder of 20th November 1944, relative to the recovery of the cost of passage of King Peter of Yugo-Slavia and entourage from Liverpool to Port Said in the m.v. "Reina Del Pacifico" September 1943, amounting to £1, 678.19. 2.

It is understood that the Yugo-Slav Government had at that time accepted liability for this cost of passage in principle, and therefore a Receivable Order was enclosed with the formal letter of application addressed to you on 8th June, 1944.

In view of the length of time which has elapsed since this Receivable Order was issued, I am to enquire whether circumstances now permit of this transfer of funds being effected through H.M. Paymaster General.⁶

On February 1, 1945 A.R. Dew of the Foreign Office wrote to the Secretary, Ministry of War Transport:

With reference to your letter F.S.3/1/3235/17/3 of the 20th November last, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Eden to transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter from the Secretary-General of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs enclosing a cheque for £1,505 in respect of the passage of forty three officials in the S.S. "Mooltan" in 1943. The cheque is also enclosed herein.

2. Lord Leathers will observe that the Yugoslav authorities question the accuracy of the list of passengers in the "Mooltan" submitted to them and

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have withheld payment in respect of ten of the officials on this list enclosed in your letter F.S.3R/1/3 170/17/3 A. J of the 25th July; and that no payment has yet been received in respect of the passages of the Yugoslav party in the "Reina del Pacifico" referred to in your letter FS3/1/3235/17/3 of June last. The Yugoslav authorities are being reminded that the settlement of the latter account is still outstanding.⁷

All this problem prompted the Foreign Office to write on June 29, 1945 to the Chancery of the British Embassy in Belgrade as follows:

The Yugoslavs owe us £1,764.15s2d. for the passage of King Peter and party to Egypt in September 1943. The enclosed copy of a letter to Protic gives particulars.

2. Despite frequent reminders the Yugoslav Government have never paid. We shall be grateful if you will press them to do so now. They have already paid the passages of the second party who followed the King to Egypt.⁸

The Chancery of the British Embassy in Belgrade on August 1, 1945 responded to the Foreign Office as follows:

The Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs have now informed us, in a Note dated July 27th, that instructions have been given for the payment to the Finance Officer, Foreign Office, of £1,678. 19. 2d.⁹

The Yugo-Communist diplomacy was very active in its request for American help. On February 7, 1945, Acting Secretary, Joseph Grew, received the Yugoslav Charge d'Affaires, Ivan Franges, to discuss the situation in Yugoslavia. The discussions resulted in the following compilation of documents.¹⁰

The Yugoslav Charge' d'Affaires, Dr. Ivan Franges, called on me today at his request and for half an hour discussed the general situation in Yugoslavia.

First of all, Dr. Franges said that Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav press were conveying to the people the impression that all the assistance that flowed to Yugoslavia came from Soviet Russia and that the Western democracies were doing nothing to help. The Charge' said that this propaganda could rapidly be broken down if the United States should make an announcement that a certain sum of money, say \$500,000,000, had been appropriated for lend-lease assistance to Yugoslavia. Such a step would commit us to nothing, as each project would have to be considered separately and the money would be forthcoming only when adequate docu-

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mentary evidence covering any given project should be submitted and found satisfactory. The United States might in any case take the position that it was not satisfied with the evidence presented, yet the psychological effect of the appropriation as a whole would be of immense value. The Charge' left with me copies of correspondence with Mr. Crowley on this subject and expressed the earnest hope that I would give him full support to such an appropriation, as only thus would the Yugoslav people be brought to realize that they had anything to look for from the United States.

The Charge' then spoke of the fact that Yugoslavia, as an agricultural country, even through its Government might move to the Left, as it properly should move, could never become a genuinely Communistic country. As long as subversive Communist activities persisted, working in cooperation with the Communists in Greece and Italy, it was certain that the country would be in a perpetual state of unrest, especially as it was very easy to slip arms and ammunition and propaganda material across the narrow straits. On the other hand, if a genuinely democratic government could be set up in Yugoslavia, even though it might be a leftist government, it would have a stabilizing effect in that entire part of the world.

The Charge' then expressed to me his appreciation of my two statements to the press regarding Yugoslavia, which he said had been very helpful indeed. He realized that we must move slowly and that our attitude and action must be contingent upon the setting up of a really representative government but he hoped that from time to time we would make similar public statements and would

try to guide the press along those lines as this would have a very beneficial effect in Yugoslavia, and especially in London. The British, he said, want above all things good relations with the United States, and the British would undoubtedly follow us if we should lead the way. He discussed this point at some length and reiterated his view that public statements by us or background guidance for our press indicating our interest in helping Yugoslavia to set up a true democracy would be of immense value. I rehearsed briefly our position in this matter and said that while we could not properly interfere in the domestic affairs of his country we were anxious to help in every proper way and that my two press statements had been issued with this intention. I said that I would be glad to give the fullest consideration to the points which the Charge had set forth.

Dear Sir:

Enclosed herewith I have the honor to present to the Foreign Economic Administration the provisional estimates of the requirements of Yugoslavia

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for the fiscal year 1946 under the sixth Lend-Lease appropriation.

In view of the short times allowed for the preparation of these estimates it has not yet been possible for me to consult my Government on all the items of our program. Therefore, I beg to reserve the right to revise the said estimates in the light of any instructions that I may still receive from my Government before January 15th.

I am enclosing herewith five copies of the Yugoslav program for the fiscal year 1946. This program consists of the following groups of requirements:

1) Relief for prisoners of war.

This part of the program has been prepared by the American Red Cross on the basis of previous requirements which were approved under the current fiscal year 1945. However, two items have been added to the program prepared by the American Red Cross:

One is to provide reserve funds for additional comfort articles. These funds will be used to increase the quantities of some of the comfort articles that have already been approved if such increase proves to be justified as well as to include some new comfort articles in the program such as artificial limbs, dental supplies, spectacles, since repair kits, kitchen utensils, vegetable seeds etc., if and when it becomes possible to have such articles sent to the prisoners of war.

The other is to provide reserve funds to be used to increase the number of standard food packages up to one package and a half a month for each prisoner of war in case that the rations received by the prisoners are reduced as a result of the increasing shortage of food in Germany

The program presented for the relief of prisoners of war totals \$14,992,660.

2) Restoration of transport and other public utilities for the prosecution of the war.

War operations against the enemy cannot be pursued unless the necessary war materials are produced in the country or imported and, in order to do so, there must be at least a partial restoration of the transportation system and of other public utilities which have been destroyed during the war.

A minimum program for this partial restoration was presented by the Yugoslav government to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. However, this institution, owing to its limited resources, will be able to fulfill only an insignificant portion of this minimum program.

Therefore, the Yugoslav Government has decided to request the Foreign Economic Administration to finance these requirements under Lend-Lease.

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I am enclosing herewith two documents: 1) the list of requirements for transport and other public utilities as presented to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; 2) a list indicating the portion of the requirements of transport and other public utilities which to our knowledge will not be covered by UNRRA and, therefore, has to be financed under Lend-Lease. The latter requirements total \$458,781,720.

3) Civilian relief supplies.

I understand that it has been decided by the Foreign Economic Administration that the Government of Yugoslavia should submit its entire program of requirements for the first year of the relief period which was presented to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and that the foreign Economic Administration will investigate how far this program is expected to be fulfilled by

the UNRRA, as that the portion of requirements not covered by UNRRA can be covered under Land-Lease.

For this purpose I am enclosing a list of Yugoslav requirements for the first six months of relief period which was presented originally to the UNRRA. As to list for the recent six months presented to the UNRRA, we have only one copy of it left which we need for our own files and it has not been possible for us to have this list copied due to shortness of time. However, I know that the UNRRA is in possession of mimeographed copies of this list and I am sure that they will be glad to supply you with a copy if you ask for it. I would like to point out in this connection that our requirements of electric equipment, basic metals, building materials & Non-Metallic Minerals and Maintenance Equipment for the second six months have not yet been submitted by the Yugoslav Government to the UNRRA because they have not yet been prepared. However, these requirements are included in the list of requirements non-covered by the UNRRA for which I am asking the financial assistance of Land-Lease.

4) Army supplies

Equipment is requested for seven infantry divisions which will be used for war operations against the enemy in the Eastern Alps. The primary object to those operations will be to free the northwestern part of Yugoslavia which is still in enemy hands but these operations will undoubtedly contribute in easing the situation of the Allied troops fighting in North Italy.

The seven divisions will consist of approximately 100,000 men some of which have already been mobilized and are fighting with the National Army of Liberation whereas the remainder of these troops will be mobilized by May of this year at the latest.

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As can be seen from the enclosed list of requirements of army supplies, following items have been requested, clothing equipment, ordnance equipment, food, soap, tobacco, fuel and miscellaneous articles. As far as ordnance equipment, food, soap and tobacco is concerned no definite quantities of requirements have been given. For ordnance equipment we have referred to specific U.S. Army tables of organization and equipment. For food, soap and tobacco, we have requested regular rations for 100,000 men for twelve months as provided for the U. S. Army.

Unfortunately, due to shortness of time and to our lack of the highly technical knowledge involved, it has not been possible for us to calculate the values of our requirements of army supplies and therefore, I should appreciate it very much if the Foreign Economic Administration would lend us their assistance in determining these values.

5) Repairing of the present ships of the Yugoslav Merchant Navy and procuring of the new ships for that Navy.

I am writing for instructions from my Government with regard to this item and hope to be able to submit a list of these requirements within a few days.

I hope that the program of Yugoslav requirements for the fiscal year of 1946 will meet the approval of Foreign Economic Administration and beg to remain

Most sincerely yours,

Ivan Franges

Charge d'Affaires a.i.

of Yugoslavia.

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**SIXTH LEND-LEASE APPROPRIATION ESTIMATES SCHEULE OF REQUIREMENTS
FISAL YEAR 1946 REPAIR OF SHIPS**

Country: Yugoslavia

ITEM NO.

FISCAL CODE NO.

DESCRIPTION UNIT QUANTITY VALUE

\$1,200,000.

Repair of ships END USE:

The above amount will be used to repair the ships of the Yugoslav Merchant Navy which have been engaged in the war effort of the United Nations from the very beginning of the war. The Yugoslav

Merchant Navy has lost in this war through sinking 46 units amounting to 508,097 tons. The present fleet consists of 32 units amounting to 220,481 tons. The average age of the ships is 29.4. An amount of \$900,000. was spent last year in the United States on repairs of these ships, whereas 210,000 pounds sterling were spent on such repairs in other countries.

Dear Mr. Crowley

January 20, 1945.

estimates of Yugoslavia for the sixth Lend Case 1 herewith our requirements for the fiscal year of 1946 Merchant Navy. of ships for the Yugoslav fleet to remain,

Most sincerely yours,

Ivan Franges,

Charge d'Affaires a.i.

of Yugoslavia.

SIXTH LEND-LEASE APPROPRIATION ESTIMATES

SCHEDULE OF REQUIREMENTS

FISCAL YEAR 1946

PRISONERS OF WAR RELIEF PROGRAM

Country: Yugoslavia

ITEM FISCAL NO. CODE NO.

1.

2. 3.

4. 5. 6.

DESCRIPTION

UNITS QUANTITY

VALUE

END USE

Standard Food Packages	Pkg-	1,560,000	\$5,772,000
Clothing Outfits	outfits	130,000	4,842,500
Sets Miscellaneous Comfort			
Articles	set.	130,000	737,000
Invalid Food Packages	pkg.	75,000	358,800
Medical Kits	pkg-	15,600	126,360
Standard Food Packages	pkg.		2,886,000

Miscellaneous Comfort Articles set
200,000

For Prisoners of War. For Prisoners of War.

For Prisoners of War. For Prisoners of War. For Prisoners of War.

These are reserve funds to provide an increase of one half of a Standard Food Package to be sent to the prisoners of war in case their rations are decreased as a result of the diminishing food supplies in Germany. These funds will be used to increase the quantities of some of the comfort articles that have already been approved if such increase proves to be justified as well as to include some new comfort articles in the program such as artificial limbs, dental supplies, spectacles, shoe repair kits, kitchen utensils, vegetable seeds etc., if and when it becomes possible to have such articles sent to the prisoners of war.

SIXTH LEND-LEASE APPROPRIATION ESTIMATES

SCHEDULE OF REQUIREMENTS

FISCAL YEAR 1946

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

Country: Yugoslavia

ITEM FISCAL NO. CODE NO.

DESCRIPTION

UNIT QUANTITY

VALUE

END USE

I. PORTS

1.	Floating Cranes, 60 - tons	
2.	Mobile Cranes, 5 - tons	
3.	Wharf Portal Cranes, 3-6 tons	
4.	Lighters	
5.	Tugboats, heavy with fire extinguishing equipment	
6.	Tugboats, medium	
7.	Tugboats, light	
8.	Grain Dischargers	
9.	Special Contractors' Plant & Machinery for Port Reconstruction	10. Portable weighing Machines up to 1.5 t. 1 1.
12.	Cargo Handling Gears	
13.	Coal Handling Equipment	
14.	Dredgers	
15.	Lighthouses, complete with Machinery & Equipment for	
	(a) main lighthouses	
	(b) unwatched lighthouses	
15.	Life Saving Boats 10-15 t.d.w.	
Units	Units	Units
Units	Units	Units
Units		
2	\$ 35,000	
7	32,000	
12	210,000	
50	250,000	
12	1,200,000	
12	600,000	
24	480,000	
5	262.500	
350,000.		
Units	50	28,500
Units	4	56,000
Units	8	112,000
Units	4	700,000
Units	100	87,500
Units	350	122,500
Units	20	30,000

Items 1 to 17 (incl.) Yugoslav Ports such as Split, Susak, Sibenik and Dubrovnik, have been steadily bombed by the enemy and allied planes, and all Port facilities might be completely destroyed. Ports, as keypoints for all activities for the army and allied supplies, must be restored as quickly as possible for further use in the war effort.

The items requested herewith are very essential for the normal function of Yugoslav Ports, which might serve as supply basis for the allied armies on the fronts.

16.

17.

Fishing Boats Tunny Fishing Boats

II. RAILWAY EQUIPMENT

1.	Rails, 45 kg/m	
2.	Accessories	
3.	Turnouts, 90 lbs.	
4.	Rails, 22 kg/m for Narrow Gauge	
5.	Accessories	
6.	Turnouts, 60 lbs.	
7.	Permanent way base repair shop & platelayers' tools	
Units	1,000	150,000.
Units	24	90,000.
TOTAL5	.
PORTS		4,196.000.
tons	70,000	6
:		7,000,000.

tons	3,600	360,000.
tons	1,560	156,000.
tons	20,000	2,000,000.
tons	1,000	100,000.
tons	480	48,000.
Units	20	70,000

TOTAL 11 .. \$
9,734,000

III. ROLLING STOCK

A. Standard Gauge, 1435 mm.

1. Locomotives; 100 tons
2. Shunting Engines
3. Goods Wagons: open, 20-tons
4. Goods Wagons: open, 10-tons
5. Goods Wagons: covered, 20-tons
6. Goods Wagons: covered, 10-tons
7. Wagons refrigerator
8. Brake vans

Units Units Units Units Units Units Units Units

400 80
1,950
2,490
3,900
2,490
150
60
56,000,000. 3,040,000. 17,745,000. 15,189,000. 42,900,000. 20,169,000.
3,000,000.
1,440,000.

The required quantity of rails and accessories covers only 10% of the total lengths of railway track in Yugoslavia or 30% of total lengths of the main railroads throughout the country, leaving from keypoints to the various frontiers.

To maintain these main lines in fairly good condition would be of great advantage to the allied cause in the war effort. These main lines have not only national but also international value.

Item 1 to 13 (incl.) According to recent reports from Yugoslavia, about 90% of its rolling stock has been destroyed. The required quantity covers only about 25% of the total prewar number of locomotives, and 10% of the total number of wagons.

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

ITEM FISCAL NO. CODE NO.

DESCRIPTION

UNIT QUANTITY

VALUE

END USE

B. Narrow Gauge 760 mm. 9. Locomotives

10. Goods wagons: Open, 10-tons
- 1 1. Goods wagons: Covered, 10-tons
12. Brake vans
13. Sheets (tarpaulins)

IV. WORKSHOPS & STORES

1. Rolling Stock Base, Repair shop, complete
2. Mobile repair train (vans, mobile workshops)

Units	300	\$ 21	,000,00
			0
Units	2,400	10	,800,00
			0
Units	1,140	3	,420,00
			0
Units	30		180,00
			0
Units	8,000		600,00
			0

TOTAL III	\$195 ,483.00
.	0

3.

4. 5.

Units Units

2 70,000.

5 89,250.

Breakdown crane, Standard gauge,

45 t.

— ditto — for narrow gauge Emergency Water tanks, Complete with pump, fitting & valves

Units Units

Units

86,100. 78,400.

42,000.

This minimum required number of rolling stock is very essential for transportation of military goods and army supplies.

Two units will be needed to bring the existing rolling stock in working order. Owing to the bad condition of the railway track and bridges, these mobile repair trains will have to go frequently to make the necessary repairs on the spot of the wreckage.

One is needed for the narrow gauge system, and the other four are needed for the standard gauge.

Items 3 and 4. Same as under No. 2.

To be used where water supply systems on railway stations, locomotive sheds,

C

5

6.

7.

8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Hand signal lamps, red, green Field telephone circuits Telegraph apparatus Telephone apparatus Battery cells

Telephone exchanges, 200 lines Insulators with pins Accumulators for coaching stock Signalling materials

Units Units Units Units Units Units Units Units Units

V. BRIDGES, RAILWAY & ROADS

1. Bailey bridges in length 12 km.

2. Bridge erecting base workshops Mobile bridge erecting units

VI. ROAD TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT AND ROAD REPAIR

1. Lories, 3 t. Units 7,500

2. Lories, 5 t. Units 2,500

3. Gasoline tankers Units 200

4. Water tankers Units 50

5. Buses, single deck Units 1,000

etc. have been destroyed. The tanks are to be erected on trestles. This amount is only 5% of the prewar number of stations.

1,300 \$ 1,000. Item 4 to 14 (inch). Materials under

2 100,000. these items will be needed for

600 4,500. sections of the line where the

1,000 5,000. signalling system has been destroyed

3,000 15,000. or is out of order. The telephone

20 20,000. exchanges will be necessary to

50,000 24,000. replace the destroyed ones in order

5,000 2,500,000. to prevent accidents and to secure

1,500 1,500,000. movement of trains and goods.

Many bridges have been destroyed and the number of required bridge units is in proportion with those destroyed, according to recent reports from our country. To maintain the traffic necessary for the movement of the Army and supplies, the required repair units are essential.

18,425,000. Item 1 toll (incl.) Owing to destruction

8,050,000. on railway systems, all supplies

560,000. both for the Army and civilian

140,000. population has to be carried out

6,270,000. by way of road transportation.

TOTA IV \$ 4,535,250

L ..

Units 500 2 4 \$ 2,940,000

Units 391,700

Units 639,800

TOTA V . . . 3,971,500

L \$

ITEM FISCAL NO. CODE NO.

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

UNIT QUANTITY VALUE

10.

li.

12.

Motorcycles

Bicycles

Jeeps

Motor transport assembly & repair shop

Mobile repair shop Car batteries

Units Units Units

For road repair:

a) Diesel Tractors DH 14

b) Diesel Tractors DH IOW

c) Scrapers, Model 400

d) Scrapers, Model CS 10

e) Scrapers, Model 28

0 Scrapers, Model L 10 g) Angle dozers, Model 551 h) Angle dozers, Model 338A i) Rippers, Model H80 j) Rollers, Model WTR 336 k) Rollers, Model WTR 288

Units

Units

Units

Units

Units

Units

Units

Units

Units

Units

Units

10

100 6,000

251,000. 147,000. '470,000.

350,000. 750,000. 120,000.

60 260,500.

60 199,500.

48 143,000.

2 2,500.

6 8,000.

4 10,500.

10 12,600.

50 51,100.

8 11,900.

8 14,000.

2 3,200.

Large areas of Yugoslavia will be entirely dependent only on road transportation. The almost complete destruction of coastal shipping will greatly increase the road transportation. Motorcycles and bicycles will be used by policemen, medical and postal services.

Repair shops will be necessary to keep the equipment in fair usable condition.

The roads and railroad tracks in

Yugoslavia have not been

maintained during the war, but were

severely damaged and destroyed by bombing, and it will be necessary to restore them as quickly as possible for transportation of the Armed Forces and material throughout our country.

1) Grader, Model 1 12 m) Grader, Model 110

Units Units

3,850. 3,200.

TOTAL VI

\$37,296,850.

VI INLAND WATER TRANSPORT

I.

1. Steel (structural) tons 8,000 \$ 800,000.

2. Wire rope, 500,000 yd. yds. 1,000,000 1,350,000.

3. Diesel motors up to 300 hp. with

injectors & fuel pumps	Units	100	350,000.
4. Diesel motors up to 30 hp.	Units	100	10,000.
5. Barges, self propelled, 500-1000 TDW	Units	100	10,000,000.
6. Canvas in rolls	Units	20,000	400,000.
7. Tarpaulin material in rolls	Units	30,000	1,000,000.
8. Tarpaulin binding	tons	130	130,000.
9. Rope Manilla	tons	2,340	2,340,000.
10. Sewing twine	tons	20	20,000.
11. Spun yarn	tons	30	30,000.
12. Halyards	tons	50	50,000.
13. Life belts	tons	4	4,000.
TOTAL VII			\$16,484,500.

VIII. FUEL & MATERIALS

1.	Locomotive coal	
2.	Briquettes	
tons	200,000	\$ 1,800,000.
tons	20,000	180,000.

Items 1 to 13 (incl.) the required material is most essential for the maintenance of the existing inland water fleet. Items 3, 4, and 5 will be of the greatest importance for the betterment of inland water transport because many of the existing barges and equipment has been destroyed and looted by the enemy.

Prior to the war, Yugoslavia imported 350,000 tons of coal annually, and according to Railway Research Services in London, Yugoslavia used 250,000 tons only for transportation purposes.

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

ITEM FISCAL						
NO.	CODE NO.	DESCRIPTION	UNIT	QUANTITY	VALUE	END USE
3.		Fuel oils:				
	a)	Motor spirit	tons	67,500	\$ 3,712,000.	Fuel oils as requested herein will be necessary for the required motor vehicles and agricultural machinery.
	b)	Kerosene	tons	31,164	498,000.	
	c)	Black oil	tons	21,850	408,000.	
	d)	Lubricants	tons	11,314	1,780,000.	
	e)	Bitumen	tons	6,876	110,000.	
	f)	Paraffin wax	tons	1,376	75,600.	
4.		Steel for ports, docks & rolling stock	tons	15,000	1,500,000.	The required materials are very essential for the maintenance and repair of existing equipment and tools.
5.		Alloy steel (nickel, high speed)	tons	100	10,000.	
6.		Tool steel	tons	200	20,000.	
7.		White Metal	tons	200	20,000.	
8.		Steel Tubes	tons	3,000	300,000.	
TOTAL VIII					\$10,413,600.	

IX. RUBBER

1.	Tires & tubes for motor vehicles	tons	1,000	\$ 2,000,000.	Owing to the destruction of railways and roads, the required ties are to maintain an efficient and increased motor road transport service.
2.	Other rubber articles	tons	440	880,000.	
3.	Crude rubber	tons	2,200	1,320,000.	
TOTAL IX				\$ 4,200,000.	The greatest wear and tear will be

on the tires due to hard work and bad roads. Item 2 and 3 are below the average annual imports.

GRAND TOTAL I-IX . \$286,283,000.

SIXTH LEND-LEASE APPROPRIATION ESTIMATES

SCHEDULE OF REQUIREMENTS

FISCAL YEAR 1946

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Country: Yugoslavia

ITEM FISCAL NO. CODE NO.

DESCRIPTION

UNIT QUANTITY

VALUE

1. Telephone equipment, exchanges,
switchboards
2. Long lines, tel. equipt. generating
sets, etc.
3. Tel. wire, cables, etc.
4. Telegraph instruments & equipt.
5. Tools for cable repair units, over-
head lines & appar. installation
6. Lorries & vans for above repair units
7. Stores for the above units
8. Broadcast transmitters, receiving
sets, plants, aerials
9. Point-to-Point Radio Telegr. &
Teleph. equipment

tons

tons tons tons

tons tons tons

tons tons

27 99 15

53

64

6,831

340 30

END USE

124 \$ 93,000.

27,000. 99,000. 11,000.

40,000.

44,000.

5,123,000.

1,075,000. 100,000.

All existing telecommunication system in the country was disrupted and most of it was destroyed. Restoration of the telecommunication in Yugoslavia is of great importance to the Army as well as the civilian population.

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TOTAL..... \$ 6,587,000.

SIXTH LEND-LEASE APPROPRIATION ESTIMATES
REQUIREMENTS

^ YUGOSLAVIA

Country Yugoslavia **SCHEDULE OF**

FISCAL YEAR 1946

MINING AND FORESTRY EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS

ITEM FISCAL NO. CODE NO.

DESCRIPTION

UNIT QUANTITY

VALUE

SOLID FUELS:

Coal Coke

WOOD AND PAPER MATERIALS:

1- Chemical pulp

2- Paper and cardboard

3- Building boards

tons 28,400 \$ 255 ,60

0

tons 44,600 401 ,40

0.

tons	220,000	\$,02	.00
		2	0,	0.
tons	23,000	.	,30	000
			0,	.
tons	4,500	1	,57	000
			5,	.

4.

Complete factories for producing chemical pulp, each with an output capacity of about 30,000 tons (one for bleaching celuloze)

Units

END USE

This hard coal and coke are necessary for industrial purposes.

According to the recent information received, two of the largest chemical pulp factories in Bosnia and Slovenia have been destroyed so that for the immediate period after the war, our paper factories will have to receive supplies of chemical pulp.

The majority of the paper factories are damaged or destroyed so that their producing capacity has been decreased 50% since the beginning of the war.

These factories have to replace the destroyed ones. The complete lists of material required tonnage, prices, etc. will be given separately later.

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FORESTR	REQUISITES:	tons	3,900	\$
Y	Tools for manual workers			1,380,000
1.				
2.	Frame Saws	Units	1,500	6,000,000
3.	Steam generating plants for above frame saws	Units	500	2,000,000

4.

Sharpening equipment file reconditioning equipment, dry kilns, plywoods production plant, wood treatment plants

tons

2,800

840,000.

MINING EQUIPMENT:

1. Excavating and other mining machinery such as coal cutters, coal conveyors, ventilators, screens air compressors, pneumatic tools, water and gas tight electromotors and equipment, wagonettes wire ropes, electric locomotives, winches, etc.

2. Construction and machinery for

ferrous and non-ferrous mines

tons

tons

10,000 10,000

4,400,000. 4,500,000.

During the war there were no replacements of tools, and there will be a great demand for them.

Items 2 to 4. Prior to the war, Yugoslavia possessed over 3,500 sawmills. According to reports of Partisans, they destroyed every sawmill wherever they came in order to prevent devastation of Yugoslav forests.

Yugoslavia was an exporting country in lumber, and her part in the period of reconstruction and war effort will be great in producing the necessary kind of lumber and pit props for mining.

Many Yugoslav mines such as Hrastnik, Jankovac, Kakanj, Velenje, Maslovare, etc., were destroyed by Partisans. To avoid the import of coal for the steam generating plants and transportation, it is essential to restore the destroyed coal mines as quickly as possible. Copper, lead, zinc and iron ore mines—Bor, Trepca, Ljubia—were damaged and partly destroyed by the

h c

c n

ITEM FISCAL NO. CODE NO.

MINING AND FORESTRY EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS

DESCRIPTION UNIT QUANTITY VALUE

3.

Essential materials and equipment for the Salt Mine "Kreka" and Soda Factory "Solvay" tons

GRAND TOTAL Mining and Forestry Equipment and Materials — Pages 1-3 (incl.) 500

225,000.

.20,497,000.

END USE

necessary to restore these mines immediately in order that they may produce raw materials for the manufacture of final products of copper, lead, zinc and pig iron. At the same time, their restoration will be most essential to the war effort.

"Kreka" and "Solvay" have been destroyed by the Partisans. "Kreka" was one of Yugoslavia's most important salt sources. "Solvay" was one of the biggest soda producing factories in the country. Their restoration is very essential.

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SIXTH LEND-LEASE APPROPRIATION ESTIMATES Country: Yugoslavia

SCHEDULE OF REQUIREMENTS FISCAL YEAR 1946

CHEMICALS

ITEM FISCAL NO. CODE NO.

- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.**
- 7.**
- 8.
9. **10. 11. 12. 13.** 14. **15.** 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

DESCRIPTION

UNIT QUANTITY

Iodine and its compounds	in.	tons	5
Mercury and its compounds	m.	tons	21
Phosphorous	in.	tons	8
Arsenic and its compounds	in.	tons	20
Lead and its compounds	m.	tons	250
Ammonia and its compounds	m.	tons	1,500
Inorganic Acids	m.	tons	165
Citric Acid	m.	tons	15
Gallic, Oxalic and Oxalates	m.	tons	127
Salicylic Acid	m.	tons	23
Stearin, Stearic & Palmitic Acids	in.	tons	no
Other organic acids	in.	tons	127
Sodium & Potassium compounds	in.	tons	1,525
Oxides, Chlorides & Carbonates	m.	tons	1,050
Permanganates	m.	tons	15
Silicon carbides	m.	tons	38
Phosphates	in.	tons	720
Calcium salts	m.	tons	110
Alums, & other Aluminum compounds	m.	tons	210
Potassium carbonate	m.	tons	100

VALUE

END USE

Items 1-44 incl. Represent the annual average imports — used for various purposes.

ITEM FISCAL NO. CODE NO.

DESCRIPTION

- 21.**
- 22.**
- 23.**
- 24.**
- 25.
- 26.**
- 27.**
- 28.
- 29.
- 30.
- 31.**
- 32.**
- 33.**
- 34.**
- 35.
- 36.**
- 37.**
- 38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

Iron compounds

Zinc chloride & sulphate

Boric acid and borates

Alinine Oil

Phenol & its derivates

Lysol, disinfectants & chloroform

Turpentine, raw & purified

Albumen & gelatine

Glues & different adhesives

Celluloid

Synthetic organic dyes

Aniline & other coal-tar dyes

Other dyes

Carbon black & printers" ink Copper & other pigment colours

Umber, siena & other earth colours

Chrome colours

Pure & mixed blues

Other metal & bronze colours

Alkaloids

Resin, raw & purified

Organic preparations for photography

Oily destillates from coal-tar oils

Different plastic materials

SUBSTANCES (Plant & Quebracho)

CHEMICALS

UNIT	QUANTITY	VALUE
------	----------	-------

m. tons	400	
---------	-----	--

m. tons	620	
---------	-----	--

m. tons	98	
---------	----	--

m. tons	25	
---------	----	--

m. tons	27	
---------	----	--

m. tons	75	
---------	----	--

m. tons	440	
---------	-----	--

m. tons	13	
---------	----	--

m. tons	27	
---------	----	--

m. tons	70	
---------	----	--

m. tons	52	
---------	----	--

m. tons	650	
---------	-----	--

m. tons	18	
---------	----	--

m. tons	30	
---------	----	--

m. tons	77	
---------	----	--

m. tons	80	
---------	----	--

m. tons	30	
---------	----	--

m. tons	18	
---------	----	--

m. tons	390	
---------	-----	--

m. tons	9	
---------	---	--

m. tons	2,260	
---------	-------	--

m. tons	5	
---------	---	--

m. tons	1,475	
---------	-------	--

m. tons	230	
---------	-----	--

m. tons	1,250	
---------	-------	--

END USE

-

2

0

-

5

For Tanning Purposes

46.		
47. 48. 49. 50.		
Starches & dextrines		
Bleaching, finishing materials		
Dyestuffs		
Oils (Other than lubricants)		
Oil seeds for technical purposes		
TOTAL — CHEMICALS		
m tons	5,182	
.		
m tons	22,402	
.		
m tons	2,485	
.		
m tons	3,007	
.		
m tons	21,400	
.		
m tons	70,972	\$ 10,130,820
.		

For Textile Industries For Textile Industries For Textile Industries For Textile Industries

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o n

Country: Yugoslavia

SIXTH LEND-LEASE APPROPRIATION ESTIMATES

SCHEDULE OF REQUIREMENTS

FISCAL YEAR 1946

ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT

2 3.

4. 5. 6.

7.

10.

11.

12. 13. 14. 15.

Generating Plants Transformers, capacity Electric lamps 110 V

Electric lamps 220 V H. T. Cable L. T. Cable Services Boiling rings

Various electrical materials Paper insulated, lead covered,

steel tape cable, 1 KW. Electrical equipment for 30,000

new houses

Electrodes for accumulators Electrodes for elec. furnaces Electrical instruments Insulating copper wire Electromotors, capacity from 5 KW. up to 500 KW.

KW. KVA.

Units Units Miles Miles Miles Units tons

tons tons

tons tons tons tons

10,000 15,000 92,000) 368,000) 4 7 5

9,000 400

1,200

780

50

800

100

2,000

KW. 50,000

,200,000. 150,000. 60,000.

50,000.

80,000

21,000.

50,000.

400,000.

1,200,000. 780,000.

50,000. 800,000. 100,000. 200,000.

700,000.

Many generating plants have been completely wiped out. The required capacity of 10,000 KW. should be provided in small units to enable small industries to produce necessary relief goods.

All other electrical material are for maintenance purposes.

Many towns and villages have been destroyed and the building of new houses will be an immediate task, for which necessary electrical equipment should be provided.

GRAND TOTAL — Electrical Machinery & Equipment . . \$ 5,841,000.

SIXTH LEND-LEASE APPROPRIATION ESTIMATES

SCHEDULE OF REQUIREMENTS

FISCAL YEAR 1946

MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT

Country: Yugoslavia

ITE	FISCAL					
M						
NO.	CODE NO.	DESCRIPTION	UNIT	QUANTITY	VALUE	END USE
1.		Small public utility shops - mobile				For smaller repairs of public
		(unit No. II)	units	28	\$ 120,000.	utilities.
2.		Large public utility shops				Items 2 and 3. Water and gas
		(Unit II s.a.)	units	3	33,000.	systems, as well as mines, have
3.		Large public utility shops for				been heavily damaged and mobile
		mines - (Unit II s.b.)	units	10	181,000.	repair shops will be needed for repair.
4.		Shops for building and woodworking				For repair of existing building
		repairs - unit IV	units	30	255,000.	and woodworking machinery.
5.		Shops for repair of general ma-				Will be needed for repair of all
		chinery Unit-III and III s.a.	units	1	142,000.	industrial machinery.
6.		Small tools for above units	sets	72	36,000.	
7.		Machine tools	tons	1,425	1,425,000.	Essential machine tools have been
9.		Hand tools Driving belts				
		tons tons				
		847 1,000				
		taken away from many existing industries, and the ones required have to replace them in order to complete the machine				
		shops.				
		423,000. These are the most essential tools for repair purposes.				
		300,000. According to reports by Partisans no belts are left on the machines owing to the lack of leather.				
		c z				
		c				
		n >				
		5				

units 10,000

^OOo 300,000.

12.

13. 14.

15. 16.

17.

18. 19. 20.

Requirements of essential accessories and machine parts for textile industry

High speed steel Screws, nails

Steel rope

Welding electrodes

Essential materials for repair of

water systems (pipes, valves,

fittings, pumps, etc.) Steam boiler fittings

Typewriters

White metal

TOTAL - Maintenance Equipment .

units

tons tons

tons tons

tons units
units tons
8,587
2,000 10,000
400 400
5,000 700
20,000 600
3,000,000.
200,000. 1,000,000.
40,000. 40,000.
500,000. 50,000.
180,000.

The Germans have taken away sewing machines from many parts of the country. The new ones will be needed to manufacture and repair clothing and boots. This amount will supply only 3% of Yugoslav households, and may also be used for the making of clothing and shoes for the Army.

Several textile factories have been severely damaged, and owing to the lack of essential spare parts, their operation came to a standstill.

For manufacture of tools.

For construction and building purposes.

For maintenance purposes. For construction purposes.

For repair of water systems.

To replace demolished fittings in the steam plants.

For office use and speedy function of administration.

For maintenance purposes.

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SIXTH LEND-LEASE APPROPRIATION ESTIMATES

SCHEDULE OF REQUIREMENTS

FISCAL YEAR 1946

Country. Yugoslavia

BUILDING AND NON-METALLIC MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT

ITE	FISCAL						
M							
NO.	CODE NO.	DESCRIPTION	UNIT	QUANTITY	VALUE	END USE	
1.		Insulation and Wall-Boards	m. tons	640	\$ 64,000.	For Building Purposes.	
2.		Steel: a. Constructional 4,200 t.	m. tons				
		b. Sheet p 6,600 t.	m. tons	9,800	980,000.	For Building Purposes.	
3.		Fireclay Bricks	m. tons	8,000	800,000.	For Industrial Furnaces.	
4.		Magnezite Bricks	m. tons	3,400	340,000.	For Industrial Furnaces.	
5.		Dinas Bricks	m. tons	2,600	260,000.	For Industrial Furnaces.	
6.		Fireclay and powder	m. tons	1,000	100,000.	For Industrial Furnaces.	
7.		Pipes: a. Cast Iron	m. tons	800	80,000.	For Building Purposes.	
		b. Steel	m. tons	5,830	583,000.	For Building Purposes.	
		c. Stoneware	m. tons	1,600	160,000.	For Building Purposes.	
8.		"Heraclit" - Insulation Wall Board	m. tons	800	80,000.	For Building Purposes.	
9.		Heat Insulating Material	m. tons	200	20,000.	For Building Purposes.	
10.		Insulating Boards, Tiles, etc.	m. tons	200	20,000.	For Building Purposes.	
li.		Gypsum	in. tons	200	20,000.	For Building Purposes.	
12.		Puzzolinas and materials for					
		hydraulic mortar	m. tons	1,050	105,000.	For Building Purposes.	
13.		Zinc	m. tons	200	20,000.	For Building Purposes.	
14.		Asbestos for all purposes	m. tons	1,200	120,000.	For Building Purposes.	
15.		Bituminous and tamed felt	m tons	400	40,000.	For Building Purposes.	
			.				
16.		Tar from Hard Coal	in. tons	900	90,000.	For Building Purposes.	
17.		Tar and Creosote	m. tons	720	72,000.	For Building Purposes.	

18.	Varnish	in. tons	100	10,000.	For Building Purposes.
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BUILDING AND NON-METALLIC MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT

ITEM FISCAL NO. CODE NO.

DESCRIPTION

UNIT QUANTITY

VALUE

END USE

19.	Stucco	m. tons	60	6,000.	
20.	Terebinthine Oil	m. tons	400	40,000.	
21.	Glas: a. Window	m. tons	1,200	120,000	
	b. Glas substitutes	m. tons	600	60,000.	
	c. Wire Glas (reinforced)	m. tons	560	56,000	
22.	Sanitary goods, i.e. W.C. Suites basins, sinks, baths, etc.	m. tons	1,800	\$ 180,000.	
23.	Ironongery (Iron fittings - hinges, etc.)	m. tons	360	36,000.	
24.	Locks, Keys, bar-locks, etc.	m. tons	300	30,000.	
25.	Mechanical equipment (boilers, for central heating, radiators)	m. tons	400	40,000.	
26.	Lagging for Insulation	m. tons	100	10,000.	
27.	"Kieselguhr" - Fireproof cement Insulating material	m. tons	1,000	100,000.	
28.	Talc	m. tons	400	40,000.	
29.	Carborundum, White Allumina and artificial Corundum for grinding and casting	m. tons	1,400	140,000.	
30.	Graphite for batteries and chemical industry	m. tons	1,000	100,000.	
31.	Fluorite	m. tons	1,400	140,000.	
32.	Heavy mechanical contractor's plant for 20,000 men	units	4	450,000.	

For Building Purposes. For Building Purposes. For Building Purposes. For Building Purposes. For Building Purposes.

For Building Purposes.

For Building Purposes. For Building Purposes.

For Building Purposes. For Building Purposes. For Insulation of Boilers and Pipes. For various purposes.

For Industrial Purposes.

For Industrial Purposes. For Industrial Purposes.

For making of houses for homeless people, and for rehabilitation of

rr 0 >

1

33.

34.

Plants for prefabricated materials Plants for fabrication of hardware such as hinges, locks, etc.

units

units

TOTAL - Building and non-metallic materials and equipment

300,000. 300,000.

6,112,000.

industrial and other buildings. Items 33 & 34. There will be a great need for prefabricated houses both for the civilians and Army, which plants might also supply the neighboring countries with prefabricated materials.

SIXTH LEND-LEASE APPROPRIATION ESTIMATES
SCHEDULE OF REQUIREMENTS
FISCAL YEAR 1946
BASIC METALS

Country: Yugoslavia

XX

ITEM NO.	FISCAL CODE NO.	DESCRIPTION	UNIT	QUANTITY	VALUE	END USE
1.	Tin		tons	104	\$ 10,400.	Items 1 to 8 incl. Average annual
2.						
3.	Aluminum sheets	Brass sheets	tons tons	600 400 300	60,000.	need for industrial as well as building purposes.
4.			tons		40,000.	
5.	Copper sheets		tons	400	40,000.	
6.	Copper tubes		tons	400	40,000.	
7.	Copper wire		tons	2,000	200,000.	
8.	Steel tubes		tons	4,000	400,000.	
9.	Rollers for rolling mills		tons	2,000	200,000.	To enable rolling mills to produce
0.	Construction steel - various dimensions.		tons	20,000	2,000,000.	rails and construction steel.
	TOTAL - basic metals.....			\$ 3,020,400.	For industrial and building purposes.

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3

SIXTH LEND-LEASE APPROPRIATION ESTIMATES
SCHEDULE OF REQUIREMENTS
FISCAL YEAR 1946
VARIOUS INDUSTRIES

Country: Yugoslavia

ITEM FISCAL NO. CODE NO.

DESCRIPTION

UNIT QUANTITY

VALUE

END USE

1.

2

3.

4. 5. 6.

7.

8. 9.

10.

Electro Copper Refinery for a

capacity of 30,000 tons/year unit

Plants for cellulose (already referred

to in Forestry Equipment) units

Plants for the production of

20,000 tons of news print units

Furniture factories units

"Penicilin" Plant units

Alluminium Plant for a capacity of

10,000 tons/year units

Textile Machinery for damaged and

destroyed factories units

Presses for olive oil units

Repair material for chlorine plant in Jajce

Repair material for oil refineries in Brod, Sisak and Smederevo.

TOTAL for the various industries

Will be submitted later.

To be built in Kostolac (Bor). To replace destroyed ones.
 To meet the needs of the country. To furnish new built houses. For medical purposes. Existing plant is too small; it is necessary to increase the production of allumina and final products.
 To increase the production of **oil**. To restore damaged and destroyed plants in Jajce and oil refineries in Brod, Sisak and Smederevo.

SIXTH LEND-LEASE APPROPRIATION ESTIMATES SCHEDULE OF REQUIREMENTS

FISCAL YEAR 1946

Country: Yugoslavia

WAR INDUSTRIES

ITEM FISCAL NO. CODE NO.

DESCRIPTION

UNIT QUANTITY

VAUE

END USE

1.

Machinery and installations for armament factories of Kragujevac, Cacak, Uzice, Sarajevo and Tivat, consisting of installations for production of rifles, machine guns, revolvers, shells, hand grenades, mines and bullets.

Items 1 to 4. For the manufacture of war materials essential for the prosecution of the war.

rr 0 >

Machinery and installations for gun powder factories, Kamenik and Obilicevo.

Machinery and installations for aeroplane factories in Kraljevo, Belgrade (Rakovica and Rogozarski), Zemun (Ikarus and Zmaj).

Remarks

More detailed specifications of these requirements will be supplied by the Yugoslav Government shortly.

S

Machinery and installations for bomb and grenade factory in Visegrad (Vistad).

TOTAL VALUE Items 1 to 4 . .

\$ 50,000,000.

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ENIGMA TITO

DESCRIPTION

UNIT

QUANTITY VALUE

Trenches or raincoats dismantled

Can meat cup canteens M1910 cover coatens dismantled

Knife, fork spoon M1926 Knife mountain

Machinery and Miscellaneous Cutting machines

Buttonhole sewing machine

Wiet button and shank button sewing machines

Sewing machines industrial electrically driven with spare parts and needles for six months maintenance

Steam clothes presses Tailors pressing irons Tailors scissors Hand sewing needles

Sewing threads requisite number buttons various sizes all required for making up one overcoat two blouses two pairs trousers

two shirts one cap for 100,000 men in sixty days plus ten percent distribution stock

Mountaineering material Helmets steel complete band

Brushes, shaving razor, safety with five blades and soap

Tooth brushes

Towels face

Combs rubber or plastic

Bags duffle or bags barrel

Pouches first aid packet

Axe ice mountain

Barbers complete with case

Cobblers seven shoe repair outfits portable

Tailoring complete

Toolsets blacksmith number one (horses)

units	1	10,00
		0

units	1	10,00
		0

unit	1	10,000
units		14
units		6
units		6
units		240
units		15
units		70
pairs		150
?ross		150
yards	64,000,000	adequate quantity
units	110,000	
units	110,000	
units	110,000	
units	220,000	
units	110,000	
units	110,000	
units	110,000	
units	10,000	
outfits	658	
kits	300	
kits	300	
sets	70	

ECONOMIC AID

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DESCRIPTION

UNIT

QUANTITY VALUE

Machines sewing singer model [?] complete as supplied to US marine corps

Carpenters wheelwright sets twenty outfits military type saws capacity 300 cubic meters

Axes and treaching shelves with carrier

[?] equipment will be that required to equip following units, as authorized by U.S. Army table of organization and equipment (with changes to date) as indicated below: Organization and equipment for seven infantry divisions as per table T/O & E7

Organization and equipment for three ordnance heavy maintenance companies (field army) as per table T/ A MO-9

Organization and equipment for one ordnance heavy maintenance company (tank) as per table T/S & MS-37

Organization and equipment for one ordnance heavy automotive maintenance company as per table T/Q & M9-197

Organization and equipment for three ordnance medium automotive maintenance companies as per table T/Q & T9-127

Organization and equipment for four ordnance depot companies as per table T/O & E9-57

Organization and equipment for four ordnance ammunition companies as per table T/O & E9-17

units

outfits

sets

120

900 50,000

for seven divisions

for three companies

for one company

for one company

for three companies

for four companies

for four companies

We recommend that for the above ordnance equipment consideration be given to issue of excess equipment so that all units will be completely mobile.

units 300

I

February 15, 1945 CWC:

I refer to the attached memorandum of conversation between the Acting Secretary and Dr. Franges and Mr. Dunn's attached inquiry.

Briefly, Dr. Franges has suggested that we aid the democratic elements in Yugoslavia by making more statements of the nature of the two already made by the Acting Secretary, and that we also issue a statement that a certain sum of money has been appropriated for lend-lease assistance to Yugoslavia. The question of issuing political statements is, of course, one which must be decided in the light of actual developments in the political sphere. It is not an easy matter to frame public statements on the present situation in Yugoslavia, but it is possible that, once conditions have become more stabilized within the country and we can better judge whether Tito's organization is really adhering to democratic principles or is establishing a totalitarian dictatorship, we shall be able to aid the cause of democratic Yugoslav elements by issuing public statements more frequently.

With regard to issuing a statement concerning the amount of lend-lease made available to Yugoslavia, it would appear that such an announcement should either be made or sanctioned by the FEA. A very complete statement in this connection was made by FEA and released through OWI on November 1, 1944 (see copy attached). (A statement was also issued by Governor Lehman on December 29, 1944 regarding the administration of relief in Yugoslavia by UNRRA (see copy attached). However, in agreement with FEA, we might arrange to place new emphasis on the FEA statement and we might also ascertain from FEA what sum has been appropriated for lend-lease assistance to Yugoslavia and whether we may draw public attention thereto by a statement. Mr. Hayes (FMA) is charged with lend-lease matters in the Department.

It might also be profitable to draw attention to the work of the United Yugoslav Relief Fund of America (see attached bulletin), although such action might provoke adverse comment on the part of Adamic's American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, the work of which latter organization should not, in my opinion, be given emphasis by us.

In connection with the points under discussion, Caserta's telegram no. 511 of February 12 is of interest since it indicates that a) each slight

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ENIGMA TITO

ambiguity in our statements is interpreted by anti-Tito forces as encouragement to revolt, and b) all references to Allied aid to Yugoslavia have been "completely stopped" in the Tito press.

Mr. Dunn agrees to postponing any statement for the time being.

On March 15, 1944, further requests of all kinds have been made and signed by the same J.B. Tito and a Colonel. The list of requests is as follows:¹¹

The National Committee

for the Liberation of Yugoslavia

TO THE CHIEF OF THE MILITARY MISSION OF THE U.S.A.

Pursuant to your request for a report about the emergency help to our people, as well as about the post-war economic help to our land, I am forwarding you the following data:

1. During the three years of the people's liberation struggle our country was subject to incessant and continual battles waged by the Partisan detachments and, at present, the People's Army of Liberation against the enemies of our people, German and Italian fascists and domestic traitors, Pavelich's Ustashi, Nedich's gendarmes, and Mihailovich's Chetniks. Because this struggle our country was subject to incessant looting.

In the beginning, immediately after the occupation, a large part of people's property was looted and taken away from the country by the German and Italian fascists. Then the same enemies continued with the help of Pavelich in Croatia, Nedich in Serbia, Rupnik in Slovenia, Krsto Popovich in Montenegro, and the Chetniks of Draza Mihailovich, to loot our people. The people's liberation Army and the Partisan Detachments have been the only power protecting the people from the enemy. The people, though in possession of meager commodities only, fed the army voluntarily for the food captured from the enemy was not sufficient for its subsistence. These are the elements which speak clearly about the great economic exhaustion of our country, especially of our liberated territory.

2. In Yugoslavia, as an agricultural land, there are provinces which produce a surplus, available for export, of some commodities, as grain livestock, and other agricultural products. To this category

belong, Voi-vodina, and parts of Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, and Macedonia. Other provinces can produce enough food for the subsistence of their population and most import the grain. These provinces are Montenegro, Hercegovina, parts of Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia. They, however, export small livestock and other agricultural products.

ECONOMIC AID

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The present situation in the liberated territory is such to require immediate allied help. This help falls under two categories: emergency help at the present and the post-war help.

I. The following present emergency help is necessary: a. Distribution of seeds for this year's agricultural campaign: 50 Wagons of Wheat (early crop) 50 Wagons of Corn 50 Wagons of Potatoes* 12 Wagons of Beans 2 Wagons of Root vegetables 12 Wagons of Onions 2 Wagons of Cabbage

*If potatoes are not available, they could be replaced by wheat and corn.

b. Agricultural implements. Through the devastation of villages the peasant has been left without agricultural implements, particularly without scythes, sickles, plows, shovels, etc.

c. The help to the people living in the territory with the permanent lack of food. According to our estimation, in our liberated territory there are approximately 1,200,000 civilians who need the help before the new crop. This help should consist, according to our examination, of 2,160 wagons of wheat and of the corresponding quantity of other commodities which are necessary for the most elementary subsistence.

According to the provinces, the number of civil population in need of food, clothing, foot wear, and other commodities, is as follows: Bosnia and Hercegovina 300,000

Montenegro and Sanjak 100,000

Croatia 550,000

Slovenia 250,000

This number of the civil population will grow before the new crop. The eventual liberation of large towns will also increase this number. After the new crop this number will become smaller and if we succeed in gathering this year's products, we would not have a serious scarcity of food.

d. The help in clothing and foot wear for the civil population is a serious problem for two reasons:

1. For almost three years the civil population was not able to get any supplies in foot wear and underwear from occupied towns, and

2. The home production in the regions of Eastern and Western Bosnia, Montenegro, Hercegovina, Lika, Kordun, Dalmatia, and the parts of Slovenia could not survive for lack of necessary articles.

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ENIGMA TITO

e. The help for the Army. (See the memorandum of the Economic Department of the Supreme Command, No. 211/44).

II. The post-war help:

For the reason that our country has suffered, in this war, big losses by the destruction of roads, bridges, railroads, mines and industrial installations, a more solid reconstruction and the rehabilitation of the whole inventory will be necessary. This would embrace, according to our present plans, the material forwarded to you under I.

We will need also a substantial sanitary help. This help, according to our present estimation, is cited in the list of materials under No. II.

The post-war help in clothing, footwear, and other commodities for the civil population would have to be much bigger, for the liberation of the whole country and large towns, whose population was looted by the enemies, German and Italian fascists and domestic traitors, would have to be taken into consideration.

The ways of the delivery of the post-war help will be agreed upon at a later date.

This is what we can give you at the present, and our experts whose task is to collect further information will inform you if any corrections appear to be necessary.

March 15, 1944

President of the National Committee

Commissioner for Economy,

J.B. Tito

R. Milutinovich
From HQ N.L.A. and P.O.
Economic Department
Material Section
No. 211

Marshal of Yugoslavia

24 March, 1944 year

SURVEY

Food demands for People's Liberation Army and Partisan Forces of Yugoslavia

I

One day needs in food

For present situation of.....292,000 fighters

there is needed:

Flour	175 tons
Smoked bacon	73 tons
Beans	14 tons

ECONOMIC AID

Rice	14 tons
Macaroni	14 tons
Farrina	14 tons
Canned vegetables	14 tons
Lard (Fats)	11 tons
Red pepper	$\frac{1}{2}$ tons
Onions	3 tons
Coffee	6 tons
Tea	$\frac{1}{2}$ tons
Sugar	11 tons
Tobacco	6 tons

II

Monthly needs in food for same number:

Flour	5,250 tons
Smoked bacon	2,190 tons
Beans	420 tons
Rice	420 tons
Macaroni	420 tons
Farrina	420 tons
Canned vegetables	420 tons
Lard (Fats)	350 tons
Red pepper	15 tons
Onions	90 tons
Coffee	180 tons
Tea	15 tons
Sugar	330 tons
Tobacco	180 tons

Chief, Colonel

Mitar I. Vujasic

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As mentioned before aid for the Partisans was mainly a British responsibility because it was in the Mediterranean Theater of War. It is very difficult to calculate the full extent of Western aid, since all British records are not yet open to inspection, and the Communist records are incomplete and mostly non-existent. Supplies were parachuted into the parts where guerrilla bands were stationed at a particular time. They were also taken in by plane and by small boats of all kinds. At first, about a dozen or more special British units of all three services were sending supplies. Sixty-five tons of

supplies that went in after the first British Missions to Tito were largely for the purpose of aiding sabotage operations against the Germans'

Yugoslavia

U. S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE — OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS (Millions of Dollars)

U. S. FISCAL YEARS													TOTAL					
1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1946-48	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954						
ECONOMIC - TOTAL						298.1	—	40.0	95.5	106.3	122.6	67.6	143.4	98.2	122.3	96.1	174.7	76.1
1,438.5																		
GRANTS.....			298.1	—	80.5	106.3	122.6	67.6	143.4	74.2	34.3	35.5	46.3	26.7	1,033.1			
LOANS.....			—	40.0	15.0	—	—	—	—	24.0	88.0	60.6	128.4	49.4	405.4			
Mutual Security Economic Program — Total						—	—	—	42.9	81.5	122.4	66.5	43.7	29.8	15.0	11.7	63.4	44.9
519.6																		
International Cooperation Administration			—	—	—	27.9	81.5	122.4	66.5	43.7	29.8	15.0	11.7	11.9	7.1	415.3		
Technical Cooperation			—	—	0.1	0.6	1.7	0.2	0.8	1.5	1.8	1.9	1.8	8.5				
Other			—	—	—	27.9	81.3	121.8	64.8	43.5	29.0	13.5	10.0	10.0	5.3	406.8		
Development Loan Fund.....						—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	51.5	37.8		
89.3																		
Other MSP Economic			—	—	—	15.0	—	—	15.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other Economic Assistance.....						298.1	—	40.0	52.6	24.8	0.2	—	99.7	68.4	107.3	84.4	111.3	31.2
918.9																		
Public Law 480:																		
Title I — Planned for Grants and Loans ...						—	—	—	—	—	—	37.8	59.7	74.5	55.6	83.4		
17.0 328.0																		
104c — Grants for Common Defense.....						—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
104d — Grants from Triangular Trans						—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
104e — Grants for Economic Development						—	—	—	37.8	50.7	—	—	3.0	14.2	8.4			
114.1																		
104e — Loans to Private Industry.....						—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
104g — Loans to Governments						—	—	9.0	74.5	52.6	69.2	8.6	213.9					
(Total Sales Agreements).....						—	—	(49.5)	(70.8)	(99.3)	(73.0)	(94.8)	(19.2)	(406.6)				
Title II — Emergency Relief.....						—	—	45.8	—	1.4	—	—	—	47.1				
Title III—Voluntary Relief Agencies.....						—	—	—	24.8	0.2	1.1	16.1	8.7	31.4	28.8	27.9	14.2	
153.1																		
Export-Import Bank Long-Term Loans						—	—	40.0	15.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
55.0																		
Other U.S. Economic Program.s ^a						298.1	—	—	37.6	—	—	—	—	335.7				
MILITARY - TOTAL						—	—	—	60.5	160.6	230.7	136.7	55.1	17.1	34.1	-0.9	—	—
693.9																		
GRANTS.....						—	—	60.5	160.6	230.7	136.7	55.1	17.1	34.1	-0.9	—	693.9	

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LOANS.....

Mutual Security Military Prog. (Chg. to App.) (From Excess Stocks)

Other Military Assistance.....

MSP EXPENDITURES - TOTAL

Economic — Total.....

U.S. FISCAL YEARS												
1946-48	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
—	—	—	—	60.5 (13.7)	160.6 (1.7)	230.7 (4.0)	136.7 (4.5)	55.1 (4,3)	17.1 (*)	34.1 (- 0.8)	-0.9 (0.2)	—

TOTAL

693.9 (27.6)

TOTAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY

	298.1	—	40.0	95.5	166.8	283.2	298.3	280.1	153.3	139.4	130.2	173.8	76.1
Mutual Security Program	298.1	—	40.0	42.9	142.0	283.0	297.2	180.4	84.9	32.1	45.8	62.5	44.9
.....				52.6	24.8	0.2	1.1	99.7	68.4	107.3	84.4	111.3	31.2

MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM EXPENDITURES

—	17.3	145.0	274.8	302.2	184.6	98.7	34.2	37.3	15.5				
International Cooperation Administration.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Development Loan Fund	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other MSP Economic	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	17.3	84.5	114.2	71.5	47.9	43.6	17.1	3.2	16.4				
—	2.3	84.5	114.2	71.5	47.9	43.6	17.1	3.2					

15.8 0.6
Military
— 15.0 — — — — — 60.5 160.6 230.7 136.7
55.1
17.1 34.1 -0.9
12.2 1,121.8
12.2 427.9
4.3 404.4
7.9 8.5
— 15.0
— 693.9

tn Z

(U.S. Fiscal Years — Millions of Dollars)

U.S. Overseas — Loans and Grants — Obligations and Loan Authorizations

Country: Yugoslavia FY 1946-48 Post-War Relief Period. FY 1949-52 Marshall Plan Period.

Program	1946	1947	1948	1949
1950				
I. Econ. Assist.-Total	195.3	102.8	—	—
Loans.....	—	—	—	—
Grants	195.3	102.8	—	—
A. Aid and Predeces.....	—	—	—	—
Loans.....	—	—	—	—
Grants	—	—	—	—
(Sec. Supp. Assist.).....	(—)	(—)	(—)	(—)
B. Food for Peace	—	—	—	—
Loans.....	—	—	—	—
Grants.....	—	—	—	—
Title I—Total	—	—	—	—
Repay, in \$-Loans	—	—	—	—
Pay. in For. Curr.....	—	—	—	—
Title II—Total.....	—	—	—	—
E. Relief. Ec. Dev & WFP.....	—	—	—	—
Vol. Relief Agency.....	—	—	—	—
C. Other Econ. Assist.....	195.3	102.8	—	—
Loans.....	—	—	—	—
Grants.....	195.3	102.8	—	—
Contr. to IFI	—	—	—	—
Peace Corps	—	—	—	—
Narcotics.....	—	—	—	—
Other.....	195.3	102.8	—	—
II. Mil. Assist.—Total.....	—	—	—	—
Loans.....	—	—	—	—
Grants	—	—	—	—
1951				
1952				
80.8				
106.0				
80.8 106.0				
43.2 81.2				
43.2 81.2				
27.9) (81.3)				
— 24.8				
24.8				
— 24.8				
— 24.8				
37.6 —				
37.6				
37.6 —				
77.5 232.5				
77.5 232.5				
A. Map Grants				
B. Credit Financing ..				
C. IntlMil. Ed.Trng.				
D. Tran-Excess Stock.				
E. Other Grants.....				
III. Total Econ. & Mil. ■				
Loans				

Grants.....
 Other US Loans
 Ex-IM Bank Loans All Other
 Less than \$50,000
 — 77.4 218.0
 — 0.1 0.1 13.8

— 158.3 338.5

I 158.3 338.5

40.0 —
 40.0 15.0 15.0

Country: Yugoslavia

Program

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

I. Econ. Assist. —Total.....

Loans

Grants.....

A. Aid and Predeces.....

Loans

Grants.....

(Sec. Supp. Assist.).....

B. Food for Peace.....

Loans

Grants.....

Title I—Total.....

Repay, in S-Loans.....

Pay, in For. Curr.....

Title II—Total

F. Relief. Ec. Dev. & WFP . Vol. Relief Agency

C. Other Econ. Assist.....

Loans

Grants.....

Contr. to IFI.....

Peace Corps.....

Narcotics

Other

II. Mil. Assist. —Total

Loans

Grants.....

A. Map Grants.....

B. Credit Financing.....

C. Intl Mil. Ed. Trng.....

122.6 67.6 153.1 106.9 131.9 105.7 176.7 76.4 97.5

— — — 24.0 97.6 48.0 125.8 54.3 72.0

122.6 67.6 153.1 82.9 34.3 57.7 50.9 22.1 25.5

122.4 66.5 43.7 29.8 15.0 11.7 63.4 44.9 56.5

— — — 15.0 13.5 8.0 59.2 40.8 52.7

122.4 66.5 43.7 14.8 1.5 3.7 4.2 4.1 3.8

121.8) (59.8) (43.5) (29.8) (15.0) (10.0) (10.0) (5.3) (26.0)

0.2 1.1 109.4 77.1 116.9 94.0 113.3 31.5 41.0

— — — 9.0 84.1 40.0 66.6 13.5 19.3

0.2 1.1 109.4 68.1 32.8 54.0 46.7 18.0 21.7

— — 47.5 68.4 84.1 65.2 85.4 17.3 26.9

—	—	47.5	68.4	84.1	65.2	85.4	17.3	26.9	C
0.2	1.1	61.9	8.7	32.8	28.8	27.9	14.2	14.1	
—	—	45.8	—	1.4	—	—	—	—	-
0.2	1.1	16.1	8.7	31.4	28.8	27.9	14.2	14.1	
166.6									
128.7									
57.6									
15.7									
38.6									
166.6	128.7	57.6	15.7	38.6					
164.2	124.1	53.0	11.9	38.4					
0.6									
0.7									
0.1									
0.2									
4.3									
4.3 1.9									
2.4									
D. Tran-Excess Stock F	1.8	3.9	4.5	3.6	170.5 97.6	110.0 48.0	176.7
Other Grants	289.2	196.3	210.7 210.7	122.6 24.0	72.9	62.0	125.8 50.9
III. Total Econ. & Mil.	Loans	289.2		196.3		98.6			76.4 54.3
..... Grants								22.1
									97.5 72.0
									25.5
<hr/>									
Other US Loans Fx-IM	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bank Loans								49.7 49.7
<hr/>									
AllOther								

Less than \$50,000.

C

C

(U.S. Fiscal Years — Millions of Dollars)

U.S. Overseas — Loans and Grants — Obligations and Loan Authorizations

Country Yugoslavia

Foreign Assistance Act Period

Program	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
1972 1973										
I. Econ. Assist.—Total.....	115.8	111.9	72.4	87.6	135.9	2.3	0.1	—	—	0.4
Loans 75.4	95.5	59.0	82.9	131.3	—	—	—	—0.4		
Grants..... 40.4	16.4	13.4	4.7	4.6	2.3	0.1	—	—	—	
A. Aid and Predeces	2.0	0.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.4
Loans —	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Grants..... 2.0	0.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.4		
(Sec. Supp. Assist.)	(5.7)	() () (—)	() () (—)	(—) (—) (—)	(—) (—) (—)	(—) (—) (—)	(—) (—) (—)			
B. Food For Peace	113.8	111.8	72.4	87.6	135.9	2.3	0.1	—	—	—
Loans 75.4	95.5	59.0	82.9	131.3	—	—	—	—	—	
Grants..... 38.4	16.3	13.4	4.7	4.6	2.3	0.1	—	—	—	
Title I—Total.....	98.7	97.5	59.0	82.9	131.3	—	—	—	—	
Repay, in \$-Loans.....	16.3	16.0	44.4	82.9	131.3	—	—	—	—	
Pay, in For. Curr.....	82.4	81.5	14.6	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Title II — Total	15.1	14.3	13.4	4.7	4.6	2.3	0.1	—	—	—
E. Relief. Ec. Dev & WFP.....	—	0.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Vol. Relief Agency	15.1	14.3	13.3	4.7	4.6	2.3	0.1	—	—	—
C. Other Econ. Assist.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Loans —	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Grants..... —	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Contr. toIFI.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Peace Corps.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Narcotics	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Other	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Mil. Assist.—Total	0.3	0.2	0.9	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Loans 0.3	0.2	0.9								
Grants.....										

O

a

A. Map Grants.....	—
B. Credit Financing.....	0.3
C. IntlMil. Ed. Trng.....	—
D. Tran-Excess Stock	—

[illegible]

Program
I. Econ. Assist. —Total.....

A. Aid and Predecessors.....

(Sec. Supp. Assist.) (

Grants.....

Pay. in For. Curr.....

Vol. Relief Agency

Grants.....

Narcotics

Loans

1975

1977

1980

—) (

$$10.0 \quad 10.0$$

$$10.0 \quad (\quad 10.0)$$

1

A. M

D. Tran-Excess Stock

III. Total Econ. & Mil.

Loans
 Grants.....
 Other US Loans . Ex-IM Bank Loan All Other
 TQ = Transitional Quarter * Less than \$50,000
C z C |
n >
3

Program
 Post-War Relief Period 1946-48
 Marshall
 Plan
 Period
 1949-52
 Mutual Security
 Act Period 1953-61
 — Foreign Assistance Act__
 Period
 1962-79
 1980
 1981 1982 1983
 Total
 FAA
 Period
 1962-83
 Total Loans
 and Grants 1946-83
 Repayments
 and
 Interest 1946-83
 Total Less Repayments
 and
 Interest 1946-83
 B. Credit Financing ..
 C. IntlMil. Ed. Trng.
 D. Tran-Excess Stock
 E. Other Grants.....
 III. Total Econ. & Mil.
 Loans
 Grants
 298.1 298.1
 0.1 13.8
 496.8 496.8
 4.2 13.8
 1449.9
 421.7 1028.2
 1.4
 537.8
 445.9
 91.9
 0.1 0.1
 0.1
 0.1
 1.4 0.3
 538.1 445.9
 92.2
 1.4
 4.6
 27.5
 2832.2 922.0 1910.2
 1.4
 788.9 788.9
4.6
 27.5
 2043.3
 133.1
 1910.2
 Other US Loans Ex-IM Bank Loans . AllOther
 55.0 55.0
 49.7 49.7
 1028.4 36.0 842.1 36.0 186.3 —
 32.5
 32.5
 17.2 17.2
 1114.1 927.8 186.3
 1211.7
 1025.4
 186.3
 882.3 671.3 211.0
 329.4 354.1
 -24.7
m O >

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As it is evident in the foregoing, Tito was receiving Marshall aid and exactly at the time when to the world press he denied receiving any.

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1. Peasantry — YO. 2. Urbanization — YO. 3. Rural — urban migration — YO. 4. Social conditions — YO. 5. Cities and

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But with all aid, military and economic, given to Yugoslavia since the WWII, reckless spending and inept management led it to economic disaster. Unable to repay its loans or to maintain a viable economy, Belgrade was forced to request more and more assistance.

In November 1983, a 4.5 million dollar financial rescue package was approved. The package consists of new loans and credits from 15 nations, including the U.S., along with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Bank for International Settlements in Basel and 600 commercial bank lenders.

Yugoslavia's present crisis arises from the excessive spending of the past two decades, when Western loans helped build an economy of worker-owned enterprises. This system has not been successful.

With soaring energy costs, inflationary prices and the world recession, the country did not have the money to repay the billions of dollars in hard-currency loans.

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This rescue package of such enormous sums created by the Western democracies to extricate Communist Yugoslavia was called the Friends of Yugoslavia Assistance Package.

The continuation of the studies of military and economic aid to Yugoslavia will be possible only when the files are open.

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XVI Political Bribe

The Webster dictionary of the American language defines "bribe" as a morsel of bread given to beggars at its origins when "briber" meant to beg. Today it means anything especially money, given or promised to induce a person to do something illegal or wrong; anything given or promised to induce a person to do something against his wishes.

Bribe must be understood as everything given out of motives which are not those of giving a gift for the sake of the gift. We know that even gifts become an inducement to get gifts because usually everybody, except beggars, reciprocate for a gift with a gift. Even the gift to your mother brings you some advantages not received from your mother before the gift, be it a motherly smile or something more tangible.

The most famous bribes are so-called donations. Everybody who makes donations is looking for something which the money or other forms of donations can bring in return. Even the famous volunteers always get rewards. Nonetheless bribery is understood to be such only when money is given to somebody in power to induce him to actions he otherwise would not perform, be it in a positive or negative sense. Bribes are as old as mankind and will not die before the last man disappears from the earth.

As bribes given to Tito, we do not mention all of the money given to Titoland in military or otherwise in economic aid as international diplomacy jargon calls it and there are no ways to change that jargon. To the average cognoscenti of the European political scene, it is known that the United States poured into Italy in 1948 some ten million dollars to insure the victory of the right wing party of Democratic Christians over the Communists. By all prognoses the Communists were winning in preelections, and those in power in the United States did not want any Communist take-over in Italy. The same people who, only a few years previously, had put into power Communism in Yugoslavia.

The same kind of money of American taxpayers and almost in the same amount was spent by the United States in 1974, when there was a possibility of the Communist take-over in Italy once again. Nobody calls those

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millions either a bribe, economic aid, or donation. For the millions spent outside the United States no reason was ever given. Of course, that money was given to keep the Communists out of power in Italy at the same time when money even in more huge amounts was being given to the rulers of Yugoslavia

to keep Communism in power there. Why the Americans give money to eliminate Communists from political power in one country, Italy, and on the other hand give money to keep the Communists in power, as in Communist Yugoslavia, must remain an enigma. We know that Americans and British used money as a direct political bribe.

At the head of the OSS Mission during the war in Tangier, was U.S. Marine Colonel William A. Eddy. His first plot was a scheme to replace the pro-Vichy Arab prime minister in Tunis with an Arab leader who was pro-Ally. In March 1942, Donovan made 50,000 dollars available to use as a bribe for that purpose.

That money was official U.S. money, and Colonel Eddy was a U.S. Naval Attache' in Tangier, thus a very high military and diplomatic U.S. official. Donovan had induced President Roosevelt to turn him loose in French Africa, among other places, with plenty of money to create a kind of spy subversive secret service. Such tactics had been long employed by European powers, but were scorned by Americans.

Much has been written about British bribes in Yugoslavia before the War. It is generally known that the famous putsch in Belgrade on March 27, 1941 was paid for by the British. That money went mostly to the bourgeois political parties. Exactly how many British pounds were given out has never been mentioned nor how much individuals and single political parties received of that money. Only the name of Milos Tupanjanin, deputy leader of the Serbian Agrarian Party is mentioned. He escaped to Istanbul after April 6 with 35,000 dollars of British money. Nobody has ever reported how much money was given to General Simovic, and even less mention of how much was given to Josip Broz Tito. It is known that William Donovan was spending big money on his famous Balkan trip, and it is known that after his meeting with Tito, the Yugo-Communist party spent money around lavishly and organized "spontaneous" demonstrations for the putsch of March 27 with exorbitant expenditures. The British have copious literature and many movies revealing how often and how much the Albion was dispersing pounds for political bribery. In 1941, the British used millions of pounds just to keep "the Iraqi tribes friendly."

During Churchill's endeavors to install Ivan Subasic as premier of the Yugo-Emigre-Government, he found himself stonewalled by the premier of the day, Bozidar Puric. When Churchill told Petar to dismiss Puric,

POLITICAL BRIBE

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Petar said that he could not do that. Churchill told him to give Puric 20,000 pounds. When Petar hesitated, Churchill said: I'll give you 60,000 pounds, 20,000 for Puric.

During that May, 1944, it was not clear whether or not there was any Yugo-Government in London. Eden and Churchill and the same Petar asked Puric to resign. Puric did not want to resign. Petar dismissed Puric on May 17, but since Subasic was not yet appointed as Premier, Puric stayed as Premier up to June 1, when Subasic was officially appointed Premier. Not even at that moment did Puric resign. He was not ever actually dismissed. He simply faded out with consequences that the Minister of Finance was paying him the pension of the Premier and not the salary.

After Tito was enthroned in Belgrade on October 27, 1944, gifts and bribes poured in from all sides. As one innocent specimen, we cite the memorandum of the U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade, Richard Patterson, about his meeting with the President at the White House on August 31, 1945:

I spent thirteen minutes with the President. He first asked me if I were going back soon and I said next week. He then said he had made Tito come to terms on the Trieste problem and I told him what I had put in the memorandum when I went to see Tito on the 72-Hour Ultimatum to him. I said I told Tito that without the authority of my government and unofficially he could expect no economic help from my country whatsoever unless he carried out his solemn commitments made at Yalta and upon which we recognized him. The President replied "You did the right thing". I asked him if I could take his greetings to Tito and to King Peter and he said "By all means, do so". I said "Mr. President, Tito is colorful, dynamic, hospitable, a military genius, but a thorough Communist, and his economic and political philosophy is not ours. Nevertheless, since he is intelligent I would suggest that I be permitted to bring him back to America for a month of indoctrination, provided the elections go reasonably well." The President replied "That's a fine thing and you do it." The President also said "I like the idea." He further stated that I could use a two-fisted, tough policy with Tito.

I told the President that I had a letter from Joe Davies this morning and that Joe suggested that possibly a constitutional monarchy would work, like England has today. The President replied "A constitutional monarch sounds good."

Further, I told the President that Tito and I were good friends, that I had seen a good deal of him, and that I was returning with 5,000 cartridges so that we could go hunting at his invitation.

Something not so innocent happened when Tito made difficulties over the Trieste question. The Prime Minister of Italy, Mario Scelba who succeeded Premier Pella, feared that the Trieste question could bring down his government. Scelba was an Italian ultra patriot and did not want to make any concessions. The Italians became so obstinate that it seemed the negotiations would have to be called off.

At this moment Robert Murphy appeared in Belgrade. Tito agreed to concessions, and the Trieste agreement was signed in London on October 5, 1954. About the vicissitudes of the mission in Belgrade, Murphy in his book, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, narrates:

During my conversations in Belgrade I discovered that Vice President Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, the economic boss of Yugoslavia, was greatly alarmed about his country's huge wheat deficit, the worst in its history. A deficit of 700,000 tons had been estimated, but now it was evident that the deficit would be at least 1,300,000 tons — this in a country which under capitalism had always been an exporter of cereals. The fact was that the collective farm system had failed miserably in Yugoslavia, there was an imperative need for wheat, and none seemed to be forthcoming from the Soviet Union. When Vukmanovic-Tempo brought up this matter, I told him that perhaps the United States could be helpful, but that I had come to Belgrade to ask for Yugoslav support on immediate settlement of the Trieste issue. Actually I was authorized to offer assistance if circumstances justified, and before departing for Rome I informed Deputy Foreign Minister Bebler in strictest confidence that the United States would be willing to deliver 400,000 tons of wheat to Yugoslavia. But it was incorrect for Sir Anthony Eden to suggest that I went to Belgrade and laid some wheat on the line, whereupon the Yugoslavs grasped the pen and signed the Trieste agreement. Tito sensibly wanted to bring the Trieste disturbance to an end, but I doubt that he would have surrendered on matters of principle for a shipment of wheat.

So far as I know, there never was any thought in Washington that we might persuade Tito to become our ally. Our objective was much more limited — to encourage a genuinely independent Yugoslavia not unfriendly to the United States. To achieve that purpose we were willing to provide extensive military and economic aid, so that Yugoslavia would not be at the mercy of Russia. I had nothing to do with the original concept of the military program which was negotiated in Belgrade by my friend General J. Lawton ("Lightning Joe") Collins while I was Ambassador in Brussels. I had no criticism of this aid policy which I believed sound, although I was

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critical later of extravagance in its application. It seemed to me that the United States could have obtained virtually the same political effect at a lower price, perhaps less than half what we actually spent. It is an American characteristic that when we once decide to pursue a policy, we are inclined to go all out and damn the cost. . . From the Yugoslav point of view, it was incomprehensible why we should press such substantial allocations upon them in the early days, and our extravagance made it difficult for us to deal with them later.'

A pity that people like Robert Murphy did not tell us more about such shticks of U.S. diplomacy. It would be interesting especially to know what Lawrence Eagleberger would have to say.

In addition to Robert Murphy's ways of conducting diplomacy in Belgrade, there were other endeavors by the Allies to induce Tito to the acceptance of their proposals about Trieste. Their persuasiveness was enhanced by their skillful catering to Tito's need for money and other material goods. The U.S. offered 20 million dollars, and Great Britain matched it with the offer of 2 million pounds. The Allies also offered to build new ports and to make other compensations for Tito's concessions. More about everything the fortunate survivors will read in 1995 when PRO opens the files on Tito.

Puric got his 20,000 Churchillian pounds and Petar his 40,000. It is clear that Petar sold the Serbians for his thirty pieces of silver.

Tito got Yugoslavia.

It is not recorded how much, how many pounds, Subasic got for accepting the coveted Premiership. No Serbian anti-Communist would ever take a bribe.

When the Premier, Milan Stojadinovic, was visiting the Fiat factories in Italy, he was excited by the beautiful Fiat cars with their high speed.

The supreme Fiat manager noticed his enthusiasm and spoke as if *ex cathedra*:

"Pronto, Eccellenza, un regalo del Duce."

"Oh, no," said Stojadinovic, "a Serbian does not take bribes. But I will buy one. How much?"

"Oh," replied the Fiat manager: "una lira."

"Give me two," said the Serbian.

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1. (New York, 1964), p. 425.

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REFERENCES

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I expect that nobody has ever put the high level plotting of the United States and Great Britain on the palm of the hand so clearly, so poignantly as I have done in this book. I can not envision anyone who now knows the unbeatable facts of Great Britain putting its agent, Josip Broz Tito, and the United States, Ivan Subasic, forward to espouse and virtualize the "sacred" interests of those two countries who would not see it as crystal clear as I do. To be sure, Great Britain deserves admiration for inducing the United States into the prostitution of violating the elementary human rights of all victims, individual and collective, in the area where the United States and Great Britain introduced Yugo Bolshevism. The peoples of Yugoslavia do not have the fortune of Great Britain where since 1066 no foreign soldier has set foot. The United States succeeded in the last two centuries only to go abroad to carry the war but did not have any foreign soldier on its soil in the meantime. It is well known that Anglo-Americans scream to the ceiling about the rights of individuals, the rights of nations, the self-determination of nations, and God forbid if any body would seek to deny individual rights, human rights, and rights of the nations to Great Britain or the United States. They are indeed fortunate that they are big and strong, that nobody can impose on them the power declared by Justice Holmes: Might is right.

But how trivial are the rights of man, the rights of individuals, human rights, and rights of nations considered in the countries of the territory where today rules Red Bolshevism. Bolshevism rules those nations and those territories not because of the will or the decision of those peoples. In Croatia, not even 5% of Croatians are for Communism. If one knows that only the Communist is a full fledged citizen of the state, that only Communists can get all privileges of public life, and full economic favors, then the statistic is a Communist disaster. Where, for God's sake, is the minority of less than 5% accepted to rule the nation.

Communism in Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, and Macedonia with Montenegro is there by the will of the Anglo-American god; Anglo-American

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gods brought Communism to those people and forced them into it with the help of the British Agent Josip Broz Tito and the U.S. Agent Ivan Subasic.

If one is astonished and stands mute before such an unbelievable attitude of peace and freedom loving Anglo-Americans without knowing the content of this book, he must now know that Britons put their interests so much ahead of the common good of the nations in Bolshevik Yugoslavia that they did not care about anything, anybody, in that savage, bloody dictatorship. All that they wanted to know were the interests of Great Britain, for which they lured into prostitution the United States who achieved those goals for them.

What are those interests for which Great Britain sacrificed the common good of those nations and lured the United States to do the same. They are the routes of Great Britain to reach safely their Empire by not shedding a drop of blood for it. Let the others bleed eternally. One drop of British blood is more sacred to the Lord God than all rivers of blood shed and those that continue to be shed for the safety of the routes for the British Empire. For those less knowledgeable about these interests of Great Britain which it declared vital for the Empire, let us mention that that route is the one from Gibraltar to Suez which leads Great Britain to reach its Empire. The immediately wanted nation is Greece, the second one is Yugoslavia which, with its territories, protects Greece and Great Britain. One must notice immediately that not all of Yugoslavia is necessary for the protection of these routes of the British Empire, but the more of it Great Britain rules the better for Great Britain.

This book abounds in admiration for the British genius of knowing how to protect the interests of Great Britain. Who but Great Britain would create a Josip Broz Tito in 1927-28, make him a Communist and infiltrate him into the Yugoslav Communist Party, and through the Yugoslav Party infiltrate him into world Communism, into the Comintern and into the fortress of Communism, and the Kremlin, with its supreme lord Stalin.

I do not think that "Wild Bill" deserves any admiration for finding the other Croatian Quisling, Ivan Subasic, and thrusting him on Churchill in order to help Britons to establish that Bolshevik empire of Yugoslavia to guard the British interests, because there were no American interests as it has been said by all Americans beginning with FDR.

From the many facets of Tito's behavior from 1928 up to 1948, it becomes evident that Tito played the Communist card even to the satisfaction of his Communist followers. How much after 1944, when the Soviets put him on the Red throne in Belgrade in Serbia, Tito deviated from the British line is not clear, but even from the few documents in our book we

register that in April 1945 Churchill was so much enraged against him that he wished that the Ustasa in Zagreb (and the White Guard in Ljubljana which Eisenhower could not pronounce) give resistance to Tito's advance, defeat him and thus save Croatia from Tito's Communism.

How much Tito acted as he did because of his love for Stalin and his hate of Churchill we do not know, because nobody has discussed this point yet. But the full-blooded Communists like Milovan Djilas and similar Montenegrin and Serbian "Muttons" (as called by the greatest writer of the domestic men of letters, Miroslav Krleža) and the lesser muttons like Edvard Kardelj, and the rest of Slovenians hated England and the United States with heart and had their heart in the Kremlin.

The British masters of Tito did not think that the Yugo Red satraps were following the line of protection of the British vital route and the vital interests and decided to strike. The chapter about the British organizing the Kremlin to oust Communist Yugoslavia with Tito out of the world of international Communism has not yet been written and what follows is the first attempt to do so.

Everybody a little cognizant of British polity in the Mediterranean and in the Balkans knows how much Great Britain sacrificed to keep Greece in the British orbit and thus keep it out of the Nazi life space. In fact, in 1941, the British had in Greece about 62,000 men, most of them landed after mid March. They also had about 80 aircraft and some tanks and artillery. British propaganda at that time divulged the news that the number of troops landed in Thessalonica and Piraeus by March 25 was up to 120,000 troops. On June 8, 1944, Churchill gave directives to his Ambassador in Washington, Earl Halifax, to advise President Roosevelt that the British had had about 40,000 losses in Greece in 1941.

Whatever Churchill wanted to achieve with that statistic, the losses were heavy but not so heavy. About 50,000 men, apparently with some Greeks, were eventually evacuated from various beaches between April 24 and 29, when the war in Greece ended in a German victory.

About Churchill's determination to thwart the Communist victory in Greece exist many documents in London and in Washington of which only a small part is published. Some echo of Churchill's idea about Communism in Greece is found also in this book. However, when after 1945, Communism started to have the upper hand in Greece with the help of the whole Communist world through the good services of Tito's Communist Yugoslavia, Great Britain as one jumped to its feet to stop Tito from helping the Communists in Greece to seize power. *Carthago delenda est.*

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Carthago deleta fuit. On June 28, 1948, the date Stalin gave the boot to Tito, Communist Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform, Communist Information Bureau founded in 1947 as a successor to the Comintern. Tito immediately stopped all help to the Communists in Greece. Markos fled Greece and Greece never became Communist, and the British interests in Greece and the imperial routes of the British Empire have been saved as the British wanted at that time and remained as the British wanted up to 1956, when finally Americans ceased to sacrifice everything and everybody for the British interests which were buried in the famous Suez crisis by Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles.

The Greek Communists are naturally the first to expose the treachery of Tito and his clique. It was because of that treachery that the Communists lost the battle in Greece. These Greek Communists emphasize that Tito's treachery was the determining reason in 1948-49 that the Communists lost the battle of Vitsi-Grammos. The Greek Communists give us also the reason why Great Britain maneuvered Stalin into denouncing Tito. According to the Greek Communists, they knew from 1946 the dishonest role of the provocateur Tito. They continued their struggle for the takeover of Greece thinking that they had a secure rear at the time when "Monarcho-Fascism had full support of America and Britain."

From all that is known, the Greek Communists do attribute to Tito the decisive role in the defeat of the Communist armies in Greece. But we have also a rich field of others who say the same. The Vice-President of the Council of the Greek Government, Venizelos, declared: "Without the aid given by Yugoslavia we could never have been so successful."

Although they used more Aesopian language than the Greek, the British Tories said the same.

Harold MacMillan at the end of 1949 said: "Without disparagement to Greek arms, what has turned the balance in the Greek Civil war? The war between Tito and Stalin. ..."

In the *Daily Telegraph*, Nov. 16, 1949, Anthony Eden wrote "But most important of all has been Tito's modification of his attitude towards Greece. . . . The collapse of the Greek rebel army in October was hastened by Tito's action in closing the Greek-Yugoslav frontier."

In his book, *The East European Revolution* (1950), Hugh Seton Watson writes: "In the summer of 1949 the government forces at last attained real success. The decisive event seems to have been Tito's closure of the frontier in July." Greece became free of Communism but Yugoslavia had to remain communist.

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Judicant consules. But it was the "gun for the Hun" even to Tito from Churchill by which those Serbians perished. Not even five thousand of Huns perished in the period April 6, 1941 to May 8, 1945. The total German casualty figure of the April 6 war was 558, including 151 killed, 392 wounded and 15 missing. If the Serbians think that hundreds of thousands of Serbians killed by Tito's Bolshies are morally proportionate to less than 5000 Germans fallen in the finding of the Serbian soul, let them say.

With Yugoslavia, Jupiter tonans (Jupiter the thunderer), Winston Spencer Churchill behaved as if it were his personal property, e.g., the Castle Marlborough or other ducal estate of the Churchills. Or maybe worse than that, as if it were personal property for which he did not care or at least where he never intended to live. "Set it ablaze," and then flee. He did not ever intend 'to make Yugoslavia his home after the war,' he told Maclean at the end of 1943; 'the less you and I worry about the form of government they set up, the better.'

Serbian ontology for pushing themselves and the rest of the peoples in Yugoslavia on March 27, 1941, into the holocaust that followed from then on up to today is a Serbian thing.

British and American ontology of pushing those people into the holocaust from then on is not only British and American ontology, but it is also my ontology and that of all those others living or dead, sacrificial lambs of their ontology, of the holocaust, i.e., destruction of all of us.

I do not know how much I differ from the Britons and Americans who knowingly, willingly, and bloodily sacrificed their co-nationals. I do not give to anyone any right to sacrifice anybody for his own purposes, be in peace or war. Evidently there are Americans and Britons who sacrifice their nationals for no purpose of any individual or of the nation, but for the reasons of imperialism and greed, strange and foreign to the individual and the nations as such.

In the British case I mention Dunkirk. Great Britain sent Britons to Europe without organization, without purpose, and without means. The invented slogans to justify that adventure, but the inventors of those pro propaganda slogans did not perish. Perished were the innocent Britons who did not have anything to do with the propaganda slogans.

Great Britain sent 62,000 Britons to Greece in March 1941. There was no reason to send that enormous number of Britons to Greece. Not even the slogans invented by the British propagandists could justify that adventure. Great Britain lost 12,000 countrymen in that adventure without hope and without necessity. In Crete alone they lost 1,000 Britons with other

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wounded and missing. Not only did Great Britain organize the Greek adventure without necessity, it gave military justification for Germany to go to Greece to wage wars against Britons. Germany never had plans to wage wars in Greece and would not have done so. All Greeks who perished because of that British invasion of Greece and the subsequent German war against Britons, and sporadically against the Greeks, without their own will, and all subsequent woes of Greece were caused by the stupid and unfounded urge of British propagandists to wage war in Greece.

The massacre of Canadians in Dieppe was the consequence of the incompetence and inefficient ways of waging that war by Great Britain. British and American terrorist and spying services can glorify themselves and thrive in the debacle, but the responsibility for those innocent lives sacrificed in vain and for nothing is an awesome ontology.

The most bloody ontologies of the last big War are Coventry and Pearl Harbor. The authors of those holocausts knew that a great number of people would perish because of their cowardice. Nobody has the right, and all of us, Churchill and FDR included, deny those rights to the Communist, Nazi, and Fascist dictators (Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini), the right to sacrifice individuals for the state. Their Hegelian ontology, dialectic materialism, teaches that the state, not the individual, is the supreme being on the earth and that the state runs the destinies of the individual, and thus the individual can be and must be sacrificed for the good of the state. When Churchill and FDR sacrificed individuals for the good of the state at Pearl Harbor and Coventry and any other place, they preached the Hegelian ontology, dialectic materialism, and were no different in practicing it from Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin.

Still another example has been only recently disclosed. Sylvia Chase on the NBC program 20/20 of May 3, 1984, moderated by Hugh Downs, reported the startling facts about the tragedy at Lyme Bay on the South Devon coast of England on April 28 — six weeks before the D Day invasion. The report on "The Tragic Secrets of Lyme Bay" revealed the forty-year cover-up of the tragic fate of the amphibious training exercise in which 749 men perished. Doctors, rescuers and villagers sworn to secrecy at the time now tell the story they witnessed — a story of tragedy caused by gross negligence and carelessness of the American and British High Command. Men untrained, without proper equipment were left without support when fired upon by a German ship. So heedless of this unnecessary sacrifice caused by their blunders, the commanders did not even make a report of the tragedy nor a report of the burial of the 749 casualties who met their death. Albeit the U.S. Army erected a monument in tribute to the Villagers

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of Devon. Thus at the same time when we condemn the Hegelian ontology, dialectic materialism, practiced by Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin, we must also condemn the Hegelian ontology, dialectic materialism, practiced by FDR and Churchill.

This is not any fantasy, any wishful thinking and writing. The same Communists who were conducting the ascent of the Croatian Quisling Josep Broz Tito to the throne of the red empire in Belgrade are the ones who tell us the history of the British coup in the ouster of Tito from the Communist world.

The most famous Communist in this field is the Briton, James Klugman, one of the top people in the British Communist Party and a member of the Parliament of that party. James Klugman was known to the Yugo Communists at least from 1928, when Tito became a British certified agent. It is not clear where Tito and Klugman met. Was it at Camp X or was it in Cambridge during the period of Fabian dreams? James Klugman in the thirties worked with the most famous Jugg young Communist, Lola Ribar (Fischer). They were meeting regularly at the conventions of the International Youth Peace organizations. Certainly Klugman met all of the Jugg Communists who were going to those meetings, but it is Vladimir Dedijer who writes in his book of knowing Klugman. As we said the Yugo-Communist Party was rich, although it had no means, and was crisscrossing the earth with other Communists.

During the war Klugman was factotum at the Yugoslav desk in Cairo as the member of SOE. When the Britons write most recently about it, some mention that he was not so much so (Basil Davidson), but others say that although a Lord was head of the desk, it was Klugman who ran the whole thing. Moreover, Klugman was maintaining ties with all resistance movements in Europe which had a Communist segment. He definitely was in connection with Leopold Trepper who was at Camp X and had a Canadian passport forged at Camp X as did Tito.

James Klugman in 1948 wrote a book from *Trotsky to Tito* which exposed Tito and many of his followers as British agents.

After the expulsion of Tito and the Yugoslav Communists from the Communist world ruled by Stalin in Moscow, the Communists all over the world sided with Stalin and accused Tito and his followers of treachery and of being agents of Anglo-American imperialism. To be sure, not all Communists in Yugoslavia sided with Tito. Some of them succeeded to escape abroad; some already were abroad. Most of those rebels who remained in Yugoslavia were sent to prisons and camps of concentration without trial. The prisons in Yugoslavia are the most atrocious places for living and all

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have less than sub-standard accommodations. Prisoner accommodations are sub-human, and in more civilized parts of Yugoslavia, even the animals have it better. Definitely the animals in different zoological gardens around many of Tito's residences had it better. Of course, they had it better than anybody in the Bolshevik empire except Tito, his mistresses and his lackeys. Most famous of all camps of concentration is the little island of Goli Otok (Bear Island) which, according to the descriptions of former inmates, is worse than any Gulag in the Soviet Union as described by their inmates.

One of the rebels was Lazar Brankov, former counselor at the Yugoslav Communist Legation in Budapest. At the trial of the unfortunate Communist Rajk, Brankov said:

"Well, they [Anglo-American Intelligence] thought that first of all there was a well-constructed plan which the British and Americans had worked out with Churchill still during the war. According to this plan, as usually is the case, they did not want to place the Balkans under their influence at the cost of the blood of Anglo-American soldiers, but wanted to achieve this through these experienced intelligence officers and they wanted in this way to place under their influence the Yugoslav leaders of these days

"While the war was still on they were trying to subjugate Yugoslavia, and then the neighboring states, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, to Anglo-American influence and their primary aim was to restrict the influence of the Soviet Union, to decrease their influence, because they knew very well that the overwhelming part of the great majority of the Yugoslav people stood by the side of the Soviet Union and loved the Soviet people. At that time they planned first to win over Tito, Kardelj, Rankovic and Djilas and through them Yugoslavia"

During the processes in Bulgaria against their fallen gods, one of them, Traico Kostov, gave testimony giving the substance of what he was told by Edvard Kardelj in an interview in Skopje at the end of November 1944:

"Then Kardelj informed me, in strict confidence, that during the war the British and Americans had supplied the Yugoslav partisans with arms and amunitions, on condition that at the end of the war Tito would keep Yugoslavia away from the U.S.S.R. and would not allow the U.S.S.R. to establish its influence, not only in Yugoslavia, but in the Balkans as well. The Americans and British had taken a firm decision in no case to

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allow the breakaway of the countries, that might be liberated by the Soviet Army, from the Western bloc.

"On this basis, between Tito on the one hand and the British and Americans on the other, a definite agreement had already been reached during the war."

About military and economic aid and participation of British and American military and intelligence personnel with Tito we have spent much of the space in this book.

The Kicking out of Tito from the Communist community of peoples gave new impetus to the United States and Great Britain to help Bolshevik Yugoslavia.

After that Communist ouster of Tito, Yugo Bolsheviks started an unheard of race in arms. By the end of 1950 Tito had an army of over one million men. The budget expenditure on arms went up rapidly from 1948. Early in 1950 Americans started unofficially to dispatch arms to Titoland. There were periods in the summer of 1950 when 15 to 20 trains weekly carried captured German arms from the American zone of western Germany to Yugoslavia. By the end of 1950 the United States decided to openly dispatch food for the Yugoslav forces. In 1950, *The Sunday Observer* on October 8, reported: "The United States, Britain and France have decided in principle to give military aid to Yugoslavia. This decision was taken during the recent Big Three Conference in New York."

Since Tito's ouster from the Moscow Communist Information Bureau, 1948, the western free world was intense in the effort to hide the real reason for the boot. They even did not want to write that Tito got the boot. They were hiding that the Britons needed Tito's help to defeat the Communist forces in Greece, and thus instead of the boot they spoke about Tito's quarrel with Moscow as if it were a family misunderstanding between two brothers. Thus they did not want to see Communism in Yugoslavia disappear and started to talk about the new Communism, Tifoism, i.e., the new socialism. All American leftists and their fellow travellers, all the British Labor Party, especially the right wing, flocked to Tito as the new Mohammed and to Belgrade as the new Mecca. Thus all of them have been eager to pour all money Tito needed to keep his bloody satrapy alive, but without revealing it to the free independent media. The need was openly admitted by the *Observer* on the same October 8, 1950:

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"There can be no question of direct aliance or an open guarantee to Yugoslavia as in the case of the Atlantic Pact countries, Western Germany, Greece, and Turkey, because Marshal Tito could not accept it and because it would provide additional fuel to the Soviet propaganda campaign against Tito as the tool of the West."

The skillful Tito had to pacify his Communist followers about his connections with the Western imperialistic Powers as he skillfully had done in the years of the guerrilla warfare. But even though American liberals and leftists and the British Labor Party Bonzos did not want to see the pouring of economic wealth and army equipment to Titoland, the Belgrade correspondent of *The Times* on February 19, 1951, wrote that Tito on February 18 in a speech at the Second Congress of his Guard Division declared that, "there could be no question at this stage of seeking arms from the West." However, the Western press was pushing for the freedom of information, with some success. The same correspondent of *The Times* on May 22, 1951, reported that the Deputy Minister of Defense, Colonel General Ivan Gosnjak, revealed that Communist Yugoslavia had openly demanded Western military aid. On June 9, Kardelj announced that the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Koca Popovic', left for the West to demand equipment and arms for the Yugo red army. In Washington, Popovic visited everybody, including General Bradley, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the *New York Herald Tribune* on June 19 stated, arms in the value of one million dollars had been

shipped from the USA to Yugoslavia, and by June 27 the value of the shipped arms exceeded the three million dollar mark. More arms were on the way. Yugoslavia accepted the U.S. demand for the right to supervise all distribution of those arms and arranged for the training in USA of Yugoslav Communist military personnel. Most of the American Right was beaming over the American anti-Soviet move. Joseph Alsop on July 7, 1951 wrote in the *New York Herald Tribune* that "it is only necessary to consider how much cheaper it is to buy strength here than it is, for example, in France." With the military equipment the U.S. sent all kinds of experts who, among others, started to build new country roads for specific military strategic purposes. Everybody in the Titoland was conscripted to work for that purpose on the construction of the roads. Thus the United States became an entrepreneur in building roads in Bolshevik Yugoslavia with forced slave labor.

Whatever since 1944 had been the feelings of the peoples in Yugoslavia about Americans forcing the Communist red dictatorship upon them from

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this period on a big hate in the slave laborers took root.

On January 1, 1950, in Washington it was announced that the USA had granted permission to Yugoslavia to import aircraft engines and parts. A whole panacea of agreements, opened and concealed, gave to the United States the right to use Yugoslav airports. The correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune* reported from Belgrade on January 17, 1950, that "American airliners will begin flying over Yugoslavia next week as a result of only one day of negotiations between Pan-American, World Airways, officials, and Yugoslav Government officials." According to the same correspondent, Yugoslavia was ready to sign similar agreements with Great Britain, France, and Italy.

From its side, Communist Yugoslavia put at the disposal of the Western capitalist countries almost all harbors on the Adriatic seacoast which had been enlarged with American "aid." On April 10, 1950, the Government issued the permission for foreign vessels to stay in Yugoslav territorial waters.

The bankrupt British Labor government could not help. Help came from President Truman. Truman's doctrine, as formulated by George Marshall, espoused the British cause by accepting responsibility for Greece and Turkey. Naturally, the United States added to the responsibility for Greece and Turkey, the responsibility for Yugoslavia.

Turkey is about to slough off the American responsibility as soon as the circumstances request. Greece is already doing it.

Yugoslavia? Americans are very vocal about fighting Communism in Cuba and in Nicaragua. Is it a supreme sign that Americans will grant to the peoples in Yugoslavia the right of decision in their political life as granted them by the Atlantic Charter and the Yalta Agreement. They do not now have that political freedom as granted by the Atlantic Charter and by the Yalta Agreements, solely because the British wanted that their agent, Josip Broz. Tito, run a Communist Yugoslavia, because, of course, he could not put together any but a Communist Yugoslavia.

There is not much ground for faith in the Americans and British who, in granting to the peoples of Yugoslavia political choice as guaranteed by the Atlantic Charter signed by President Roosevelt and Premier Churchill and by the Yalta Agreement signed by Stalin in addition to the above two, never applied the guarantees to the nations of Yugoslavia. Still the right of nations always wins and it will win. No might of the United States or of any American satellite is strong enough to deny it for a long period to come.

There should not be much expectation from American or British wisdom, for not even their own fortunes are the fruit of their wisdom alone.

The financing of the war of the Yugo-Communists by Americans and British helped the British Agent Tito to become the lord of that Bolshevik Empire. From every statistic we have previously given, it is clear that the U.S. and Great Britain continued to disburse all financial and other necessities to keep Yugoslavia afloat. It remains afloat only because Great Britain and the United States and their satellites, like Italy, Germany, and France, continue to pay the expenses for the maintenance of the cruel regime which oppresses the innocent peace-loving people.

Communist Yugoslavia's foreign debt in 1983 was 20 billion dollars.

Yugoslavia was unable to meet its commitments on time in 1983, and only a 4.5 billion dollar package put together by IMF, fifteen Western governments, the Bank for International Settlement (BIS), and 600 commercial banks avoided international bankruptcy for Communist Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia is a rich country in natural resources. When Croatia was independent in the Habsburg Monarchy and also later in Royal Yugoslavia, it had a high standard of living and it was able to export so much of its produce because it had a healthy surplus economy. It is not a problem of richness of natural resources that plagues Communist Yugoslavia, but at the root of the problem is the political and economic system reigning in that Communist empire.

That is the problem which faces the godfathers of Communist Yugoslavia. Once upon a time Great Britain declared that its vital interests demanded a Yugoslavia, be it Communist, if ruled by the British Agent Tito, and the United States accepted that rule of its big brother. The supreme benefit of that perverse international polity of Great Britain and the United States is ready to fall as ripe fruit into the bosom of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union watches with a feline appetite for the mouse to stop playing the game of the Western imperialistic powers. The intensive effect of the Western imperialistic powers to save and keep afloat Bolshevik Yugoslavia, by pouring all that money into it, is not a healthy geo-political reality. Nothing was saved in history by money, huge as it could be, as the money poured in by Western imperialistic powers to save the Communism of Josip Broz Tito. These powers act as if they do not even know that he is dead. How they manage to keep his legacy without ever revealing who is a British or American agent among the Yugo-Communist gods, is the mystery of the day. Come the Russians, we will see who will be royally received in the West.

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Daniel Lascelles, the counselor of the British Ambassador Reginald Leeper, in the autumn of 1945, wrote: "We seem to have a passion for half-way houses and useless compromises. The plain fact is that without our help Greece can not be viable either economically or militarily. If we want to keep her on our side of the fence — and it is sometimes forgotten that we are helping her for this reason of self-interest only—we must go on helping her, and on a very considerable scale..."

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Since 1939-1945, Empires have changed. Most portentous changes for the human race happened exactly in the Empire where the sun never set. The sun set. Great Britain in its previous glory is no more, especially since 1956, and so the ontology of power changed as well as world politics.

Changes in English world power brought changes in the Balkans more than in any other place. Greece, as the center of British highest state interest, is no longer so, and in Greece only the memory of Lord Byron is sweet and nothing else. The Greeks want their Elgins returned for supreme domestic reasons, but especially to erase all memories of British colonialism.

Greece is putting itself to the test by its new leftist regime. It looks as if Great Britain is not involved in it. At least no help is being delivered. The problems of NATO are open. Americans are puzzled but help.

All reasons of Rule Britannia for creating and keeping Bolshevik Yugoslavia have been eliminated by events that mean the sun now sets on the British Empire. There is no more the sun that never sets. The sun does set, did set.

Who keeps Yugoslavia afloat?

Great Britain definitely not. Great Britain does not need any Yugoslavia. It cannot afford to pour all economic and military help needed by the little British agents left in Bolshevik Yugoslavia after the Master British Agent died.

It is the United States who keeps on its feet that Communist monster which devours its own children, as all monsters do.

Well and good for Americans to nourish such a monster, if they choose, in their own country, but who gave them the right to fatten such monsters in other sovereign nations. They, Americans, teach that they do not have that right. Sovereignty exactly means that each nation runs its own destinies. It is exactly the doctrine of sovereignty of nations that each nation is its own supreme ruler, and that no other nation has any right to run another sovereign nation. In the doctrine of sovereignty of nations, there is no Big Brother, great power, super-power. There is no dollar diplomacy, gun diplomacy, or sacro-egoism, nor the right of any state for its own interests to infringe on the rights of the interests of other sovereign nations.

The doctrine of interfering with the sovereignty of other nations has been called Fascism, Nazism, and Communism. While the Communists are sincere and teach limited sovereignty for their satellites, and Fascism and Nazism teach the same, the democracies, led by the United States, teach

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absolute sovereignty of nations, at the same time practicing interference in Yugoslavia. They do not call their policy, Communism, Nazism, Facism, or Hegelian dialectic materialism, but they practice the same Hegelian dialectic materialism accepted by Fascism, Nazism, and Communism. The only difference between them and the United States is that they are so professedly, and the United States which teaches non-interference with the destinies of other nations at the same time denies freedom, independence and sovereignty to the various nations of Bolshevik Yugoslavia, by keeping that Bolshevik Yugoslavia afloat against the will of those nations which are captive nations.

The United States are even the celebrated champion of the right to freedom, independence, and sovereignty of captive nations. Can there be, is there any greater hypocrisy in world politics.

No prophet is needed to predict that the Yugo Communist hell will disintegrate soon into its constituent parts, as it did on April 6, 1941, the moment the opportunity arises. In a better conglomeration of ideologies, all constituent nations will achieve freedom, independence, and sovereignty. The prophet cannot prophesize when the exact moment will come, but it will come.

The prophet does not believe in the eternal stupidity or eternal crimes of the United States in denying the basic human rights and the Four Freedoms professedly granted by the United States to all peoples and nations.

The Madam in the Foreign Office is dead. It is not known that the position is hereditary.

The moles in the White House are dead. It is sure that their positions are not hereditary.

Only a Satanic power can continue to impose the: Unity, Integrity (and) Inviolability of Communist (or any) Yugoslavia.

The monstrosity of the Bolshevik Yugoslavia is not only of moral nature which encompasses the problem of the rights of nations to self determination and sovereignty to command their own destinies. Bolshevik Yugoslavia is a monster also from its total impotence to exist as a viable state. This viability is two-fold. Primo: The viability to exist as the association of multiple nations which it subjugated. Secundo: viability as an economic unity which can satisfy the needs of the enslaved peoples. The statistics of aid, military and economic, give some idea of Yugoslavia's complete financial dependence on the West. All the while, especially in the last two decades, it was moving inexorably toward the economic crisis caused by over-spending and over-borrowing with the result that it was unable to repay the billions of dollars in hard currency loans.

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In November 1983 a multibillion dollar aid package under the planning and pushing of Lawrence Eagleburger was put together by thirteen Western European countries, the U.S. and Japan supported by international lending organizations headed by the International Monetary Fund and nearly 600 private commercial banks.

Yugoslavia was brought to its disastrous state by its inept economic system, which of course is a corollary of its political system. In a period of world recession, oil crisis, and inflation spiral, begun in

1970 (rate in 1983 was 60%), it continued a spending spree marked by bribery and corruption. A striking example of the ineptitude are the scores of factories built that stand idle for lack of raw material. Djilas was recently quoted as saying neither agriculture nor industry was efficient or productive.

Since Tito's death economic as well as political stresses have increased. Living standards have declined, gasoline is rationed at 9 gallons per car per month at a cost of \$2.35 a gallon as normal price, more in the black market, unemployment rate is at 12%. The country the same as an individual could not carry its burden of excessive spending and borrowing.

The average mind is staggered by terms of millions and billions, but the particulars of the plan are indicative of the pauperism of the country.

The five part plan orchestrated by the West made the following provisions:

I. Two billion dollars in short-term and medium-term loans from 600 commercial banks in the 13 Western European countries, the U.S. and Japan.

II. Six hundred million dollars of new commercial credit.

III. One billion four hundred million dollars worth of government credits extended by 15 nations.

Twenty per cent of these credits are American. IV. A short-term bridging loan of 500 million dollars arranged by the Bank of International Settlements in Basel.

V. Six hundred fifty-five million dollars of fresh standby credits from the I.M.F. and its sister organization, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as well as a separate loan of two hundred and seventy-five million dollars from the I.B.R.D.

Everybody who knows the elementary science of finance knows that such a plan in Bolshevik Yugoslavia is an insanity. As Robert Murphy already observed that country in the time of the non-Bolshevik dictatorship not only satisfied the needs of its inhabitants but also was able to export at least husbandry and agricultural products. The studies of this problem are known, and whoever wants to know can reach for those studies and study them.

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As already mentioned in many places the Bolshevik Yugoslavia is not viable to exist either as a Bolshevik dictatorship or as a democracy. It does exist only because of the bayonets of the United States. The real patriot must wish either the defeat of those bayonets or pray for reason.*

Note: All originals have been reproduced without any change or addition except or *[sic]* in a few places. Otherwise the *[sic]* would appear too many times.

* The plague on the Croatian nation is also marked by the fact that Bolshevik Juggery confiscated all records and other sources of modern history of Croatia and transferred them to Belgrade where they are kept under Bolshevik seal not accessible to the free scholarly historical research. Having access to them are only Yugo-Bolshevik Quisling scribblers like Bogdan Kri/inan who distort the records and sources and give only the Yugo-Bolshevik interpretation. The only other people to have access to them are other Quislings like Jozo Tomasevic and British, American, and other fellow travellers. Quislings are not scholars. They are traitors to the fatherland and so traitors to historical science and research. According to the laws and practice of Nuremberg, the fate for Quislings is always the same: the gallows.

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APPENDIX I

The problem of Draza Mihailovic being considered a War Criminal was started in the War Office by Patrick Dean. His Minutes registered in PRO as F.O. 371/48865 xc/A 59853 follow:

I agree with Mr. Ward that in speaking of Mihailovic we must be clear whether we regard him as a "war criminal" or a "traitor". For our purposes a war criminal is an enemy, or a person associated with the enemy, who has committed a violation of the rules of war, but he is *not* a person who, being an Allied national, has merely collaborated with the enemy or committed treason, however black, against his own country. The Russians, however, (and presumably the Yugoslavs and Albanians) use the term "war criminals" to cover not only war criminals in our sense but also persons who have been guilty of collaborating with the Germans, particularly against the Soviet Union.

On the assumption that Mihailovic is a traitor only, we are not bound, subject to one possibility, by any inter-allied agreement or declaration to hand him over to Tito. The circular note of 29th March (U 1527/29/73) really refers to handing persons over from the U.K. only except for paragraph 7, which covers persons who are held as prisoners of war. If we should regard Mihailovic as a prisoner of war we should be bound to hand him over under paragraph 7 provided that we are satisfied that a *prima facie* case of treason can be made out against him. If he does not fall under paragraph 7 of the circular note it would, I think, be difficult nevertheless not to hand him over to Tito provided that we are satisfied about his treasonable activities, since in general we allow the Allies to take over their Quislings and traitors whom we capture, though we generally stipulate that no trials should take place until all risk of reprisals against British prisoners has vanished. This risk presumably has almost gone by now.

It seems possible to me, however, that Mihailovic may be chargeable as a war criminal in the strict sense if members of the forces operating under his command, in conjunction with the Germans, have committed breaches of the rules of war upon Tito's troops (*ofa fortiori* on British or American troops operating with Tito). Mr. Hayter tells me that the Yugoslav Government could no doubt trump up a case of guilt as a war criminal in the strict sense against Mihailovic if necessary. If Mihailovic is or can be proved to be a war criminal in the strict sense we are bound under the Moscow Declaration to hand him over to the Yugoslav Government (on the assumption that the war crimes he has committed were against Yugoslavs). For the reasons given therefore it seems probable that in practice it would be difficult to refuse to hand over Mihailovic either as a traitor or as a "war criminal", provided that Tito makes out a *prima facie* case of treason or guilt of a war crime against him.

[Would it be worth asking Mr. Stevenson whether he can find out unobtrusively with what Tito's Government are in fact likely to charge Mihailovic?]

hi P. Dean 5th May 1945.

O. Sargent, on May 6, added in handwriting: "I rather doubt if this would be desirable."

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Materials for this appendix are contained in PRO, F.O. 371-48865 R7730/130/92 dated beginning with 1st May, through June 1945. After office minutes written by J.M. Addis, D. Howard, and others, contained on pp. 155-167, Sir O. Sargent made a draft minute to the Prime Minister as follows (p. 162):

Prime Minister.

Disposal of Mihailovic.

Last November H.M. Embassy in Washington was instructed to attempt to reach with the State Department an agreed policy on what should be done with Mihailovic if he fell into Allied hands. Our view then was that Mihailovic should not be handed over to the Yugoslav Government but should be given an asylum, preferably in the United States. Despite several reminders, the State Department have never expressed any view on this question.

2. Our views have now altered and we consider that we may be obliged to deliver Mihailovic to Tito, however distasteful that might be. If you agree, we propose to send the attached draft telegram to Washington. I enclose a copy of that circular note of 29th March to the Allied Govts. referred to in the draft tel.

After that JMA on May 14, added:

Bring up June 1st. Please keep file together as it is.

Over the file is written: Suspended. On pp. 163-164 is the draft of J.M.A. to H.M. Ambassador in Washington:

Despatched

My telegram No. 296 Saving [of March 28th: disposal of Mihailovic] You will have seen from Belgrade telegrams Nos. 558 [of March 1st] and 592 [of March 4th] that present whereabouts of Mihailovic are unknown and that conflicting reports are current. It is, nevertheless, a fair presumption that his intention will be to make his way to an area where he can surrender to British or American forces and avoid capture by Tito's troops. It therefore seems necessary to press the State Department to consider what should be done with Mihailovic if he falls into our hands.

2. Our views on this question have altered since despatch of my telegram No. 709 of November 15th last. We now consider that it would be difficult to resist a request from the Yugoslav Government that he should be handed over for trial. It seems possible that the Yugoslav Government would be able to produce such a *prima facie* case against Mihailovic of having committed "war crimes" in the strict, international law sense of the term, such as might oblige us to deliver him for trial in accordance with the Moscow Declaration of 1st Nov 1943. In any case, it seems certain that the Yugoslav Government will be able to make a *prima facie* case of treason against him; it has been our general practice to allow Allied Governments to take over their quislings and traitors whom we capture, and we have confirmed this in the circular note of 29 March copied to you in my desp. No. 602 of April 10. Moreover, so much evidence of collaboration with the enemy on the part of Mihailovic's subordinate commanders has accumulated during the last nine months that we consider that we should on this score be under an obligation to deliver Mihailovic to justice, even though the Yugoslav version of justice which Mihailovic is likely to experience is extremely distasteful to our own ideas.

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3. If Mihailovic is captured by Tito's troops, we do not think that any intervention on our part with the Yugoslav Government would serve a useful purpose.

4. The foregoing are our preliminary views for submission to the State Department, who should be given a copy of the circular note of 29 March referred to above. We still consider it important that U.S. Government and ourselves should, if possible, adopt an identical line on this question.

(The brackets are in original.)

The pages 165-166 contain the following J.M.A. draft to H.M. Ambassador, Washington:

Despatched

My telegram No. 296 Saving (of March 28th: disposal of Mihailovic). It will probably not be long now before we and the U.S. Government have to decide what action to take if Mihailovic either surrenders to the American or British forces or is captured by Tito's forces and tried as a traitor or conceivably as a war criminal. You will see from Belgrade telegram No. 558 [of May 1st] that there are conflicting reports that Mihailovic has moved to the Montenegrin coast and that he has gone to

Istria. If the former report is correct, it may be that he intends to attempt to cross to Italy and surrender to us; but if he has in fact gone to Istria it is on the whole more likely that he will be captured by Tito's forces. You will also see from the same telegram that General Velebit, who should know, thinks that Mihailovic will certainly be shot if he is caught by the Yugoslavs.

2. We still consider that the main responsibility for deciding what should be done with Mihailovic in the event of his surrender to us should rest with the U.S. Government, as stated in my telegram No. 9996 [of November 23rd] and we shall be prepared to support a decision to give him asylum in the United States. If, on the other hand, Mihailovic should be captured by the Yugoslavs and tried as a traitor or possibly as a war criminal, we consider that H.M.G. and the U.S.G. should make a joint appeal to the Yugoslav Government to exercise mercy, although in present circumstances such an appeal would certainly be unheeded.

3. I realize that this is not a good moment to press the State Department to make up their minds on this difficult question, but I hope that nevertheless you will make an attempt to elicit an expression of opinion from them.

(The brackets are in original.)

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APPENDIX II

The following document is registered in the PRO as F.O. 30240 xc/A 59853.

Communicated by G Laffan 7/2 CN

YUGOSLAV CLAIMS ON CERTAIN ITALIAN TERRITORIES I. Summary.

This memorandum is concerned to show the Yugoslav ethnic claims and how far they could reasonably be satisfied by frontier revision and finally exchange of populations. It does not take account of such considerations as British policy in regard to Italy or the possibility of any supra-national organization in Europe after the present war.

Yugoslavia can put forward claims, based on the principle of nationality, to certain Italian territories. These territories are the whole of the former Austrian Coastland (Gorizia-Gradisca, Trieste and Istria), except the plain from Monfalcone westwards, the urban district of Trieste, and the western coast of Istria; and also the strip of former Carniola annexed by Italy after the World War. To these claims can be added a further claim to the cities of Zara and Fiume which are Italian enclaves isolated in Yugoslav-inhabited territory, and the islands of Cherso, Lussin and Lagosta, in only one of which (Lussin) was there an Italian majority in 1910.

For the nationality numbers, the Austrian and Hungarian census figures of 1910 have been accepted as approximately accurate. The Italian census of 1921 accentuated the Italian character of the districts given as Italian in 1910, but did not alter the national characters of the various districts annexed by Italy. The published Italian official sources have not given nationality figures later than those for 1921.

The main difficulties encountered in any attempt to adjust the Italo-Yugoslav frontier *in accordance with nationality* are (1) the city of Trieste, which is Italian in culture and economic life, which is surrounded by Yugoslav-inhabited territory, and which is, or could be, of the greatest economic importance to a wide area of Central Europe. It is suggested (on the general principle of the less change of frontier, the less human misery) that Trieste should remain Italian. (2) The coast-line of western Istria, which is also Italian, but isolated by a Yugoslav hinterland. A frontier closely corresponding to the ethnic line would be quite possible, but it would cut off Pola from good railway connection with Trieste and leave too few Yugoslavs in Italy for purposes of final exchange of populations. The frontier in Istria could be drawn, to the advantage of Italy, approximately along the 'Wilson Line' of April 14th, 1919. (3) With regard to the city of Gorizia, it is a nice question whether it should be united to its Yugoslav-inhabited hinterland or left to Italy. The decision between the two alternatives appears to depend on whether an ethnic or an economic frontier conduces better to peace. The upper Isonzo valley north of Gorizia is purely Slovene. If it is attributed to Yugoslavia, its economic interest would demand the similar attribution of Gorizia and a frontier which made possible a railway, within Yugoslavia, from Gorizia to the sea at Fiume. But Gorizia is an Italian city. The ethnic principle, as well as Italian strategic considerations, would demand that the frontier should run north of Gorizia and of the railway-line Gorizia — St. Daniele. The Upper Isonzo valley would be hard hit by separation from Gorizia, but it would have railway connection with the rest of Slovenia. On the whole it seems better to leave Gorizia to Italy.

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Italy's treatment of her Yugoslav subjects has been a conspicuous example of forcible denationalization, probably more rigorous even than that of her Austrians in South Tirol. It might be said that Italy has forfeited the right to rule these Yugoslavs any longer.

It is suggested, accordingly, that the Yugoslav frontier could be advanced to the pre-1918 Austro-Italian frontier, turning eastwards north of Gorizia and St. Daniele and then southwards to the mouth of the Arsa; that all territories and islands to the north and east of that line could be attributed to Yugoslavia; that, after the establishment of such frontier revision, there could be an exchange of populations, on a voluntary basis; that the existing rights of Hungary in the port of Fiume should be safeguarded.

II. Argument.

A. The rival claims at the Peace Conference

After the close of hostilities in November, 1918, the Italians occupied the Austrian territories, which by the Treaty of London, of the 26th April, 1915, were to be attributed to Italy, i.e. Gradisca-Gorizia; Trieste; Istria (except a narrow strip north-west of Fiume and the island of Krk-Veglia); a strip of Carniola, including Idria, Adelsberg and St. Peter; and Dalmatia north-west of Trogir-Trau, with most of the Dalmatian islands. This Italian action was probably the most effective cause of the rapid union of the Yugoslav peoples into one State.

At the Peace Conference the Italians claimed all the territory thus occupied, and added claims to further strips of Istria and Carniola on strategic grounds, and Fiume on the ground of nationality. The Yugoslavs rejected the argument based on the Treaty of London on the ground that the Treaty assumed the continued existence of the Habsburg Monarchy, which had in fact vanished. They based their counter-claims on the principle of nationality, to which expression had been given in President Wilson's 9th Point¹ and in the Pact of Rome, of the 10th April, 1918.² Accordingly they claimed the whole of Gorizia-Gradisca (except the lowlands of Monfalcone and Gradisca), Trieste and Istria, and *a fortiori* Fiume and the whole of Carniola and Dalmatia.

1. Point 9 ran 'A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality'. The Italian Premier, Signor Orlando, stated on the 1st May, 1919, that he had taken exception to Point 9 during the Allied discussions which preceded President Wilson's reply to the German Government on the 5th November, 1918. As Point 9, however, was irrelevant to negotiations with Germany, he had been persuaded not to press the matter. No pre-armistice agreement was made with Austria or Hungary; and consequently Signor Orlando had no opportunity to express his reservation of Point 9. When at last he made public his secret reservation (on the 1st May, 1919), Italy had long been held guilty of rejecting the Wilsonian principles after having solemnly accepted them.

2. The Pact of Rome consisted of a declaration issued by the 'Congress of oppressed nationalities' held at Rome in April, 1918, and enthusiastically welcomed by Signor Orlando. The Pact contained four clauses which embodied an earlier agreement, signed in London on the 7th March, 1918, by Signor Torre, head of the Italian Parliamentary Committee for Italo-Yugoslav agreement, and Dr. Trumbic, President of the Yugoslav Committee. The relevant portions of the Pact ran: 'The representatives of the Italian people and those of the Yugoslav people

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(6) undertake to decide . . . the pending territorial questions on the basis of the principle of nationalities and of the right of peoples to dispose of their own destinies, and that so as not to prejudice the vital interests of the two nations . . .

(7) to those groups of one people who shall find themselves included within the frontiers of the other shall be recognized and guaranteed the right of seeing their language, their culture, and their moral and economic interests respected.' (Tem-perley, History of the Peace Conference, Vol. V, Appendix III, iii, l.)

Thus, after deducting the uncontested districts of Monfalcone and Gradisca (to Italy) and Krk-Veglia (to Yugoslavia), there remained a large contested area.

If the principle of nationality were to be applied to this area, the only available figures were those of the Austrian and Hungarian census of 1910, based on the language of habitual use. Both Italian and Yugoslav writers have attacked those figures as unfavourable to their respective nations. There are grounds, however, for confidence in the figures. As to Dalmatia and Carniola the figures were not seriously disputed by anyone of repute. In the Austrian Coastland the Austrian authorities would not have had cause continuously to favour one side more than another; and it is remarkable that the proportionate figures for 1900 hardly differ from those of 1910, with the one exception that the percentage of Slovenes in Trieste had risen from 16.34 in 1900 to 29.81 in 1910 (even in this case it may be pointed out that the percentage was 20.47 in 1890, and that in a large port, where business was done in Italian or German, figures based on the language of habitual use were unlikely to favour the Slovene tongue). Confidence may, therefore, be placed in the figures; with the possible exception of Fiume, where Hungarian policy had long favoured the Italianization of the city.

On the basis of the census figures for 1910, the contested area contained (to the nearest thousand) — 321,000 Italians, and 756,000 Yugoslavs

B. The 'Wilson Line'

President Wilson attempted to effect a compromise in his memorandum of the 14th April, 1919. Admitting the Italian character of the cities of Trieste and Gorizia and of Pola and the other Italianate towns of western coast of Istria, he attributed them to Italy, together with so much of Istria as should safeguard to Italy the railway-line from Pola to Trieste, and the whole province of Gorizia-Gradisca on the ground that the destiny of its inhabitants was 'naturally linked, by the very nature of the country, with the destiny of the Italian population'. To Yugoslavia he attributed eastern Istria and its islands and the whole of Dalmatia and its islands (except Lissa), on the ground of their overwhelmingly Yugoslav ethnic character.' As to Fiume, he argued that, remote from any Italian-inhabited territory and serving the economic needs of the Danubian lands, it should be endowed with autonomy, as an international port within the customs area of Yugoslavia.

Of the contested area the 'Wilson Line' would have attributed to Italy (to the nearest thousand) — 270,000 Italians, 346,000 Yugoslavs.

And to Yugoslavia — 27,000 Italians, 386,000 Yugoslavs. And to Fiume — 24,000 Italians, 24,000 Yugoslavs.

President Wilson's intervention caused the temporary departure of the Italian delegation from Paris; and no solution of the Italo-Yugoslav dispute was achieved by the Peace Conference.

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1. The small and remote island of Pelagosa has been retained by Italy. It is believed that its continued retention by Italy would encounter no criticism.

C. The Settlement

Direct negotiations, however, between the two disputants resulted in the Treaty of Rapallo, 12th November, 1920. Both parties made considerable sacrifices. Italy abandoned her claim to Dalmatia, only retaining the islands of Lagosta and Pelagosa and the city of Zara. Yugoslavia abandoned her claims to the Austrian Coastland and its islands of Cherso and Lussin and to the strip of Carniola. Both parties surrendered their claims to Fiume, which was to form a small independent State. Thus Italy renounced the popular Italian doctrines that the medieval Venetian rule of the Dalmatian towns had made that province for ever Italian and that Fiume was a most Italian city; a renunciation which considerably assisted the rise of

Fascismo in Italy. And Yugoslavia abandoned to Italy nearly half a million Croats and Slovenes, a decision which contributed to the bitterness felt against Belgrade in the former Austro-Hungarian provinces of Yugoslavia. The Free City of Fiume had a troubled existence for three years; and then by the Treaty of Rome, of 27th January, 1924, Italy annexed the city and a narrow strip of coast joining the city to Italy, while Yugoslavia annexed Fiume's eastern suburb of Susak and the Baross harbour. Fiume was thus left Italian, but separated by the adjacent Yugoslav frontier from any hinterland, her trade being diverted either to Susak or to Trieste.

By these two treaties the contested area was divided. Italy was confirmed in the possession of territories which in 1910 had been inhabited by (approximately): 318,000 Italians and 488,000 Yugoslavs.

And Yugoslavia received territories which in 1910 had been inhabited by (approximately): 3,000 Italians and 268,000 Yugoslavs.

D. The settlement a violation of the principle of nationality

This division of territory violated the principle of nationality to the disadvantage of Yugoslavia. In 1910 the ethnographical line between the two nationalities was singularly clear and definite. In Gorizia-Gradisca the two lowland districts of Gradisca and Monfalcone were overwhelmingly Italian and were not contested by Yugoslavia. In the city of Gorizia, without its suburbs, there were 14,812 Italians and 10,868 Yugoslavs. In the whole of the rest of Gorizia-Gradisca there were 3,137 Italians and 137,520 Yugoslavs. The whole province, north and east of Gorizia, was solidly Slovene.

In Trieste the Italians numbered 118,959, and the Yugoslavs (nearly all Slovenes) 59,319. There were also 11,856 Germans, 779 others, and 38,597 aliens, largely Italians of Italy. The business of the city was mainly in Italian or German hands.

In Istria (less Krk-Veglia, which was uncontestedly Yugoslav) there were 145,973 Italians and 203,756 Yugoslavs. But the dividing line was tolerably clear. Seven districts along the west coast of Istria contained 104,766 of the Italians and only 46,466 of the Yugoslavs. In all the rest of Istria there were only 41,973 Italians (of whom 9,884 were in the islands of Cherso and Lussino) and 167,290 Yugoslavs.

In the cities of Fiume and Zara there were clear Italian majorities, with a cultural and economic superiority over the Yugoslavs.

It will be seen that the coastal strip from the pre-1918 Italian frontier to the southern extremity of Istria, together with the isolated cities of Fiume and Zara, was overwhelmingly

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Italian by nationality, while all the remainder of the contested territory was as overwhelmingly Yugoslav.

Why then did Italy insist on a settlement so ethnically unjust to the Yugoslavs? For four reasons. (1) The basic assumption was that Trieste must be Italian. (2) Strategic. The clear ethnic line would have brought the Yugoslav frontier to the hills immediately dominating the eastern border of the Venetian plain, the city and gulf of Trieste, the western Istrian coast and Fiume, and would have separated Fiume from Italy by both mainland territory and islands. (3) Economic. Italy desired to make sure of a second railway line from Trieste to Gorizia (and thence to Udine and Austria) and the lines from Trieste to Pola and to Fiume; and to obtain the quicksilver mines of Idria, the second richest in the world. Also the economic life of the Slovene population of the Austrian Coastland had been bound up with Trieste and Gorizia. (4) Nationalist. There was an ill-informed tradition, widespread in Italy, that Gorizia-Gradisca, Istria and Fiume (not to mention Dalmatia) were historically and ethnically Italian. The sacrifice of almost purely Yugoslav Dalmatia and the long haggling over Fiume were hard for Italian opinion to bear. The renunciation of any part of the Austrian Coastland would have evoked uncontrollable fury in Italy.

E. The condition of the Yugoslavs in Italy since 1919

Of these Yugoslavs it may be said that the Croats were, speaking generally, on a lower economic and cultural level than their Italian neighbors, but that, except in Trieste itself, the Slovenes had a higher standard of literacy than the Italians, and had developed strong economic and literary organisations. The Italian census of 1921 very naturally showed considerably increased figures for the Italians, especially where they had already been in the majority in 1910; but did not substantially change the territorial distribution of the Italian and Yugoslav majorities.

In the years immediately after the war, some of the most exalted personages in Italy assured the Yugoslav minority of generous consideration for its nationality. But Italy never assumed any international obligation in the matter except as regards the Yugoslav *nationals* in Zara and Fiume. In those two urban districts persons who opted for Yugoslav nationality were given the same rights as the optants for Italian nationality in Dalmatia (by the Treaty of St. Margherita, 1922, in respect of Zara, and by the Nettuno agreements, 1925, in respect of Fiume). These rights included those of the free use of the Serbo-Croat language in religion and in legal documents, of the maintenance of schools and welfare institutions, and of the free pursuit of professions and trade. All the remaining Yugoslavs annexed to Italy had, as such, no rights.

Three stages can be discerned in the treatment of these Yugoslavs, (a) 1918-1923 (b) 1923-1929 (c) 1929 - .

(a) The Italian Government accorded to its Yugoslavs most of the rights attributed elsewhere to minorities by treaty; but failed to protect them from mob violence. Of 531 Yugoslav primary schools, 149 were suppressed. Of seven Yugoslav secondary schools, four were suppressed. Yugoslavs enjoyed the use of their own language in dealing with legal tribunals, and their economic and cultural organizations survived. Five Slovene and two Croat deputies were elected to Parliament in 1921, despite terrorization in Istria, which elicited protests from the Italian Bishop of Trieste and Pope Benedict XV. On the other hand many Yugoslav priests were expelled from the country and several communities of religious were suppressed; and the Yugoslav clergy and publishing offices were the special object of unofficial terrorization.

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(b) Italian policy changed after 1922. All Slav place-names gave way to Italian in official publications, maps, time-tables, post-cards, etc. Decrees of 1926 and 1927 ordered the italianization of family names officially held to be corruptions of

Italian originals. In 1928 Slav Christian names were forbidden. Between 1923 and 1930 all Yugoslav primary and secondary schools were suppressed. The teaching of Slovene in the home was forbidden. By 1929 all the Yugoslav periodicals had been suppressed. In 1925 Yugoslavs were deprived of the use of their language in legal procedure. With the nomination of Italian officials as mayors, even village affairs had to be conducted in Italian. Of 300 Yugoslav cultural and welfare associations all were suppressed in 1927-8. Under the Fascist regime there have been no Yugoslav deputies in Parliament. Thus the Yugoslavs were left with no expression of their nationality; except in matters of religion, thanks to the stubborn support which they received from Mgr. Sedej, the Slovene Archbishop of Gorizia, and of Mgr. Fogar, the Italian Bishop of Trieste.

(c) By the Concordat of 1929 the Holy See sacrificed the Yugoslavs of Italy. Henceforth every parish priest had to be an Italian subject and to speak Italian. The catechism was to be taught in Italian. The Slavonic liturgy (which had survived among the Croats) was suppressed. Neither the Slovene nor the Croat language might be used in church. The last Yugoslav religious house, that of the Lazarists near Trieste, was suppressed in 1935.

It may be true that the Italian Government has improved the material conditions of life of the poorer class of Yugoslavs. It is certainly true that that Government has attempted systematically to stamp out Yugoslav nationality in Italy.

The fate of the Yugoslavs in Italy has been bitterly resented by the Croats and Slovenes of Yugoslavia, amongst whom the organisations and newspapers of the Yugoslav emigrants from Italy have flourished; but the Government of Belgrade, with its eyes on other, more Serbian, interests, has avoided raising the issue. With the rise of the Axis to power, Yugoslav official policy has even been one of friendship with Italy, a sentiment emphatically rejected by Yugoslav public opinion. In the summer of 1940 the Government was even constrained to dissolve the societies of Yugoslav emigrants from Italy.

It is remarkable, however, that the intensity of this national question has not prevented Italy from being the chief, or second largest, customer of Yugoslavia between 1920 and 1940, except during the period affected by sanctions.

F. Final considerations and conclusions

It is impossible to state how successful the Italian authorities have been in suppressing the national sentiments of their Yugoslavs. An observer stated in 1930 that nearly a quarter of the Yugoslavs had left Italy. But it seems improbable that their sense of nationality could have been eliminated in eighteen years. And the injuries done to these Yugoslavs call for remedy.

The precedent established by the German Reich, of taking the 1910 census figures as the basis for frontier revision in Bohemia-Moravia, might justify a similar use of those figures in the present case. But it is to be hoped that in this case Italians, encouraged by the Italian Government to settle in the Yugoslav-inhabited territory, would receive compensation should they be extruded as a result of frontier revision.

The problem of the Yugoslavs in Italy is not to be solved merely by exchange of populations, since the Italians at present in Yugoslavia are negligible in number (not more than 8,000 by the census of 1910).

1. C. Bakker van Bosse, *Les Minorites Nationales*, Vol. III, No. 1. January, 1930.

APPENDIX II

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Frontier revision on ethnic lines, were they the only consideration, would be exceptionally easy; as has been shown. Such revision would leave to Italy a strip of coast, of varying breadth, from the pre-1918 frontier to the southern point of Istria, and containing Monfalcone, Gradisca, Gorizia, Trieste, Rovigno and Pola. All the rest of the former Austrian Coastland would be attributed to Yugoslavia.

But there are other considerations. The valley of the upper Isonzo, in 1921 solidly Slovene, is economically centered on Gorizia, where the Italians are in the majority. Gorizia might, on economic grounds, also be attributed to Yugoslavia. If that be considered undesirable (on ethnic grounds and on the ground that the fewer changes, the less the sum of human misery), then the frontier could be placed slightly north of Gorizia and of the railway-line Gorizia-St. Daniele-Trieste. In either case the upper Isonzo valley would be linked by railway with Yugoslavia and in either case Trieste would enjoy a double-track railway connection with Udine and Austria. In Istria, the railway-line Pola-Trieste traverses Yugoslavia-inhabited territory. In this case the advantage of linking Pola and Trieste and the cultural superiority of Italy over Yugoslavia may be held to outweigh the national sentiments of the local Yugoslavs (about 100,000), who are not too numerous to be exchanged against the Italians of Eastern Istria, Zara, Fiume, Dalmatia and the Istrian islands. The frontier in Istria might approximately follow the 'Wilson Line' from the mouth of the Arsa, northwards to a point slightly east of St. Daniele.

Strategically, this revision of the frontier would bring Yugoslavia dangerously near to Trieste and render the position of the Italian part of Istria precarious in the event of an Italian-Yugoslav war. The weight of this argument depends on the post-war settlement of

Europe.*

Beyond the former Austrian Coastland lie Fiume, Zara and the islands. It is submitted that the Italian enclave of Fiume is unjustifiable on any principle except that of the national sentiment of a few thousand citizens. If the above suggestions were adopted, Fiume would be isolated in Yugoslav territory. Fiume might, therefore, be attributed to Yugoslavia subject to the reservation to Hungary of at least that country's existing facilities in the port. The even more remote Italian enclave at Zara, which is isolated, without railway connection or any trade with its hinterland, might also be attributed to Yugoslavia. Of the islands, the only one with an Italian majority in 1910 was Lussino. But the life of Lussino is closely bound up with that of the island of Cherso, with which indeed it is joined by a bridge. Lussino therefore, together with Lagosta, might be attributed to Yugoslavia, the Italian islander being exchanged against Croats of central Istria.

The effect of the proposed alterations would be (1) to make Yugoslav the whole of the Quarnero, its coasts and islands, in accordance with the words of Dante, quoted by Mazzini in 1871: "... a Pola dentro del Quarnero, Ch Italia chiude e i suoi termini bagna",** (2)

* A more ethnically correct frontier could be drawn, giving Pinguente and Pisino to Yugoslavia; but leaving to Italy the main railway line from Pola to Cantanaro, whence a railway could be built to Montona to join the Parenzo-Montona-Pirano-Trieste railway. But such a railway, which may already exist, appears a poor substitute for the main-line. A more important point is

that such a change of frontier would leave too few Yugoslavs in Italy for equitable exchange against the Italians of the territories attributed to Yugoslavia. ** *Scritti*, XVI, 143.

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to 'redeem' most of the Slovene territory in Italy though depriving it of connection with Trieste (and also perhaps Gorizia), (3) to leave a small minority of Slovenes in Trieste (and perhaps Gorizia), who might be exchanged against Italians recently intruded into the territory north of Trieste, (4) to exchange about 100,000 Yugoslavs of central and western Istria against the Italians of Fiume, Zara, Eastern Istria, the islands and Dalmatia;*** thus leaving no Italians in Yugoslavia and no Yugoslavs in Italy. Since the difficulty arises that most of the Italians concerned are engaged in maritime and urban occupations and most, but not all, of the Yugoslavs in agriculture, it is suggested that the exchange of populations should be voluntary, but that the minorities of both sides should be warned that they will receive no 'minority privileges' should they refuse to be exchanged.

It is to be remembered that, should any of the territories under discussion be attributed to Yugoslavia, the federal constitution, which is in process of being applied to that country, will ensure that such territories come under the administration not of the somewhat 'Balkan' Serbians, but of the much more 'European' authorities of Ljubljana and Zagreb.

Should any revision of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier be made on the ground of nationality, equity would seem to require that some similar revision should be made, e.g. on the Hungarian and Albanian frontiers, to Yugoslavia's disadvantage.

Foreign Research and Press Service, 5th February, 1941.

Balliol College,
Oxford.

The number of Italians now resident on the east coast of Istria, in Fiume, Cherso and Lussin, cannot be estimated from available material, owing to the changes of administrative districts as well as the absence of nationality figures.

APPENDIX II Rough Sketch Map

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CA/t //VTn/4

ITALY

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APPENDIX III

The following document is registered in the PRO as F.O. 371/30208 xc/A 59853

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

R.3377/G.

[Cypher].

SPECIAL (EDEN).

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO SECRETARY OF STATE (AT ATHENS) No. 695.

D. 10.45 p.m. 2nd April, 1941.

April 2nd, 1941. Repeated to Belgrade No. 472.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Passage might be on the following lines:-

Begins: German intrigues to break up the unity of the three nations which form the Yugoslav Kingdom are bound to fail. We know that this time the Germans are not faced with people like the unhappy Slovaks who after a thousand years of slavery and twenty years of freedom, all too short for the formation of national consciousness, allowed a band of traitors to sell them back to their former masters.

We know the Serbs. They were our Allies in the last war and their armies are covered with glory, and we know also the military history of the Croats and Slovenes, who for centuries were the bulwark of Christianity; and whose fame as warriors spread far and wide on the continent.

One of the finest episodes in the history of Croatia is the one, when in the sixteenth century, long before the French Revolution, the peasants rose to defend the rights of man, and fight for those principles which centuries later gave the world democracy.

The Yugoslav peoples are above all democrats, and far too intelligent to think that, now that the Italians have been defeated, it is possible for Germany to beat England and her backer America. The sailors of Croatia and Dalmatia understand only too well the importance of Sea Power in this war. They know that since our recent victory over the Italians our ships and planes can reach their coasts. The Adriatic once the scene of conflict between the ancient kings of Croatia and Venice, and later in the war against the Turkish pirates, will become, not the Italian lake which Mussolini desired, but the sea of Yugoslavia.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

SPECIAL (EDEN)

FROM BELGRADE TO SECRETARY OF STATE (AT ATHENS)

Mr. Campbell

D. 3.00 a.m. 4th April, 1941.

No. 289

R. 10.25 a.m. 4th April, 1941.

3rd April, 1941. Repeated to FOREIGN OFFICE No. 625

Your telegram No. 133 and Foreign Office telegrams Nos. 694 and 695 to Athens.

My observations are as follows:

1. Our readiness to advocate, at peace settlement, Yugoslavia's claim to Istria is likely to appeal more to the Slovenes than to the Croats.

APPENDIX III

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5.30 p.m. 3rd April, 1941. 12.15 a.m. 4th April, 1941.

2. My latest information (see my telegram No. 281 and Zagreb telegram No. I to Athens) is that the Croat [grp. omitted: ? question] has now been settled.

3. If any declaration on lines proposed is made it should be made in such a way as not to seem to be an attempt to push Croatia or Yugoslavia into war.

4. Subject to 3, I see no harm in the statement being made on lines proposed.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher]

SPECIAL (EDEN)

FROM BELGRADE TO SECRETARY OF STATE (AT ATHENS)

Mr. Campbell.

No: 281.

April 3rd, 1941.

Repeated to Foreign Office

D:

No. 616.

R:

IMPORTANT.

CONFIDENTIAL.

According to X. full agreement has now been reached with Croats on internal questions which were under discussion.

Following decisions have been taken:-

1. A State Council will be set up consisting of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Marie Matchek and Professor Slobodan Jovanovic Council will in fact be a form of Regency.

2. Senate will be abolished.

3. A Parliament will be summoned its members being chosen by nomination.

(2). Matchek is expected in Belgrade tonight or tomorrow and a declaration will then be issued by the Government.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[Cypher]

SPECIAL (EDEN)

FROM BELGRADE TO ATHENS

Mr. Campbell

No. 283

April 3rd, 1941.

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 619

Cairo No. 241

Angora No. 217

SECRET.

D. 12. midnight. 3rd April, 1941. R. 9.55 a.m. 4th April, 1941.

^otSr^ing the Present of the Councils reverts rented i grams Nos. 283, 285 and 286, I asked him about Yugoslav relations «*^ Italy. His Excellency informed me of the intended visit by Professor Jovan V.ce-President of the Council to Italy, adding that the Yugoslav Go—n to settle the basis for conversations (my telegram No. 280). The movt was policy of gaming time and of making it plain for internal purposes hat the taken ever, possible step to avoid war. The Croat hesitation had been due t
econd first

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new Government would follow a policy of adventure and provocation of Germany: they had been assured that this was not so, but that the policy would be one of peace and national security. They had now agreed therefore to join the Government. The Germans however were still working hard to separate the Croats from the Slovenes. He had told the Italian Minister that there could be no question of demobilization and no compromise over the attack on the zone of Salonika. There were unverified indications that Italy was urging Germany strongly not to attack Salonika because of the consequences for the Italians in Albania. As for relations with Germany, here again the Government were seeking to gain time and it was even possible that the Minister for Foreign Affairs might pay a visit there. But though the coup d'etat had thrown the Germans out of their stride, and it might take time for them to adapt themselves for action against Yugoslavia, Hitler was furiously angry and might bombard at once. Yugoslavia must however try to spin things out till she was ready. It was certain that the Yugoslav Government would stand firm. They were in office because the Yugoslav people demanded firmness and would permit nothing else.

2. I urged the great danger of engaging in conversations with the Axis Powers, but the President of the Council again emphasized the necessity to gain time from the military point of view, and from the internal, to show the Croats that everything possible was being done within the limits of Government's policy to maintain peace. I asked him what was the date up to which time must be gained for military purposes. He told me April 22nd. Half his concentrations were complete: the other half would not be finished until that date. I asked him whether he was convinced that Yugoslavia and not Germany

stood to gain most by gaining time and said that if the Germans had been thrown out of their stride and were not ready now it was certain that if given time they would be very ready indeed. I asked whether he knew of the movements of the German Alpine divisions (Military Attache's telegram No. 149), and whether he did not fear that they might be destined for transport to Albania in the next few days, in which case it seems that the Yugoslav army might well lose its chance of liquidating the Italians there. His Excellency said he had not heard about the Alpine divisions, though German troops were entering Italy to hold the country, (they were not destined for Africa). Anyhow the Yugoslav army could deal with the Germans and Italians in Albania easily enough. However, the British navy should take steps to control their passage between Italy and Albania: and as soon as the Yugoslav army was involved in war we should send as many aircraft as possible to help it. I said that I presumed he had dealt with the situation in the last matters in conversation with Mr. Preston. He said that he had, and that General Yankovic would be raising them at Fiorina.

3. The President of the Council seemed rather taken aback when I said that the decision to send Professor Jovanovic to Italy and the possibility of a visit to Germany by the Minister for Foreign Affairs would surprise His Majesty's Government to say the least of it, and that I would like to explain the Yugoslav reasons fully to them. He repeated the arguments of the need to gain time for military and for internal reasons.

4. My comments follow.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher]

SPECIAL (EDEN)

APPENDIX III

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D. 1.34 p.m. 4th April, 1941. R. 9.25 p.m. 4th April, 1941.

FROM BELGRADE TO ATHENS FOR SECRETARY OF STATE Mr. Campbell No. 290 4th April, 1941.

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 626 Angora No. 221 Cairo No. 247.

My telegram No. 283.

President of the Council spoke to me as if it were natural to assume that Yugoslavia, who was already on our side, would presumably be fighting with us. This does not mean that they would not welcome honourable neutrality if this were attainable: but I believe that General Simovitch at least considers a German attack almost inevitable. He entirely takes it for granted that His Majesty's Government will on the above basis not only understand the Yugoslav Government's efforts to gain time but will also trust them not to be led astray again by the Axis Powers but to resist firmly any attack or unreasonable demand.

2. I feel sure that the Yugoslav Government will stick to this present line until there is clear evidence of German aggressive intentions, and that no further arguments we can use will move them from it. The best means open to us of ensuring continuing firmness and resistance when the time comes is the use of propaganda to maintain feeling at a strength which will keep the Government up to the mark. But, however, ready the Croats may be to fight if Yugoslavia is invaded, differences of opinion may arise between them and the Serbs over what constitutes a German demand which requires rejection (at the risk of war) or an essentially protective measure (e.g., invasion of Albania or presence of troops in Yugoslavia itself). In these circumstances General Simovitch may prove unable to maintain unity in his cabinet and in the country at the critical moment but the support of the army and air force should stand him in good stead and there is in any case no one else in sight to take his place.

(Cypher).

SPECIAL (EDEN).

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO SECRETARY OF STATE (AT ATHENS).

No. 694.

D. 9.30 p.m. April 2nd, 1941.

April 2nd, 1941.

Repeated to Belgrade No. 471.

We are not yet aware whether the Croat difficulty has been settled (see Zagreb telegram repeated to us No. 18 A giving Matchek's conditions) but until it is, it appears that the president of the Council is unable to secure the agreement of his Government to any form of binding obligation (paragraph 4 of Belgrade telegram to Athens No. 269). Do you think it would be useful to make some special mention of the Croats in any broadcast which may be made in the near future by Minister of the Crown? The lines of a possible passage are contained in my immediately following telegram.

2. You will recall the discretion granted to Mr. Campbell in paragraph 1 (b) of your telegram from Cairo to Belgrade No. 122 to give assurances that we would advocate Yugoslavia's claim to Istria at the peace settlement. We are not aware of the precise use Mr. Campbell made of that discretion and it might be useful to repeat these assurances to the new government to be passed on to the Croat leaders. At the same time it might have a useful effect upon Croat public opinion to make now and publicly in this country a sympathetic reference to this claim. If you agree perhaps you would consult Mr. Campbell and let us know your views.

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APPENDIX IV

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APPENDIX V

APPENDIX V

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The following document is registered in the PRO as: W.O. 170/4982 xc/A 59852

WAR DIARY

or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Unit 3rd Bn Welsh Guards

Commanding Officer: Lt Col R.C. ROSE PRICE, DSO

Month and Year: May 1945

Place: VILLACH

Date: 8

Further details were received as to general layout and organisation of the town. Five installations were to be guarded and 7 rd blocks to be found SE of the town with orders to impound all German civilians and cars, checking of all newcomers into the town and preventing all German civilians leaving the town. An exhausting day. Listened to Kings and Prime Minister's speech.

Date: 9

Hour: 1000

CO inspects Barracks and finds that it contains an enormous amount of equipment, forage and food stock. Layout of camp was adjusted by CO's conference to Coy Comds, 21Cs and staff on miscellaneous points. Visit from Bde Comd followed by VE dinner for all officers in Offrs Mess.

Date: 10

Busy day getting all op commitments sorted out, distributing huge stores of booty, wine and butter, etc., further conferences.

Hour: 2330

Orders received that two Coys were to establish themselves at ROSEGG 0249 just South of the WORTHER SEE and control the TITO movement over the R. DRAU. 1 and 2 Coys and Carrier PI were detailed for this task.

Date: 11

Hectic night. Tac HQ, 1 and 2 Coys and Sec Carrier PI moved off 1000 hrs after Bde Comd conference. 3 and 4 Coys remain behind doing rd blocks and installation duty. Bde Comd conference held in Barracks I 100 hrs. Occupation bdys and areas given out to everyone satisfaction. WG on West, 1 Gds Bde in centre, Gren Gds on East, 1 WELCH Regt u/c 61 Inf Bde at KLAGENFURT.

Date: 11

1 Coy on arrival at ROSEGG established itself ST MICHAEL guarding Br over DRAU and Carrier PI formed a rd block at ST PETER and ST JACOB. That evening information received from 61 Bde that there had been some shooting in KLAGENFURT and that 1 Coy was to proceed there forthwith to quell this riot.

7 RB who had temporarily been given this task were relieved by 1 Coy.

Meanwhile at VILLACH news was received that commitments were to be handed over to

78 Div 1 100 hrs.

Order and Counter Order.

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Date: 12

1 Coy guards Cage VIKTRING and disarm and shepherd thousands of PsW of various nationalities. After considerable delay and friction Grenadiers were induced to relieve 1 Coy of its commitments by late p.m. 12 May. At VILLACH Inniskilling Coy arrived to take over installations from 4 Coy and Bn of Royal West Rents the rd blocks commitments from 3 Coy. Remainder of Bn i.e. Rear Bn HQ, 3 and 4 Coys moved to ROSEGG 0277. New area proved quite delightful. Bn HQ was situated in a large cream and green shuttered house owned by Prince Frederick Von LEICHTENSTEIN who at one time had been Military Attache at the Austrian Embassy in London. The country round about was thickly wooded and very lush and green and was in marked contrast to the sordidity of both ITALY and VILLACH.

1 Coy returned from VIKTRING commitments and moves into billets ST MICHAEL. Bn layout as follows:- 1 Coy as above.

2 Coy ST PETER, 3 and 4 Coys ST EGIDEN, Sp Coy UNTERJESERZ, Bn HQ SCHLOSS ROSEGG.

Place: ROSEGG Date: 13 Lovely day. Morning Service consisting of thanksgiving prayers held by Padre for all Coys.

p.m.

General scout round area and test of various luxuries i.e. Alfa Romeo Car and Motor

Speedboat that had recently been acquired from the enemy.

Date: 14

Very Fine. Bde Comd and BM, visit Bn and meet Prince Von Leichtenstein. Discussion held on boating areas on WORTHER SEE which was in dispute between 5 Corps and ourselves.

Date: 15

TITO tps become more active and more aggressive. Proclamation issued by TITO that CARINTHIA and GORITZA belonged to YUGOSLAVIA and that he claimed it on racial and martial grounds.

Hour: 1030 p.m.

GOC 6 Brit Armd Div, Bde Comd, BM and ADC visit Bn. Co and 2IC visit Gren Gds Drum concert at KLAGENFURT. 4 Coy provides a PI as guard to prevent crowds from surging forward. Great success. - especially appreciated by Russians. Capt. R.N. KJNG-ZETT goes on A.E.C. course, PERUGIA. Orders received that all enemy vehs to be handed in.

Date: 16

Hot and fine. Tp of mounted horse formed within Bn and 22 horses collected by 21C and Lt O.J.L. PUGH for this purpose from neighbouring Cossacks.

Quiet day. Sp Coy send Carrier PI to VELDEN to take over commitments there from RHA who move to KLAGENFURT.

Date: 16

Coys send bathing parties to WORTHER SEE.

Prince and Princess Von Leichtenstein come to dinner and meet BIO.

TITO incident which only proved to be mere "jeux de foie" but at the time seemed alarming with 25 pdr and mortar bombs bursting all too close.

APPENDIX V

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Date: 17

Misty morning. CO attends Bde conference.

Sp Coy ordered to move complete to VELDEN and PI of 2 Coy moved to ROSENBACH to guard Railway tunnel there to prevent trains coming over frontier from Yugoslavia to Austria.

p.m.

Coys send bathing parties to lake.

Situation deteriorates as far as TITS are concerned. TITS try and commandeer both food and billets in VELDEN and dispute comes to a head between OC Carrier PI and TIT Commander. CO asks for additional Tank Sp and DY despatched one Tp to VELDEN, one to ROSENBACH, one to ST PETER and one to ST. EGIDEN. 380 Croats arrived 2100 hrs ROSENBACH for evacuation to Yugoslavia as TIT PsW.

Date: 18

CO visits Coys. Fine morning.

1 Coy ordered to clear and look after 5,000 Croats and form a temporary PW Cage for all Croats in transit from local Cages to entraining areas MARIA ELEN and ROSENBACH.

Date: 19

Lovely day.

Evacuation of Croats begin. Order of most sinister duplicity received i.e. to send Croats to their foes i.e. TITS to Yugoslavia under the impression that they were to go to ITALY. TIT guards on trains hidden in guards van.

Date: 19

2,500 Croats evacuated from station MARIA ELEN by evening of 19 May.

No incidents between TITs and us.

Col REES of Austrian SIB dines.

Date: 20

Hour: 0930

Padre held Service Bn HQ. CO attends conference 61 Inf Bde HQ over billeting question.

2 Bn London Irish Rifles move to VELDEN without previous warning, under the impression that they were going to take over our Bn role. Result of conference satisfactory. LIR remain in VELDEN with orders to proceed West i.e. back to 78 Div area soonest and 3 WG retain their Bn commitments. 1 Coy evacuate 650 Croats from their cage at MULBACH and entrain them at MARIA ELEN.

Orders also received that all TITO tps were to leave present area and return to Yugoslavia by 1900 hrs 21 May. Failing this Op BEEHIVE would take place in which TITO tps would be forcibly ejected.

Date: 21

Evacuation of TITs proceed smoothly.

Capt P.R. LEUCHARS goes on leave.

Lt O.J.L. PUGH accompanies him as far as UDINE to cash letter of credit.

1 Coy remains at Cage MUHLBACH.

Date: 22

Wet and cold. Conference for CO, Bde HQ over Exercise. RATTING 1700 hrs followed by further conference for all. Coy comds at Bn HQ 1900 hrs.

The scope of Exercise RATTING was

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- (1) To carry out a house to house search for all German civilians and military personnel.
- (2) Collect all arms held by civilians.
- (3) Report the locn of all vehs held by civilians.
- (4) Arrest all German soldiers still at large.

Brigadier P. SCOTT, Comd 38 Inf Bde and DAA & QMG dine.

Date: 23

Exercise RATTING Part I takes place involving Sp, 1,3, & 4 Coys. The area cleared was from South of the WORTHER SEE to North of River DRAU. One sec Mounted Tp sent to ROSENBACH to carry out daily patrol to the YUGOSLAV frontier.

Lt-Col P.T. CLIFTON, DSO (Comd 3 Gren Gds), 21C and OC Sp Coy 3 Gren Gds dine.

Date: 24

Cold and wet. Bn has its first day off, free of operational roles.

Lt-Col J.E. GURNEY, DSO, MC visits Bn and stays the night.

Date: 25

Exercise RATTING Part II takes place.

Scope, the same as in Rattng Part I except area South of River DRAU to YUGOSLAV border cleared.

2, 3, & 4 Coys take part.

a.m.

CO attends conference at 3 Gren Gds.

Hour: 1100

Date: 26

Very wet day. Lt-Col J.E. GURNEY, DSO, MC leaves.

CO and IO leave to meet Div Comd, Bde Comd and CRA at HQ RA and spend day discussing and recceing area for OP COSSACK. 2IC, Adjt and Padre attend Welfare conference Bde HQ to discuss discipline, welfare and sports.

1 WELCH Regt relieve Sp Coy of MARIA ELEND PW Cage commitment and 2 Coy of their PI commitment ROSENBACH.

Hour: 1800

CO returns and gives out orders for Op COSSACK.

Date: 27

Op COSSACK starts re list of which is:

- (1) To concentrate and guard Cossack and German Offrs and ORs and transmit them to nearby station for further onward transmission to Russians.
- (2) To guard up to 6,000 horses.
- (3) To guard grooms looking after them.

'O'Gp and CO leave for GURK 225090 at 0800 hrs (35 miles North of KLAGENFURT). Padre holds morning service for 1 & 2 Coys. 3, 4 & Sp Coys move off for GURK.

Hour: 1230

Quiet afternoon for remainder of Bn.

At GURK and WEITENSFELD MR 149065, where Tac Bn HQ was established, all was activity. Orders were given out - 3 Coy to guard Cossack offrs and ORs cages, Sp Coy - German Offrs cage and 4 Coy Cossack grooms' cage and horse lines.

APPENDIX V

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As an additional embarassment news received that one German General and six other offrs had escaped, fortunately not from our charge.

Date: 28

Lts SCUDAMORE, PETTITT and SWINNERTON go on leave to PARIS.

Lovely day.

Cossack avalanche move into the various cages throughout the day and come under guard.

Extraordinary sight of a coin consisting of about 3,600 horses and waggonettes being driven along by squat cossacks singing and jingling along in a flurry of dust.

GOC held conference Tac Bn HQ and outlined the actions for the removal and disposal of Cossacks for the following day. Coys had a good time riding and poaching trout from an excellent nearby stream.

Div Comd held a large supper party.

Date: 29

WEITENSFELD. Rather trying day. Half of the Cossack offrs when they were informed that they were to embuss refused to as they had been tactlessly informed that they were going to RUSSIA. Thinking that their fate would be a desperate one they demanded to be shot or given firearms in lieu. By tactfui negotiation and timely display of a wasp flamethrower they were induced to get into the TCVs. Just as the coin was moving off a timely reprieve came from 5 Corps saying that they were found to be White Russians and were to be debussed and put back in their original cages again.

This caused widespread rejoicing as no one relished the idea of sending them to an uncertain fate in RUSSIA.

Date: 30

Overcast. Entrainment proceeded under guard from Gurk Station of all Cossack ORs disposed in three trains. This was completed without incident by 1500 hrs.
Co then returned, 3, 4 & Sp Coys following later leaving behind a party to guard the remainder of Cossack grooms and train guards.

Date: 31

Wet day. Remainder of 4 Coy return from WEITENSFELD after escorting remainder of Cossack ORs to WOLFSBERG.

/s/ RC Rose Price

Lt-Col.

Commanding 3rd Bn Welsh Guards

[Yugoslavia, Yugoslav is spelled in original: Yugo-Slavia, Yugo-Slav]

